Canada's NATO commitment: current controversies, past debates, and future issues: since the conflict in Kosovo, we can probably expect the familiar debates about Canada's involvement in NATO to continue, as issues of cost-effectiveness, democracy, and constructive engagement remain unresolved. (Perspective).

Although Canada has been a committed member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the alliance was founded in 1949, it has not greeted all NATO decisions with unalloyed pleasure, as the recent debate about enlargement and the controversy over NATO bombing of Kosovo and Serbia will attest. And we can probably expect yet another debate about Canada's commitment to NATO later this year because the foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, has promised to question NATO'S continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. There is also bound to be future dissension over whether the Allies should embrace such countries as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in a `second round of expansion.' While issues related to NATO expansion and the war in Kosovo have dominated the news lately, it might be useful to stand back and look at some past debates and possible future issues around Canada's NATO involvement since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war.

CURRENT CONTROVERSIES

Expansion could be a risky business

In the spring of 1999, before the war in Kosovo, NATO was preparing a party in Washington, DC, to mark its fiftieth anniversary. Celine Dion would sing, and NATO jet fighters would fly in formation overhead. Among the achievements to be celebrated was NATO's expansion from 16 to 19 members as it took in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the first round of enlargement. But the black ties and tuxedos were never unpacked, and the big party was cancelled in favour of a quiet meeting to discuss what might be done about the crisis in Kosovo.

Although every political party in Russia vigorously opposed NATO expansion, at the last moment, President Boris Yeltsin backed down. Nonetheless, the issue raised a great deal of controversy. Some NATO analysts in the West and in the East saw expansion as a regression to regional alliance formations and balance-of-power politics. Some even feared a return to the politics of containment, to the focus on military force, to collective defence, and possibly extended deterrence. Others saw it as a challenge to current efforts, under the United Nations (UN) for example, to co-ordinate security at lower levels of defence expenditure and worried lest the expansion of a regional collective defence organization would be at the expense of efforts to reform a universal collective security organization such as the UN. Still others saw that expansion could risk another security dilemma, that efforts to increase NATO security might lessen Russia's sense of security and possibly lead to greater tensions, maybe even to another arms race in a divided Europe. Others argued that NATO expansion would provide Russian nationalists with another excuse to turn back the clock and reverse reforms. Nonetheless, plans were made to expand.

Now that the first round of expansion has taken place, NATO policy-makers must forge a consensus among 19 allies - NATO officially runs by consensus, not majority vote - to decide who will be accepted in the `second round' of expansion. The risks that expansion could eventually lead Russia to move some of its conventional or nuclear arsenal into defensive positions along a newly defined border, along a new central front remain.

On just which countries to invite into NATO during the second round - Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, or Bulgaria - NATO policy-makers are ambiguous. Their ambiguity stems, in part, from concerns about the risk of undermining the credibility of article 5 of NATO, which I call the `three Musketeers' article because it guarantees that an attack against one is an attack against all. This is by far the most important article in NATO's founding treaty. For example, during the Kosovo debate, the fact that technically Serbia's president, Slobodan Milosevic, had not violated article 5 was raised as a salient point. Article 5 raises other troubling questions. For instance, if Hungary, now a NATO ally, were to be drawn into a war with Romania over Transylvania, an area over which the two countries have argued for centuries, would NATO automatically be involved? Both countries made a great effort to patch up their differences so that they would be invited into the NATO club. But a few years or decades from now, if an armed conflict should occur, as it has done between two other NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, would Canada be left in a quandary about its article 5 commitment? It is fair to say that NATO expansion is not entirely risk-free.

The War in Yugoslavia and the Debate at Home

Most recently, the Canadian government's strong support of NATO actions in Serbia and Kosovo during the war seemed to many to be proof of loyalty to the Alliance. Certainly, the United States Information Agency saw it that way. (1) However, the bombing did provoke substantial public discussion about the role Canada should take in NATO's management of the crisis in Kosovo and Serbia. It also prompted fears about the nature of Canada's NATO obligations should the war spill over into the rest of the Balkans. During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns were voiced about whether Canada should condone bombing a sovereign country that had not attacked any member of NATO, and that was technically outside NATO's territory of responsibility. When CF- 18 Canadian fighter planes were sent to assist with the aerial bombing of Serbia and Kosovo, a debate arose over whether air strikes were necessary or morally unjustifiable.

Not surprisingly, the possibility of a ground war in the former Yugoslavia also incited a great deal of debate across the country and in the media. Many radio hot-line shows burned up the airwaves on the issue of contributing ground forces to Kosovo and the question of whether Canada should take in refugees. The Defence Department housed thousands of refugees, temporarily, at various Canadian Forces bases.

Whether the federal cabinet was internally divided on these questions is not yet known. Certain comments by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that he harboured reservations about unequivocally supporting NATO's actions in the Balkans. (2) Put simply, the war served to remind Canadians that NATO membership entails obligations and commitments that might be difficult to sustain.

DEBATES SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Challenge and Commitment

In 1987, the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney published a defence white paper. Challenge and Commitment (sometimes rather derisively referred to as the `coffee table white paper' because of its many colour photographs) promised a significant increase in defence spending, ostensibly because of the challenge from the Soviet Union. It also promised to strengthen Canada's NATO commitments. Specifically, the government intended to acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of $10-$12 billion. It wanted to double Canada's troop strength in Europe and modernize Canadian equipment for high-intensity warfare on NATO's central front. Basically, the government proposed to spend $183 billion on defence over the next fifteen years. It was a very expensive package for countering the primary threat of the cold war.

A couple of years later, in 1989, the Conservatives suddenly announced an abrupt freeze on defence spending. They cut back major capital expenditures. The nuclear submarines were cancelled along with new main battle tanks and plans to deploy a division in Europe. It was evident to almost everyone that the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union had changed. Canada could no longer devote so much money and resources toward improving collective defence, particularly through its NATO commitments.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and war in the Persian Gulf in the winter of 1991, Canadians continued to debate whether there was any reason for Canada to retain its NATO commitments. The government spent approximately $1 billion a year merely to maintain Canadian troops in Europe - and that did not include the cost of training, equipping, and supplying the rest of the Armed Forces, which were also structured primarily for big-league NATO roles, including war in Europe.

Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC and Peacekeeping

The government announcement in September 1991 that it intended to withdraw all but 1200 troops from the central front in Germany came as no great surprise. The financial savings involved in a gradual withdrawal were estimated at some $1.2 billion over five years. It was a different matter when the minister of finance announced, in February 1992, plans to withdraw Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The members of the Canadian delegation to NATO were given only a few hours' notice of the change in policy. Initially, the decision was difficult to justify, especially since just a few months before Mulroney had assured Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of Germany, that Canada intended to retain a visible military presence on European soil. The European allies and the American military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) sharply criticized the timing of the decision and the fact that it was taken without proper consultation with the other allies. (3) Canadian delegates to NATO and SHAPE in Brussels tried to soften the blow by underscoring Canada's commitment to European security through its peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia and by pointing out the significant role Canada's ambassador to NATO was playing in establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). (4)

Mulroney had broached the idea of associate membership in NATO for former Warsaw Pact nations in 1991. When this possibility was rejected - Britain and France worried about the security guarantee it entailed - the Canadian ambassador to NATO set about devising a form of NATO membership for the east Europeans under NACC auspices. (5)

Then there was the claim that Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia was a renewed contribution to European security. The claim was assisted by the high media profile of the commander of the UN forces, Canada's General Lewis Mackenzie. Indeed, it was not long before Canadians at NATO headquarters received requests from the other allies, including the Americans, for more information on peacekeeping. Although high-level representatives from allied countries such as Britain and Germany still saw Canada's most valuable contribution to European security was to retain on European soil troops ear-marked for NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as if the sudden shift of interest to peacekeeping might somehow brighten Canada's image at NATO headquarters.

The general attitude of the Canadian delegation to NATO was one of resignation. It was aware that the Canadian announcement was most likely a precursor to similar announcements of reductions and cutbacks among the other allies. It was clear that Canada would remain an active participant in the North Atlantic Council, in the hundreds of committees at NATO and SHAPE, and in the discussions surrounding the implementation of the New Strategic Concept. NATO's secretary-general, Manfred Woerner, assured the allies in February 1992, after the announcement of the troop withdrawal, that Canada would meet its other commitments to NATO. (6)

Canada's Continuing Alliance Commitments

Despite the end of the cold war, many of Canada's other NATO commitments remained unchanged after the 1992 announcement. For instance, it could still dispatch an expeditionary brigade group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and an air defence battery to Europe, if necessary. A Canadian Forces battalion was prepared to deploy to Europe with the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force or the NATO Composite Force. Canadians continued to serve as part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as aircrew aboard NATO AEW aircraft. Canadian destroyers and frigates were prepared to sail with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, while eleven destroyers and frigates, one supply ship, three submarines, fourteen long-range patrol aircraft, and twenty-five helicopters retained their role in patrolling the North Atlantic as part of NATO's `augmentation' forces. Canada would continue to do its part to defend the Canada-US region of NATO, as well as to contribute to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is responsible for the defence of NATO's largest single land mass. Canada also offered its allies facilities and territory for military training, such as those at CFB Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo in Manitoba, and the underwater naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in British Columbia.

The Conservative government continued to demonstrate its support for NATO through other means as well. The portion of the infrastructure budget at NATO headquarters paid by Canada, although not widely known, was viewed at NATO headquarters as a significant contribution. The government's intention to retain approximately 650 Canadian personnel at NATO and SHAPE as military planners, attaches, and representatives on the Canadian delegation was also seen as an important commitment. The renewal of a ten-year contract to train approximately 6,000 German Armed Forces annually at CFB Shilo and CFB Goose Bay was described as yet another example of Canada's intention to help strengthen the alliance. Although aboriginal residents complained about the environmental effects of low-flying jets, and Goose Bay was slated to be closed because the United States thought it was too expensive for training purposes, German and other NATO planes continued to train there.

The Chretien Government's Defence Review

In November 1993, Jean Chretien's new Liberal government announced a comprehensive review of Canadian defence policy, which precipitated another debate about Canada's NATO commitments. By February 1994, a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons was established to initiate consultations and report to the government. In testimony before the Special Joint Com-mit-tee on Canada's Defence Policy, some policy-makers continued to argue that NATO had to remain a priority for both defence and foreign policy because of new conflicts in the world, particularly in Europe, the instability of the Russian leadership, and the remaining military threat. They advised the government to ensure that the country had modern military equipment and sufficient tri-service personnel to fulfil the strategic requirements of deterrence as well as NATO's New Strategic Concept. Canada, they argued, must continue to structure and train its military for mid-to-high intensity combat operations. They acceded that Canada should contribute to UN peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, but such contributions should remain a low priority for the Canadian Forces relative to their general combat capability for defending Canada and its allies. As some argued, the alternatives posed a risk to security and stability as well as to Alliance relations. In their opinion, NATO was adapting to the new uncertain environment, and NATO alone retained the political coherence and military capabilities to ensure collective defence and security. (7)

Others assigned a lower priority to NATO with the disintegration of the Soviet military threat and the disappearance of both the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. They noted the unlikelihood of an attack across Europe's central front and frequently cited the historic inability of military alliances to combat diffuse threats such as ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, and human rights violations. Some suggested that Canada should de-emphasize its military commitments to NATO but retain a diplomatic and consultative presence in the higher councils of the Alliance. Alternatively, many favoured increasing Canada's foreign aid and its contributions to UN agencies and operations. There were also related proposals for new defence priorities that would emphasize monitoring and surveillance of Canadian territorial waters and air space as well as expand the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. Rather than attempt to maintain a general-purpose, combat-capable army, navy, and air force, there were calls for the Canadian Forces to be restructured and retrained to contribute more productively to peacekeeping and the various initiatives outlined in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace. In the new environment, there would be unnecessary risks and expenses in adhering to the prevailing assumptions, practices, and institutions of the past fifty years. (8)

In the midst of this defence review, the government announced its commitment to the conversion of Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia into a multinational training centre for UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At the new Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the government would sponsor training for military and civilian personnel from countries participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well as from developing countries under Canada's Military Training Assistance Program. This decision provoked yet more controversy about peacekeeping training and the advisability of establishing a privatized peacekeeping training centre.

The 1994 Defence White Paper

In December, the Department of National Defence released The 1994 Defence White Paper, which announced that Canada would remain a full and active member of NATO. The monolithic threat to Western Europe had disappeared, and the principal responsibility for European defence lay with the Europeans. At the same time, the government valued the transatlantic link and recognized that NATO had made progress in adapting to a post-cold war world. The paper noted in particular those aspects of NATO that reflected a co-operative approach to European security relations, including the creation of NACC, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the development of the Combined Joint Task Force Concept. This perspective on NATO `underpinned' the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces Canada maintained for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO. Yet, for the first time, the Defence Department consistently referred to Canada's NATO defence commitments after pointing out the country's UN obligations. This seemed to herald a fundamental reordering of Canada's defence priorities.

The Costs of NATO Enlargement

Predictably, the release of thie 1994 white paper did not end the debate over the measure and extent of Canada's NATO commitments. Gradually some high-level foreign and defence policy advisers became concerned about the costs of NATO enlargement for Canada. Prime Minister Chretien initially supported expanding NATO membership from twelve to sixteen (with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia being the preferred additons). However, estimates of the costs of enlargement tended to vary widely, in part because of uncertainty about how many new members to admit. Nevertheless, in 1997 many high-level American officials agreed that expansion would cost somewhere between US$27 billion and US$35 billion over the next 13 years.

Behind the scenes, some senior Canadian policy-makers worried about the looming costs of expansion and about the extent to which Canada should or could support the rebuilding of the defence systems of the new members. In the weeks prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in the United States Congress, the State Department concurred with NATO's revised assessment that enlargement could cost only US$1.5 billion rather than US$27-35 billion. Nonetheless, these wide variations in estimates among such reputable analysts as the United States Congressional Budget Office, the Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO headquarters raised more questions about the measure of Canada's NATO commitments and whether all estimates might prove to be too low. Even as NATO opened the door to the first round of expansion, many Canadians worried about the potential cost of Canada's NATO obligations.

FUTURE ISSUES

NATO's Nuclear Strategy and the Middle Powers Initiative 

One issue around which further controversy will undoubtedly swirl is NATO's reliance on nuclear deterrence strategy. The NATO summit in Washington in April 1999 opened the door to a wide-ranging review of NATO'S nuclear weapons policy. NATO'S New Strategic Concept, which since 1991 has reaffirmed its reliance on nuclear weapons, will be reviewed and re-examined. Pressure from the leaders of the Middle Powers Initiative and the non-nuclear weapon states, particularly from key policy-makers in Canada, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Japan, may result in a serious review of the Strategic Concept. In particular, the Middle Powers Initiative, launched in 1998, could influence NATO's decision-making regarding its nuclear commitments and lead to important and subtle shifts in NATO's deterrence strategy between 2000 and 2002.

The issue that NATO has promised to review is of historical and practical, as well as theoretical, interest. After fifty years of relying upon nuclear weapons for defence, recent developments, including the end of the cold war, present an opportunity to enter this millennium with a plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Many distinguished world figures argue that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweighs any possible benefit imputed to nuclear deterrence. They believe that the end of the cold war created a climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, an opportunity that must be exploited quickly or it will be lost. They see the Middle Powers Initiative as a bold attempt to encourage NATO leaders to `break free from their cold war mindsets' and move rapidly to a nuclear weapon-free world.

The Middle Power Initiative was launched to buttress the grassroots efforts of hundreds of international and non-governmental organizations determined to abolish nuclear weapons. Canada's Senator Douglas Roche is the chair of the Middle Powers Initiative, which includes other non-nuclear weapon states such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO's Strategic Concept has hardly changed since 1991 on the issue of relying on nuclear weapons, the Washington summit communique, issued on 24 April 1999, commits NATO to `review' its strategic policy. At a news conference on the same day, Lloyd Axworthy confirmed NATO'S willingness `to have a review initiated' of its nuclear weapons policies. Explaining that this was the thrust of the recommendations in the report of Canada's Foreign Affairs Committee, Axworthy added: `It's a message that the [Canadian] Prime Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders ... I think we have now gained an acknowledgement that such a review would be appropriate and that there would be directions to the NATO Council to start the mechanics of bringing that about.' (9)

This gives the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, and the 12 abstainers on the New Agenda Coalition's 1998 resolution at the UN, an opportunity to press for a `quality review' rather than a perfunctory one. The Middle Powers Initiative believes that the NATO communique strengthens the possibility that appropriate representations can be made to a number of important countries around the world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its official policy statement, that urged NATO to begin a nuclear weapons review, and this was carried into the NATO summit. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative are expected to press for further changes in NATO's deterrence strategy in the near future. Success will depend on whether a new coalition of leaders from countries respected by the nuclear weapon states - especially by the United States - generates sufficient political momentum and media attention. (It should be noted that Canada recently abstained on crucial nuclear disarmament resolutions put forward by the New Agenda Coalition at the 1998 and 1999 sessions of the UN First Committee, and voted against resolutions put forward by China and Russia to strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.)

CONCLUSION

Canada's policy record since the end of the cold war indicates that it will remain committed to NATO, but on somewhat different terms. One seldom reaches a silver or golden anniversary in any relationship without some doubts and an occasional shift in terms of commitment. Still, as many concede, this has been a relatively successful alliance over the last fifty years. The challenge for Canada, once again, is to remain constructively engaged - to chart a safbr course - and to ensure NATO responds cost-effectively and responsibly. Canada must remind the other NATO allies that some arguments, controversy, debate, and dissension can and should be expected in what is alleged to be a democratic relationship - indeed, they may help improve this long-standing institution.

NOTES

(1.) Diana McCaffrey and Katherine Starr, eds, `Consequences of Kosovo - views from Western Europe and Canada,' United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, 9 July 1999, available at http://www.usia.gov/admin/005/ww wh9709.html. It has recently come to light that NATO was internally fractured. See, for example, `The dilemmas of war: what went wrong for NATO?' CBC Television, 11 June 1999, online transcript available at http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgmin fo/kosovo3/nato.html.

(2.) See, for example, `Mission to Moscow,' CBC television, transcript http://tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/ko sovo2/axworthy990426.html; and `Lloyd Axworthy's biggest test,' Globe and Mail (Toronto) 16 June 1999.

(3.) Confidential interviews at NATO and SHAPE Headquarters, October 1992; `NATO greets troop pullout from Europe "with regret,"' Montreal Gazette, 27 February 1992; and `Canadian troop pullout upsets allies in NATO,' Globe and Mail 5 March 1992.

(4.) Briefing on NACC from Ralph Lysyshyn, Deputy Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, NATO headquarters, October 1992; interviews with Angela Bogden, Canadian Delegation, and Glen Brown, Canadian Liaison Officer, NATO headquarters, Brussels, October 1992.

(5.) Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Speech to Stanford University, 29 September 1991; `Throw Soviets a "lifeline," Mulroney says,' Globe and Mail 30 September 1991.

(6) `NATO greets troop pullout from Europe "with regret,"' Montreal Gazette, 27 February 1992. Despite Woerner's comments, a classified report was apparently issued at NATO headquarters that took Canada to task for the withdrawal. Confidential interview, NATO headquarters, October 1992.

(7) Although this is a generalization of different positions, it is evident in various presentations to the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy. See, for example, the testimony of Michael Hennessy and Greg Kennedy, Minutes and Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, 2 (19 April 1994); Vice Admiral Daniel Mainguy (ret.), 4 (26 April 1994); Lt. Col Ernest Wesson (ret.) and Col. Sean Henry (ret.), 3 (20 April 1994); and David Haglund, Robert Spencer, and Lt. Col. John Marteinson, 5 (27 April 1994).

(8) Once again, this is an approximation of various arguments and proposals. See, for example, Donald Macdonald, Janice Stein, and Maurice Archdeacon, Minutes and Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, 3 (20 April 1994); Harriet Critchley, 10 (9 May 1994); Admiral Robert Falls (ret), 4 (26 April 1994); and H. Peter Langille, 26 (21 June 1994).

(9) Quoted in Douglas Roche, `Analysis of NATO action on nuclear weapons,' 28 April 1999, available at http://sen.parl.gc.ca/droche/

Erika Simpson is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. She has been a CIIPS Senior Barton Fellow, a DND Security and Defence Forum scholar, and a NATO Fellow. She has written numerous articles and a book on Canadian defence and foreign policy, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders confront Critics (McGill-Queen's University Press, forthcoming autumn 2000). A frequent commentator on television and radio, she co-authored the original proposals for a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre, now the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis.