CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES IN THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR.

IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, after nearly a decade of violence, the civil war in Algeria is winding down. A unilateral cease-fire sponsored by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in 1997 and the regime's Civil Concord initiative, which promised amnesty or light sentences for rebels who surrendered by January 2000, created momentum for the cessation of political violence. The number of deaths attributed to the conflict has diminished substantially in the last few years, and there is renewed optimism about the prospects for rebuilding Algerian society.

Despite such remarkable progress toward peace, however, a number of Islamist groups are perpetuating a low-intensity conflict, raising the specter of intractable episodes of sporadic military engagements. The civil war has not exhausted itself, and questions persist as to whether the regime is capable of ending the violence. The possibility of a long, drawn out conflict is a sober reality for an Algerian public already saturated by the experience of atrocities and death.

The daunting task of forging a cessation of political violence is, at least in part, the legacy of a factionalized civil war. Unlike many revolutions or rebellions where opposition forces coordinate under a centralized command capable of negotiating a comprehensive cease-fire, the armed Islamist opposition was never a coherent, unified movement. Instead, it was characterized by a nebulous, loose affiliation of autonomous groupings, each with its own leadership, strategies, tactics, and religious dogma. Although the Islamists faced a common enemy, there were profound differences over interpretations of Islamic doctrine regarding the purpose of the struggle and the religious permissibility of particular actions and tactics in warfare. [1]

These differences created centrifugal pressures toward internecine conflict that factionalized the movement into disparate groups. Ideological fissures among Islamists engendered pressure for a polycephelous armed movement with autonomous and often contradictory elements, rendering peace-making a Hercu-lean task. Throughout the civil war, Islamist groups proliferated as disagreements prompted spin-off movements. Despite the AIS cease-fire and the surrender of a number of Islamists, schisms within the movement remain and a number of armed groups still operate. The centrifugal tendencies in the civil war continue to induce low levels of Islamist violence that may prolong the "agony of Algeria" for some time to come. [2]

TENDENCIES IN THE ARMED MOVEMENT

In Algeria, despite attempts to unify Islamists under a common organizational umbrella, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), they have never represented a coherent movement. [3] Rather, the organization of the Islamists is characterized by a nebulous network of myriad groups, followings, and religious orientations, best described as an assortment of tendencies or ideological clusters. While they may share the goal of creating an Islamic state and society, there are divergent views over religious practice, strategy, and tactics. These differences inform internal schisms that underlie the structure of the movement. The term "tendency" is used here to connote the absence of rigid distinctions among variegated groupings. While individuals "tend" toward particular perspectives, categorization may not capture the fluidity of orientation, since individuals often move from one cluster to another, whether motivated by personal, pragmatic, or religious considerations.

In Algeria, there are two dominant tendencies in the Islamist movement. The first articulates an Islamic nationalist perspective that emphasizes political considerations defined by a complex national milieu. Frequently termed "Algerianist" (djaza 'ara), these Islamists are not driven exclusively by religious conviction. Instead, they consider the realities of political context and a rational calculus of what will benefit society and the polity. [4] For Algerianists, strengthening the nation may require compromise and cooperation with non-Islamist forces. This tendency is dominated by a politically experienced, pragmatic, intellectual core, represented by figures such as Abassi Madani, president and speaker of the FIS. [5]

Through most of the civil war, this accommodationist stance articulated a discourse of jihad frequently couched in symbols of democracy and human rights. The struggle was depicted as a war against an authoritarian regime that bypassed democratic procedures, canceling the electoral process in January 1992 as the FIS was positioned to control parliament. Jihad was viewed as a religiously justified rebellion to reinstate the electoral results and gain access to institutions of governance. Although the regime consistently refused to negotiate with the FIS, the Algerianists sought reincorporation into the political system. [6]

The second tendency is represented by the Salafis, a global movement driven by a desire for religious purification. [7] The purpose of the movement is not pragmatic, national politics; it is explicitly religious and ideological. Salafis believe that over centuries of religious practice, certain innovations were introduced to the religion through Sufism and other popular customs. As a result, society is following a deviant variant of Islam, in contradistinction to sirat al-mustaqim, the "straight path" of God. Salafis seek to reinstitute practices that capture the purity of Islam, as understood by the salaf (early companions of the Prophet) and revealed in the Quran and Sunna (path or example of the Prophet Mohammed). [8]

For the Salafi tendency in the Algerian civil war, armed conflict was seen as a religiously mandated struggle for social and political revolution, not as a means for democratic inclusion. This tendency articulated a view prevalent among violent Islamist groups elsewhere that jihad is the "sixth pillar" or "forgotten obligation" of Islam. It is thus a required religious ritual, incumbent upon all able Muslims. Surrender, compromise with the regime, or a cease-fire means abandoning the path ordained by God and signifies an abrogation of the faith. From this perspective, jihad is not simply a means to an end; it is an end in itself. Accommodation is possible for some, but only under extraordinary circumstances when it represents a lesser evil given available choices.

In addition to divisions over the purpose of jihad, Islamists also disagreed about the rules of engagement. Classic Muslim debates on warfare predominantly focused upon jus in bello (legitimate means in warfare), rather than jus ad bellum (grounds for warfare), and produced a set of broad rules for jihad al-sayf (struggle of the sword). These include rules concerning combatants, noncombatants, the enemy, prisoners, tactics, and weapons. [10] However, despite a number of areas of agreement among the classical jurists, there are points of ambiguity and conflict that create discursive space for contemporary disagreements over whether particular actions are religiously sanctioned. As a result, Islamists have extrapolated arguments, invented others, and selectively chosen doctrinal evidence to support their own tactics and strategies of engagement. This leaves ample room for centrifugal ideological differences that tend to factionalize movements [11]

Islamists in Algeria vociferously diverged, in particular, over the permissibility of targeting civilians. On one side of the debate, Islamists argued that Islam prohibits attacks against civilians. Innocent human life is spared except in the most extreme circumstances, and the mujahidin (holy warriors) must do all that is possible to avoid civilian casualties. Legitimate targets include only those directly engaged in the conflict, such as the government, police, and military. The Algerianists and a number of Salafis who believe in jihad, but not at any cost, supported this understanding.

In contrast, the more radical Salafis, as represented by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), drew a stark distinction between supporters and opponents of the jihad. [12] Opponents included noncombatants who were deemed obstacles to the struggle, such as the press, academics, teachers, secularists, and various civil society leaders. Beginning in the mid-1990s, certain GIA factions expanded this category to include ordinary Algerians, who through their everyday activities were seen as providing tacit approval for the regime. Thus school children attending government schools, journalists providing negative coverage of Islamist actions, the leaders of civil society organizations that sponsored nonIslamist causes, and anyone not actively supporting the jihad were judged apostates and legitimate targets of violence. Even other armed Islamist groups that did not conform to this radical doctrine of engagement were not immune from attacks.

These disagreements over the purpose of jihad and proper conduct in warfare engendered centrifugal pressures that factionalized the movement into divergent and frequently conflictual groups. Spin-off movements, factions, and alternative organizations were created, at least in part, in response to doctrinal and ideological differences over jihad. [13] As a result, the jihad against the regime became multiple wars targeting the state, other Islamists, and the Algerian people, pursued by proliferating groups in a chaotic context of religious differences.

THE CENTRIFUGAL CATALYST: GIA TACTICS IN THE CIVIL WAR

The scope and tenor of the Algerian civil war escalated dramatically in 1993 with the emergence of the GIA, which quickly distinguished itself from other armed groups through its willingness to use extreme forms of violence. 14 While the GIA initially included both Salafi and Algerianist tendencies in an attempt to foster a unified jihad movement, cooperation between the two quickly disintegrated over doctrinal issues. In 1994, Salafis in the GIA moved against the Algerianist tendency, killing 140, including prominent Islamist figures such as Mohammed al-Said and Abd al-Razzak Radjam. The carnage consolidated the dominance of the Salafi tendency within the loose organizational structure of the GIA as Algerianists either defected to alternative groups or were killed.

Initial GIA attacks against the regime following the cancellation of elections quickly gave way to operations against softer targets in society. By the mid-1990s, the GIA claimed responsibility for a number of bomb explosions in popular markets, cafes, and other public spaces. This was accompanied by the assassination of public civil society figures, including Berber singers, feminist leaders, civic organizers, academics, editors, and journalists. GIA factions eventually expanded the scope of violence to include the massacre of civilian populations. Fake roadblocks and attacks on entire villages in the middle of the night led to wholesale slaughters. The military and the village "patriots" (self defense groups set up by villagers) were appallingly inept at protecting civilians, who died en masse during the 1996-1998 period, especially in the provinces and towns surrounding Algiers. While some blame common criminals, tribal revenge, renegade "patriots," and military factions for at least a few of the atrociti es, most of the evidence and the GIA's own pronouncements indicate that the vast majority of massacres were committed by radical GIA factions. [15] Groups such as the al-Ansour Battalion, the Green Battalion, and the faction led by emir Othman Khalifi, known as the "Flash" or "Arrow," reigned terror on towns and villages and were responsible for some of the worst atrocities. [16]

In an interview in al-Djamaa, which claimed to represent the "official voice of the GIA in the West," GIA chief Abu al-Moudhir outlined the GIA rationale for attacks against civilian populations. According to Moudhir, the GIA divided society into three categories: 1) the mujahidin; 2) those fighting against the jihad by "force, talk or with the pen"; and 3) Islamist "imposters and wrongdoers" who support democracy. This last category refers to the Algerianists and the FIS leadership, who viewed the struggle in political terms and supported democratic institutions deemed un-Islamic according to Salafi doctrine. In the interview, Moudhir bluntly stated that for these Islamists, "their fate is death." [17] This is consistent with other GIA threats against the FIS, including a 1995 ultimatum that demanded the FIS leadership join the GIA or face consequences. [18]

The ambiguity of the second category-those who fight against Islam by "force, talk or with the pen"-opened the way for attacks against anyone deemed an obstacle to the GIA. Local emirs were responsible for local situations and determining whether individuals or groups were hindering the jihad. While some GIA factions continued to primarily attack the state, others unleashed brutal campaigns of terror against society, supported by GIA issued fatwas (jurisprudential opinions) and communiques authorizing the assaults. No one was immune to GIA accusations of apostasy, and the entire society was trapped between an undemocratic regime that seemed unable or unwilling to protect its populace and an increasingly violent Islamist insurrection.

CIVILIAN POPULATIONS

From 1996-1999, the massacre of civilians was epidemic. Particularly in the area surrounding Algiers, where the GIA traditionally operated, attacks against villages became obscenely common. Although civilian casualties were ubiquitous throughout the conflict, early deaths were predominantly the result of bombs placed in public settings. The massacres that plagued Algeria and drew international attention to the civil war were qualitatively different. Attackers rarely used bombs or firearms during these attacks. Rather, they wielded knives, machetes, and swords, necessitating close proximity to the victims. Ordinary citizens were maimed, decapitated, and burned alive at an alarming rate.

The outbreak of civilian massacres began in 1996 when Antar Zouabri became emir of the GIA. lie inaugurated his new leadership by issuing a foreboding fatwa that charged the entire society with apostasy, reminiscent of Takfir wa Hijra in Egypt. The fatwa authorized attacks against any Algerian who did not join or aid the GIA, including other armed Islamist groups and dissident GIA factions operating independently of the central leadership. This, in effect, created two groups according to GIA doctrine: those that assisted the GIA and those that did not. According to Zouabri, the latter are condemned as apostates and are therefore legitimate targets of jihad. The position is summed up in a GIA communique posted in an Algiers suburb in 1997: "There is no neutrality in the war we are waging. With the exception of those who are with us, all the others are apostates and deserve to die." [19] The GIA argued that support for the armed Islamist groups was an individual responsibility (fard 'ayn), and thus mandatory a ccording to Islam. Anyone who did not offer support became a target of the GIA onslaught.

Most civilian massacres targeted particular villages and even specific families and individuals who no longer supported the GIA. [20] Civilian populations that withdrew their support from the GIA were viewed as apostates according to the narrow definition used in GIA doctrine. This included the families of former GIA members who had left the group, joined other Islamist groups, or surrendered to the regime. According to Moudhir, all of these people "have become the enemies of our fighters, from the youngest of their children to the oldest of their elderly." [21] In response to accusations of indiscriminate killings, he argued that:

It is clear that there is no indiscriminate killing. Our fighters only kill those who deserve to die. We say to those who accuse us of indiscriminate killing that we will fight those traitors who have gone over to the 'taghout' [un-Islamic government]. We do no more than carry out the wishes of God and the Prophet. When you hear of killings and throat-slittings in a town or a village, you should know it is a matter of the death of government partisans, or else it is the application of GIA communiques ordering [us] to do good and combat evil. [22]

Still other civilians were targeted for engaging in what the GIA and other Islamists deemed un-Islamic behaviors. As part of the sharia injunction to command good and forbid what is evil, the GIA argued that it is a religious duty to eliminate "those who do not pray, who drink alcohol, take drugs, homosexuals, and immodest or debauched women." [23] This rationale was used to justify vicious assaults against a variety of targets, including women and pubescent girls who did not wear the hijab (head covering); places of "disrepute," such as bars and video stores; and individuals who did not act in accordance with GIA interpretations of sharia sanctioned moral behavior. [24] Any civilians killed inadvertently through bombs or other methods were considered martyrs if they were in the same area as the broadly defined "enemy," thus covering the GIA's religious legitimation for all casualties.

Attacks against civilians targeted not only ordinary villagers and Algerian citizens, but also prominent cultural figures and civil society leaders. Popular Berber singers, such as Cheb Hasni and Lounes Matoub were denounced as "the enemy of God, one of the symbols of depravation and debauchery in the Kabylie region." [25] They were kidnapped and murdered by GIA factions, engendering anti-Islamist protests in Berber communities. Other civil society figures, such as the head of a football club, a student leader, the director of the Algerian national theater, and the head of a feminist organization, were killed by the GIA for sponsoring ideas deemed inimical to Islam. [26]

THE PEN AND THE SWORD

In combating any group countenancing regime interests, journalists, editors, and the press became prime targets. The press is tightly censored and controlled by the Algerian regime, and reporting on the civil war was curtailed to suit the counterinsurgency efforts and propaganda of the state and its security services. Sympathetic Islamist journalists were consistently harassed and prevented from offering an alternative perspective on the conflict. Even secular journalists and editors who reported information the regime considered compromising were arrested. For the GIA, the press was simply an extension of the regime's war against the Islamists. As a result, the GIA viewed journalists and other members of the press industry as legitimate targets. Armed groups assassinated journalists and editors and bombed newspaper offices and television stations.

In a communique in 1995, the GIA outlined its rationale for attacking the press:

The rotten apostate regime did not stop using the mercenary media to cover its crimes and rationalize its aggression. This has turned all written, seen, and heard media outlets into a tool of aggression spreading lies and rumors. It would have been an obligation for these writers to stand with their nation in these hard times and embrace the blessed jihad, but instead they have turned their pens into swords defending the low lives of apostasy and treason. Based on that, mujahidin consider every reporter and journalist working for radio and television as no different than regime apostates. GIA calls on every reporter working there to immediately stop work, otherwise the group will continue hitting hard those who do not comply. Whoever fights us with the pen will be fought with the sword. [27]

The assassination of leading journalists and editors reflected the logic of attacks against all forces not directly aligned with the radical GIA. Although the attacks did not seem to mute criticism of the armed Islamist groups, they certainly expanded the scope of terror and attracted the concern of international press organizations. Domestic and international pressure pushed the regime to provide security for vulnerable members of the press. [28]

SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, AND STUDENTS

In the battle to expand the sphere of Islamist influence, education plays a critical role. Schools and other educational institutions represent important socializing agents, promoting particular cultural and moral values. For Islamists, education is critical for indoctrinating the next generation of Muslims. As a result, Muslim politics and contentious activism target the educational sphere to gain control of the instruments and mechanisms responsible for socializing children.

The GIA attack against society included schools, teachers, and students, not only because of perceived immoral behavior, un-Islamic curricula, and a desire to control socialization, but also because government-controlled institutions dominate education in Algeria. As a result, the GIA reasoned that participation in educational institutions represents support for the kufar (un-Islamic) agents of the regime and is therefore a legitimate target of jihad. In a statement published in the Arabic daily al-Hayat, the GIA claimed that, "According to the sharia, one is not allowed to work in establishments which belong to the government or its allies," especially schools where the curriculum is "contrary to the rules of Islam." The GIA believed that those who "continue their studies are helping the tyrant to ensure stability and thereby are not accomplishing the jihad." Any student, teacher, or school director who did not conform with the GIA ban was considered a heretic and therefore subject to punishment according t o GIA understandings of the sharia (in other words, death). [29]

During the last two months of the summer in 1994, GIA attacks against educational targets accelerated as schools prepared to open. During this time period, thirty teachers and school directors were killed and 538 schools suffered arson or bomb attacks. By the end of 1994, Islamists had assassinated 142 teachers. [30] Violence also extended to schoolchildren, including a number of deaths resulting from bomb explosions. In Blida, Islamists snatched schoolbags in an attempt at intimidation, and a number of schoolgirls were killed for not wearing the hijab. [31] The intimidation and violence prompted the closure of schools in areas of heightened violence such as the notorious "triangle of death."

THE EXTERNAL ENEMY: FOREIGN FORCES

In applying its reductionist view of the world as either for or against the GIA mujahidin, the group expanded the scope of its attacks to include foreign influences. The GIA threatened any government that created obstacles for the GIA; foreigners working or living in Algeria (seen as colonizers); and foreign governments that directly supported the Algerian regime through economic, political, or financial assistance.

France, in particular, became a major GIA target. Like many past imperial powers, France retained strong political and economic relations with its former territory, despite the anti-colonial, nationalistic rhetoric of the new Algerian entity. French is still spoken by a large number of Algerians, especially in secular circles, and is used by many government officials, despite regime Arabization policies. Because leading members of the military establishment were either trained in France or actually served in the French army prior to the war of independence, Islamists have always suspected an intimate relationship, frequently referring to the military hierarchy as Hizb Farancia (Party of France). French foreign assistance to the Algerian regime and a seemingly hostile stance toward Islamists living abroad in France prompted the GIA to target the former colonizer with a number of audacious attacks. These included a hijacking and bombings in Paris in the mid-1990s. The GIA issued statements "prohibiting" travel to and from France and threatened reprisals for those who violated the ban. [32]

Following the attacks in France and the growth of GIA networks throughout western Europe, other foreign governments were embroiled in the conflict. Decisions to extradite GIA members to France or other European countries and crackdowns against GIA supply networks were interpreted as obstacles to the jihad. This led to violent confrontations between the GIA and the police in various European countries, including targeted GIA attacks against law enforcement, such as the murder of two police officers in Belgium. Tensions between the group and authorities increased in Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. [33]

Even other Muslim countries were not immune to GIA threats. The group claimed responsibility for crossing into Tunisia in 1995 and killing seven police officers, warning the Tunisian regime to halt its oppression of Islamists. [34] Threats were also made against Morocco after the government issued new entry visa requirements that hampered cross-border GIA movement. [35] This exacerbated tensions that had grown since the Moroccan decision to extradite GIA chief Badelhak Layada to Algeria after he was sentenced to death by a special court in March 1993.

The GIA also turned against foreign nationals in Algeria, issuing statements warning all foreigners to leave the country. In 1995, communiques were sent to foreign embassies in Algiers, stating that, "All contact with our country should be broken by January 7 and the embassy should be cleared. We cannot guarantee the lives of foreign nationals after the expiry of this ultimatum. After that all unbelievers will be killed in cold blood." [36] Foreign workers, particularly those working in the oil industry, were systematically targeted in widespread attacks.

Some of the most gruesome and widely publicized violence directed toward foreigners targeted missionaries, especially French nuns and priests, who were viewed as part of an imperial Christian plot to undermine Islam in Algerian society. In perhaps the best known incident in 1996, a GIA faction kidnapped seven French, Trappist monks and demanded the French government release GIA prisoners held in France. The French government refused to negotiate and the monks were beheaded. In a booklet written by then GIA leader Djamal Zaytuni, the group argued that the monks were "mixing with them [the Algerian people], living with them, and blocking the way of Allah by calling people to Christianity, and these are the worst way of fighting the religion of Allah and Muslims." Although the monks claimed they had received thimma (security and convenance) from local GIA chief Sheikh Aba Yunis Atiyyah, the GIA rejected the covenant, arguing that even if a thimma existed, the act of proselytizing nullified the agreement. [37] F or the GIA, the fact that the monks were French provided further evidence of their insidious intent, since all foreigners were considered part of a plan to recolonize Algeria.

FACTIONALIZATION AND DISUNITY 

The ideological differences over legitimate conduct in warfare and Islamist opposition to the GIA tactics described above surfaced dramatically in the mid-1990s, as attacks against society and civilians increased. Divergences over the permissibility of killing civilians sparked an internal movement controversy that served as a catalyst for further centrifugal factionalization. Armed groups decried one another as un-Islamic, and differences frequently degenerated into factional clashes.

PRAGMATISTS AND THE CEASE-FIRE

The goal of most Algerianists in the struggle was not total destruction of the regime, but rather inclusion in a legitimate democratic process. As a result, the FIS and its military wing (the Islamic Salvation Army, AIS) were mortified by the direction of the GIA. Not only were attacks against civilians viewed as un-Islamic, but such actions undermined the pragmatic and political stance of the FIS in a number of directions as well. First, it eroded FIS efforts to gain international recognition as the legitimate representative of the Algerian people. The civil war and massacres were linked in international opinion, and the GIA's actions colored views of the conflict as the jihad became increasingly associated with atrocities. Second, the massacres threatened to undermine the FIS base of support. Not only was popular opinion in Algeria turning against the Islamists as a result of the massacres, but the attacks also targeted towns and provinces that expressed strong support for the FIS in the 1990 and 1991 elect ions. [38] Third, the FIS leadership and the AIS believed that the GIA actions had little justification in religious doctrine and were undermining the moral leverage of a legitimate jihad.

Ideological differences over the permissibility of killing civilians in warfare were reflected in what is commonly termed "the war of the communiques" between the GIA and the FIS/AIS from 1995-1998. In the initial stages of the GIA escalation against society, the AIS turned to the FIS leadership for instructions and guidance. In a letter sent from the AIS to Abassi Madani and 'Ali Bel Hadj, the AIS requested clarification about the religiously sanctioned use of violence:

Our daring sheiks...they [the mujahidin] also want you to define--clearly--the main foundations of our jihad movement, which we cannot transcend, abandon, or negotiate over, in order to intercept the ignorant people claiming knowledge and the slanderers issuing fatwas, who have--as a result of their violation of religion--caused confusion among mujahidin battalions by misleading some people and declaring others unbelievers, relying on incompatible jurisprudence rules that do not apply to what we are experiencing at all. [39]

The letter initiated a direct, scathing critique of the GIA and its tactics, accusing GIA participants of sedition and sowing discord (fitna) among the Islamic fighters. More importantly, the AIS openly derided Zouabri,s fatwa condemning society and the people as kafir: "They [the GIA] also spread the rumor that the people are unbelievers and tyrannical and started to judge them for minor mistakes that can be tackled by good preaching, wisdom, and good example." [40]

Both the AIS and FIS issued numerous statements condemning the attacks against civilians in an attempt to distance themselves from the GIA. In an early reaction to the GIA attacks, the AIS stated that, "in line with our divine constitution [Quran] and the Prophet's charter [Sunna], the AIS is innocent of all illegal jihad actions, and particularly the killing of women and children." The AIS called the GIA's actions "a distorted jihad." In the al-Tasbira bulletin, AIS commander Madani Merzak derided the GIA tactics: "unlike the parallel jihad organization [GIA], the AIS mujahidin are fighting a man's war and do not kill elderly people, children or women." [41] The FIS charged that the GIA "fatwas and theatrical operations targeting the lives of women and children and justifying them on the basis of the sharia only serve the interests of the [ruling] clique." [42]

This led the FIS to issue statements prohibiting attacks against civilians, including foreigners, scholars, politicians, writers, and journalists. [43] This broad ban on killing was most likely designed to maintain popular support in the face of GIA atrocities. Attacks against foreigners, in particular, threatened widespread European crackdowns on Islamist networks, including those of the FIS, and undermined the FIS's moral authority in Western circles. In addition, such attacks jeopardized the FIS leadership in exile in Germany and the United States, since they operated according to the good will of the host country.

The GIA, for its part, issued statements condemning its Islamist critics as apostates. It published threats against AIS and FIS leaders and used intimidation to prevent defections and opposition to the Zouabri supported assaults on villages. In a number of instances, this resulted in armed conflict between AIS and GIA forces as well as internal GIA factional clashes. Anyone opposed to the GlA fatwas, even other Islamist rebels, was considered a heretic. The war of the communiques between the GIA and its Islamist critics became a discursive contest over control of the scope of the jihad and the definition of legitimate targets. Both sides urged the mujahidin to join their particular variant of jihad while denouncing the religious transgressions or lapses of the other.

Despite efforts by the FIS and AIS to reign in the violence, by the middle of 1997 the conflict had spiraled beyond the control of the pragmatic Algerianists. The GIA atrocities continued and the Algerianists were losing the initiative and unable to stop the massacres. The popular mood shifted dramatically against the Islamic movement in general and the regime capitalized by portraying all Islamists involved in the conflict as part of a single, ultra-violent jihad movement. Unable to limit the scope of the violence and save the image of jihad, the pragmatists recognized that they could no longer reach their objective of political inclusion through the use of violence. Bolstered by public opinion, the regime had become even more intransigent over the issue of FIS political participation. [44] The FIS decided to abandon the civil war, and the AIS announced a unilateral cease-fire effective 1 October 1997.

While the cease-fire reduced the overall level of political violence, it further fragmented the armed Islamic groups. A number of Algerianists and some Salafi groups joined the AIS cease-fire, recognizing that the escalation of violence against civilians had hindered the jihad. The radical Salafis, on the other hand, vehemently denounced compromise. But while the more radical Salafis, especially those in the GIA factions around Algiers, decried the AIS's "surrender" to the regime as tantamount to heresy and vowed to continue the struggle, they strongly disagreed over whether civilians could be targeted. This segmented the remaining armed groups into two ideological clusters as centrifugal pressures continued to mount.

SALAFI FACTIONALIZATION

Like the Algerian Islamist movement as a whole, the GIA was always, in reality, an amalgamation of various factions with relatively independent leaderships, followings, strategies, and tactics. The nebulous assortment of Salafi followings, which came to dominate the GIA, temporarily united through a bay 'a--an oath of loyalty to follow a leader so long as he abides by certain conditions. The conditionality of these agreements provided factions with ample space to defect if there were divergences of opinion as to whether the leader was following the Salafi straight path. As a result, while the groups shared a common cause and Salafi perspective, they only loosely followed a central command. In instances where factional leaders disagreed with the overall GIA "emir," local groups frequently ignored edicts and commands issued by the central leadership, instead following their own interpretations of the true Salafi path.

The loose structure of the GIA was reflected in the proliferation of autonomous groups under the GIA banner. Names such as Katibat al-Shahada, the Furqan Battalion, Katibat Jund Allah, the Intiqam Battalion, and Katibat al-Ansour signified smaller Salafi factions within the ambiguous structure of the GIA. Although many of these groups operated under the GIA name, tactical decisions were usually independent of a central command. This reflected the decentralized nature of the movement and the lack of an authoritative, hegemonic, centralized leadership. The result was that no single person could speak authoritatively for all Salafis in the jihad community, making it difficult to attribute responsibility for specific acts of violence.

When Zouabri began issuing fatwas condoning attacks against unarmed civilians, the already tenuous organizational coherence of the GIA splintered as constituent groups defected over proper conduct in warfare. This included 8-10 GIA factions that joined the AIS cease-fire in 1997. Other GIA dissidents attempted to appropriate the GIA name for themselves to direct the movement away from Zouabri. In one example, a breakaway faction published a bulletin entitled al-Ghuaraba' (The Expatriates) in Europe, claiming to represent the "real" GIA. The central themes of the bulletin reflected traditional GIA arguments about the war, differing only in views about the permissibility of killing civilians. [45] This was accompanied by accusations that the security services had infiltrated Zouabri's faction and were directing GIA actions to discredit the legitimate jihad.

In 1996, Hassan Hattab, the GIA emir of the second region, began positioning himself as the strongest alternative to Zouabri's tactics. Hattab believed that Zouabri's fatwa condoning attacks against civilians was not supported by evidence from the Quran and Sunna. He and his followers operated according to their own doctrinal understanding about what is permissible in the conduct of warfare and ignored Zouabri. Hattab formally withdrew from the GIA leadership; and although he continued to sign statements and documents as the commander of the second region, this was designed to signify his support for the old Djamal Zaytuni-led GIA policies and not Zouabri.

In pursuing this more reserved line within the jihad movement, Hattab claimed the mantel of Abd al-Qadir Shabbuti, a well-known Salafi and first commander of the AIS, who issued a fatwa that violence should accord primacy to a military rationale and not target civilians. At the same time, Hattab invoked the position of former GIA leader Zaytuni, who issued a series of fatwas condoning attacks against foreigners, members of the intelligentsia deemed supportive of the state, government functionaries, and other Islamist groups that advocated dialogue with the regime. According to Zaytuni, all of these individuals betrayed the jihad cause and were apostates who deserved death. Hattab's emerging Salafi faction thus sought to continue the violence while limiting attacks against the general public. He believed that his interpretation of permissible conduct would attract others to his cause, particularly dissident members of the AIS, who did not support the cease-fire, and the harakat al-naqimin (movement of those wh o are angry) within the GIA who disagreed with Zouabri's direction. His decision brought him into direct conflict (often military confrontation) with other factions in the GIA.

Hattab's strategy received support from a number of leading Salafi figures in the global jihad movement, including Osama Ben Laden. In May 1998, Qamar al-Din Kharban, leader of the Algerian Afghans, received support from Ben Laden for funds and networks in Europe to help consolidate Hattab's faction. [46] Ben Laden and other Salafis outside Algeria viewed the new movement as a means of weakening the FIS leadership, which supported the AIS cease-fire, while distancing the mujahidin from the GIA, which was believed to have deviated from the straight path. In a trial in Tizi Quzou, Mohammed Barashid, an emir close to Hattab, claimed that Ben Laden promised logistical and financial support for a new movement since the GIA had strayed. In fact, it is rumored that Ben Laden even suggested the name for the group--Salafi Group for Call and Combat (Arabic: al-jamaa 'a al-salafiya li al-da 'wa wa al-qilal; French: Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat or GSPC). [47]

The GSPC was formally announced later that year and quickly attracted dissidents from both the GIA and the AIS. Within the first year, the GSPC grew from 700 to 3,000 fighters. It claimed to focus its attacks against security forces and the regime, denying involvement in civilian massacres and condemning the GIA. In a communique posted in the eastern district of Algiers, the GSPC "condemned the crimes of the GIA of Antar Zouabri, which is still shedding the blood of innocent people in massacres." The GSPC, however, proclaimed its determination to continue the jihad and "declared war against the Islamic Salvation Army, which accepted the truce and laid down its weapons. [48] By association, this entailed a rejection of the FIS and its political leadership.

In late May 1999, Hattab passed formal leadership of the GSPC to Abd al-Majid Dishu, his religious advisor and a specialist in sharia, so that he could focus on military operations. Recognizing the centrifugal pressures that had created disunity among the Salafi factions, the move was intended to demonstrate the coherence of the new group. According to a GSPC communique, the change in leadership was designed to "reinforce the unity of the Salafist fighters and change the doctrinal and spiritual deviations that have occurred within the Armed Islamic Group." [49]

In addition to the GSPC, which has become a dominant faction in the conflict, other smaller movements formed in the late 1990s to continue the struggle while weakening the GIA's position in the jihad movement. Opposed to attacks on civilians, new groups, such as the "Islamic Movement for Spreading the Faith and Holy War" and the "Faithful to the Oath," promised to combat those responsible for the massacres and to reappropriate the jihad for the straight path. Despite the AIS cease-fire and the subsequent surrender of a number of armed Islamists following the Civil Concord in 1999, groups still operate and proliferate as ideological differences over the purpose and scope of the jihad continue to exert centrifugal pressures.

CONCLUSION

The civil war in Algeria involved a complex array of diverse Islamist orientations, ideologies, tactics, strategies, networks, and organizations. Groups proliferated throughout the conflict in response to ideological differences over the purpose of jihad and permissible tactics in warfare, splintering the Islamist movement into a dizzying array of clusters and groupings. While the FIS and its military operatives initially dominated the movement, the alternative ascendancy of the GIA and its extreme forms of jihad challenged their preeminence. The result was an escalation of the conflict into the niches of society where no one was safe from violence. Extreme actions against civilian populations, in turn, led to further factionalization over the religious permissibility of attacking noncombatants.

The AIS cease-fire, which reflected the pragmatists' response to the GIA atrocities, and the regime's Civil Concord represent real opportunities for constraining political violence. Indeed, 8,000 AIS fighters surrendered and received amnesty under the Civil Concord in January 2000, reflecting possibilities for future cooperation. [50] But in a factionalized, polycephelous movement, such as the jihad movement in Algeria, no single individual or group can effectively coordinate activism or speak with authority on behalf of the entire movement; and the AIS decision to end hostilities did not inexorably lead to a cessation of violence. On the contrary, other armed Islamist groups emerged to engage in warfare according to an alternative understanding of jihad. While the pace of violence has diminished, armed groups continue to operate, posing a challenge to peace in Algeria.

The regime is itself, in part, responsible for this condition. It never committed to parsing the network and tendencies of the armed movement in an effort to discern possible allies for peace. Instead, it followed a strict, combative policy of uncompromising counter-violence against all armed Islamist groups and their supporters. Despite FIS/AIS overtures toward compromise and widespread support among political parties and civil society actors for including the FIS in any dialogue on democratization, the regime remained intransigent in its opposition to FIS participation in the political system. This weakened accommodationist voices within the armed movement and strengthened the position of radicals, such as those in the GIA, who pointed to regime policies as indicative of a determination to crush Islamism in any guise.

In addition, regardless of any possibilities for dialogue, it was never clear whether the regime actively sought a complete cessation of violence. Disturbing details have emerged in the last few years indicating that the regime was at least complicit in a few massacres, refusing to intervene despite the proximity of security forces and the extended duration of the massacres (some were more than four hours long). [51] One former officer even claims that the regime was directly responsible for some of the deadly attacks. [52] Others argue that the new, low intensity conflict suits regime interests, so long as strategic resources, such as oil pipelines, are protected. From this perspective, the continuation of violence provides the regime with a rationale for continued repression against Islamists and other opposition forces. And at least a few observers believe the regime allowed the massacres in order to drive local farmers from government controlled land. Many of the massacres took place in agricultural area s with fertile, state-owned land that is scheduled for privatization. Since any privatization will require compensation for local farmers, the massacres conveniently eliminated high cost expenditures by forcing farmers off the land. [53]

Regardless of regime intent, neither the centrifugal pressures among the armed groups nor the regime's record in dealing with the conflict auger well for the future of peace in Algeria. The scenario that is developing is one in which small, relatively independent Islamist groups continue to engage in violence without any hope of ousting those in power, while the regime continues to fight off low-intensity conflict without definitively ending the violence. If this is indeed the future, then the civil war has transformed into a state of limited but persistent conflict, continuing to remind citizens that the agony of Algeria is not over.

Quintan Wiktorowicz is an assistant professor of international studies at Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee.

NOTES

(1.) This was complicated by personal rivalries, banditry, and clans, which posed further obstacles to a coordinated struggle.

(2.) This phrase is taken from Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

(3.) For background on Islamists and the conflict in Algeria, see Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The Embattled Arians of Algiers," Third World Quarterly, 10, 2 (April 1988): 556-89; Martha Crenshaw, "Political Violence in Algeria," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, 3 (Autumn 1994): 261-280; Hugh Roberts, "From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979-1992, "in Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Severine Labat, Les Islamistes Algeriens: Entre les Urnes et le Maquis (Apris: Editions: du Seuil 1995); Claire Spencer, "The Roots and Future of Islamism in Algeria," in Islamic Fundamentalism, ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," Middle East Journal 54, 4 (Fall 2000): 572-91; and Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

(4.) This is similar to nationalist Islamist movements elsewhere such as Hamas See Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

(5.) The FIS was formed as an Islamist political party in response to democratic openings that followed the repression of austerity riots in October 1988. Although it was initially sponsored by Islamists from a variety of tendencies, by July 1991 the Algerianists controlled the leadership and dominated the party. See Roberts, "From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition."

(6.) This was codified through FIS participation in the Sant'Egidio conference from 21-22 November 1994, which brought together political parties from across the political spectrum to discuss a return to democracy in Algeria. It resulted in the "Treaty of Rome," which outlined FIS support for peace and basic democratic freedoms and called for an inclusion of the FIS in the political process. See Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian Civil War," Middle East Journal 50, 1 (Winter 1996): 35-38.

(7.) A number of different terms are used to refer to Salafis, including Salafiyyists, neo-Wahhabis, Hanbalists, and new Islamism. The term Salafi is used here since most publications by the movement in English use this designation.

(8.) For more on the Salafis, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan," International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000): 219-40; and idem, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).

(9.) See Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and the Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986); and Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

(10.) Khaled Abon El Fadl, "The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources," The Muslim World 89, 2 (April 1999): 144-57; and So-hail H. Hashmi, "Saving and Taking Life in War: Three Modern Muslim Views," The Muslim World 89, 2 (April 1999): 158-80.

(11.) For a good explanation of the different ideological orientations of the various Islamist factions in the civil war, see Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements"; and Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, chapter 9.

(12.) It should be noted that the various armed groups that constituted the GIA in the mid-1990s were not all equally motivated by religious convictions. Criminals, unemployed young men, those seeking protection from the authorities, and a host of other social groups often joined the GIA for their own narrow interests rather than a broad religious cause (see Martinez, The Algerian Civil War).

(13.) Highlighting the role of ideological differences in splitting the jihad movement does not entail a dismissal of other centrifugal pressures that also played a role, including personal rivalries, competing economic interests, and the impact of regime strategies of repression. Doctrinal differences, however, reflected divergent goals and understandings about the basic premises of the jihad and made coordination difficult.

(14.) For background on the GIA, see Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria; "Backgrounder: Algeria-GIA," Middle East Reporter, 15 June 1996, pp. 14-15; Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements"; and Martinez, The Algerian Civil War.

(15.) See Amnesty International, Algeria: Civilians Caught between Two Fires (New York: Amnesty International, 1997); idem, Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence (New York: Amnesty International, 1997); Armed Islamic Group, Communique issued 11 January 1995; idem, Communique issued 16 January 1995; idem, Communique issued 18 January 1995; idem, Al-Qital, bulletin 32 (1996); United Nations, Algeria: Report of Eminent Panel, July-August 1998 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998). For a discussion of the military's direct involvement in massacres, see the confessional and observations of former officer Habib Souaida in La Sale Guerre (Paris: La Decouverte, 2001).

(16.) Al-Majallah, 14-20 March 1999, pp. 21, 22, in Federal Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS-NES)-1999-0323.

(17.) AFP, 7 August 1997.

(18.) AI-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 May 1995, pp. 1,4, in FBIS-NES-95-094.

(19.) AFP, 21 January 1997, in FBIS-NES-97-013.

(20.) Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society 11, 3 (1999): 243-85.

(21.) AFP, 7 August 1997.

(22.) Ibid.

(23.) Al-Majallah, 14-20 March 1999, pp. 21-22, in FBIS-NES-1999-0323.

(24.) It was also used to justify attacks against groups and individuals who participated in the 1995 elections, seen by many as the regime's attempt to reinvigorate its legitimacy.

(25.) AFP, 2 October 1994, in FBIS-NES-94-191.

(26.) AFP, 20 February 1995.

(27.) Armed Islamic Group, Communique issued 16 January 1995.

(28.) There is speculation that in at least a few instances the regime eliminated opponents in the press while blaming the Islamists, but the GIA claimed responsibility for a number of such attacks.

(29.) AFP, 6 August 1994, in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS)-TOT-94-034-L.

(30.) Liberte, 16 June 1999.

(31.) AFP, 21 September 1994, in FBIS-NES-94-184.

(32.) Armed Islamic Group, Communique, issued 16 January 1995.

(33.) Paris AFP, 25 October 96, in FBIS-TOT-97-00l-L.

(34.) AFP, 20 February 1995.

(35.) AFP, 31 August 1994, in FBIS-NES-94-170.

(36.) Press Association (London), 3 January 1995, in Federal Broadcast Information Service-West Europe (hereafter FBIS-WEU)-95-002.

(37.) Armed Islamic Group, Communique issued 18 April 1996.

(38.) Presse du Revue, Halte Aux Massacres en Algerie (October 1997). Available at www.algeria-watch.de/mrv/mrvmass/halte.htm.

(39.) Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 3 April 1995, p. 1, 4, in FBIS-NES-95-067.

(40.) Ibid.

(41.) Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 May 1995, pp. 1, 4, in FBIS-NES-95-094.

(42.) Ibid.

(43.) AFP, 18 March 1995, in FBIS-NES-95-053.

(44.) At the same time, the regime encouraged the political participation of moderate groups that had not engaged in violence, including Harakat Mujtama' al-Silm (Movement for the Society of Peace) and Harakat al-Nahda (Movement of Renaissance).

(45.) Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 22 August 1997, p. 6, in FBIS-TOT-97-234.

(46.) Kharban trained Arabs in Peshawar during the war in Afghanistan and enjoyed close relations with Ben Laden. The Algerian Afghans are predominantly comprised of Salafi radicals who fought in the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.

(47.) Al-Majallah, 20-26 June 1999, p. 1, 23, in FBIS-NES-1999-0627.

(48.) AFP, 2 May 1998, in FBIS-TOT-98-123.

(49.) AFP, 2 May 1999, in FBIS-WEU-1999-502.

(50.) John F. Burns, "In Assault on Islamic Rebels, a Bid to End Algeria s Civil War," New York Times, 27 January 2000.

(51.) See Amnesty International, Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence; and Presse du Revue, Halte Aux Massacres en Algerie.

(52.) Souaida, La Sale Guerre.

(53.) Elie Chalala, "In Algeria's Killing Fields: A Hidden Governmental Role?" The Humanist (March/April 1999): 5-6.