CMO in Baghdad: 3-82 FA Red Dragons hit the streets.

The battalion intelligence officer (S2) forecast the day's high temperature in Baghdad as a steamy 110 degrees. The pavement in the Mansur neighborhood was hot, and hundreds of cars packed the smoggy streets.

The dismounted combat patrol in that neighborhood had many intelligence requirements. Who owns this hardware store on Mansur Street? What are the Iraqi civilians thinking about the upcoming transfer of national sovereignty? What was the message of last Friday's prayer call? How is the nearby school rehabilitation project progressing?

Certainly the NBC television crew following the patrol didn't help the pressure-cooker sensation. As always, the foot patrol was acutely aware of the constant enemy threat, including snipers, suicide car bombers and other terrorist criminals.

By the end of the patrol, the patrol leader, a second lieutenant, had spoken to scores of local residents and a local neighborhood council member, negotiated a resolution to a contractual disagreement between a school headmistress and a contractor, and obtained a sense of the locals' feelings of apprehension regarding the transfer of sovereignty.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

In an hour's time, the combat patrol had collected actionable intelligence, supervised a civic action project, negotiated with local leaders, conducted an "atmospherics" assessment, dealt with television media, and provided security on a major urban intersection. After returning to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC), the patrol leader debriefed the battalion civil military operations (CMO) officer (S5) and S2 on his successful mission.

Several days later, Tom Brokaw introduced the patrol leader, Second Lieutenant Peter J. Balke, to the nation on the NBC Nightly News. Despite the heat, Lieutenant Balke appeared remarkably cool and composed on screen. As a platoon leader in the Red Dragons 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82 FA), 1st Cavalry Division, his Mansur patrol had been just another CMO mission among many.

In Baghdad, 3-82 FA was organized as a motorized infantry battalion in the Blackjack 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and routinely conducted combat patrols. The Red Dragons took CMO seriously, and Lieutenant Balke had the training and experience to do it right.

This article shares the Red Dragons' experiences in CMO during their tour in central Baghdad from January through November 2004 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and II. 3-82 FA applied both emerging and established doctrine from many specialties, including civil affairs (CA), public affairs (PA), information operations (IO) and others to create an effective standard for CMO. Although these CMO tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) were as unique as the area in which the Red Dragons operated, they might provide points of departure for other units deploying to Iraq today.

The Neighborhood. The Red Dragons' area of operations (AO) was sandwiched between the infamous Green Zone, now called the International Zone, in downtown Baghdad and the roiling Sunni Arab neighborhoods of western Baghdad. Socio-economically, the Mansur District in the AO is wealthier than many other areas of the city and is home to many of the major players in Iraqi politics.

The terrorists and criminals, also known as anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), often attempted to attack troops in convoys, fixed-site security points and patrols. However, their most disruptive operations were criminal and terrorist activities, such as kidnappings and car-bombings against Iraqis in prominent government positions and those working with the MultiNational Forces (MNF).

3-82 FA faced some limitations upon assuming its mission in February 2004. The unit had a 15-to-30 minute "commute" to its AO from a camp near the Baghdad International Airport.

Also, 3-82 received one CA Team-Alpha (CAT-A) from the 425th Civil Affairs Battalion, but with only eight Soldiers and two high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), the CAT needed augmentation to meet the daytime three-vehicle requirement to move freely in the AO. The CAT did not deploy or train with 3-82 and arrived two weeks after the Red Dragons assumed responsibility for their AO.

In addition, the battalion had to work with a limited reconstruction budget consisting of funds from the commander's emergency response program (CERP). The unit's CERP budget was smaller than other battalions' budgets as the neighborhood's problems with water, sewage, schools and other areas of civil assessment were less urgent than the more problematic parts of the city where funds could produce a more dramatic IO effect.

Red Dragons' CMO Techniques. The figure outlines five characteristics of CMO by the Red Dragons in Baghdad.

1. CMO--A Battalion-Wide Effort. FM 41-10 Civil Affairs TTPs describes CMO as a "set of unit operations which encompasses CA activities, PA activities, IO and other types of functions, including combat operations." Within that framework, certain CA activities encompass humanitarian assistance, reconstruction projects, local leader interface and governance support. Therefore, CMO is much more than CA--in itself, it is much more than reconstruction projects.

Soldiers executing CMO must have a sense of civic pride in their area of responsibility (AOR) and attempt to foster that pride in their residents. Many units operate from a forward operating base (FOB) that is not near their AO. This makes it difficult for commanders to instill that level of civic responsibility in the troops.

Units should attempt to include all Soldiers in CMO. If everyday combat patrols make occasional stops at local school rehabilitation projects, routinely conduct atmospherics patrols at various roadside produce stands or deliver humanitarian assistance with the CAT, Soldiers begin to feel a connection to the area and the people who live there.

Soldiers will interact with the population everyday and contribute greatly to the unit's success if they understand the role and importance of CMO. Empowered Soldiers support CMO, determining problems and helping the unit develop possible solutions.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

In the winter of 2003, the Red Dragons honed their combat skills during a 14-week pre-deployment train-up at Fort Hood, Texas. The proud Paladin Artillerymen of 3-82 FA focused training in their military occupational specialties (MOS) to ensure they could deliver timely and accurate fires in support of the Blackjack BCT.

Simultaneously, 3-82 FA leaders studied the demography of their future AO in Baghdad, kept abreast of Iraqi current events and became proficient in CMO tasks, such as using interpreters, developing cultural awareness and dealing with media.

This train-up is described in Lieutenant Colonel Timothy A. Vuono's article "3-82 FA Transformation into a Hybrid Motorized Rifle and Paladin Battalion: Training for Baghdad" in the January-February 2004 edition. The training imbued Soldiers with a CMO mindset and helped them understand the need to "be polite, be professional and be prepared to kill."

According to FM 41-10, the battalion S5 works in the battalion operations section (S3) and performs CMO planning and CAT integration as an additional duty. However, the current table of organization and equipment (TOE) for FA and maneuver battalions does not authorize an S5. Commanders know the importance of CMO and resource its execution, but it helps to have a proactive S5.

3-82 FA's S5 helped give commanders the information and training tools needed to prepare troops for Baghdad during the pre-deployment train-up. He briefed at the command and staff meetings and ensured the S5 section had the assets it needed to operate, to include a CMO NCO, laptop computer, office equipment and HMMWV. Weeks later, when the unit received its attached CAT-A in Baghdad, the CMO team was already a part of the battalion.

Knowing the importance of CMO, battery commanders prepared to perform CA activities in support of the battalion mission. Each commander appointed a CMO lieutenant to participate in weekly neighborhood council meetings, track and update CA assessments in the battery AOs, and plan the CMO-specific tasks and purposes of each preplanned battery combat patrol. In effect, each battery became capable of performing CA activities of its own, including local governance (neighborhood council) support, area assessments, atmospherics patrols, small project development and supervision, management of the initial consequences of devastating AIF attacks and (or) MNF operations affecting the civilian population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The Red Dragons tracked the effectiveness of MNF CMO and IO campaigns using atmospherics patrols. Atmospherics are civil situation indicators collected from civilians by patrols to meet specific civil-military information requirements.

Patrols collect them by asking selected civilians a series of questions developed by the battalion S5 and CAT. Examples include: What is the city's power schedule? What is the water pressure like? How effective are the Iraqi police in your neighborhood? Are grocery prices rising, falling or staying the same? How long do you have to wait in line for gasoline? What do you think about the reconstruction projects in your neighborhood? S2s and S5s at all echelons reported and analyzed atmospherics to help shape future operations.

Increased violence in the unit AO can make it difficult to perform CMO. AIF attacks and an increased emphasis on deliberate MNF combat operations can preempt CMO patrols, delay ongoing reconstruction projects and keep the battalion S5 in the TOC to help plan and execute battalion operations.

However, concern for CMO rarely falls by the wayside during these "surge" operations. The battalion S5 (or S2 in many units) continues to support fighting units with interpreters. The S5 also performs consequence management, passively collects intelligence and takes over the execution of the CMO tasks normally performed by batteries when not performing surge combat operations. These include project supervision and governance support.

2. High-Volume CMO. Battalion S5s should see it as their duty to make a positive and stabilizing impact on their AO in the limited time available. Projects are a visible way to create a lasting positive effect on the populace and can be exploited using IO in support of the mission.

3-82 FA developed a CMO campaign plan based on the commander's intent and current area assessments. From spring 2003 through January 2004, 4-1 FA, 1st Armored Division, and the supporting CAT-A from the 490th CA Battalion created a thorough assessment database of all key locations within AO Red Dragon, including schools, mosques, police stations, governance locations, banks, clinics and utilities. In October 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) estimated the Red Dragons' AO population exceeded 350,000, but Baghdad city administrators postulated it could be twice that number.

The initial task of the CAT was to verify and update the area assessment data and familiarize itself and the unit with the existing civil administration structure. This meant meeting with the local public works and regional electrical director-generals and other municipal officials.

The Red Dragons created the CMO campaign plan before deploying, based on the 1st Armored Division and, later, the 1st Cavalry Division commanders' guidance for CMO. This guidance boiled down to what was known as the sewer, water, electric and trash improvement plan, or "SWET." The S5 section then incorporated the commander's guidance, assessment data, the unique needs of the neighborhood and input from the local neighborhood and district advisory councils.

3-82 FA developed a dynamic campaign plan to create short-, medium- and long-term improvements to essential services and capabilities within the AO and quantified the focus along a timeline. The S5 section recommended priorities for each month and quarter.

For example, education improvement began in February 2004 as the most intense CMO effort and continued through the summer vacation period, culminating in an IO event at the beginning of the new school year in October. With education, the task was to rehabilitate all 63 public schools in the area during the summer to enable the Baghdad Karkh 1 School District to maintain the school system in the future.

It was a massive school reconstruction project campaign funded by a combination of CERP and rehabilitation funds from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Our endstate was the successful handover of the management of education to the Iraqi Government, culminating in a district-wide town hall meeting with Ministry of Education representatives, local school headmasters, parents and Arab media.

Later, sewage system improvement became a battalion-level priority to preclude anticipated sewer backups during the onset of the rainy season in November. The battalion priorities shifted over time to respond to the specific neighborhood needs while meeting the brigade and division commanders' intent.

3-82 FA planned scores of reconstruction projects at one time. The steps of a project are relatively simple, involving a little paperwork and cooperation from a local Iraqi contractor. The unit creates a detailed statement of work (SOW) with a request for proposal (RFP) and releases it to local contractors so they can prepare estimates. The unit then selects the winning contractor, prepares the funding request paperwork, seeks and gains funding approval, prepares and signs a contract, and supervises the work.

The battalion S5 arranges final payment only after the contract is completed successfully and usually closes out the project with a ceremony, Arab media coverage or other IO event with the intent to give legitimacy to the Iraqi Government or council members involved.

Local contractors attended the weekly contractor meeting at the Mamu'n Telecommunications Tower secured by battalion troops and Iraqi National Guardsmen. The battalion S5 and brigade CERP pay agents sometimes received more than 40 local contractors to release new RFPs, collect estimates, sign contracts, serve notices of deficiencies for ongoing work and (or) make progress payments for current or completed projects. The system proved successful, helping 3-82 FA manage up to 60 projects and activities at once.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

The batteries and CAT supervised projects throughout the week with the assistance of a team of Iraqi engineers and inspectors. Providing feedback to contractors at the weekly meeting helped enforce high standards of engineering quality control while still meeting more than 90 percent of project completion timelines.

Project Tracker was one of the unit's most useful staff products. (See an example of the project tracker in the sidebar "The S5 NCO and CMO Project Management" by Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Kelly III on Page 43.)

The S5 quickly can get swamped in hundreds of issues, ranging from contract disputes, substandard workmanship, property rights arguments, personal feuds, contractor corruption scandals and more. An effective project management system with detailed and easily accessible records multiplies the amount of projects one unit can handle at a time, injecting a degree of accountability and quality control into what could be a chaotic process.

The S5 should leave "no stone unturned" in the search for project funding sources. While the BCT and division staffs helped the Red Dragons with funding, 3-82 FA developed many fruitful personal relationships with USAID; reconstruction officials from the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG); foreign embassies, such as Japan and Spain; and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as JumpStart International and the United Iraqi Medical Society. Each endeavor had varying degrees of success but provided the longer-term benefit of bringing together diverse groups for a common purpose: the stability and security of a free Iraq.

3. Vertical CMO. The Red Dragons maintained a tactical command post (TAC) in the International Zone for several months, giving it the opportunity to liaise with officials in the CPA (later, the US Embassy) and Iraqi Government ministries. 3-82 FA worked together with the BCT S5 and division G5 to gain access to the right group for each issue faced.

By bringing Iraqi Government officials into the picture, the unit usually achieved a more lasting and appropriate solution to a problem and, eventually, passed responsibility for the work to the appropriate Iraqi agency. This technique brought opportunities to help develop and strengthen the applicable Iraqi agency to handle other issues for themselves in the future.

The Red Dragons' best example of vertical integration of CMO is the security of the Grand Mosque of Al Mansur in April 2004. The Grand Mosque was a partially completed Saddam Hussein presidential mosque the size of the Houston Astrodome in the center of Baghdad's prestigious Mansur neighborhood. After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, Shiite Arab peoples from other parts of Baghdad and Iraq who were led by a group of influential Shiite religious scholars moved into the construction site by the hundreds.

A series of events followed, including sectarian accusations of theft and crime from local long-time residents, infiltrations of the normally peaceful Friday prayer calls at the construction site by supporters of the radical Muqtada al Sadr, and occasional verbal confrontations between officials from the Ministry of Housing and Construction and the religious scholar sheikhs at the site. The Red Dragons' main concerns were the security and safety of all area residents and enabling the Iraqi Government to forge a long-term solution of its own by deciding what to do with the partially constructed mosque.

3-82 FA helped initiate a broad CMO plan to ensure immediate and long-term security at the site. It included street-level humanitarian assistance (HA) delivered to residents of the construction site and the surrounding neighborhood, a CA assessment and listing of all 500 construction-site residents, the initiation of park rehabilitation projects nearby, meetings between the local commander and sheikhs at the mosque, and Arab media accompaniment on all patrols to supervise the project.

3-82 FA employed combat patrols and set up observation posts (OPs) at certain times to protect area residents from suspected AIF infiltrating from other parts of the city. CMO patrols, such as the one conducted by Lieutenant Balke, gathered information and intelligence to help plan these operations.

Simultaneously, the battalion commander and S5, with the help of the division G5's governance support team (GST), facilitated the first inter-ministerial working group since the CPA's creation. For the first time, the working group brought together representatives from the CPA, US State Department and four separate Iraqi ministries to set the conditions for immediate security and the eventual Iraqi Government-sponsored long-term solution.

All parties agreed to a combined presence of Iraqi Facilities Protective Service (FPS) and periodic 3-82 FA patrols and observation at the Grand Mosque to stabilize the volatile situation until the Ministry of Housing and Construction could enter the premises and remove the government-owned construction equipment. With interaction between all parties from the street to the national level, the Red Dragons were able to affect short-term security and long-term development in what could have become a hotbed of violence in Mansur.

4. Focus on Iraq: Be an Important Part of Your Neighborhood. Local national interpreters do much to connect Soldiers with Iraqis in their AO. The 3-82 FA S5 managed up to 45 interpreters for the battalion who were hired by Titan Corporation, a defense contractor in Iraq. Each battery scheduled and cared for its own four to seven interpreters.

These brave men and women became a part of the unit with which they worked and served alongside troops on all missions. They were enormous assets to the battalion and performed many tasks: atmospherics collection, Arabic language training, interrogation, intelligence collection and daily interpretation. As the platoon sergeant for the interpreters, the S5 NCO ensured the interpreters were well cared for, paid and equipped.

Another important technique 3-82 FA used to become intimate with their neighborhoods was to constantly update and renew their area assessments. The CAT, S5 and each CMO lieutenant at the battery level carried a 10-page packet with the eight-digit grids, names, phone numbers and other information on all important locations and individuals in the area. Verifying this information in the first few weeks of operations helped the unit become familiar with the area. Carrying the information with them on patrols over the next several months enabled leaders to maintain this intimacy and react intelligently to most situations.

In August 2004, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated near the IIG minister's villa compound in the neighborhood of Qadisiyah in the Red Dragon AO. Initial reports came to the battalion TOC from security elements near the compound as well as via cellular telephone calls from locals at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) building near the attack.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

The S5 and local battery commander contacted representatives from the Iraqi police station, public works directorate and local hospital to evacuate the wounded, restore power, clean up the site and repair the road to restore traffic flow in a matter of hours instead of days or weeks. The rapid resolution of this event and subsequent CMO, PA and IO victories for the residents of Qadisiyah were possible mainly because of the highly developed personal relationships between the Red Dragons and Iraqi Government and medical leaders who were just a phone call away.

In October 2004, the Red Dragons worked with officials from the Ministry of Education to hold Mansur's first education town hall meeting at a local community center. 3-82 FA and USAID had rehabilitated all but two public schools in the area during the summer and were eager to prepare the local school district director-general to assume the bulk of the responsibility for future improvements to education. 3-82 FA used a series of meetings between the MNF-supported district council and the established, but fragile, education ministry to get the ministry officials up to speed on the progress in their schools and to propose a realistic plan for the future. The presence of the CAT and representatives from USAID helped legitimize the fledgling district council.

Shortly thereafter, the district council and Ministry of Education held their own town hall meeting with hundreds of local headmasters and parents. Red Dragons worked with the local Iraqi police to provide security and invited Arab media to the event. At the end of the day, the Ministry of Education and district council had assumed a new level of responsibility for the public school system in Mansur, were able to publicize the significant improvements made during the summer, became accountable to parents and residents for continued progress in education, and were prepared to continue improvements in education with their new partner, USAID, without day-to-day direction from the Red Dragons.

5. Synchronize CMO. 3-82 FA held an internal weekly CMO meeting in the battalion conference room. Each battery sent its CMO lieutenant to meet with the battalion S5, CAT and the battalion public affairs office (PAO), IO and intelligence exploitation (S2X) officers. Attendees updated assessment data and discussed issues and the status of reconstruction projects. Participants also shared information and developed solutions to other issues ranging from interpreter assignments and pay to sewer, water or trash service problems in the AO.

The most important part of the meeting was the synchronization roundtable. The S5 developed and briefed a tentative plan for the week. During the roundtable, attendees finalized the week's plan by arranging joint battery-CAT patrols, developing specific CMO-related tasks and purposes for selected battery combat patrols, developing passive intelligence and atmospherics reporting requirements for the week, determining exactly which operations would receive Arab or western media representatives and more. The battalion CMO/IO calendar encoded this information on a single page, making it visible for all battalion staff and commanders for three weeks out. The battalion S3 then revised the CMO/IO plan to synchronize it with combat operations and psychological operations (PSYOP).

Lessons Learned. Iraq is a dynamic and ever-changing environment. Lessons learned today may not apply to the problems of tomorrow. However, during 3-82 FA's year-long CMO experience, several lessons may prove useful to units operating in Iraq today and in the future.

* Provide a common CMO assessment product. The assessment data 3-82 FA collected on a master file proved to be a useful tool. Soldiers on patrol must be able to tell that the assessment of, say, "their clinic" among the "14 clinics" in the AO is still valid. To ensure that the unit assesses every inch of ground and speaks to every Iraqi possible, the S5 can draw a cartoon map like those commonly sold in tourist cities, not necessarily to scale, but showing important locations and information in an easy-to-read format. It can be hand-drawn on a large piece of paper posted on the wall of the TOC or CMO center (CMOC).

If a patrol from B Battery speaks with the owner of a produce stand near the gas station, the patrol leader can describe it to the S5 who can draw its caricature on the map with basic information about the location and the people who work there. The amount of helpful information that could be attained using this method is unlimited, easily understood by all and helpful in solving the "puzzle" of Iraq.

Furthermore, this information can be fed into the S2's all-source analysis system (ASAS) database via contact reports submitted after each mission.

* Add interpreter training to the pre-deployment train-up. Soldiers should use specific techniques to maximize the effectiveness of their communications when using interpreters. The language barrier may be formidable, but it is not insurmountable. With our cursory leader training on working with interpreters in November 2003, many Soldiers failed to communicate effectively.

Learning to use an interpreter properly not only helps the Soldier be understood, but also fosters good relations with the people in the community. Soldiers will appreciate the immense value local national interpreters offer the unit. By establishing relationships with interpreters, the battalion can better understand the cultural landscape of the AO.

* Seek CA training for S5s and battery CMO lieutenants. Before deploying, S5 personnel attended 40 hours of training by CA officers from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center sent to Fort Hood from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The S5 is not the only Soldier who performs CMO tasks. CA training of any kind for battery-level leaders will benefit the unit greatly.

During their 10 months in central Baghdad, the Red Dragons worked with Iraqis and used CMO to make remarkable and lasting progress in their AO. 3-82 FA, together with the Mansur District Council, subordinate neighborhood councils and many local leaders and officials, forged the potential for a bright and prosperous future in an important and influential area of Baghdad.

RELATED ARTICLE

CMO must be--

1. Soldier-Executed

2. High-Volume

3. Vertical

4. Neighborhood-Centric

5. Synchronized

Red Dragon's Five Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Characteristics

By Captain Evans A. Hanson

Captain Evans A. Hanson is the Civil Military Operations (CMO) Officer (S5) for 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82 FA), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. From January 2004 until February 2005, he was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. He served as an Assistant Operations Officer during the pre-deployment train-up. Previously, he was the Executive Officer, Paladin Platoon Leader and Battery Fire Direction Officer in B/3-82 FA and Fire Support Officer for D/1-8 Cav.