Can the backup be backed up? Voter-verified paper audit trails face problems for November.

With suspicion mounting over the use of paperless electronic voting machines in recent years, paper backup ballots sounded like the best possible solution. Voters could check their choices on screen against a printed record. In the event of a recount, the paper ballots could be compared to the electronic total.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Unfortunately, a recent report casts some doubt on the effectiveness of the paper backup systems. After studying machine and poll worker errors from Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the Election Science Institute found that almost 10 percent of sample paper ballots cast in the May primary were uncountable. This is an alarmingly high proportion for a state that requires a paper ballot of record in the event of a recount. (The county had commissioned the San Francisco-based nonpartisan organization to study the use of electronic voting systems.)

Such problems could be grounds for legal action. And, assuming as many pundits do, a closely-fought battle nationwide for control of Congress, the importance of each vote--and each missing, torn or otherwise problematic paper record--will be magnified.

Cuyahoga's system closely resembles that of hundreds of other localities around the country. The county in northeastern Ohio uses Diebold TSx voting systems with attached printers; the printed record is then cut and stored, ready to be recounted in the event of an electronic mishap, routine audit or close race. Ohio is one of 23 states that require that their e-voting machines use voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPATs).

The May primary marked the first time Cuyahoga used the TSx. Some of the problems were attributed to human error; poll workers loaded the paper into the printers backwards, which then resulted in blank audit trails and crumpled ballots. Some of the storage canisters containing the VVPATs were marked incorrectly, while others weren't marked at all.

Some problems seemed to come from the machines. In a few cases, ESI reported that electronic vote totals did not match up with paper records. Researchers found long, blank spaces between ballots that could have represented missing or unprinted VVPATs, torn and taped-together VVPATs, and missing ballot text.

The report, however, found that there were considerable problems plaguing the administration of the VVPAT system in the Ohio county.

"The VVPAT is only as reliable as the administration of the system that produces the paper trail," said Tracy Warren, the ESI researcher in charge of the manual recount of the VVPATs.

Diebold spokesman David Bear said most of the problems with Cuyahoga's paper trails were caused by poll worker mistakes, with poor training as the primary culprit.

Other counties in Ohio and beyond had used the same system without problems, he added. "They're not too difficult," Bear said. "It's an issue of familiarity."

However, when November rolls around, not too many jurisdictions can claim familiarity. In fact, only Utah, Nevada and some counties in Ohio have held more than one election using VVPATs.

In Cuyahoga, the answer to missing or damaged VVPATs is simple: use the machine's electronic memory to reproduce the ballots, said Michael Vu, the county's election director.

"Certainly there's the redundancy issue," he acknowledged. "But at least no votes are being lost."

David Dill, a Stanford computer science professor who founded VerifiedVoting.org, an organization that supports paper ballots, said Cuyahoga's screwed up VVPATs defeat the purpose and puts some of the blame on the manufacturer of the system. "Ten percent is a complete disaster," he said. "You can blame it on poll worker training, but there are ways to design equipment that makes user error less likely."

With no changes to the design before next month's elections, the onus will be on those administering the election to get it right the first time.

Dan Seligson is editor of electionline.org. The report is available online at https://electionline.org or in hard copy. E-mail [e-mail] to request a copy.