CHAVEZ'S REVOLUTION.

Report from Venezuela

Politics in Venezuela, which is usually waged with great passion, was all but forgotten in the weeks after December 15, 1999. On that day, 71 percent of the voters ratified the new constitution devised by the followers of President Hugo Chavez to "refound" the republic. Then, just hours after the last votes were cast, torrential rains along the nation's entire coastal area produced one of the most destructive catastrophes in twentieth-century Latin America, leaving an estimated 30,000 dead and 300,000 homeless.

The convergence of elections of paramount importance, the calamity of the century, and the end of the millennium led some Venezuelans to attribute it all to divine wrath, and to hold President Chavez personally responsible. In fact, the catastrophe served to underline a theme raised by Chavez in February 1992, when he led a failed military coup, and again in 1998 when he successfully campaigned for president: Venezuela's only hope lies in ending the old way of doing politics, in which individual interests, party patronage, and rampant corruption block the effort needed to pull the nation out of underdevelopment.

The challenge of national recovery thrust on Venezuelans by the events of December 15 dovetails with another theme addressed by Chavez: the pressing need to evacuate the inhabitants of hundreds of slums on the hillsides of Caracas and the coast. In Caracas's central Libertador municipality, 237,000 people live in precarious dwellings. Chavez's proposal, one of Marshall Plan proportions, would relocate these people to safer ground while connecting the Orinoco and Apure rivers with the Amazonian system, thus promoting Latin American integration.

To achieve ambitious national goals like this, Chavez has assigned the Venezuelan armed forces a special role, tapping into their perceived discipline and public prestige. The military's image contrasts sharply with the nearly absolute disrepute with which the country's traditional political parties are currently held. At several rallies for the constitutional referendum, Chavez called out "at ease" to soldiers in military formation and then dispersed them into the crowd, illustrating his slogan of a "civilian-military alliance." Chavez has appointed officers to top positions in both his party and the government, and has entrusted the military with the administration of a massive public works program known as the "Plan Bolivar-2000."

By the early weeks of January, politics was back to normal and Chavez's hardline adversaries were pointing to the new constitution as a sure road to military dictatorship. Opposition politicians decry the strengthening of the national executive at the expense of the Congress, and express special concern over the lengthening of the presidential term from five to six years as well as the significant and novel change of permitting immediate reelection. In its 1999 annual report, Freedom House concluded that Venezuela under Chavez had established itself as a "role model for future demagogues."

The danger of slippage for Venezuela's forty-year democracy is undeniable. The new constitution weakens the legislative branch in favor of the national executive. In addition, while military efficiency may be a welcome change when it comes to public administration, the long-term implications are disquieting. Even Chavez's civilian supporters expressed displeasure off the record in January when the president filled the post of infrastructure minister with a fellow officer, thus confirming his growing reliance on the military. Still, the two referenda held last year-in April to approve the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, and on December 15-were firsts in Venezuela and have the potential for deepening democratic processes. In another novelty for Venezuela, the new constitution includes organizations of civil society (such as lawyers' guilds and university groups) in the process of naming judges and electoral officials.

Political reforms notwithstanding, Venezuela's democracy cannot function well if the "other half" of the population is excluded from social benefits. With an economic downturn encompassing the last twenty years, those lacking steady jobs in the formal economy now exceed half the work force. Chavez's constitution incorporates these people into the social security system, thus rescinding a law privatizing health and retirement payments approved by Congress months before Chavez assumed office.

Chavez's resistance to large-scale privatization, which in the past has favored U.S. multinationals, does not sit well with Washington. U.S. suspicion of Chavez is aggravated by his friendly relations with Havana and his refusal to allow additional U.S. military personnel to take part in hurricane relief efforts. Nevertheless, during Chavez's first year in office the Clinton administration refrained from criticizing his policies. Washington's moderation may stem from a previous embarrassing experience. Chavez, a polemicist like New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, thrives on aggressive opposition. During the presidential campaign in 1998, when the U.S. State Department denied Chavez's request for a visa, his popularity soared.

Chavez's appeal to the downtrodden and neglected sectors, his attempt to include them in the political and economic life of the nation, his adept use of the media and the military, and his ambitious development plans have helped maintain his popularity in the face of natural disasters, continued economic downturn, growing opposition from the Catholic church, and the fears of civil libertarians at home and abroad. At present, all eyes in Latin America are turned to Venezuela. Its success or failure will have continental implications.

Steve Ellner, a frequent contributor to Commonweal, teaches in the graduate school of political science at the Central University in Caracas.