Canadian military exports during 2006.

In July the Canadian government quietly released its latest report on military goods exports. It revealed that Canada exported military equipment worth $360.4-million to 68 states during 2006. Six of the recipient states were involved in armed conflict (and concomitant human fights violations) and for an additional five there were reputable reports of serious violations of human fights by state forces. However, the published detail is insufficient for a public assessment of the risks of specific transfers. In fact, the level of report transparency remains a major problem and this new publication is no improvement over the previous report in terms of detail.

Summary of findings

Breaking with a tradition of tabling reports on arms exports in Parliament, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT 2009) posted the report of 2006 arms exports to its website several weeks after the House of Commons rose in June. Previous reports have received little parliamentary attention, (1) but the timing of the latest release reduces even further the likelihood of parliamentary questions to the Foreign Affairs Minister.

At $360.4-million the total value of reported military goods exported from Canada during 2006 was greater than the 2005 total of $322-million but remained less than half the recent record peak of $723.5-million reported for 2005. The number of recipients increased to 68 from an average of 58 per year for the previous three years. As with prior reports, the military export data did not include exports to the US.

Following the pattern of earlier years, most reported military goods were shipped to a few major recipients. The five largest importers, in descending order, were the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Germany. The value of military goods shipped to these states totaled $209.5-million or 58 per cent of the reported value of all exports (see Table 1). In contrast, the shipment value for eight states was less than $10,000.

Canadian export control guidelines call for close control of military exports to countries "that are involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities" (DFAIT 2009, p. 2). Canada nevertheless shipped military goods valued at more than $100,000 to each of six states that were the sites of armed conflict during 2006, according to Project Ploughshares' Armed Conflicts Report 2007 (see Table 2).

Similarly, Canadian military goods worth $100,000 or more were exported to six additional states where there were reputable reports of serious and persistent human rights violations by state forces (see Table 3). Export guidelines call for close control of military goods and technology to governments with "a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population" (DFAIT 2009, p. 2).

Are international obligations being met?

According to this latest report (p. 3), the authorization of arms exports involves consultations with a wide range of DFAIT, Department of National Defence (DND), and other governmental experts and "each export permit application is assessed for its consistency with Canada's foreign and defence policies." This consultative, case-by-case approach to export authorization is advocated by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and states promoting negotiation of an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). They argue that an ATT must be based on obligations under international law and emerging international norms, and that state authorization must be preceded by an assessment of the risk that these laws or norms will be breached as the result of a particular arms transfer. Moreover, to create multilateral and public confidence in the implementation of an ATT, there should be sufficient transparency in state arms transfer reports that external observers can monitor whether authorities are appropriately assessing these risks.

The degree of transparency in Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2006 is insufficient. Like its predecessor for the three-year period 2003-2005, the latest report provides less detail on transfers than prior publications up to 2002. Whereas earlier reports distinguished among weapons systems, support systems, and parts and included descriptive detail such as "sporting firearms" or "small arms components," the latest reports omit this information. Instead, reported shipment values correspond to Export Control List groups that represent a broad range of equipment. At this level of detail it is not possible to ascertain the risks posed by the weapons shipments.

For example, the report lists $160,000 in shipments to Egypt of the Export Control List item 2-1. Item 2-1 contains "smooth-bore weapons with a caliber of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a caliber of 12.7 mm or less, and accessories" (DFAIT 2007, p. 52). From the data it is not possible to verify that the reported transfers are "firearms intended for sporting or other recreational use" that the report claims are "the bulk of reported firearms" (DFAIT 2009, p. 3). The goods could equally well be automatic firearms for military or police use. Clearly, more detail is needed to adequately assess the risk that the transferred weapons could be used in such breaches of international obligations as violations of human rights. (2)

The report has additional transparency failings, including "double-counted" figures that are assigned to two (or more) categories, making a determination of the real value of either category impossible. Most strikingly, as noted above, there is no figure for weapons shipments to the US even though the current report (DFAIT 2009, p. 7) notes that these "are estimated to account for over half of Canada's exports of military goods and technology." Indeed, according to Project Ploughshares estimates, Canadian arms sales to the US totaled $1.66-billion in 2006, (3) more than four times the total reported for all other states combined. Hence, by far the largest component of Canadian military exports is omitted, creating a major gap in transparency that obscures the full extent of Canada's role in the international arms trade.

Other failings and inconsistencies contribute to a general decline in reporting standards. Covering a calendar year that ended more than 30 months before, this report is less current than equivalent reports of many other arms-exporting states. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2009), as of July 2009--when the Canadian report was released--at least 20 states had reported details of their arms transfers during 2007. At least four of these states (Belgium, Estonia, Norway, and Switzerland) had also reported on their transfers during 2008.

Not for the first time, the detail of the report on military exports differs from data supplied by the Department of Foreign Affairs to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. During 2006 Canadian exports that fell in the categories of the UN Register included 160 armoured combat vehicles to Indonesia (noted as "bulldozer configuration") and one armoured combat vehicle to the United Arab Emirates. For the same period DFAIT reported no equivalent transfers (i.e., category 2-6, ground vehicles and components) to either country in the just released exports report.

However, Canadian military aid, including transfers of surplus equipment from DND, is not subject to the Export and Import Permits Act and export permits are not required. Since the report on military exports is compiled from permit data, the discrepancy could thus be accounted for. But this variation suggests that, even from the standpoint of reporting consistency, DND surplus equipment transfers should be included in the 2009 report as additional data. (4)

The 2006 report data records shipments of military goods included in Group 2 on the Export Control List, defined as "specially designed or modified for military use" (DFAIT 2009, p. 2). Goods and technology not on the Export Control List are not normally subject to export controls even, as the report notes, "if they are intended for sale to a military end-user" (DFAIT 2009, p. 2). Yet Canada regularly supplies civilian-certified equipment for military end-use. Table 4 offers examples of transfers during 2006 of aerospace equipment for military end-use reported by open sources. None of these "dual-use" exports appear in the latest report. If export authorization were required for such equipment the reported value of Canada's military exports would rise significantly.

The 2009 report on the export of military goods from Canada in 2006 is a minimal effort, maintaining the level of inadequate information on Canadian arms transfers found in the previous report. Important data is missing, muddled, inconsistent, or overlooked. In February 2009 Project Ploughshares met with Department of Foreign Affairs officials in Ottawa to review Ploughshares' "audit" of Canada's Report on Military Exports, 2003-2005. (5) At the time export controls officials agreed to consider recommendations for report improvements, but predicted that the report on 2006 exports would not likely reflect them. Their prediction proved correct. There is wide scope for the report on 2007 exports to do much better.

REFERENCES

Epps, Kenneth & Kyle Gossen. 2009. On the Record: An audit of Canada's report on military exports, 2003-2005. Waterloo: Project Ploughshares. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Control/ Audit2003-05MilitaryExports.pdf.

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 2007. A Guide to Canada's Export Controls. http://www.international.gc.ca/controlscontroles/ assets/pdfs/documents/exportcontrols2007-en,pdf.

--. 2009. Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2006. http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/ pdfs/military/documents/Military_Report2006-en.pdf.

Project Ploughshares. 2007a. The 2007 Armed Conflicts Report--a preview. The Ploughshares Monitor 28:2 (Summer), pp. 22-23. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monj07g.pdf.

--. 2007b. Selected Canadian military export contracts or deliveries reported during 2006. The Ploughshares Monitor 28:3 (Autumn), p. 20. http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/ mons07i.pdf.

Regehr, Ernie. 2009. Canada's Automatic Weapons Gift to Afghanistan: Were Canadian Military Export Regulations Followed? Project Ploughshares Briefing 09/2. http://www.ploughshares.ca/ libraries/Briefings/brf092.pdf.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2009. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. http://www.sipri.org/databases/ armstransfers.

--. 2009. National reports on arms exports, http://www.sipri. org/research/armaments/transfers/researchissues/transparency/ national reports.

United States Department of State. 2006. 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2006.

NOTES

(1.) An exception occurred in the Fall of 2007 when parliamentary questions were raised, not about report details but about an unprecedented delay in publication. The first ever multi-year report (for three years, 2003-2005) was released by the government two months later.

(2.) In some exceptional cases it is possible to comment on the risks of specific transfers because information is available from other sources. For example, the 2006 shipments of "ground vehicles and components," worth $26.5-million, to Saudi Arabia can be confirmed as transfers of armoured vehicles for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) on the basis of reports from several sources, including the company that manufactures the vehicles, General Dynamics Land Systems Canada. Since the purpose of the SANG is to protect the autocratic rulers of Saudi Arabia, there is a significant risk that the armoured vehicles will be used against opposition groups, including civilian protestors.

(3.) Project Ploughshares estimates Canadian arms transfers to the US from data obtained from the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) under the federal Access to Information process. The CCC is a crown corporation that brokers trade between foreign governments and Canadian exporters. About 60 per cent of its contracts are with foreign military agencies, chiefly the Pentagon.

(4.) For more discussion of the exemption of military aid from export control regulations see Regehr 2009.

(5.) See Epps & Gossen 2009.

Kenneth Epps is Senior Program Associate with Project Ploughshares.

Table 1: Largest five non-US recipients of Canadian military
goods during 2006

                                  Reported value
                                     of military
Recipient                        goods shipments

United Kingdom                       $80,151,594
Australia                            $51,804,263
Saudi Arabia                         $43,515,750
South Korea                          $18,374,365
Germany                              $15,605,755

TOTAL                               $209,451,727

Table 2: Canadian arms exports to states in armed conflict *

                                  Reported value
                                     of military
Recipient                        goods shipments

Algeria                                 $365,263
Colombia                              $1,177,088
India                                   $692,872
Israel                                  $994,653
Kenya                                   $165,119
Thailand                                $378,335

Additional source: Project Ploughshares 2007a

* Only states receiving more than $100,000 in Canadian
military goods during 2006 are included.

Table 3: Canadian arms exports to states with reported
serious human rights violations by state forces *

                                  Reported value
                                     of military
Recipient                        goods shipments

Brazil                                  $738,800
Egypt                                 $1,815,587
Indonesia                               $115,680
Saudi Arabia                         $43,515,750
South Africa                          $1,142,828

Additional source: US State Department 2006

* Only states receiving more than $100,000 in Canadian
military goods during 2006 are included.

Table 4: Examples of Canadian aerospace equipment
transferred for military end-use during 2006

                                 Military      Reported or
Equipment                        end-user      estimated value

PC-9 aircraft engine *           Chad          $1 million
NBeII-412 helicopter engines     Indonesia     $3 million
Diamond training aircraft *      Jamaica       $1 million
PC-9 aircraft engines *          Mexico        $2 million
Y-12 aircraft engines            Zambia        $4 million

* Reported as a military transfer by SIPRI 2009

Source: Project Ploughshares 2007b