Call for withdrawal of foreign troops, political solution in Afghanistan.

Call for Withdrawal of Foreign Troops, Political Solution in Afghanistan

On 23 November, by adopting resolution 38/29, the Assembly called for immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan and asked all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return home "in safety and honour'.

The Assembly acted by a recorded vote of 116 in favour to 20 against (Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam), with 17 abstentions.

The Assembly also reiterated that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan was essential for a peaceful solution of the problem, and reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and choose their own political and social system.

It also renewed its appeal for international humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of Afghan refugees.

Reports

The Assembly reviewed a report of the Secretary-General (document A/38/449-S/16005) which states that he had continued his efforts to promote a political solution through negotiations. From 21 January to 7 February 1983, his Personal Representative, Diego Cordovez, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, had had detailed consultations in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran on four items previously identified for consideration--withdrawal of foreign troops, non-interference and non-intervention, international guarantees and voluntary return of refugees.

During those consultations, the report states, it had been possible to widen the understandings reached during discussions held in Geneva in June 1982 and to reach additional understandings on the nature and operation of a "policy mechanism' that would be articulated in the comprehensive settlement and on the kind of provisions required to ensure its effective implementation. It was also agreed that a second round of discussions would be held on the same basis as that for the April 1983 talks.

In March 1983, the Secretary-General reports, he had exchanged views on the situation with President Y.V. Andropov and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government strongly favoured a political settlement and categorically supported the continuation of his efforts, the Secretary-General said.

Shah Mohammad Dost, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, and Sahabazada Yuqub-khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, were present at the second round of discussions, held in Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983 through the intermediary of Mr. Cordovez. Iran had been kept informed through its Permanent Representative. Substantial progress had been made in the definition of the contents of the comprehensive settlement, its principles and objectives, the interrelationship of its four components, and provisions including time-frames for its implementation. It had not been possible, however, to bridge differences of attitude and position regarding a number of issues, including some crucial ones, which had been left in abeyance, the report states.

It was agreed that preparations for arrangements aimed at ascertaining the voluntary and unimpeded character of the refugees' return should begin without delay. Consultations were accordingly held throughout the summer with the UNHCR with a view to submitting specific proposals.

Valuable and indispensable work had been accomplished, which had gone a long way towards achieving a fair and lasting political solution, the Secretary-General concludes. That had proved possible, in the main, because all concerned had remained firmly determined to work in good faith in the progressive development of a comprehensive settlement which would effectively resolve all the issues involved.

The Secretary-General said he was deeply concerned at the slow pace of the negotiations and the difficulties encountered in overcoming obstacles. He noted that if those negotiations succeeded, all Afghans would be able to decide their future in peace, and the foundations would have been laid for mutual understanding and co-operation among the States in the area. He felt the diplomatic process was moving in the right direction, and a settlement was possible on the basis of what had already been accomplished, provided that the necessary policy decisions were made.

Debate

The majority of the 53 speakers who participated in the debate called for the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan. Some speakers said that a time-frame for a withdrawal was a crucial element for any viable agreement.

A number of speakers said the Afghan refugees must be allowed to return to their homeland and the Afghan people must be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination free from outside interference and foreign domination. There must be respect for Afghanistan's national sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-aligned status, those countries said.

A number of countries advocated a peaceful settlement of the problem within the framework of United Nations resolutions. They maintained that the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan constituted interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and was a violation of the Charter and international law. The situation, they said, was a threat to international peace and security. Efforts by the Secretary-General and Mr. Cordovez to achieve the framework of an acceptable solution were endorsed.

A number of countries stated that Afghanistan's proposals of 14 May 1980 and 24 August 1981 were the most realistic basis for a comprehensive solution. The United States was criticized by some for wanting to use Afghanistan as a forward post against the Soviet Union and for using the question as a pretext for building military bases in Asia.

Some nations maintained that the Soviet Union had come to the aid of Afghanistan to help it preserve its territorial integrity. They said that the real source of problem around Afghanistan was the aggression emanating from across the border in Pakistan. An end to that intervention had to be the focus of negotiations.

Parties Concerned

Pakistan said accounts by impartial observers illustrated the magnitude and intensity of the Afghan resistance and its indigenous character. Since Soviet forces had entered Afghanistan, an estimated 130,000 Afghans had perished and more than a quarter of the population had fled the country. The crisis had dealt a severe blow to the concept of detente, constituted a principal cause of deterioration in the international climate and set a dangerous precedent for the future. Its solution lay in the termination of the foreign armed intervention.

There had been substantial progress in delineating the elements and the structure of a comprehensive settlement. Pakistan supported the Secretary-General's efforts in that regard. The only possible solution was a political, not a military one.

Pakistan said the three main outstanding issues integral to a settlement were the time-frame for the withdrawal of foreign troops, consultations with the refugees and international guarantees. Pakistan had been prepared to participate in the next round of indirect talks during the current Assembly session, but the representative of the Kabul regime could not make himself available at that time. Pakistan believed the method of indirect negotiations could be usefully pursued and the demand for direct talks in and by itself did not enhance the prospects for resolving issues of substance.

Negotiations must continue. The stage had been reached when the great Powers, particularly the Soviet Union, could help facilitate progress towards the goal of a just and lasting settlement. The indication of a reasonable time-frame for the withdrawal of troops would give a decisive impetus to the United Nations process, thus leading to an early solution.

The present situation posed a threat to Pakistan's security, with repeated violations of its airspace and territory. Also, there were three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and that number increased each day. Pakistan rejected "slanderous allegations' by some that portrayed its humanitarian assistance to the refugees as evidence of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. The refugee camps were open to all to come to see for themselves. Pakistan also resented the "ridiculous' suggestion that it was obstructing the voluntary return of the refugees.

Afghanistan said it rejected as invalid the "illegal and interventionist' exercise taking place in the Assembly, which had been orchestrated by the United States and its collaborators --China and Pakistan in the first place. The Assembly should concern itself with the situation created by the use of force against Afghanistan which had resulted in the escalation of tension around Afghanistan. The instigators of the debate, the United States in the first place, had no desire to help in finding a solution for problems prevailing in the region.

Imperialist and reactionary interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs had been in the pre-revolutionary era and had been upgraded to an undeclared war right after the April 1978 revolution, said Afghanistan. The revolution's victory had brought about a drastic increase in that interference and had taken the form of armed aggression by Pakistan, whose Government played a crucial role in forming and expanding counter-revolutionary groups in that country.

It could not be argued that Afghanistan could not invoke Article 51 of the Charter and its 1978 bilateral Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in taking appropriate measures to repel aggression. Official Afghan records belied assertions that no request had been made by Afghanistan for the limited contingent of Soviet troops.

Long before December 1979, it had requested the Soviet Union to render it aid, including military aid, to defend the country in the event of escalation of outside armed interference. After repeated approaches by the Afghan side, that request had been met to a very limited extent. The decision to invoke the 1978 Treaty to obtain military assistance was Afghanistan's last recourse, and had been made only after repeated resort to diplomatic means to deal with the "ominous pace' which the armed intervention had acquired.

Afghanistan said it had displayed utmost restraint in face of provocations. Every effort had been made to defuse the tension arising from the armed intervention against Afghanistan. Afghanistan's approach to the Soviet Union for help had been a natural choice for it. The notion that the problems in South-West Asia emanated from the internal developments in Afghanistan was false and baseless, it said.

The armed aggression against Afghanistan had given rise to the need and, subsequently, the request for military aid. The introduction of "some limited contingents' had taken place long before 27 December 1979. By providing more sophisticated arms and equipment to the "counterrevolutionary bands stationed in Pakistan', the "Islamabad regime and its imperialist and hegemonist supporters' were prolonging the withdrawal of the limited Soviet contingents.

Afghanistan said the revolution of April 1978 was irreversible. However, it was with "deep interest and great sincerity' that Afghanistan was engaged in negotiations with Pakistan through Mr. Cordovez. The Afghan Foreign Minister was available in New York "even at this moment' for consultation with the Secretary-General. Pakistan's references to the progress of the negotiations had been "excessively distorted'.

Afghanistan had already decreed a general amnesty regarding "bona fide' refugees. The number of refugees--thousands of whom had returned home--had been grossly exaggerated. It had called upon its "deceived compatriots' abroad to "return to the homeland'. All Members should exert their moral influence for the launching of direct Afghanistan-Pakistan negotiations, which constituted "the correct path towards the overall settlement of the situation around Afghanistan'.

The USSR said the United States, with the assistance of certain other States, had for some time now been waging an undeclared war against the people of Afghanistan. The total amount spent by the United States and its partners for the fight against the Afghan revolution had been estimated at $1 billion.

Having organized the armed intervention against Afghanistan, the United States had decided to seek revenge for the loss of its positions in Iran and also to use the destabilization of the situation in south western Asia as an exercise for military preparations in the region of the Persian Gulf, where the United States was sending its naval units on a large scale.

The bands of counter-revolutionaries in Afghanistan, armed by the United States and countries following its line, were destroying harvests and irrigation systems, taking cattle away from the peasants, and trying to terrorize the population, the USSR said. In the spreading of education and knowledge among the Afghan population, the foes of the revolution saw a danger to their "ideological effect upon the workers'. The destruction and burning of schools and the "brutal repression' of the teachers was a "harsh and bitter reality'.

The USSR said no barriers existed to the return of Afghans to their country in safety and honour. All those who had returned had assumed their rightful place in Afghan society. The problem of Afghan refugees outside Afghanistan's borders, like all problems creating tension in and around Afghanistan, was being caused by the policy of those countries supporting the state of undeclared war against Afghanistan.

"Those in the ruling circles of those countries' talked hypocritically about their concern for the fate of the refugees, but their principal purpose was to hold those "misguided persons' in camps on foreign territory and use them against the people of Afghanistan. Pakistan had converted its territory into the main base for "continuous bandit raids' against Afghanistan's peaceful cities and villages. China was arming Afghan "terrorists', supplying its instructors to train them and "pushing them into a fratricidal war', the Soviet Union asserted.

The USSR said it supported Afghanistan's programme of political settlement. On the basis of that programme, it was possible to agree on solving the questions relating to the external aspect of the Afghanistan problem. Internal affairs must be resolved only by the people of Afghanistan themselves. The USSR took a positive view of the negotiations being held between Afghanistan and Pakistan through Mr. Cordovez. It hoped that at an early date a way would be found for a direct dialogue between those two countries.

Pakistan's attempt to make the negotiations the subject of public discussion could give rise to doubts about its attempt to make progress at the negotiations, the USSR stated.

President Andropov had said that as soon as outside interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs ceased, and as soon as there was a guarantee that it would not be resumed, the USSR would withdraw its troops, which were in Afghanistan at the request of the lawful Afghanistan Government, "the one which was in power at that time'. Those troops remained there at the request of that Government, headed by Babrak Karmal. "Therefore, we do not seek anything ourselves', the President had stated. The USSR had responded to "the call for help from a friendly neighbouring country'.

Iran said the homeland of the oppressed Moslem people of Afghanistan had been invaded by the military forces of a permanent member of the Security Council, allegedly and ironically responsible for the preservation of international peace and security. In spite of an exceptionally heavy economic burden of the Iraqiimposed war and in spite of all the economic sanctions and embargoes imposed on it by imperialist Powers, Iran had been hosting millions of "our Afghan brothers and sisters without any assistance from any national or international organizations.' Only the people of Afghanistan could choose their own form of government and their own economic, political and social system based on their own cultural heritage and free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.

Russian troops must withdraw immediately, totally and unconditionally from Afghan territory. The non-interference of any foreign Power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan must be achieved. The Afghan mujahideen freedom fighters must return to their homeland. Iran rejected any efforts for a solution, including negotiations, in which the true representatives of the Afghan people did not take an active part.

Other Views

China said the Soviet Union did not sincerely desire a political settlement. It only wanted to relieve pressure from the international community through delaying tactics, diverting public attention and cooling off the issue tolegitimize its aggression against and occupation of Afghanistan. Since the launching of its war of aggression, the Soviet Union had stepped up its military offensives against Afghan resistance forces in an attempt to wipe them out. It was establishing or expanding air bases and had built strategic highways, bridges, barracks, oil depots and other military installations on a scale far exceeding the needs of the "so-called temporary garrisoning of Soviet troops'. That proved it was prepared for a prolonged occupation and was trying to turn the country into a major strategic base for its southward expansion.

China said the Soviet Union had intervened in Afghanistan's internal affairs. The Soviet Union had asserted that it had dispatched troops for its own safety and for the security of its southern frontier. But how could a friendly and weak Afghanistan threaten the security of a super-Power? The resistance movement would end only with the complete withdrawal of foreign troops. The Soviet occupation had undermined peace and stability in the region, and had endangered China's security.

After the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, China said, it was ready to join other countries concerned in an international guarantee against interference, by whatever means, in Afghanistan's internal affairs, and against occupying or using Afghan territory to infringe on the independence and sovereignty of any other regional country. China favoured a political settlement which, however, must accord with the basic principles of the relevant United Nations resolutions and guarantee the implementation of those resolutions. It should also reflect the opinions of Afghans engaged in the fighting. The key to a solution lay in the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops.

Greece, on behalf of the European Community, said the Soviet military intervention was a testimony to Moscow's willingness to pursue its aims by use of its massive military potential. The Ten could not accept the attempt to impose a regime by force on the people of Afghanistan. The occupation forces' withdrawal was the key requirement of any solution. Only a settlement which was ultimately endorsed by the people of Afghanistan and which look fully into account their right to self-determination would make lasting peace and stability in the area possible. The Ten were prepared to support any constructive initiative aimed at a satisfactory political solution.

The United States said that Soviet forces had launched ruthless campaigns against the general populace--levelling entire villages, burning harvests, killing livestock and taking reprisals against Afghan civilians. Those forces had used chemical and toxic weapons against freedom-fighters and civilians in contravention of international law and agreements, and human decency. The Soviets also continued to use booby-trapped mines disguised as toys, cigarette packs, pens and other household objects in violation of an international convention, which they had signed in 1981, prohibiting the use of such weapons.

The Soviet invasion and occupation was a blatant example of imperialist expansion and the fulfilment of a long-standing Soviet goal of obtaining warm-water ports on the Indian Ocean, the United States said. Moscow had unilaterally invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and installed a puppet regime there. Its claim that it was invited by an established Government had been concocted after the invasion. The Soviet assertion that it sent its forces to beat back American, Chinese and other foreign invaders was "absurd and unsubstantiated'. Moscow's argument that it was fighting outside interference was valid only if one considered Afghans to be outsiders in their own country. Moscow was attempting to make Afghanistan a subservient satellite, with 105,000 Soviet troops "wreaking death and destruction upon an unyielding Afghan citizenry'.

Real Soviet intentions were further underscored by its efforts to absorb Afghanistan economically and culturally into the Soviet empire, the United States said. Efforts to reshape Afghan culture in a Marxist-Leninist mold indicated the total absence of popular support for the Soviet occupation and Babrak Karmal's puppet regime. As a result, the Soviets and their surrogates had had to exert control through brute force and terror.

With the Soviet invasion of 1979, a totalitarian, one-party State ruled by the Afghan communists had given way to a totalitarian apparatus completely controlled by the Soviet Union. The Soviet client regime's tenuous control extended only over parts of some major cities. Defections from the Afghan army to the resistance equalled inductions into the army. The use of force by the Soviet Union was without legal foundation and lacked any reasonable moral or political justification; it was an oppressor and a foreign aggressor, not a liberator.

The Soviet Union, the United States said, had bombed hospitals established by French doctors in an effort to drive them out of the country. Moscow gave no sign that it had any intention of withdrawing its forces in the foreseeable future. Moscow's argument that Afghans had exercised their right of self-determination through the "so-called Great Saur Revolution of April 1979', thus precluding the need for free elections, was "ludicrous'.

The United States supported the search for a negotiated political settlement and the Secretary-General's efforts to find such a settlement. The Soviet Union alone could ensure the success of the United Nations talks by committing itself to a timetable for the total withdrawal of its troops.

India stressed the need to prevent the escalation of tensions in South-West Asia and to take all action to defuse them. What needed to be done most urgently was to work for the evolution of a political solution based on a dialogue between the parties directly involved, whose co-operation was essential to prevent the situation from escalating.

Such an approach should look towards an eventual settlement taking into account all factors relevant to the present situation. A political solution should be based on certain commonly acceptable elements, of which the most important were the complete cessation of all interference and intervention in the internal affairs of States, opposition to the presence of foreign troops in any country and the furnishing of reliable and complete guarantees against all forms of interference.

India said the consensus on South-West Asia adopted by the seventh summit conference of Non-Aligned countries, held in New Delhi in March 1983, remained valid and provided guidelines for action. Notwithstanding differences and difficulties which persisted, India trusted that all concerned would demonstrate a disposition to reach, through negotiations, a comprehensive settlement that would lay the foundation for the promotion of good-neighbourly relations and co-operation among the States in the area and for strengthening international peace and security in the region.