CIA 'Engineered Nuke Brain Drain'.

The Washington Post on Dec. 9 reported that the CIA had launched a secret programme in 2005 designed to degrade Iran's nuclear weapons work by persuading key officials to defect, an effort which prompted a "handful" of significant departures. Citing "current and former US intelligence officials familiar with the operation", the paper said the previously undisclosed programme, which CIA officials dubbed "the Brain Drain", was part of a major intelligence push against Iran ordered by the White House in 2005.

Intelligence gathered as part of that push provided much of the basis for the Dec. 3 NIE report. The Post added: "Officials declined to say how much of that intelligence could be attributed to the CIA programme aimed at recruiting defectors. Although the CIA effort on defections has been aimed in part at gaining information about Iran's nuclear capabilities, its goal has been to undermine Iran's emerging atomic energy capabilities by plucking key scientists, military officers and other personnel from its nuclear roster.

The programme has had limited success. Officials said fewer than six well-placed Iranians had defected, and that none had been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Iran's nuclear programme.

The Post said: "The CIA effort on defectors reflects the urgency with which the US government has sought to slow down Iran's nuclear advances. It was described by officials on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the effort.

"The White House ordered the stepped-up effort in hopes of gathering stronger evidence that Tehran was making progress towards building a nuclear bomb. The Bush administration 'wanted better information' on Iran's nuclear programmes, said a US official briefed on the expanded collection efforts".

The Post quoted that official as saying: "I can't imagine that they would have ever guessed that the information they got would show that the programme was shut down" - the central finding of the comprehensive NIE which contradicted previous intelligence assessments and undercut assertions by the Bush administration.

The new estimate on Iran also concluded that Tehran "at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and continuing to pursue civilian nuclear energy technologies that could help Iran make a bomb.

The Bush administration's decision to step up intelligence collection on Iran in 2005 was a reversal from a position the White House took after Bush was first elected. The defector programme was put in place under then-CIA Director Porter J. Goss.

The agency compiled a list of dozens of people to target as potential defectors based on a single criterion, according to a former official involved in the operation: "Who, if removed from the programme, would have the biggest impact on slowing or stopping their progress?"

In the two years since it was launched, the programme has led to carefully orchestrated extractions of a small group of Iranian officials who operated in the mid- to upper tiers of the theocracy's nuclear programmes. None of those who defected was considered essential to the nuclear programme, nor were they in position to provide comprehensive descriptions of Iran's efforts.

The Post quoted "the former official involved in the operation" as saying: "Did they have replacements for these people? Any country would have. But we did slow the programme". The paper said: "Officials declined to discuss the whereabouts of the defectors, or details regarding the methods used to approach them. The former senior US intelligence official said potential defectors have not been approached directly by the CIA, but through other contacts the agency has cultivated inside the country.

"Officials in the National Security Council urged the CIA to make the programme as broad as possible, and to spread word through Iranian networks the United States was prepared to help officials leave the country and relocate. But CIA officials fought to keep the programme narrowly targeted to avoid calling it to the attention of Iran's intelligence service. Even at that, CIA officials assumed that Iran's service was keeping close watch on key officials in the nuclear programme, and that potential defectors could be decoys".