Canada's security policies.

INTRODUCTION

The new federal government under Paul Martin has stated its intention to reverse the decline, evident over the last few decades, in Canada's position in the world. Achieving this goal will involve review and revision of our present programs in the areas of foreign policy, security policy, and international aid policy, which are to a considerable degree interdependent. This paper relates mainly to security and defence policies and programs.

Canada's basic defence objectives remain very much the same as they have been since the end of the Second World War. Our situation in North America, our vast extent and our wealth of resources, to say nothing of our proud military history, require us to maintain armed forces. We must ensure the protection of our sovereign territory. We wish to co-operate with like-minded countries in defending against possible external aggression, and in preventing or containing threats to peace and security elsewhere in the world. Like most other developed countries, Canada is currently seeking to reorient its international relations in the aftermath of the Cold War and following the emergence of new and very different threats to peace and stability. Some of these threats relate not only to the world outside, but also to our own territory.

Until the collapse of the Soviet empire, our defence plans and programs were dominated by the threat of a major war in Europe between massed, heavily armed forces. The structure of our forces today still largely reflects these concerns. This is understandable, in that forces so structured can also be employed in protection of our territory, in control of serious civil unrest, and in international peacekeeping. We must consider, however, whether the force structure of the Cold War era represents the most efficient utilization of limited resources in today's world.

It is most unlikely that Canada will again become involved in hostilities between advanced heavily armed sovereign states in the foreseeable future. True, our forces participated in the Gulf War and would probably have joined in the invasion of Iraq if the United States had been able to persuade the Security Council to endorse it. But while participation in such hostilities is both possible and useful when the necessary relatively specialized units are available, maintenance of a high-quality but small-scale heavy combat capability for such situations should not be the highest priority for Canada.

The protection of our own territory and its approaches remains a high priority, as well as the ability to participate effectively in overseas interventions such as Bosnia and Afghanistan, whether they are required to put an end to intolerable treatment of citizens or to counter international terrorism. Our current capabilities allow us to contribute only a small number of well-qualified military forces to the overseas operations.

Geography, coupled with the fact that the United States is probably the chief target for the current variety of international terrorism, gives Canada a special responsibility for the defence of the North American continent against the entry of terrorists. We must search for ways to improve the quantity and the quality of the Canadian contributions, including those provided by police, coast guard, intelligence, the immigration department, and other agencies as well as the military.

Recognizing the competing demands on the financial resources of the federal government, we should identify changes to security and defence programs for which the costs would be modest and could be offset to some extent by reductions in capabilities of lower priority, by opportunities for Canadian industry, and by the establishment of capabilities that would have economic and social value as well as improving security for Canada. And it would be preferable if new acquisitions and their financial costs could be spread over an extended period.

DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

We believe that the greatest threat to North American security today lies in terrorism. Defence against terrorism can be conducted in different geographical areas:

1) in the distant countries where the main leadership and training grounds for terrorism are located, and hatred of western developed countries is encouraged;

2) on the approaches to North America through which terrorists make their way to Canada and the United States;

3) in North America, identifying terrorists already present and putting a stop to their activities;

4) At specific locations in North America, protecting sites likely to be attacked, limiting damage and planning for early restoration of whatever services have been impaired.

Overseas activities to counter terrorism

Over the long run, it is the operations in the overseas countries that will probably be the most likely to overcome terrorism. This must be a very widespread international effort, in which Canada can play only a relatively modest role.

Nevertheless, significant contributions can be made with Canadian military contingents, such as the force currently in Afghanistan, perhaps with the addition of police personnel; by Canadian embassies and consulates abroad, in the screening of applicants for Canadian citizenship; and in the provision by Canada of aid of many kinds to poorer countries.

The long process of rebuilding and restructuring a damaged country which still harbours dedicated remnants of terrorist networks is likely to require an occupation lasting much longer than the original and probably violent conflict conducted in order to destroy, or at least disperse, the most recognizable elements of the terrorist organization.

Many of the techniques needed for this different but no less essential stage in the establishment of a stable, peaceful state, cleansed of the practitioners of terrorism, are akin more to those needed for law enforcement and education than for military success. Terrorism is blurring the boundaries between organized crime and warfare. Non-government organizations could play an important part. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) program could be adjusted to maximize its influence in reducing miserable conditions which may create incentives for terrorism.

Protecting the sea and air approaches to North America

Terrorists are most likely to make their way to North America as passengers in legal commercial aircraft or ships, landing at Canadian or American airports or seaports where they must present themselves to the customs and immigration authorities. The primary defence is to identify the passengers likely to be terrorists, preferably before they are allowed to begin their journey. This depends on the arrangements in Canadian and American embassies and consulates abroad, who depend in turn on the efforts of intelligence agencies to detect reasons to focus attention on certain applicants. The chances of customs and immigration officers detecting terrorists or their equipment when they do arrive in Canada would be very much improved by early communication of whatever information has been assembled by intelligence and the missions abroad.

A very unsatisfactory element in the Canadian handling of immigration has been the practice of easily admitting travelers who arrive with suspect or inadequate documentation, or none at all. Some seek refugee status but present little or no evidence to justify their claim. Too many of these people are admitted on a temporary basis and then disappear. Even those who do turn up for official appointments are able to extend their stay for long periods by using the remarkably generous provisions of Canadian laws.

A possible step to curb this situation could be for Canadian embassies and consulates to rely less on locally engaged staff for the processing of visa applications. And, perhaps some changes could be made in the legal processes which allow long delays in the final decisions regarding admission or deportation.

The present situation offers such easy opportunities for terrorists to enter Canada that it should be tightened up forthwith. In addition to the threat to the security of Canada, it presents the United States with a strong incentive to put their most stringent entry barriers at the Canadian border, instead of relying on an effective perimeter of North America.

Another illicit method of entering North America is to transfer illegal travelers from a ship into a small boat and take them to a secluded landing. (This requires the assistance of people already on shore.) Similarly people can be flown to airfields that have no customs and immigration posts using smaller aircraft that can reach Canada or the us from the Caribbean, Mexico, or Central America.

Large items of equipment needed by terrorists would probably be sent in cargo ships. Protection begins with intelligence obtained in the country of departure, including inspections in seaports, and ends with inspections at the port of landing. Unfortunately, the illegal equipment will probably be concealed in sealed containers, for which adequate close inspection requires considerable time and expertise. Advance information indicating which containers warrant dose attention would increase the efficiency of the inspection process. Sensors able to detect certain characteristics of the contents of a sealed container are being developed, which should make detailed close inspection easier or less necessary.

Between their departures from overseas seaports and their arrival in North America, ships are unlikely to reveal evidence of the presence of terrorist passengers or cargo unless they are boarded for inspection. However, surveillance of the movements of a ship throughout its voyage could reveal information about the nature of its business, allowing preparations for boarding and inspection before it lands and permitting authorities to head off transhipment of passengers to smaller vessels offshore. If transfers cannot be stopped, advance intelligence should make it possible to intercept small fast vessels before they can deliver their passengers or cargo to their colleagues ashore.

Another threat is the possible launch of an attack directly from a ship operated by terrorists. A nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapon stored in a ship could be detonated or dispersed close to the shore, or even while moored in port. Cruise missiles could be launched from some distance offshore.

A significant step toward preventing terrorists from coming to North America would be improving surveillance of the waters of the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans off the Canadian coasts. Sensors capable of detecting medium-sized ships can be carried by satellites, large aircraft, smaller fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, balloons and ships. Large shore-mounted High Frequency Surface Wave radars can detect shipping well beyond the horizon. Each of these methods has advantages and limitations.

From high altitudes the sensors can detect the presence of ships over a large area of the ocean, although with resolution insufficient to reveal details. Coverage of a given area by any one satellite in low earth orbit is brief and intermittent, and the duration of coverage by any one aircraft is limited.

To identify a ship and observe its externally visible structure and cargo, it is necessary to bring the sensors to much closer range, using aircraft at low altitude or ships. Boarding at sea requires a helicopter, or a vessel with a maximum speed greater than that of the suspect ship.

Countering the delivery into North America of terrorists or terrorist equipment by air also requires surveillance of the approaches. But an important difference is that, whereas a large proportion of the normal sea approaches to the United States do not traverse waters close to the Canadian coast, the majority of the normal air approaches from Europe or Asia to destinations in the US pass over vast stretches of sea, ice or land near or directly above Canada. Therefore, if the United States wants reliable surveillance of the air approaches to its own territory it will want to know what is coming in through Canadian airspace.

The existing arrangements for the control of civil air traffic entering North America are very effective for the vast majority of aircraft, which file the required flight plans and use airborne transponders which allow them to be identified and tracked by the widespread network of secondary radars located around the perimeters of Canada and the USA. But these secondary radars depend on the operation of the transponders; presumably an aircraft seeking to arrive undetected would not use one. This deficiency can be overcome by the North American Aerospace Defence Command's (NORAD) military air defence system, which employs primary radar, not depending on the cooperation of the target aircraft. However, the coverage of the primary radars is far from complete over Canada, especially in its northern regions.

NORAD can also detect and track aircraft using the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), but the extent and duration of the coverage is limited by the endurance of the aircraft.

Another means of detecting uncooperative intruders, that is being employed in the United States along the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico against small low-flying aircraft, is to mount radars on unmanned tethered balloons.

Identifying terrorist presence in North America

Many of the features which we value most in democratic societies, such as respect for privacy and tolerance of cultural differences, have made it easy for terrorists, whether home grown or immigrants, to live in the US or Canada undetected, make preparations for attacks and deliver them successfully. The strengthening of policing and the increasing demands for confirmation of personal identification that would be needed to better detect terrorists or their activities while still in preparation, are likely to encroach on the privacy of innocent citizens.

These problems would be particularly evident in large cities, where there are concentrations of immigrant populations. Striking a balance between effective measures needed to counter terrorism and the nuisance or discontent which these measures inflict on the general public poses difficult choices for lawmakers and officials.

Small outposts in sparsely inhabited regions of Canada could be the sites of undetected training and preparation for attacks on targets in southern Canada or the northern United States. The problems of detection of suspect activity on the ground in the Canadian North bear some resemblance to those of surveillance of the sea approaches. The obvious answer is overhead surveillance, using satellites or aircraft with modern sensors to detect something unusual from a high altitude, then following with a more detailed inspection from an aircraft at lower altitude and, if necessary, with a visit from a helicopter. The Canadian Rangers would have a role in both surveillance and possible intervention.

Overhead surveillance provides many benefits in addition to those relating to security discussed above. Quite apart from its contribution to security, the increased knowledge of the activities on the sea approaches, and on the land and the ice, would produce economic and social benefits of great value for Canada.

Better surveillance of the fishing grounds off the Canadian coasts would assist the policing of those areas against unpermitted intrusions by foreign vessels. Observation of fishing activities might reveal infringement of the rules. Detection of oil slicks would allow steps to be taken to reduce pollution.

Closer inspection of cargoes for the primary purpose of detecting terrorist equipment could also lead to interception of illegal drugs. Accurate plotting of ice cover would be of assistance to maritime navigation. Search and rescue would be aided, both on sea and land.

Surveillance of the land, especially the sparsely inhabited regions, would bring even more benefits unrelated to security against terrorism. The progress of forest fires and floods could be tracked and the allocation of defensive measures directed. The health of crops and forests could be monitored, as well as the progress of tree cutting. Poisonous emissions from industrial enterprises, and other form of pollution could be detected and followed. Prospecting for minerals on or near the surface could be assisted.

The economic value of these contributions would be substantial. It would seem sensible to have the flying operations carried out by the air force, with the results freely shared with a host of users. Accordingly, some of the costs should be recovered from sources outside the Department of National Defence (DND) budget.

Protecting likely targets in Canada

A difficult but necessary task in defence against terrorism, which is already being addressed in a new Department of Public Safety, is to identify which of the enormous number of possible targets all over Canada constitute part of a "critical infrastructure", and therefore merit high priority for the installation of protective measures.

Typical measures to reduce the vulnerability of critical targets before they are attacked include erection of barriers, strengthening of buildings, improvement of fire protection and installation of shatterproof windows. After an attack has occurred repair and reconstruction will be needed. It may be desirable to form a few specially trained and equipped teams able to perform these services for the most critical targets in Canada. Areas deserving special attention are power lines and oil and gas pipelines. They are vulnerable to attack and often badly located for rapid repair.

In the few hours following a successful attack there will be an urgent need for firefighting, rescue, first aid and rapid hospitalization, and perhaps inoculation against biological weapons. These will all be needed very quickly. Advance preparations should include ensuring full coordination of all the agencies that must be involved. There could well be a role for military reserve units, properly trained and equipped.

Information on protection against biological and chemical weapons and from nuclear radiation, and on the treatment of casualties should be widely distributed to medical centers. Short training courses should be provided.

The need for effective intelligence

The type of intelligence needed for effective defence against international terrorism differs in many respects from the traditional military intelligence needed to assess the threats posed by the armed forces of established countries. In many ways it resembles more the intelligence needed to police international organized crime. The most difficult aspect is the identification and location of individuals involved in terrorist activities, whether abroad or already in North America.

Effective collection, assembly and assessment of intelligence originating from many sources depends on the wholehearted cooperation of the organizations controlling these sources. But organizations that are very dependent on human undercover agents, working in great personal danger, are often reluctant to share information with other organizations, lest their sources be compromised, deactivated, or even killed.

A key role for the intelligence required for defence against terrorism is to provide the agencies responsible for authorizing the entry into Canada of individuals and cargoes with information allowing them to concentrate their limited resources on those ships, aircraft, people, and goods most deserving close attention.

CANADA/US RELATIONS--NORAD

Canada's location on the air approaches to the US was important for the defence of the USs against long-range bomber aircraft, and still is vital for reliable management of long-range civilian air traffic. Unless Canada is seen by the US to be providing the cooperation needed for an integrated North American defence, the capital could consider that defence of its own territory against terrorism would be weakened without deployment of sensors or weapons in Canadian territory.

In the days when the prime threat to North America was from long-range bomber aircraft, the NORAD relationship was a model example of bilateral cooperation, bringing advantages to Canada that would not have been available in any other way. The decline of the bomber threat reduced the significance of NORAD, but NORAD retained the responsibility for warning against the threat of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). That threat has also disappeared. But the us is now proceeding to provide itself with a rudimentary defence against ICBMs from so-called "states of concern", a threat not given a high priority by Canada or most other countries. If Canada elects to abstain from cooperation in anti-ICBM defence, then the capital will consign that system (including its missile warning system) to a purely American organization, and NORAD will lose even more of its significance.

However, defence against terrorism could be the incentive for a revival of NORAD. Whereas the threat against which NORAD was created early in the Cold War was from bombers approaching North America from the USSR, the primary air threats today are considered to be from aircraft or cruise missiles launching their attacks from inside or close to North America. Defence against these threats is the responsibility of NORAD today. If Canada were to acquire an effective system for overhead surveillance of the sea approaches to its shores and of its extensive land mass, the responsibilities of NORAD could be expanded to include the Canadian and us forces which already practice effective close cooperation in several types of maritime operations. NORAD could add "maritime" to its "aerospace" defence responsibilities, with Canada as a full partner.

Canada could agree to consider any contributions to the capital missile defence program that required stationing equipment in Canada (a requirement which seems unlikely during the near future), while indicating that we prefer to make our contribution to ballistic missile defence through research and development of systems for defence against short range ballistic missiles. Thousands have been used in war, many hundreds are deployed today, and some may well be used against Canadian troops in future operations overseas.

Canadian defence research establishments and industry possess skills and experience appropriate for such R&D, and as defence against short-range missiles improves, it will develop a growing capability to intercept ICBMs in the early and the terminal phases of their intercontinental trajectories.

As regards overhead surveillance of the sea approaches and the land, effective coverage of the large Canadian area by our own aircraft, with the information being shared with the Americans, should be a contribution to North American security warranting reciprocal complete sharing with Canada of the information concerning the same area that is obtained by the space-based surveillance systems operated by the us. The American systems cover virtually all the world, without requiring the assistance or even the permission of the countries being observed. Anything contributed by Canadian space-based systems (likely to be supplemented by RADARSAT II) would be added to the common pool.

The combination of these co-operative measures would reestablish a vital and expanded NORAD.

CANADA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES: WHERE TO REDUCE AND WHAT TO INCREASE

Today the size and character of the forces available to the opponents most likely to be encountered by Canadian forces bear little resemblance to those of the former Warsaw Pact. The most probable types of conflicts would be on a much smaller scale and in very different circumstances than would have been encountered in an all-out Third World War between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

For the (less probable) circumstances in which a need for substantial capabilities for air-to-air, antisubmarine, and tank warfare may arise, it is virtually certain that Canada would be engaged as a member of a coalition including the United States and probably other larger countries who would still possess the systems needed for these roles. With limited resources likely to be made available for defence, Canada should not attempt to maintain expensive capabilities which would only be required in circumstances which are much less likely to face us than those of the asymmetric confrontations to be expected in the near and mid-term future. We need to consider what capabilities of the army, the airforce and the navy should be reduced, and which should be strengthened.

The Army

As is being shown in Iraq, protracted opposition to a well-armed coalition force will not take the form of battles between large armies in open terrain, where the advantages of heavy tanks, heavy and medium artillery, and close air support would be decisive. It will come after the intervention forces have dispersed from their divisions, brigades, and battalions, and are attempting to establish order throughout the area in which the opposition forces are scattered. The occupying army that must assume the formidable tasks of protection of vital assets, pursuit of attackers and eventual elimination of the enemy, until local military and police forces can be established to take control.

In many respects the occupiers' tasks resemble those normally performed by police forces, or by the British army and the French Foreign Legion, operating in the outposts of the empires of the 19th century.

Heavy main battle tanks cannot easily be deployed rapidly to a distant theatre, and are of limited use in densely built-up areas or mountainous terrain. Many of the likely opponents will not have tanks. Any necessary anti-tank roles could be handled by guided anti-tank missiles launched from aircraft or land vehicles that are lighter and faster than tanks, such as the Stryker.

Some of the roles of heavy and medium guns can be undertaken by surface-to-surface and air-to-surface guided missiles, some of them capable of reaching very long ranges, and likely to destroy the intended targets with less undesirable collateral damage.

Many of the changes needed to make the Canadian army better able to deal with the challenges it is most likely to face in the coming decade are in structure, operational procedure and training. Most of the necessary changes are related to operations overseas, whether for peace support or counterterrorism.

A start has already been made with Joint Task Force Two, designed for counterterrorism, and the "Special Operations" usually associated with military commando forces.

The emphasis will be on small, highly mobile units that can be delivered by parachute and recovered by helicopter. In order to operate in units smaller and much more scattered than in the patterns of the Cold War, and with highly effective air support available, better communications will be essential, both ground-to-ground and ground-to-air. Many of the operations will need to be conducted in the dark. Reliable means of distinguishing friends from foes will be important. Authority must be delegated to lower levels of command.

The army will need more engineers for combat operations, construction of defensive barriers and reconstruction. Mine clearance will be vital, as well as detection and disarming of booby traps.

Maintenance of the rapidly increasing number of highly desirable electronic devices, including computers, radios, radars and fire control instruments, will require more well-qualified technicians, quickly available in the field.

The Air Force

Since the end of the Cold War, none of the international overseas operations, whether peacekeeping, peace support, humanitarian intervention, or anti-terrorist, have had to face significant opposition from the air. The enemy only contested the air superiority of the intervening coalition by means of ground-based air defences, including their use by terrorists against civilian aircraft.

The coalition air forces have been used, usually very effectively, for surveillance and reconnaissance, bombing, close support of the ground forces and for attacks on ground-based air defences. Many aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat have been used for air-to-ground operations. Their effectiveness has been enhanced by new technologies for accurate navigation, radar, electro-optical sensors and precision-guided air-to-ground weapons. Canadian F18 fighter aircraft have been successfully employed in some of these roles.

Some F18s will need to be retained to control the airspace above and on the approaches to Canada. But this will require fewer of them than were necessary for defence against Cold War Soviet intercontinental bombers.

For defence against terrorism the Canadian Air Force will have heavy responsibilities for surveillance over Canada and its sea approaches. Its long-range patrol aircraft are well suited for this role and can be made even more effective by the addition of new types of sensors capable of detecting moving targets and things that have changed on the ground. However, there will probably not be enough of these large aircraft to fulfill the requirements for the vast area involved. And although a single large aircraft flying at high altitude can produce good-quality coverage of a considerable area of the earth's surface, this coverage will be intermittent, and the imagery cannot have the better resolution of detail in a smaller area that can be obtained from lower altitude. After the high-altitude sensors detect something warranting a closer look, it may be necessary to dispatch properly equipped helicopters or smaller fixed-wing aircraft to investigate further.

Merging the immense amount of data produced by a fleet of overhead sensors which may include those mounted in satellites as well as in aircraft; extracting, displaying and analyzing the needed information; deciding whether a reaction is needed, and, if necessary, organizing the reaction requires a centre for joint command and control with the latest communications and data processing equipment. It could be situated in Canada, or possibly in the headquarters of NORAD in Colorado Springs.

For combat and counterterrorism in distant theatres the principal roles for the Canadian air force will be surveillance and reconnaissance, close support of ground troops, and in some cases suppression of air defences. Both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters with the right equipment are important for these roles.

For continuous surveillance of activities on the ground, or of low-flying missiles or aircraft, significant advantages can be provided by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including balloons. Also, for attack of ground targets by missiles of limited range, suitably armed UAVs provide the advantage of flying at low altitude without the risk of losing a pilot.

Overseas operations by Canadian forces would benefit from an increased capability for airlift, both into and within distant theatres. The ageing aircraft need refurbishing, and new additions should be capable of providing aerial refuelling.

The Navy

For peace support missions, both during and after the Cold War, the navy has been employed in roles such as observation and inspection of merchant shipping, and aiding in transportation of supplies and personnel to troops ashore. And as before, it has had responsibility for mine clearance. While the threat of attack by anti-ship cruise missiles is growing, that from aircraft, well-armed surface ships, and modern submarines is now comparatively low. To comply with the changing requirements the navy should de-emphasize capacity for antiaircraft and antisubmarine warfare.

The most urgent need for the navy is the replacement of the Sea King, a program which the new government has signalled its intention to complete. Even without a high priority requirement for antisubmarine warfare (for which the Sea King was procured, long ago) the frigates and destroyers depend on shipborne helicopters for surveillance, inspection, defence against small surface craft and transport of personnel. These are all important for both counterterrorism and peace support missions.

Supply ships have been providing essential services for the army and air force as well as the naval overseas missions, and this should continue at an adequate level in all the theatres to which Canadian forces are assigned.

The naval operations most likely to be called for in the mid-term future are likely to be in or near coastal waters, rather than on the open ocean. The opponents may possess anti-ship missiles which can be launched from the shore, small fast boats, or small aircraft, and will probably be able to plant mines, and use frogmen against moored ships. They are less likely to possess submarines or large surface warships or aircraft.

Some of the capabilities for defence of our ships against attack by aircraft using torpedoes and bombs should be transferred to defence against anti-ship missiles. The most modern equipment for mine detection and mine clearance should be obtained. It is important to maintain the high degree of interoperability which has allowed Canadian ships to cooperate with the capital and other navies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Of the many desirable changes discussed above, the ones that our group believes warrant the highest priority for early attention are:

1) Initiation of a program to greatly increase Canada's capabilities for overhead surveillance of the surface of our land and ice, with special attention to the scarcely populated regions, as well as the sea approaches.

2) Negotiating with the United States the strengthening and expansion of NORAD. Its responsibilities should include surveillance of the sea approaches to North America, and command and control of defence against cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as defence against attack by aircraft taking off within North America.

3) Making some changes to the Canadian armed forces to increase their effectiveness for defence against terrorism:

* increasing the capabilities of the air force for overhead surveillance of activities on the sea and the land, and also for the support of land force operations, including the refurbishment of the aircraft needed for transport into and within overseas theatres

* increasing the capabilities of the navy for patrol of the sea approaches to Canada, including interception of ships suspected of intending to illegally discharge people or equipment in North America or to deliver an attack

* increasing the capabilities of the army for overseas operations of a "special forces", commando, and policing nature.

To compensate in part for the costs associated with these changes, capabilities for the following roles should be reduced:

* air-to-air combat

* antisubmarine warfare

* land operations against large armoured formations.

4) Strengthening the collection and use of intelligence, and making some changes in laws and procedures to aid the customs, immigration, and police services in the identification and apprehension of terrorists currently resident in North America or attempting to enter it.

5) Strengthening the capabilities of Canadian embassies and consulates to assess the validity of applications for entry, immigration, or admittance with refugee status.

This paper, prepared by George Lindsey, is based on discussions of a study group organized by the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. The members of the study group, mostly retired after long service in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Department of National Defence, were BGen Clay Beattie, Bob Cameron, Col Ron Cleminson, Bob Edmonds, Ross Francis, Dwight Fulford, George Grande, BGen Keith Greenaway, John Hadwen, Hugh Henry, David Kirkwood, George Lindsey, Blair Seaborn, Ken Williamson and Gerry Wright.