CONTROL AND RESISTANCE AT LOCAL- LEVEL INSTITUTIONS: A STUDY OF KAFR YASSIF'S LOCAL COUNCIL UNDER THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

INTRODUCTION

ALTHOUGH LOCAL-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS are known to play a fundamental role both in the trickle down of State power and in local resistance to the State, little attention has been paid to the circumstances surrounding the establishment and functioning of Arab local authorities in Israel during their formative stages. Rather, most researchers who have dealt with Arab local authorities have tended to concentrate on later periods or have made generalizations regarding the role local authorities played in the institutionalization of Israeli control over the Palestinian minority. In the period 1950-1954, the State initiated a process of establishing local governments in Arab localities and of reactivating the authorities that had existed prior to 1948. The municipalities of Nazareth and Shafa-'Amr and the local council of Kafr Yassif were reactivated during the early 50s, [1] and by 1965 the State had already established thirty-eight local authorities. Approximately 70 percent of all Palestinians lived within the boun daries of these thirty-eight localities. [2]

Landau (1969) has described the establishment of Arab local authorities as part of a State-sponsored modernization plan for the minority, as well as a venue for promoting relations between the State and the minority. [3] However, in his opinion, the trickle down effect of modernization was hampered by the local social structures. The rivalries between the different clans (Hamula) spoiled the progression of modernization.

In contradistinction to Landau's thesis, Nakhleh (1975) maintains that the structure of Palestinian communities experienced fundamental changes following the inauguration of local councils. Local power shifted from clans to factions, which did not follow the traditional clan or religious lines. The hegemonic party MAPAI (the Land of Israel Workers' Party), and, later on, other Zionist parties - such as the National Religious Party (MAFDAL) - managed to manipulate these divisions in order to further their goals, i.e., gaining influence and securing a percentage of the Arab vote in the general elections. [4] According to Nakhleh, the intrusion of the Zionist parties into local-level politics created a reality wherein the Palestinians faced three political options:

1) To respond to the official encouragement of "assimilating" into existing national Zionist parties and seek the rewards of such assimilation, namely, maximization of personal interest....

2) To recognize this pressure and opt for actual isolation from the entire political process.

3) To understand this process and follow the path which has proved to be the most dangerous in terms of one's source of livelihood, one's personal freedom, etc. Although counterproductive in terms of personal material rewards, the choice of criticizing and publicly opposing this process is positive in that it provides the potential for the development of collective consciousness. [5]

Nakhleh (1975) delineates the dilemma that Palestinians had, and, in some ways, continue to face. Under many circumstances, they have been compelled to choose between their personal well-being and their deep political convictions. The factors that influence the exact shape of this dilemma, however, are not fixed. He points to various changes--a generational change in which the young are less compromising than the older generations, the transformation of the bulk of the Palestinian workforce from peasants to wage laborers, and a gradual decline in MAPAI's hegemony, which influences the outcome.

The main findings of Nakhleh's anthropological research--the communal fragmentation and the increased rivalries following the establishment of local councils and the intrusion of MAPAI into local politics--were corroborated by archival data uncovered about a decade after the publication of his research. Segev (1984) quotes the following top-secret memorandum from 1959, which exposes the official policy regarding the establishment of Arab local authorities:

The government's policy... has sought to divide the Arab population into diverse communities and regions.... The municipality status of Arab villages, and the competitive spirit of local elections deepened the divisions inside the villages. [6]

In the rest of this article I will analyze the functioning of Kafr Yassif's local council, which was fundamentally different from the ones in Ramah and Beit-Jann. This local council served as an arena of struggle between MAPAI and its local followers on the one hand, and the nationalist-communist coalition (NCC) headed by the mayor Yani Yani on the other. The first section offers a brief history of Kafr Yassif local council. The second describes the local council under the mayor Yani Yani, a period in which the NCC was triumphant. Moreover, I offer an analysis of the NCC's ideology and the way it was propagated. Although this ideology was wider in its scope and implications than Kafr Yassif, it eventually affected the local council and its functioning. Section three reveals MAPAI's tactics of fighting the NCC and its endeavors to unseat and discredit Mr. Yani. The fourth section discusses the struggle after Yani's s departure, while section five analyzes the short-term legacy of this struggle.

Although Nakhleh's research is pioneering and his findings are relevant to most Palestinian villages in Israel during the 1950s, 60s and even 70s, it suffers from two shortcomings. First, Nakhleh does not pay attention to the human agent as a carrier of consciousness. For Nakhleh, consciousness evolves along with various economic and political changes. This evolutionary interpretation could give the erroneous impression that those who experienced the tragic disintegration of Palestinian society in 1948 were either devoid of nationalist consciousness or failed to give expression to it in the public sphere. Second, the villages Nakhleh studied -- Ramah and Beit-Jann -- are representative of many but not all Palestinian villages in Israel. Indeed, the presentation of com munities where MAPAI's policy of co-opting local leaders and instigating conflicts between various factions was successful creates the impression that resistance to the State at the local institutional level during this period was theoretical. However, Nakhleh conducted his research when much of the archival material was not yet available and the critical investigation of State policy was still in its initial stages. In fact, Nakhleh himself was one of the academic pioneers who began to develop an alternative to the official paradigm.

KAFR YASSIF'S LOCAL COUNCIL

Kafr Yassif was an unusual case among Arab villages in one major respect. It was the only village with an elected local authority, which continued to exist after the establishment of the State of Israel. Its local authority was established by the Mandatory Government on 1 December 1925. Yani Kustandi Yani served as mayor from 1933 to 1948. The Israeli Government reactivated the local authority on 5 June 1951, after a hiatus of three years. The first elections under Israeli rule were held on 26 January 1954.

Despite the dramatic changes in the political environment, an alliance between the Communist Party and a Nationalist Group (Kafr Yassif List) headed by Mr. Yani won a majority of seats in the council, thus resulting in Yani's reelection. He was able to maintain the confidence of the majority of council members, despite the successive elections and the change in representatives, and to stay in office until his death in l962. [7] The period of Yani's service was characterized by a fierce struggle not only between NCC and MAPAI, the hegemonic political force in Israel, but also between two opposing ideologies and conceptions regarding the position of the Palestinian minority in Israel. In order to discuss this conflict, I will begin by describing the NCC's ideology, and then I will go on to present MAPAI's fight against the NCC's orientation.

YANI AS MAYOR: THE PRACTICE OF A NATIONALIST VISION

NCC, headed by Yani, viewed the Arabs in Israel as a part of the Palestinian people. Its struggle was characterized by a high public profile, and its aim was to bolster the political position of the Arabs in Israel. According to the NCC's conception, the Palestinians in Israel should be considered a national minority with an Arab identity and orientation. This attitude found expression in the numerous letters that Yani sent to state officials, in his public statements, as well as in his political behavior. The alliance that Yani established with the representatives of the Communist Party in the local council--the party that MAPAI considered its bitter antagonist in the Arab sector--was a constant source of irritation to MAPAI and state officials. More significantly however, Yani, as head of NCC, considered himself to be a representative of and spokesperson for all Palestinians in Israel.

NCC's political orientation manifested itself most clearly in two areas which were of grave concern to the Palestinian minority during the 1950s and early 1960s: the State's massive confiscation of Arab-owned land and the State's harsh treatment of Arab youths who attempted to flee to neighboring Arab countries. For example, on 8 March 1962 Yani sent a letter to the Israeli Prime Minister, with additional copies addressed to the Ministers of Interior, Construction, Agriculture, and Finance, the Speaker of the Knesset, all of the parties in the Knesset, and to the newspapers, protesting the confiscation of 5500 dunams owned by residents of the villages of Bi'neh, Dayr Al-Assad and Nahef. This land was used to establish the Jewish town of Karme,el. [8] In his letter, he wrote that Kafr Yassif's local authority decided to:

1) Protest against the decision regarding the confiscation.

2) To support the residents of the three villages, Bi'neh, Dayr Al-Assad and Nahaf, in their struggle to revoke the confiscation decision mentioned above and to call upon the authorities to stop the confiscation of lands owned by the Arabs in Israel.

3) To appeal to the Jewish public [asking them] to support the residents of the three villages so that they could keep their land and their source of livelihood, and to endeavor to abrogate the confiscation decision mentioned above. [9]

Undeterred by security considerations to which Israel attaches utmost importance and which it covers with a veil of secrecy, Mr. Yani raised the issue of Arab youths who attempted to cross the borders and enter the Arab states. His treatment of the subject was characterized by both humane concern for the youths and a criticism of the State's policy. Following the killing of five Arab youths - from Haifa, Sakhnin and Um al-Fahim - in 1961, who were shot-dead by the Israeli army while they were trying to cross the border into the Gaza strip, he sent a letter to the politicians and ministers concerned: the Speaker of the Knesset, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Police and the Minister of Interior. Among other things, he wrote:

In its meeting of 26.9.1961, our local council discussed the incident in which five Arab youths were killed.... We decided to strongly condemn the killing of these five youths, and to express our astonishment at the way in which the killing was carried out. Our council particularly condemns the mutilation of the bodies of these youth, if what has been reported is correct. We call for the establishment of a popular (Arab-Jewish) committee of investigation to examine the rumors which surround this incident....

We condemn the slogans, hostile to the State, which were used in the demonstrations protesting the killing of the five youths, if the reports on this are accurate. . . . We call upon the authorities to deal with the problem of illegal border crossing by creating employment opportunities for the workers and the educated, and the abolition of [existing forms of] discrimination and oppression.

Our council condemns all forms of racist incitement. .. [particularly those] which have resulted in attacks carried out by Jews against Arab workers in Acre's [central] bus station in the last few days. Our council condemns these attacks and calls upon the authorities to take legal action... [against the attackers] and to prevent the recurrence of such events.... [10]

In this letter, NCC accuses the State of creating the conditions that led Arab youths to attempt to cross the borders. Contrary to the media and the Israeli officials who argued that these acts were motivated by nationalist beliefs, NCC points to the State's policies of discrimination and oppression. Moreover, the letter expresses doubts regarding the official version of the above-mentioned incident and calls for the establishment of a popular committee. Racist attacks carried out against Arabs are also mentioned, and an accusation is leveled against the State for not seriously attempting to curb them.

A clear articulation of the NCC's political attitude can be found in Mr. Yani's public letter to the Prime Minister concerning pronouncements made by Mr. Uri Lubrani, the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs. In a press conference held on 30 July 1960, Uri Lubrani accused Arabs in Israel of endeavoring to undermine State security. In his letter Yani wrote:

Our council views the statement by Mr. Lubrani, your advisor on Arab Affairs, as constituting a serious blow to the amiable relations between the two peoples of this country, and a means of fomenting hatred and animosity between them. Moreover, it constitutes incitement against a people whose only sin is being Arab, a people who desire to live in freedom and dignity in their homeland. It also aims to justify the policy of oppression and subjugation imposed on the Arabs. [11]

The tone of this letter is unusual, and, in many ways, unique. While the Arab representatives under the Military Government were accustomed to employing all kinds of exaggeration in praise of the State, Yani dared to speak truth to the ruling power. The concepts of oppression, subjugation and the existence of a dignified people which he invoked were not part of the Arab public discourse at the time. They only appeared in clandestine leaflets, or in publications of the Communist Party and the Popular Front.

NCC's defiant attitude also manifested itself in political action. In 1958, the Israeli Government decided to celebrate, in nationwide festivities, the 10th anniversary of independence. The Arab citizens were ordered to take part in the celebrations. The governing coalition of Kafr Yassif's local council, nevertheless, decided not to participate. In explaining its decision, the council argued that it could not take part in the celebrations while Arabs continued to live under the yoke of the Military Government. [12] Communist Party members mentioned additional reasons, including the Kafr Qassim massacre that the Israeli army had carried out on the eve of Suez War in 1956, and the demolition of houses belonging to Palestinians who were then transferred from their villages to neighboring localities. [13] However, the Kafr Yassif local council's decision was reversed following immense pressure employed by the State. Yet the retreat was not total. The letter that Yani sent to the Department of "Illumination and Enlightenment" reveals that the celebration's program was kept to a minimum. [14]

Another clear example of NCC's defiance was the local council's decision regarding the employment of teachers that was made at the beginning of the 1960/1961 academic year. Teachers whom the Ministry of Education sent to the local secondary school were rejected. Instead, the council hired Botros Daleh, a graduate of the Hebrew University, who was known for his patriotic stand. [15] This decision exemplifies the conflict between the State's policy towards the Arabs and NCC's ideology. State and MAPAI agencies, including the Office of the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs, the security services (Shin Bet), and MAPAI's Arab Department viewed the employment of young educated Arabs in the educational system as a way of co-opting them. Consequently, the status of the teachers rapidly declined. The teachers were viewed as informers, or at best cowards and hypocrites. [16] In this regard, Kafr Yassif local council's decision represented a resistance to this policy.

Yani's most direct challenge to MAPAI's hegemony, however, was courageously articulated through his activities as a founding member and chairperson of, and chief spokesperson for, the national group, "The Popular Front", which was established on 6 July 1958. [17] The intention of the Popular Front was to become a nationwide alliance between the nationalists and the communists, which could then represent the Palestinian minority rather than having it rely on the Arab Knesset members affiliated with Zionist parties and decadent dignitaries. The Front was established following the repressive police response to the May First demonstrations held in Nazareth and Um-al-Fahim during which 350 Arabs were arrested. [18]

The Military Governor tried to prevent the Front's inauguratory meeting, which was due to take place in Acre, by imposing movement restrictions on 37 of the leading public figures. [19] Yani was among these leaders and was ordered to appear at police headquarters twice a day for a week. Moreover, he was denied freedom of movement for a month. In his speech, which was read in absentia, he reiterated NCC's political vision mentioned above: "Our situation is deteriorating, therefore we must unite in order to ensure a future life of freedom and dignity. The Arabs are willing to establish friendly relations with the Jews." [20]

In addition, Yani initiated the establishment of a Front branch in his village--the second such branch, the first one having been established in Nazareth--to serve the neighboring villages. In the inaugural ceremony, he urged the participants not to be deterred by the Military Government's restrictions and to act with resoluteness. He also emphasized that the Front represented an independent organization and was not an arm of the Communist Party as the Government and the Israeli press was claiming. [21] The last message would be repeated several times before the Front's disintegration in early 1959.

The Front's self-fashioning as a representative of the "Arab People in Israel" was threatening to the representatives of the Jewish State in general and to MAPAI's hegemony more specifically. The Front's demands were wide-ranging. They included the abolishment of movement restrictions, the return of the refugees (inside Israel) to their villages of origin, an end to existing forms of discrimination in the labor market against Arab workers and academics, an end to the confiscation of Arab-owned land, a termination of the dual judicial system in which Arabs were tried in military courts while Jews were tried in civilian courts, the hastening of the legal procedures - which had been underway for two years--against the commanders and soldiers who were suspected of carrying out the Kafr Qassim massacre. In addition to these local demands, the Front called for the Palestinian refugees' repatriation. [22] The Front also published a bulletin composed of four articles in which suggestions for resolving specific Arab complaints were detailed. These relate to the Islamic endowments, waqf, education, and the status of the Islamic courts. [23]

MAPAI'S RESPONSE

The lives of the Arab dissidents during this period were tenuous at best. This was due to the Military Government, under which the Arabs lived in conditions of isolation, misinformation, and disempowerment. The Military Governors enjoyed almost absolute control of Arabs' lives. The Zionist parties, principally MAPAI, endeavored to control the Arabs through their bureaucrats who specialized in Arab affairs.

MAPAI's fight against NCC and its endeavors to unseat Yani were conducted via the Military Government, the apparatuses of the party, and the Histadrut. Already by the mid-1950s, a MAPAI envoy was sent to meet with the deputy mayor, Raja Jiryis. [24] The emissary reported that he had not been successful in establishing common ground with Jiryis, for he had demanded the abolishment of the Military Government in Kafr Yassif and substantial reductions in the taxes imposed on the residents. In October 1958, the Military Government banished three dissidents from Kafr Yassif, sent them to Safad, and withdrew the travel permits of all Popular Front members. [25] Without these permits they could not travel outside the village to work. As mentioned earlier, a movement restriction order was also issued to Yani himself.

In 1957/58, MAPAI joined forces with MAPAM in its endeavor to unseat the mayor. On 29 April 1957 Mussa Bassal, MAPAM's representative in the council, left the coalition and his position as deputy mayor. In his public letter of resignation he accused the council and the mayor of inefficiency in the levying of taxes, and of sluggishness in the carrying out of development projects. [26] In the Labor Party's archives there is a document from the Minorities Department of the Interior Ministry that gives a detailed account of Kafr Yassif's 1956/57 budget. [27] Yet I could not establish a definite connection between this document and the letter of resignation. On 12 October 1958, the representatives of the two parties asked Yani to convene a council meeting in order to vote on their non-confidence motion. [28] This call came as a result of negotiations that had been underway since May 1957; the goal of these negotiations had been to establish an alternative coalition. [29]

After the 1960 elections, MAPAI tried to weaken Yani through its support of council member Fawzi Khuri. Amnon Linn, one of MAPAI's senior bureaucrats in charge of Arab affairs, persuaded Khuri to file a complaint to the High Court of Justice. [30] The court ruled in Yani's favor and ordered Khuri to pay a fine. MAPAI paid a fine of 150 Israeli Lira (pound). [31] Amnon Linn wrote to his superior, Yackov 'Aini, suggesting that MAPAI pay the costs. In a side note he wrote, "You promised him". [32] Interestingly, Fawzi Khuri later decided to join the NCC.

Of all the councils Yani served in as mayor, the council that emerged after the 1960 election was the most inconvenient for him. NCC won only 4 out of the council's 9 seats. The representatives of MAPAM and MAPAI won two and three seats respectively. Yani was reelected due to the conflict between his rivals. The senior bureaucrats of MAPAI and MAPAM stepped in and tried to achieve their goals, which had been laid out in an aborted coalition agreement.

They had agreed to form a new coalition and that the position of mayor would be filled by rotation between the heads of their lists--each serving one half of the term. Beyond the local and technical issues, Article 10 of the agreement states, "It is agreed that the council will not deal with national political subjects and will confine its activities to the municipal level." According to Article 11, the highest authority to adjudicate in cases of disagreement would be the Municipal Section of the Executive Committee of the Histadrut. Article 12 states that the agreement requires the ratification of the parties' representatives, Yackov 'Aini of MAPAI and Simha Flapan of MAPAM. [33] This agreement reveals two things: first, MAPAI's endeavor to prevent the emergence of a national leadership among the Palestinian minority; and second, the strategy of the Zionist parties, principally MAPAI and MAPAM, whose goal was to manage local Arab affairs through their functionaries.

MAPAI's fight against Yani also took a personal turn. In a document composed by MAPAI functionaries and including important data on the village, they wrote, "The social worker, Violet Khuri, the mayor's wife, is known to be a nationalist. In accordance with our request, she was transferred from Kafr Yassif to the (village of) Ramah, following a lengthy investigation of her case." [34]

THE STRUGGLE AFTER YANI'S DEATH

Yani Yani died on 1 August 1962 without leaving a successor who had leadership qualities and who could successfully mobilize the residents. A power struggle erupted in the NCC soon after his death. [35] Thus, MAPAT's functionaries had their long-awaited opportunity. Although their supporters were disunited, [36] they were able to lay down a strategy, which eventually allowed the MAPAI's affiliated The United Block (AI-Kutlah al-Muwahada) to form the governing coalition in Kafr Yassif's local council for the first time. This strategy was coordinated in two meetings of MAPAL's Arab Department functionaries, which were held on 3 November 1963 and 10 February 1964. In the first meeting they discussed the establishment of an Islamic list, which would exist alongside the United Block. To secure its influence, they decided to obtain a State grant of 1,000 Israeli Lira in order to build a mosque in the village. [37] In the second meeting they discussed their relation to the Islamic List, which had been established b y this time, and to MAPAM. Simha Flapan, MAPAM's representative in charge of Arab affairs, promised MAPAI's functionaries that after the elections MAPAM would only form a coalition with their party. [38]

Moreover, MAPAT's tactics of manipulating the religious sentiments of the Arabs in Israel was translated on the local level into religious rhetoric. In the 1964 election campaigns of both the Islamic List and the United Block religious motifs and slogans were predominant. For example, the leaflet of the Islamic List began with the title, "In the Name of God" and was followed by Koranic verses, in which the Moslems were called upon to unite. Moreover, the first two objectives on the List's program were sectarian. They promised to complete the building of the mosque by acquiring government assistance and to outlaw pig rearing. [39] The United Block followed suit; a poem outlining its platform states that: "This day is the day of liberty, of strong unity against infidelity, faithlessness and Communist anarchy. Today we unite. We promise each other, in the presence of God, to mutually support each other, Muslims and Christians. ... We want progress and construction, streets with light [electricity]... [40]

This change of rhetoric touches on two fundamental issues relating to the relations between the State and the Palestinian minority. These two issues are the collective identity of the Palestinians and their political position. NCC viewed the Arabs in Israel as a national Palestinian-Arab minority, a group that desired to live in dignity in its homeland and in peace with the Jewish majority. Moreover, as such a minority, the Palestinians should be given equal treatment by the State. MAPAI's outlook was diametrically opposed to this. Israel was viewed as a single nationality State and the non-Jews were a collection of religious and cultural groups: Muslims, Christians, Druze and Bedouins. Therefore, the non-Jews--as a heterogeneous group--could not speak in one voice. In addition, Israel had been established to realize Zionist-Jewish aspirations. The needs, demands and objectives of the non-Jews were therefore subordinate to those of the Jews. [4]

MAPAI endeavored to enlist the local population's support by signaling--not just in words but also in deeds-that the promises vis-a-vis local issues would be carried out. For example, in an act of public visibility, Jabr Dahish Mu'adi, a Knesset member in an Arab list affiliated to MAPAI, pursued the issue of pig rearing with the Ministry of Interior. He sent a letter to the deputy Minister of Interior about the legality of pig rearing in Kafr Yassif and the ways it could be stopped. [42] Moreover, State officials, Arab public figures known for their collaboration with the State and MAPAI, and Jewish functionaries took part in the election campaign of the United Block. Ministers were sent to promise that the public projects the State had refrained from carrying out during the Yani years would now be implemented.

Thus, in the second meeting of MAPAI's functionaries, they decided to hold a public meeting on 22 February 1964, which Minister Shitret would attend. Shitret was an oriental Jew who had been appointed in the first Israeli government as a minister for "Minorities' Affairs" and who, due to his position, personality and knowledge of Arabic, had won the confidence of some sections of the Palestinian population. Furthermore, it was decided that another public meeting would be held on 7 March 1964 and would be attended by the Minister AI-Mogie, who would disclose plans of connecting the village to the electricity grid and initiating a public housing project. Other figures associated with MAPAI who participated in the elections campaign included Sief al-Deen alZu'bi, the mayor of Nazareth, Muhammad Hbeshi, the deputy mayor of Acre, Muhammad Shabaan, a member of the workers' council of Acre, and Amnon Linn, a senior party functionary. [43] Both the United Block and the Islamic List raised local issues, such as conne cting of the village to the national electricity grid, the paving of roads, the building of schools, and enlarging the area under the municipality's jurisdiction.

THE LEGACY OF THE STORMY YEARS

Today, given the historical perspective and our access to hitherto closed MAPAI archives, it might be possible to place the ideology of Yani and that of his adversaries in the history of the emergence and evolution of a national consciousness among the Palestinians in Israel. However, in the following pages I will confine my discussion to the immediate aftermath of Yani's departure from the political scene.

The 1964 elections were the first ones to be held after Yani's death. They resulted in substantial gains for MAPAI affiliated lists. The United Block headed by Rafeq Shehadeh won two seats, and the Islamic list also won two seats. MAPAM and the list affiliated with the National Religious Party (MAFDAL) each won a single seat. NCC won only three seats. [44] Despite these results, it was not easy for the United Block to form a stable coalition. Therefore, MAPAI functionaries had to resort to bribery. They reached an agreement with representatives of the MAFDAL, which stipulated, among other things, that MAPAI would be required to pay a monthly installment of 300 Israeli Lira to the MAFDAL's representative until a job was found for him. This agreement is extraordinary in one other respect. The local representatives themselves were not part of it. Rather, it was reached and signed by Jewish functionaries of the above-mentioned parties, and the agreement was composed entirely in Hebrew. [45] The implementation wa s also dependent upon the signatories. Yackov 'Aini sent a letter to MAPAI's secretary Reouvin Barekit informing him of the deal and asking him to make the payments. [46]

Subsequently, Jewish functionaries of Zionist parties began to make all of the main decisions concerning Kafr Yassif's local affairs. Rafeq Shehadeh, the new mayor, was an old and ailing man. He was aware of the limits of his role. His first "significant" letter in his capacity as mayor was sent to Reouvin Barekit thanking him for his support. Beyond the courtesy and politeness, which are usually included in such letters, it resonates with an admission of his powerlessness and dependency. Among other things he wrote:

With great pleasure I received your letter, in which you congratulate us for our victory and the forming of the new coalition in Kafr Yassif. I am most thankful for your efforts in this regard. I became head of this coalition thanks to your efforts and the efforts of our great party, MAPAI. I will fulfill my role in this coalition to the best of my ability. I am counting on your good-will to help me fulfill my duty to develop the village.... [47]

The new mayor basically states here that he owed his position, first and foremost, to MAPAI and its functionaries. Moreover, he acknowledges that his success was dependent upon their support. Yani Yani would never have composed such a letter. The legitimacy of his leadership rested on the support of the residents.

After Yani's death, Kafr Yassif was still without various public utilities, such as electricity, roads, schools and a zoning plan. However, under Yani's leadership the residents were not willing to trade their national consciousness for the developmental needs of their village. The new representatives were aware of this reality. Publicly, they could not ignore the discourse that was dominant during Yani's years. While they were trying to change such rhetoric, from time to time they were forced to employ some of its vocabulary.

An examination of the discussions on the guidelines of the coalition reveals the way in which such rhetoric was utilized and manipulated. These discussions yielded two documents. The first, "The Program of the Coalition for the Management of Kafr Yassif's Council" [48] is long and detailed. It reflects the main demands and interests of the partners and includes 32 articles. The articles are arranged according to decreasing significance. The guidelines begin with the objective of ending pig rearing, and then go on to detail other local objectives, such as the building of schools, the paving of new roads, the building of a playground for the children etc. Article 23 begins to address objectives of a collective nature mentioned; i.e., it mentions the goal of transferring decision power vis-a-vis Islamic endowments from the State to the Moslem citizens of Israel. Article 24 emphasizes the goal of obliterating the Military Government; Article 26 mentions the struggle for a just solution to the problem of the inte rnal refugees; Article 29 calls for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem through peaceful negotiations between the parties; and Article 31 mentions the struggle for World peace and for peace in the Middle East. This document illustrates the change in orientation; that is, the demands and objectives were clearly focused on local affairs.

The second document, "The Political Program of Kafr Yassif's Coalition," [49] is an abridged version of the first and includes 9 broad guidelines. However, the priorities and emphasis are reversed. Only one article deals with local issues; Article 3 states the objective of developing the village and of building public utilities that already existed in other settlements. The rest of the articles deal with issues that had been given a low priority in the first policy statement. These include the struggle for the abolition of the Military Government, the achievement of equality between all citizens of Israel, the end to land confiscations etc. It seems that it was composed to help project a nationalist image for the new coalition, in other words, to pay lip service to the discourse that had prevailed during the Yani years. Indeed, in its meeting of 4 June 1964, the council unanimously decided to demand the abolishment of the Military Government, and the mayor communicated this decision to the Prime Minister. [5 0] However, to prevent a situation whereby nationalist rhetoric might get out of hand, two guidelines were added at the end of the Political Program. First, the political principles were not binding for MAPAPI representatives, and second, disagreement over any of these articles were not to affect the coalition's composition.

CONCLUSION

An examination of the history of Kafr Yassif during the 1950s and early l960s reveals a socio-political reality that has been noticeably absent from the prevailing analyses of the political behavior of Palestinians in Israel, particularly from the discussions concentrating on this period. The Palestinians have been described as an object of either State-sponsored modernization or of its coercive power. This article illustrates that these conceptions are fundamentally inadequate. The Palestinians, through collaboration, resistance or detachment from politics, have indeed been the subjects of history. Although living under unfavorable conditions, they have always influenced their history. NCC, headed by Yani developed an ideology and a method of political struggle that outraged MAPAI's leaders. Yani, NCC members, and the village residents were punished for this struggle, on both the personal as well as on the collective level. However, the influence of NCC's ideas and method of struggle has been long-lasting. Three issues were laid down in the struggle discussed in this paper, and these issues were of the utmost significance for the emergence of the Palestinians in Israel as a national minority.

First, the conceptualization of a multifaceted Palestinian collective identity developed, and this conceptualization has become predominant, especially since the mid 1970s. An identity emerged which managed to unite the pre- and post-1948 Palestinian existence within what was to become Israel, and the Palestinians inside Israel and the refugees. The indigenous component of this collective identity is also emphasized. Yani Yani highlighted the fact that the Palestinians live in their own homeland, and that they should be allowed to live in dignity and freedom, thus opposing the identity which MAPAI endeavored to create for them - an identity made up of a collection of minorities which lacked a coherent national history.

Second, a political reality was created in which local level institutions began to be used not only as an arm of the State but also as a possible venue for empowerment and resistance. Indeed, Yani Yani created a new role for the mayor, a role that extended beyond the local duties of managing local education, health etc. to include issues of a collective nature, such as land confiscation and allocation, and refugees. This expanded definition of the mayoral role was only adopted by Arab mayors in 1976 when they established the Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Authorities; ironically this committee was established with the assistance of the Prime Minister's advisor on Arab Affairs, Shmouel Toledano. This committee has played a vital role since 1976 in the bolstering of Palestinians' demands for equality and in supporting the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

Third, new methods and venues of political activities were tested. That is, there was an exploration of the horizons of struggle that could be waged under the Israeli regime. Indeed, the Palestinians had to invent their modes of political struggle, particularly the extra-parliamentary forms, and NCC made pioneering steps in this direction.

In addition to these substantive conclusions, two methodological implications are worth pointing to. First, sweeping generalizations or the selection of data in accordance with a pre-determined paradigm cannot substitute for a thorough investigation of the historical facts. Second, the dialectical nature of historical processes should receive careful considerations. The Israeli method of dividing the Palestinians by manipulating their religious sentiments eventually gave rise to religious feelings, which are now far beyond the regime's ability to control or accommodate them.

Ahmad H. Sa'di teaches in the Department of Politics and Government at BenGurion University of the Negev.

ENDNOTES

(1.) Majid Al-Haj & Henry Rosenfeld; Arab Local Government in Israel, (Tel-Aviv: International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1988), 26.

(2.) Ibid., 28.

(3.) Jacob Landau, The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 156-161.

(4.) Khalil Nakhleh, "The Direction of Local-Level Conflict in Two Palestinian Villages in Israel", American Ethnologist, 2 (1975).

(5.) Ibid., 513-514.

(6.) Tom Segev, 1948- First Israelis, (Jerusalem: Domino, 1984, in Hebrew), 78.

(7.) "The local Authority of Kafr Yassif", Undated, Labor Party Archive in Beit-Berl, (Here after LPA), Files, 26-14-23. Also "Kafr Yassif, 1.7.1963", LPA, 26-14-23.

(8.) Regarding the establishment of Karme'el, see e.g. Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 109-111.

(9.) Yani Yani, "Letter to: His Excellency the Prime Minister Jerusalem, 8.3.1962", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(10.) Yani Yani "Letter to: Their Excellency; The Minister of Defense, The Minister of Police and The Minister of Interior, 29.9.1961", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(11.) Yani Yani, "Letter to: His Excellency, The Prime Minister, 15.10.1960", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(12.) Information on this position is found in Kusa's letter to Kafr Yassif's local council. Elias Kusa, "Letter to: The Honorable Persons, the Mayor and the Council Members of Kafr Yassif, 4.4.1958", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(13.) Yaqub Daoud wrote reports on the major events that take place in Kafr Yassif and sent them to the functionaries of MAPAI. On the pronouncements of Communist Party members concerning the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of Israel's Independence see Yaqub Daoud, "Report on the Meeting of the Communist Party in Kafr Yassif, 1.3.1958", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(14.) Yani Yani, "Letter to the Head of the Department of Illumination and Enlightening, undated", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(15.) "An Extreme Nationalist Teacher in the Secondary School in Kafr Yassif', Davar, 24 October 1960.

(16.) On the status of Arab teachers see e.g. Ian Lustick, Arabs in The Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority, (Austin: Texas University Press, 1980), Chapter Seven; also Walid Sadik, "Towards a Change in Educational Policy", New Oulook, 27 (1984), 58-59.

(17.) K. Amnon, "MKI (The Communist Party) and Arab Nationalists are Expected to Announce the Establishment of the 'Front' Today", Al-Hamishmar, 6 July 1958; "Restriction Orders Were Issued to the Leaders Who Initiated the Establishment of the 'Arab Front'", Ha'artez, 7 July 1958.

(18.) K. Amnon, "MKI (The Communist Party) and Arab Nationalists are Expected to Announce the Establishment of the 'Front' Today", Al-Hamishmar, 6 July 1958.

(19.) "Restriction Orders Were Issued to the Leaders Who Initiated the Establishment of the 'Arab Front'", Ha'artez, 7 July 1958. The causes which led to the Front's establishment and the reaction of the Military Governor are also detailed in "Communique: The Popular Front, The Executive Committee, undated", LPA, Files, 26-14-9.

(20.) K. Amnon, "An Arab Nationalist Front Was Established by MKI", Al-Hamishmar, 7 July 1958.

(21.) Quoted in the following report sent by Yaqub Daoud to MAPAI functionaries. Yaqub Daoud, "Report on the Meeting of the Arab Front in Kafr Yassif, Which Took Place on Saturday 23 August 1958", LPA, Files, 26-14-9.

(22.) "The Leaders of the 'Arab Front': We Are Not Hostile to the State of Israel", Ha'aretz, 11 August 1958; see also Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 40-41; 185-187.

(23.) The Popular Front, "Towards Solutions to Issues Concerning the Arab People in Israel, undated". A copy of this pamphlet can be found in LPA, Files, 26-14-9.

(24.) "Note to Yackouv ('Aini), undated", LPA, Files, 26-14-23. I think that this document dates from the mid-1950; the documents in this file are arranged, by and large, according to chronological order, and the number of this document is 2. I could not identify the signature of the sender.

(25.) The Branch of the Popular Front in Kafr Yassif, "Communique to the Masses of Our Village, undated", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(26.) Mussa Bassal, "To the Inhabitants of Kafr Yassif: The Letter of Resignation From His Position as Deputy Mayor that Mussa Bassel Sent to the Mayor, 29 April 1957", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(27.) "The Amount of Taxes Levied by Kafr Yassif Local Council in 1956/1957", LPA, Files, 26-14-23. One of the footnotes indicates that the numbers are taken from the Minorities' Department of the Ministry of Interior.

(28.) Hussein Safyiah, Najeeb Labeeb Khuri, Mussa Bassal & Saleem Shehadeh, "Letter to Mr. Yani Yani, 12 October 1958", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(29.) "Kafr Yassif Local Council, 26 May 1957", LPA, Files, 26-14-23. This list of notes was probably written by Yackouv 'Aini.

(30.) Fawzi Khuri, "Letter to Yackov 'Aini, 1 May 1960 [internal number 22]", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(31.) Yackov 'Aini, "Letter to Benyamin Lezoush: Appeal to the High Court of Justice Against the Mayor of Kafr Yassif, 16 June 1960 [internal number 23]", LPA, Files, 26-14-23. This letter also reveals that MAPAL paid the lawyer's fees.

(32.) Fawzi Khuri, "Letter to Hananiah, undated [internal number 29], LPA, Files, 26-14-23. One note reveals these bureaucrats' attitude to the Arabs, "you should not give him the feeling that we should do that (pay the money).

(33.) "The Draft of the Agreement, undated [internal number 32]", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(34.) "Kafr Yassif, 1 July 1963", LPA, 26-14-23, 1-2. This document includes the major data on Kafr Yassif, such as the composition of the local council, the infrastructure, the families, political parties, religious groups etc. Interestingly they found this issue as important as other major demographical subjects.

(35.) "The Situation in Kafr Yassif After the Death of Yani Yani, 24 July 1962", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(36.) The internal divisions were expressed by various factions. For example, Josef Turn a, "Secret Letter to: Yackov 'Aini, 15 November 1963", LPA, Files, 26-14-23. This letter is against nominating Rafeq Shehadeh to the head position of MAPAI's Affiliated List in Kafr Yassif. Such divisions led Amnon Linn, who was appointed to manage the election campaign in Kafr Yassif, to send a letter of resignation to his superior Abba Hushi. Amnon Linn, "Letter to Abba Hushi, 7 November 1963: My Resignation from the Management of the Election Campaign in Kafr Yassif", ", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(37.) "Summary of the Meeting Regarding the Elections of Kafr Yassif's Local Council, 3 November 1963", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(38.) "Report on the Meeting that Took Place on 10 February 1964 and Discussed the Situation in Kafr Yassif", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(39.) The Islamic List, "Leaflet", LPA, Files, 26-14-23. It included the demands of the List and the names of its candidates for the council.

(40.) The content of the poem shows that it represents the stand of The United Block. It can be found in LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(41.) See e.g. Ahmad H. Sa'di, "Between State Ideology and Minority National Identity: Palestinians in Israel and Israeli Social Science Research", Review of Middle East Studies, 5 (1992), 110-130.

(42.) See the answer of Zeev Falk, the legal advisor to the Ministry of Interior. Zeev Falk, "Letter to Sheik Jubir Mu'adi: Regarding Your Letter to The Deputy of the Interior Minister, 28. April, 1964", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(43.) The United Block, "Leaflet: Invitation for a Public Meeting, Saturday 1-2-1964", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(44.) Yackov 'Aini, "Our Achievement in Kafr Yassif and the Defeat of MKI", Hapo'el Haiza' air, 17 March 1964.

(45.) "Agreement for the Establishment of a Coalition in Kafr Yassif's Local Council Between MAPAI and MAFDAL, 22 April 1964", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(46.) Yackov 'Aini, "Letter to Reouvin Barekit, 19 May 1964", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(47.) Rafeq Shehadeh, "Letter to: Haaver Barekit, MAPAI's Secretary, 29 May 1964", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(48.) The Program of the Coalition for the Management of Kafr Yassif's Council", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(49.) "The Political Program of Kafr Yassi's Coalition", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.

(50.) Rafeq Shehadeh, "Letter to: The Prime Minister, and to The Speaker of the Knesset, 13 June 1964", ", LPA, Files, 26-14-23.