California high court endorses broad definition of 'disability'.

In a ruling that clarified the scope of California's legal protections for the disabled, the state supreme court recently affirmed that the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) defines physical disability more broadly than the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The February decision in Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc., resolved inconsistencies in appellate court rulings on the definition of physical disability under California law. (130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662 (2003).)

The ruling is "a big deal for those in California," said Erwin Chemerinsky, a law professor and civil rights expert at the University of Southern California. "Many people who can gain recovery in California could not get it under [the ADA]."

Francisco Colmenares had worked as a general laborer at the Braemar Country Club for 25 years when he was fired in 1997. In 1981, he had hurt his back at work, and Braemar assigned him lighter duties. The next year, Colmenares was made a foreman of a golf course maintenance crew, a position that accommodated his back injury. He received several good performance reviews and raises until 1995, when a new supervisor began giving him poor reviews. In 1997, Colmenares was reassigned to a clubhouse construction project that involved heavy labor. Two months later, he was fired for "deficiencies in his work performance."

Colmenares sued Braemar for violating the FEHA, alleging discrimination based on a physical disability, among other claims. The trial court granted Braemar's motion for summary judgment, finding that Colmenares had failed to make a prima facie showing of physical disability. Colmenares appealed. While his case was pending, the Prudence Kay Poppink Act, an amendment to the FEHA, took effect. It clarified that under the FEHA, a person is physically disabled when he or she suffers from a physiological ailment that "limits a major life activity." This definition did not include the word "substantially"; the ADA requires that a disability "substantially limit one or more... major life activities."

The court of appeals held that the Poppink Act's definition did not apply to Colmenares's case because he had been fired before the act's effective date. Instead, the court found that the FEHA incorporated the ADA's narrower definition of physical disability. Colmenares had conceded that his back did not substantially limit his ability to perform his job, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. (107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (Ct. App. 2001).)

However, two months later, a different division of the same court held in Wittkopf v. County of Los Angeles that the FEHA required only a "mere" limitation, rather than a substantial one. (109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (Ct. App. 2001).) The California Supreme Court agreed to settle the issue.

Finding for Colmenares, the court concluded that the FEHA "does not require the federal test's substantial limitation of a major life activity." The Poppink Act's enactment date was a moot point, the court said; the act clarified language that had always been a part of the FEHA but had been misinterpreted over the years in the wake of the ADA.

"California has its own language; it does not rely on federal law," said Linda Kilb, an attorney with the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund in Berkeley, California, who briefed and argued Colmenares. Since the standard for a disability in California has been clarified, she said, a case that raises the question of a plaintiff's disability is more likely to succeed under the broader FEHA than under the ADA.