COMMON SENSE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: A CHRISTIAN APPRAISAL.

Christian organizations have joined the secular professions in spelling out detailed ethical codes. Yet what basis can be provided for the supposition that these ethical codes truly inform us about what is objectively right or wrong? Frequently, modern ethicists have argued that we must derive our moral judgments by the application some specific 'ethical theory' to ensure that we are arriving at moral truth. The lack of success in this modern project has contributed to post-modern skepticism about the possibility of arriving at objective moral truth. The modern moral project, and its post-modern skeptics, share a set of mistaken assumptions Plantinga has summarized under the term "internalism." These assumptions are contrasted with the common sense moral realism advocated by the Christian thinker Thomas Reid. It is argued that common sense moral realism provides a practical and rich basis for professional ethics that is informed by a Christian worldview, one that does not leave us with the forced choice of ei ther first justifying our ethical beliefs on some special grounds or doubting the reality of objective moral truth. The implications of this approach for ethical training are briefly considered.

Christian counseling organizations have emulated secular professional organizations by developing specific ethical codes to guide the conduct of their members (AACC, 1998; CAPS, 1993). These codes share many common characteristics with the secular codes promulgated by organizations such as the American Psychological Association (APA, 1992) and the American Counseling Association (ACA, 1995). These codes reflect a commitment to many core principles including: non-malfeasance (e.g., "doing no harm"), practicing within one's scope of competence, avoiding exploitation of others, treating people with dignity and respect, protecting client confidentiality, acting only with informed consent, and promoting justice (McMinn & Meek, 1997). The secular codes reflect various types of ethical normativity: including both enforceable "minimal obligations" and the aspirational "ideals" (Tjeltveit, 1997).

A recent Christian Counseling Code of Ethics developed by the American Association of Christian Counselors (AACC, 1998) is purportedly both 'aspirational' and 'enforceable.' The AACC Code was developed by the organization's Law and Ethics Committee, which was established in 1993. The code was adopted by AACC in 1999. Although pastoral counseling represents a distinct tradition from the Christian mental health professions, the American Association of Pastoral Counselors has also developed an ethical code which shares many points of commonalities with the AACC, CAPS, and the secular codes (AAPC, 1994). Beck (1997) analyzed the CAPS and AAPC codes in light of 23 ethical descriptors drawn from Williams's "Index of Ethical Code Terminology."

These 23 descriptors apply to all of the six major mental health professional codes including terms such as "competence," "confidentiality," "exploitation," "colleague relationships" and "deception." Beck found that the majority of these descriptors characterized the two reli gious codes as well.

Although there is considerable agreement found between the various Christian and secular codes, is there any reason to think such ethical principles constitute more than just mere convention or opinion? Despite the explicit references to Christian morality in both the CAPS guidelines and the AACC ethics code, neither the secular nor the Christian codes articulate a specific ethical theory that guides their decision-making or application. The existence of a set of ethical principles requires an intervening ethical judgment process in order to be applied to concrete situations. Yet is there any basis for the belief that out moral judgments inform us about what is truly right or wrong in some objective sense?

THE ENLIGHTENMENT BASIS FOR ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE

The modern project of many western philosophers was to identify a way to "justify" such moral judgments (MacIntyre, 1981, Beauchamp, 1991). On the modernist view, the task of ethics was primarily a task of moral epistemology: One must first locate a way to determine and justify moral knowledge. This ethical 'theory' or matrix will then provide the basis for ethical decision making by indicating which ethical claims/choices are 'right' and which ones are 'wrong' in light of the theory.

Two dominant types of ethical theories have been promoted in the modern era to accomplish this task: deontological ethics and utilitarianism (Bentham, 1996/1789, Kant, 1993/1785, Mill, 1968/1863). Both of these ethical theories advanced forms of moral realism, despite their varied ways of understanding the 'good.' Moral 'realism' holds that the moral refers to an objective state of affairs. Our moral claims can thus be true or erroneous depending on their 'correspondence' to this state of affairs (Boyd, 1988). The modern deontologist asserted that ethical conduct is conduct, which can be shown to conform to the dictates of rationally demonstrable moral principles. In contrast, utilitarians viewed right conduct as a matter of maximizing pleasure over pain.

Despite the promulgation of various ethical theories in the history of philosophy, no single ethical theory has governed either the development or application of the professional codes. Kendler (1999) has reacted to current epistemic status of ethical theory by pointing to an "inevitable ascendancy of moral pluralism." He notes that no single ethical theory governs the ethical and social applications of psychology. This observation has led some to bemoan the absence of an overriding ethical theory. For instance, O'Donohue and Mangold (1996) state that the lack of such a theory is "... problematic for several reasons but particularly because it vitiates the process of fair ethical inquires (pg. 376)."

What assumption is suggested by the belief that our ethical judgments will be 'unfair' unless guided by a regnant theory? O'Donohue and Mangold view the apparent fact that most clinicians do not make ethical judgments by applying a specific ethical theory to the concrete situations as a deficiency in current practice. But such practice would be deficient only if the assumption that one must justify ethical judgments using a specific ethical theory is correct. This assumption is intimately connected to an internalist approach to ethics that emerged during the Enlightenment (Maclntyre, 1981; Plantinga, 1992,1993).

INTERNALIST ASSUMPTIONS IN ETHICS: TO DREAM THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM

The assumed need for a regnant ethical theory to guide professional ethical praxis betrays the modernist preoccupation with "method" as a foundation for knowledge (Feyerabend, 1993). The modernist or Enlightenment moral project was to identify an epistemology which would allow us to "know" the right from the wrong by accepting only those ethical beliefs which could be justified in light of the particular ethical decision making formula. As long as we conform our decision making to this explicit and knowable methodology, it was assumed, we would arrive at the 'right decisions' and know that we had arrived at them (Maclntyre, 1981).

Furthermore, this project is itself an instance of the more general modernist preoccupation with providing an absolute or certain foundation to all of knowledge. Plantinga (1992, 1993, 2000) has titled the distinctive features of this modernist epistemic attitude "internalism". He delineates internalism as an epistemology that emphasizes the personal justification of beliefs on the basis of some grounds for which the knowing subject has special access. This special access may be understood in dramatically different ways. It has been characteristic of both rationalism and empiricism, the two dominant streams of modern epistemology. Descartes (1979/1641) argued for a rationalist version of special access in which knowledge is grounded on "clear and distinct" or incorrigible contents of consciousness. After ruling out a wide range of beliefs, he reduced his sphere of indubitable knowledge to the single idea that he must exist as a thinking thing if he is capable of doubting his own existence (e.g., "I think the refore I am."). He then inferred many other types of beliefs from this core assertion. In contrast, Locke (1964/1690) advanced an empiricist version of foundationalism, holding that one should only assent to beliefs to the degree they are proportioned to the sensible evidence. By grounding our beliefs in careful observation, we could avoid error and build up a body of firmly established knowledge.

Why has O'Donohue & Mangold's (1996) suggested need for a specific ethical theory to 'ground' or guide actual ethical practice in the professions stirred little emotion among professionals? One plausible reason is that the suggested need for regulatory and justifying ethical theory makes an internalist assumption that incorrectly characterizes the way moral knowledge is obtained. During his graduate training, the author arranged a discussion in a clinical psychology class with a philosopher who was a medical ethicist. The ethicist specialized in mental health ethics. The event proceeded unremarkably as the ethicist analyzed various ethical dilemmas faced in mental health. The ethicist described her role in the professional ethics process as a careful observer who could analyze the philosophical assumptions and implications of various aspects of practice. The class received this calmly. The tone of the exchange soon altered when the ethicist also stated that such careful philosophical analysis might help to d etermine the appropriate course of action for mental health professionals. At this point, the attentive and characteristically stoic instructor exclaimed in an angry outburst, "Who are you to tell us how to practice!" His reaction appeared to focus on the idea that the ethicist wanted to impose a moral decision making theory on psychology as a nonpsychologist. Although he did not articulate it in these terms, the instructor appeared to see the ethicist's internalist application of ethical theory as an illegitimate imposition of values (Foucault, 1970).

AN EXTERNALIST ACCOUNT

The ethicist in the preceding example appeared to believe that anyone wielding the right philosophical approach could enter the fray of the professional practice context and decide the right course of conduct for the professional. In contrast, the instructor displayed an intuition that there are aspects of ethical judgment in the professional context that may be lost to someone who is not a practitioner. He did not object to the ethicist's view of the relevant abstract ethical principles or even to her analysis of ethical dilemmas facing clinicians. Rather he questioned her ability to make correct or adequate ethical judgments without having her moral judgment faculties shaped by the process of professional training. Without being trained to see the world as a practitioner sees it, he believed her moral perceptions of the practice context would likely be incomplete or ill formed. This idea, that knowledge comes from the proper functioning of mental faculties which have been shaped to form correct judgments in a particular setting, points to a radical departure from Enlightenment internalism (Greco, 2000).

Building on the work of Thomas Reid (1969/1785; 1969/1788), Plantinga argues for an alternative approach to epistemology he labels 'externalism'. Externalism asserts that knowledge is present when our beliefs result from a process that is designed to reliably produce true beliefs under some set of circumstances. For Plantinga (1992, 1993) this process involves the proper functioning of human cognitive abilities that are designed to discern truth when operating in a congenial environment. Plantinga (2000) summarizes his account in this way:

Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth (pg. 156).

Plantinga's account is complex and highly nuanced, employing several related concepts to flesh out his proposal such as: cognitive faculties aimed at truth, proper function, design plan, and congenial environments. A core notion in Plantinga's account is the idea of knowledge as a reliable product of properly functioning cognitive faculties aimed at truth. He explains that the cognitive faculties are "functioning properly" when they are unimpeded by distorting processes, such as disorder or dysfunction. Plantinga's notion of proper functioning is closely connected to the idea of a 'design plan.' A design plan refers to the way things are "supposed to work" when there is no malfunction. Good design plans are those that have a high probability of producing truth-approximating beliefs when functioning properly in a setting for which they are well suited.

Why is a congenial environment important? A belief-producing faculty may be functioning without malfunction and yet producing false beliefs because of operating in an environment that is significantly dissimilar from that in which the faculty was designed to function. This point can be illustrated by considering the case of the Ames room situation used in the study of perception (Dorward & Day, 1997; Gehringer & Engel, 1986). The Ames room is constructed so that a non-rectangular room appears rectangular from the vantage point of the observer. As individuals in the room move from one side of the room to the other, observers typically perceive the individuals as either growing or shrinking, depending on direction of travel. An observer with a properly functioning visual system will typically form erroneous perceptions about changes in the observee's size. The misperceptions arise largely because the visual environment (e.g., ecological viewing conditions) substantially diverges from that in which our properly functioning visual systems were designed to form truth-approximating beliefs about visual shape constancy.

It is important to emphasize the profound paradigm shift that Plantinga is heralding in epistemology The internalist views knowledge primarily as a matter of using a specific approach to knowing for which the subject has some sort of direct or special access. This approach purportedly allows the subject to identify those beliefs that can be considered knowledge (i.e., justified true belief). The emphasis is on withholding belief until beliefs are justified. In contrast, the externalist notes that we do not ordinarily choose our beliefs. We naturally and normally believe many things that serve us well without first proving those things. Furthermore, the externalist finds it appropriate, defensible and reasonable to treat at least some of these beliefs as 'properly basic' (i.e., requiring no further justification). These foundational beliefs are not first 'proven' but nonetheless count as knowledge in the absence of adequate defeating considerations (Reid, 1969/1785).

Reid (1969/1788) made similar claims about basic moral principles. He views our moral knowledge as the output of a 'moral sense' which is a process analogous in some ways to sense perception (Reid, 1969/1788). When operating in an appropriate fashion, our 'moral sense' will produce moral evaluations and conceptions "...of right and wrong in conduct, of merit and of demerit, and the original judgments that this conduct is right, that is wrong.... (pg. 232-33)." On Reid's account, these moral judgments are not 'inferred' or deduced but are rather produced by the operation of the moral sense (Stecker, 1987). This does not mean that all our moral inclinations are accurate. As Plantinga notes regarding our cognitive faculties, moral beliefs must be formed by the proper operation of our moral sensibilities to count as knowledge. According to Reid (1969/1788), factors such as bias, passion, interest or fashion can interfere with the proper functioning of the moral sense. Such attitudes interfere with the proper fun ctioning in the 'moral sense' just as tinged lighting interferes with color perception. A properly functioning moral sense yield real 'moral truths' as its output, because there is an objective moral dimension to the universe and we are designed to perceive it.

THE VALUE OF COMMON SENSE ETHICS DESPITE UNCERTAIN FOUNDATIONS

Reid's (1969/1788) common sense approach provides a way to understand many of the complex issues arising in both philosophical and professional ethics. It provides a basis or 'grounding' for professional ethics but in a manner that is quite different from classical or internalist foundationalism. While both the internalist approach to morality and common sense realism suggests that objective knowledge about right and wrong is possible, the common sense approach does not suggest that a single method exists which can be applied to all moral judgment tasks to discern this truth. Rather, we simply 'perceive' many moral truths and, if our moral faculties are operating properly in an appropriate context, then we form true beliefs about what is right and what is wrong. Yet Reid does not claim that all of our moral judgments are known directly through a 'moral sense'. He asserts that our foundational "first principles," such as preferring the "greater to the lesser good" or "treating others as one would like to be t reated" are directly perceived by the moral sense. Some of our moral judgments involve a direct application of our 'conscience' to the concrete situation. Other judgments may involve the extension of these directly perceived "first principles" by reason.

Reid views these moral first principles as corresponding to a true moral state of affairs that characterize the created universe. Consequently, he is arguing for a moral realism that is at significant odds with emotivist or sentiment-based theories of morality characteristic of post-modernity. Moral principles are objective "perceptions" rather than "feelings" or "values." Although visual perception is an experience, it would be incorrect to say that we 'feel' a tree our eyes. In the same way, our experience of "moral perception" is not a feeling but rather a distinct class of cognitive activity for Reid. YetReid acknowledges that our moral sense may be mistaken, just as our perceptual knowledge of the world can be mistaken. Human moral knowledge, like human knowledge in general, is not infallible. Individuals may err in their judgment and may be significantly lacking in their moral sense. Holmes (1997) notes that, on Reid's view, a "... person without such conscience is like someone colorblind, functionally impaired (pg. 115)."

In the wake of the Enlightenment, a natural response to Reid's view is to ask, "how do we know when we are mistaken?" Reid's answer would be very unpretentious: we know we are mistaken because the moral belief is subsequently proven wrong or "defeated" by experience, reasoning or any of the multiple ways we discover truth as human beings. He would see little reason to cater to the Enlightenment intent to count as knowledge only that which can be first proven by some particular method. How then would we know where to start? What sort of beliefs may be regarded as 'properly basic,' counting as knowledge without first being otherwise justified? Clark (1990) explains:

While not offering a criterion for proper basicality, Platinga suggests a Reidian procedure for assessing such criteria.... The proper method is inductive; the epistemologist ought to assemble beliefs he considers properly basic and proceed to frame a principle of rationality on the basis of this set of beliefs (pg. 141).

Reid's common sense moral realism also provides a plausible account of how the different schools of moral theory (deontology, consequentialist utilitarianism, or virtue theory) can all appear to have valid insights despite the significant differences between the various theories. Tjeltveit (1999) notes the pluralism that characterizes professional ethical praxis. Yet an eclectic strategy appears vulnerable to what philosophers have called the 'leaky bucket problem.' If no single ethical theory can gain ascendancy because of cogent criticisms offered by competing approaches (i.e., indicating each is a 'leaky bucket'), then any attempt to overcome the weaknesses of a single approach by simply combining multiple flawed approaches will not ensure ethical knowledge. Using a collection of leaky bucket approaches provides no guarantee that one's ethical judgments will ultimately 'hold water.'

However, practitioners may use an eclectic decision making process for reasons other than "justifying" decisions. It is also possible that the practitioners directly perceive that these diverse principles may all have some legitimate bearing on the moral decisions before them. For instance, practitioners may simply recognize that they should avoid actions that are harmful to clients (deontological non-malfeasance) and should also seek to maximize their client's wellbeing (utilitarian consequentialism), even if they do not have any philosophical justification for adhering to these principles. Reid's account of morality anticipates just such an eclectic state of affairs without falling prey to either relativism or emotivism (McGregor, 1987, Stecker, 1987).

Contemporary common sense approaches to ethics have proceeded by unpacking the wisdom of embodied ethical practice (McNamara, 1996). Moral insights are gleaned from the common law tradition, casuistry and the analysis of ordinary moral language. Rather than assuming the burden of first 'proving' the foundational principles, these approaches view the resources of rationality as more appropriately applied to the clarification of meanings, analysis of counterfactuals and identification of exceptions or 'defeating' conditions. If Plantinga (1992, 1993, 2000) is correct, Reid's common sense philosophy provides warrant for this approach. Contrary to O'Donohue and Mangold's (1996) claim that a regulatory ethical theory must be spelled out if professional ethics is to proceed in a 'fair manner,' common sense moral philosophy indicates that our moral discernment can appropriately function even in the absence of an internalist moral epistemology.

COMMON SENSE AND CHRISTIAN THEISM 

Plantinga's (1993, 2000) externalism is inspired by a confidence that our cognitive faculties are designed for their appropriate functions. This is of course quite compatible with the Christian view of God as creator and of humanity as created in God's image. Since Christians believe in a God who is inherently ethical, it is not surprising that Christians typically endorse moral realism (Geisler, 1981; Holmes, 1997; Grentz, 1997). But this does not mean that one should predict universal agreement throughout humanity about our moral judgments. Nor does it mean that, if such agreement is not forthcoming, the Christian idea of an objective moral truth is refuted. Although Reid's philosophy supports the idea of an objective truth, it also recognizes that the basic principles of this truth are discerned through human moral faculties. Any individual, Christian or non-Christian, may be mistaken about their perceptual judgments, and thus may be in error over any particular moral perception (Stecker, 1987). Yet, just as the fallibility of perceptual judgment does not warrant pervasive skepticism about all perceptual beliefs, so moral fallibility does not warrant pervasive skepticism about moral perception (Holmes, 1997; Greco, 2000).

Plantinga's (1992, 1993, 2000) externalism provides some indication of when false moral discernment may result from the operation of the moral sense in at least one set of circumstances. When our moral faculties are applied to an environment that is not congenial to their proper function, error may result. A Christian might suggest that a non-Christian would frequently operate from factual assumptions that are erroneous in a manner that also impacts the moral faculties.

Consider the case of abortion. If one rejects the idea of an eternal soul and opts instead for 'capacity-based' definitions of human worth, then the decision about whether to allow elective abortion is viewed as a matter of self-determination rather than one of protection of the innocent or non-malfeasance. The pro-life Christian, believing the abortion process results in the murder of a human person, sees the abortion question as a case involving the latter two principles in ways that override principles of self-determination. The disagreement is not so much about the principles discerned by the moral sense as it is about the worldview guiding their application. This account is premised on the assumption that a pro-life position is the biblical position. Granting this assumption for the purpose of discussion, it would not be surprising that moral mistakes would arise in the non-Christian discernment process regarding abortion. When individuals operate on the basis of worldview assumptions that significantly deviates from reality, their moral faculties are functioning in a context for which they have not been designed. Of course, none of this implies that immoral responses to abortion or other situations are only a function of moral misjudgment. Reid acknowledges that people often willfully act, and fail to act, in ways they know to be either virtuous or immoral (Reid, 1969/1788; Holmes, 1997).

Does this mean that the Christian and non-Christian will always reach discrepant moral judgments due their divergent vantage points or the effects of sin on human thought (e.g., the noetic effects of the fall)? No. Unless they suffer from the most severe forms of psychosis or dementia, the non-Christian must live in the real world and this will produce some constraints on their cognitive landscape (Norris, 1997). C.S. Lewis (1962) has argued that there is substantial agreement across cultures about general moral principles that may be overlooked due to the nuances of language/translation and contemporary beliefs about relativism. The amount of agreement may vary considerably between Christians and/or non-Christians, but not necessarily in a straightforward manner. A non-Christian may 'see' the rightness or wrongness of a certain principle (e.g., nonmalfeasance) and apply it correctly to a range of ethical judgments.

Yet, if a long tradition in Christian philosophy is correct, self-aware non-Christians are apt to find little warrant for the objective reality of their moral perceptions in a non-theistic worldview (Plantinga, 2000). Consequently, they may profess naturalism or other ideologies that are at odds with the dictates of their moral sense, affirming instead various nonobjective moralities or skepticism (Holmes, 1997). Despite this tendency, non-theists will often live inconsistently with their presuppositions, tacitly recognizing the existence of moral truth despite the tension such beliefs create with the broader contours of their worldview (Schaeffer, 1968). On some readings, Calvin is thought to have implied that the non-Christian is incapable of any true knowledge, given their non-Christian noetic starting point. Plantinga (2000) details an argument to the effect that naturalism or agnosticism defeat firm commitment to any particular belief in a manner that undercuts the possibility of knowledge, when consist ently developed. Yet he also states:

The noetic effects of sin don't necessarily include the failure to know anything, Calvin (if that is what, in fact, he thought) goes too far. ... So rejection of theistic belief doesn't automatically produce skepticism; many who don't believe in God know much. But that is only because they don't accurately think through the consequences of this rejection. Once they do, they will lose their knowledge.... (pg. 240)

Though a non-Christian starting point may provide an inadequate basis for moral knowledge, there is nothing in the common sense moral realist position to suggest Christians are immune to ethical malfunctionings. Many obvious counter-examples to any claim of Christian ethical infallibility can be readily adduced, such as the widely recognized fact that many American Christians justified slavery with elaborate theological and moral arguments; or the disagreement among Christians about ethical issues related to divorce and remarriage (House, 1990). Although there may have been many reasons for these moral misjudgments among Christians, Reid's comments about taking care to avoid being influenced by 'interest' and 'bias' certainly seem relevant.

As noted earlier, the core principles of Christian and secular professional codes overlap on many significant points. This moral convergence between secular and Christian mental health professions is not surprising from an externalist perspective. Christian and non-Christian mental health professionals find themselves in the same helping context, often intervening to achieve highly similar goals. They have often been trained in the same training programs or training models and thus are likely to bring their moral sense to bear in similar ways upon the clinical situation. The common sense realist perspective affords some confidence about the possibility of establishing general moral parameters with our non-Christian peers in that many of our basic moral judgments are causally produced by the objective moral realm's impact on the moral sense instilled in humanity.

God is inherently ethical; therefore, creatures made in his image will bear the marks of the moral (Holmes, 1984). While the fall may have distorted the divine image reflected in humanity; this does not mean that the divine image is altogether lost in fallen humanity; Erickson (1998) puts the matter this way:

The objective moral dimension, and our design as moral creatures, remains an objective fact of existence regardless of whether we explicitly believe in such notions or have any awareness of these aspects of our design.

The image of God has not been lost as a result of sin or specifically the fall. The prohibitions against murder and cursing apply to the treatment of sinful humans as well as godly believers. The presence and likeness in the non-Christian is assumed....The image of God is not something accidental or external to human nature. It is inseparably connected with humanity. (pg. 532)

Nevertheless, the biblical worldview provides a richer and more complete view of the 'objective universe', thus issuing a prophetic challenge to any ethical perspective that does not consider the added insights of special revelation (Carson, 1996). It is unclear from scripture the extent to which any particular unbeliever is cut off from forming correct moral judgments without directly drawing insights from Scripture or an explicit Christian worldview (Rom 2:14-15). Whether or not moral truths are revealed in the special revelation of the Word of God or "written on hearts" by the creator, it is still God who is the author of the truth (Demarest, 1982). Consequently, it is possible that a non-Christian may correctly discern a number of the relevant ethical concerns that apply to professional practice. Christians will have to examine the development of professional codes for incompleteness or error in the light of a Biblical perspective.

ILLUMINATING ETHICAL TRAINING FROM AN EXTERNALIST FRAMEWORK

The externalist model of common sense moral philosophy has significant implications for ethical training. However, these implications do not point to a radically new way of practicing ethical training in the professions as much as they highlight what has already proven useful. Because warranted moral judgments are the result of the proper functioning of our moral sense, the goal of training is accordingly to hone the moral faculties of the clinicians in training. The clinical context is a unique setting with its own peculiar environmental characteristics (Tjeltveit, 1997). Clients, clinicians, and a variety of other stakeholders frequently approach the clinical relationship with strong interests and agendas (Tjeltveit, 1999). These factors are likely to impact the functioning of a moral sense that was designed to operate in an originally unfallen human community. For instance, humans typically form beliefs in response to testimonial evidence from others. In therapy, such unqualified belief formation by the t herapist may involve buying into inaccurate client self-presentations distorted by various agendas or psychopathology.

Consider the scenario of client-therapist attraction. Under normal circumstances, a male and female adult who are in recurrent, close, and intimate contact are somewhat more likely to develop romantic attraction for many reasons including the effects of 'propinquity' (Baron & Byrne, 1994). When such feelings are pursued in the context of a relationship that otherwise conforms to Biblical morality, the appropriate moral response is one of approbation (Gen 2:18-25). It should not be surprising, given the propinquity effect, our relational design as sexual creatures, and the generally benevolent nature of romantic attraction, when a man and woman form a belief that such attraction is a good thing. Why would the identification of these parties as 'therapist' and 'client' change our moral sense about this phenomena? It seems unlikely that God designed us to directly 'intuit' such intimate interactions with a potential mate as morally wrong just in the case that they occur under the 'banner' of therapy. This point is amplified if one posits that therapeutic relationships are in part necessary or present only due to the effects of the fall (Carter, 1994). Presumably, in an unfallen world humans would not find themselves in such relationships without potential romantic involvement being appropriate.

Fortunately, God has providentially designed in us a 'defeater' system. We can train ourselves to attend to those situations, characteristics, and information sources that might alter the formation of erroneous moral perceptions that are likely in a fallen world. A therapist who perceives romantic attraction developing with a client can be taught to have a different moral reaction to this circumstance. This is done in part by helping the therapist reframe the situation in a manner that construes the client as reduced in his/her consensual capacity due to factors such as power differentials or client vulnerability. The apparently benign quality of romantic attraction can also be refrained as a therapeutic situation that poses significant risks for harm. Once these perceptual habits are developed, a properly functioning moral sense would recognize such a relationship as involving risks of harm and the potential for exploitation. A therapist, thus trained, should accordingly react with disapproval of pursuing t he romantic attraction or failing to take appropriate steps to manage it.

Notice that the therapist in this scenario does not know that improper management of therapist-client attraction is wrong through a process of reasoning to this conclusion from a specific ethical theory. Their moral sensibilities are so honed that their natural moral sense directly applies moral "first principles," such as non-malfeasance or non-exploitation, to the case in point. The hypothetical therapist's natural moral sense has been calibrated to produce correct judgments despite operating in the "unnatural environment" (e.g., divergent from the original Edenic setting) required due to the fall. Of course, the therapist may still choose to act immorally but will do so knowing that his or her actions are immoral.

Along these lines, Greco (2000) proposes an externalist account the way both "expert sense perception" and "expert moral perception" differ from lay judgment without appealing to internalist notions of a priori truth guaranteeing methods. He points out that not "... everyone is a reliable moral perceiver. But this does not entail that no one is, or that some people are not more reliable than others (pg. 246)." He views expert perception, either moral or sensory as a cultivated skill that alters the moral beliefs formed in the clinician under many circumstances. Greco (2000) asks us to

...consider an unusually affectionate child-one who runs up to hug and kiss strangers with little or no caution or discrimination. Many people will see this behavior as carefree or innocent. But it can have another moral color for a psychologist for whom medical evidence has evoked the persona of a sexually abused child. The same actions, now understood as manifesting an absence of normal boundaries, will present themselves as tragic, even horrifying. (pg. 247)

The goal of clinical training is thus much more like a mentoring process than the attainment of an abstract decision making science. Ethical mentors attempt to inculcate ethical virtues and sensitivities that will produce accurate moral judgments when the trainee functions in the clinical setting (Greco, 2000). The trainee "apprentices" with the trainer, learning to perfect the skills of ethical judgment as it bears on their context of practice. Such skills would clearly include, but go beyond, a pure 'moral reasoning' acumen. It is beyond the scope of this article to delineate the specific training strategies that might facilitate this task for psychological practice. A few examples of such strategies include: modeling appropriate applications of the moral sense; fostering a habit of ethical self reflection; encouraging clinicians to maintain sensitivity to factors which can defeat erroneous moral judgments; keeping up with the empirical research relevant to one's practice; fostering ongoing relationships t hat provide accountability; and inculcating ethical sensitivities that are relevant to the clinical context by exposure to case examples, embodied professional codes, and through clinical supervision that is ethically reflective (McMinn & Meek, 1997). The externalist would be quite comfortable with Tjeltveit's (1999) description of the role of clinical training as "shaping the ethicist."

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The current article asserts that common sense moral theory revitalized by Plantinga's (1992, 1993, 2000) externalist philosophy of knowledge, provides a highly relevant account of how professional ethical praxis appears to be actually conducted. This approach diverges radically from the "Enlightenment project" of counting as knowledge those moral claims that can be justified by some special relationship to a highly certain ground of moral knowledge; yet, it also differs from the skeptical, relativistic, and anti-f foundationalist views that characterize much of post-modernity. The common sense realist believes that moral perceptions are valid in the absence of any adequate defeating characteristics. On the externalist vision, the role of ethical training in the professions is more analogous to the formation of technical skills by apprenticeship than learning to apply an abstract, geometric decision-making theory. It should not be surprising that such an account often highlights what appears to be the current practice in ethical training. The common sense moralist believes that humans often approximate accurate perceptions about objective moral principles even when they are unaware of the grounds for such moral knowledge.

Externalists are not left with the forced choice of either first justifying our ethical beliefs on some special grounds or doubting the reality of objective moral truth. Rather, the externalist trusts God's providential design of humanity that allows for knowledge of the moral and thus finds no compelling epistemological reason to doubt moral perceptions in advance of any particular ethical deliberation. The dictates of a properly functioning moral sense are viewed as an appropriate guide to ethical practice.

What the common sense approach does not do is provide a complete account of what constitutes a "properly functioning" moral sense in every possible context in advance of careful reflection by the relevant community of ethical practitioners. Contrary to the overconfident hopes of the Enlightenment, such ethical insight is often hard won and teased our of ambiguity and uncertainty (Dinger & Coupland, 1999). Nonetheless, common sense moral realism does provide a rich account of why the limited and fallible nature of human ethical judgment does not undercut the possibility or reality of true moral knowledge.

AUTHOR

HATHAWAY, WILLIAM L. Address: Regent University, 1000 Regent University Drive, Virginia Beach, VA 23464. Title: Associate Professor of Psychology. Degrees: MA, Philosophy, Bowling Green Stare University; PhD, Clinical Psychology, Bowling Green State University.

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