CASE STUDIES IN JAPANESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR.

CASE STUDIES IN JAPANESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR. By Michael Blaker, Paul Giarra, and Ezra F. Vogel. Washington (DC): United States Institute of Peace Press. 2002. 170 pp. (Illus.) US$12.50, paper. ISBN 1-929223-10-2.

Some idiosyncratic tendencies are easily detected in negotiations with adversaries, whether in war or in negotiation. North Korea has been widely regarded as being assiduous in building nuclear power plants, some of the products of which can be naturally transformed into nuclear weapons, to be used as weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has been designated as one of the axis of evil countries by President George W. Bush. When Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong II held a summit meeting in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, the United States government was alarmed for two reasons: First, the Japanese government had not informed the United States government well in advance and in full details. Second, the Japanese government did not appear to have been well informed of the North Korean nuclear developments.

Therefore, while the United States government did not show any hint of displeasure about this summit meeting, it sent James Kelley, Jr., assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, to North Korea to ask his North Korean counterpart whether they were working on nuclear weapons. To Kelley's great surprise--he had expected to hear a resolute no from his counterpart--the North Korean replied in the affirmative. Caught by surprise, James Kelley kept his game face on and proceeded swiftly to the next stop on his itinerary, Japan. His North Korean counterpart must have thought that his frank admission on nuclear weapons development would be taken by the Americans as the North Korean willingness to begin engagement with the United States. Given their long history of conflict, the North Koreans and the Americans have had ample opportunities to study each other's behaviour and negotiation tactics. But unfortunately, these kinds of misunderstandings do take place, hence the need to pay further attention to this subject.

The book under review studies Japanese negotiating behaviour, and is authored by renowned and experienced Japan hands in the United States. Blaker, Giarra and Vogel have come up with a most readable book on Japanese negotiation behaviour on the basis of four negotiations the United States undertook with Japan for the last quarter of the twentieth century: orange imports, 1977-88; rice imports, 1986-93; FSX aircraft joint manufacturing, 1985-89; and redefinition of alliance, 1991-96. Patrick Cronin characterizes Japanese negotiating behaviour as having the following recurring patterns, i.e., defensive coping, use of gaiatsu (or external pressure), consensus building, back channels, slow pace and confidentiality. Since their portrait does not disregard some idiosyncratic characters of American negotiating behaviour, worries about the possible revival of Orientalism are not warranted here. Similarly, since historical and domestic contexts are well taken into account in their stories of the four cases, helping to induce a stiff response to a surprise scenario a la Kelley as noted above is not likely to take place. The book under review is written by professionally experienced and culturally fluent authors in refreshingly non-jargonized clear and plain English.

TAKASHI INOGUCHI The University of Tokyo, Japan