CAS: myths, realities and planning principles.

Close air support (CAS) had its beginnings in the early 20th century with bombs dropped by hand. In less than a century, we have transitioned from open-air cockpits to the higher-performance aircraft of World War II through the sound barrier and now to sophisticated technologies of stealth aircraft designs and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ground maneuver forces have evolved as well, and the Army currently is transforming into a smaller, more agile, faster and more deployable force--enabled by networked information in an increasingly complex web of battle command.

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The Army's modular force emphasizes new efficiencies in command and control ([C.sup.2]) and the seamless integration of joint fires as essential enablers. In consonance with this strategy, the Army is divesting itself of some of its organic indirect fires assets (along with tanks, Bradleys, aviation platforms and other assets) and leveraging the capabilities of other services' joint fires. CAS constitutes one of the most significant of these capabilities.

Understanding how to employ CAS is essential, and understanding how to request it is imperative.

CAS--what is it? Definitions are important. It is critical, then, to understand CAS as expressed in joint doctrine. "CAS is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces" (Joint Publication 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures [TTP] for Close Air Support, Chapter I). "Close proximity" is a relative, situational term that is unrelated to a specific distance. The requirement for "detailed integration [because of proximity] with the fire or movement of those forces" is the determining factor. As further noted in joint doctrine. Army aviation does not conduct CAS, but it may use joint TTP to conduct close combat attacks (CCAs) as an integrated Army aerial maneuver element.

Preplanned CAS Requests. A preplanned request is nothing more than one that is submitted early enough to be included on the joint air tasking order (ATO). This is often 72 hours in advance but may be less than that based on established procedures. Most of the written TTP state that preplanned requests are submitted on a DD Form 1972 Joint Tactical Air Strike Request, but there are automated alternatives.

Fire supporters can use the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) to submit requests for both preplanned and immediate air support requests (ASRs) for CAS. AFATDS uses the D670 US message text format (USMTF) and automatically populates the appropriate data fields for transmission to other Army and joint [C.sup.2] systems.

The advantages in doing so are digital transmission from the AFATDS work-station up the fire support chain to the joint air operations center (JAOC) and to its associated battlefield coordination detachment (BCD); automated response regarding whether the request was approved, disapproved or is still in coordination; digital transmission of a mission number when approved; and the capability to receive the ATO with other mission data.

Immediate CAS Requests. Immediate ASRs are those submitted outside of the ATO planning cycle. Immediate requests for CAS are not responsive solutions for failures to plan.

A useful enhancement to an immediate CAS request is to extract the supporting unit information from the ATO (an air wing if resourced by the Air Force) and contact the Army ground liaison officer (GLO) in the wing operations center. The GLO communicates the latest ground maneuver situation to the wing's aircrews before they execute the mission and participates in aircrew debriefings after the missions are completed. Direct contact can promote aircrews' situational awareness and is particularly valuable in volatile, dynamic circumstances and when critical information becomes available close to the time for mission execution.

As with preplanned requests, most written TTP neglect the automated [C.sup.2] systems available to submit immediate ASRs. While immediate requests are often submitted via the Air Force air request net (AFARN) used by the air liaison officer (ALO) and tactical air control parties (TACPs), AFATDS also can transmit these requests with the advantages previously noted plus an additional one. Immediate requests are approved at each fire support echelon in the hierarchical chain, and these requests receive final approval via the commander (usually through the effects coordinator or ECOORD) at the lowest level where resources can be made available for the mission. AFATDS accomplishes this quickly, but it takes practice.

There are broad misunderstandings about CAS request procedures. This article highlights some of these misunderstandings and advances some planning principles--more how to think than what to think.

CAS Request Myths and Realities. Unless a Soldier has been through the Joint ATO Processes Course (formerly known as the Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, or the Joint Firepower Course at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, it is rare for him to have the insight to plan and develop CAS requests with the flexibility the system is designed to provide.

Most often, it's what we think we know that leads to trouble. So it is with CAS. The following are some familiar myths and their corresponding realities.

1. Myth: The ATO is inflexible. The process is so regimented that it does not meet maneuver commanders' needs for responsive CAS.

Reality: The ATO is a flexible document with opportunities for refinement within the typical 72-hour cycle.

2. Myth: If you want CAS, you need a 10-digit grid and a target description 72 hours in advance.

Reality: An ASR for CAS can be submitted even if all that is known 72 hours in advance is that CAS will be required in a future operation (with an idea of the timeframe).

3. Myth: There is always plenty of CAS--we never had a problem in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Reality: CAS requirements compete with other priorities for air power. Our recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have been against adversaries with no significant air power and with some-what vulnerable air defenses.

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Other potential adversaries may require substantial apportionment of air power assets against other theater missions, particularly at the onset of conflict. Recent experiences with CAS availability should, in fact, be considered the exception vice the rule.

4. Myth: "Push CAS" (near continuous on-call CAS missions) is the best approach to the request process. The ALO makes sure that CAS is available when we need it. He is the expert, so let him figure it out.

Reality: Push CAS is not the cure for all ills and carries disadvantages of its own. Push CAS is based upon a level of relatively unconstrained CAS assets.

Even in circumstances of abundant CAS availability, commanders and fire supporters must be closely involved in CAS planning. Timing, weapons loads and aircrew situational awareness are important details for CAS missions and are much more important for CAS in an urban environment.

The ALO is a vital asset in the process, providing expertise on capabilities, limitations and effective TTP for employment. However, the ground commander is responsible for the timing and effects of joint fires--including CAS.

5. Myth: The 72-hour timeline causes maneuver commanders to default to "immediate CAS"--ask for it when it is needed. That's why they call it "immediate."

Reality: There is no such thing as "immediate" CAS. There are only immediate ASRs for CAS. Immediate requests resource truly unanticipated requirements, not failures to plan.

Immediate requests are typically filled either with aircraft on on-call missions or by diverting aircraft from other scheduled missions. In both cases, the aircraft may have been intended to support other ground maneuver missions. The aircrews will have planned for different missions, have ordnance tailored for other requirements and have developed situational awareness for other circumstances--all of which increase the risk of fratricide and the time required to respond and decrease the probability of achieving the effects needed.

6. Myth: The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is an impediment to the rapid employment of CAS. Missions conducted short of the FSCL are CAS missions, requiring terminal attack control by a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC).

Reality: The FSCL is not a CAS demarcation line; this is an explicit point in JP 3-09.3 (Chapter III). CAS is not tied to a location on the battlefield and may occur well beyond the FSCL.

Similarly, missions short of the FSCL are not necessarily CAS. There is nothing that precludes air interdiction missions short of the FSCL, requiring only that maneuver commanders control these operations. Air interdiction missions do not require terminal attack con-trol.

Understanding CAS [C.sup.2] Architecture. The [C.sup.2] architecture supporting CAS request procedures is a broad, fairly complex web of [C.sup.2] nodes and associated functions that extend from the battalion level up to the theater's joint force commander. It includes all four services, designated theater-level functional joint force commands and the US Special Operations Command as described in the Air Land Sea Application Center's publication TAGS: Multi-service TTP for the Theater Air-Ground System (designated Army FM 3-52.2). TAGS is the joint [C.sup.2] architecture with service coordination links that facilitates the integration, synchronization, planning and execution of joint air-ground operations.

While the details of this "system of systems" are beyond the scope of this article, everyone in the business of joint fires and effects should have a working knowledge of the dynamics outlined in the publication. Especially important are the Air Force system, the theater air control system (TACS), and the Army system, the Army air-ground system (AAGS), that together constitute the [C.sup.2] nodes, linkages and liaisons necessary for the Army to conduct joint air-ground operations in general and CAS specifically.

Even when the Army employs Marine or Navy CAS assets, TACS/AAGS applies. The tasks of integrating and executing fire support planning via terminal attack control of CAS aircraft require this Army-Air Force partnership.

Principles for CAS Planning. The TTP in JP 3-09.3 nearly suffices to shape planners' thinking. Even so, there are some unwritten organizing principles that apply to preplanned and immediate requests.

The principles presented here are to be used in conjunction with the joint doctrine in JP 3-09.3 and with the multi-service TTP in TAGS. They complement the two publications by relating familiar planning processes with ASRs. This is more about how to think than what to do.

When distilled to the most fundamental elements, all relate to time management.

Time matters. In developing requests, focus on the time period for the requirement over other considerations. The ATO seeks to organize people and things in space, time and purpose to apply air power capabilities. In truth, it is more of a plan than an order. The ATO is constrained more by time periods for execution than locations for CAS (using assets that can shift locations at more than 400 knots per hour).

CAS execution has a long list of associated tasks that must be synchronized with the mission: aircraft maintenance, aerial refueling plans, ordnance configuration and loading, defensive counterair planning, electronic warfare (EW) planning, updated imagery requirements, weather assessments and others that need some lead time.

Resource ambiguous future requirements with on-call missions. A preplanned or an immediate ASR can be used to request an on-call CAS mission that is updated later with previously unavailable mission details. The update simply references the mission number. The time period, probable target type and probable location are sufficient to initiate a request.

Integrate CAS planning into the military decision-making process (MDMP) timelines. In the MDMP, "receipt of mission" is not too early to submit an ASR. Just as a commander may issue initial guidance, start reconnaissance operations and begin logistics preparation when he receives the mission, he also can submit an ASR for CAS when the requirement is relatively certain and the time period is fairly well defined. He must be sure to use the ALO's insights.

Higher headquarters can ease the process. Higher headquarters can submit a preplanned ASR for an on-call mission to support subordinate forces future operations. In most cases, the higher headquarters will have better insights into future missions. Fire supporters at higher headquarters should take the initiative to submit ASRs early to ensure CAS assets are available.

Other CAS Considerations. The brigade combat teams (BCTs) of the modular force are assuming additional [C.sup.2] functions previously found at the division or corps levels. The BCT's joint fires and effects cell (JFEC) must integrate fire support planning with the air defense and airspace management (ADAM) cell and with the brigade aviation element (BAE).

CAS cannot be considered as an operation isolated from others in the battlespace. Surface-to-surface fires, UAV operations, civilian air operations, air and missile defense missions, Army aviation operations and CAS all may occur simultaneously. Integrating the ATO, the airspace control order (ACO), fire support coordinating measures (FSCM), airspace control measures (ACM), air defense planning, the civil aviation structure, clearance of fires, the ground common operating picture (COP) and the air COP all can come into play. We must understand the joint processes involved, the [C.sup.2] systems tools used for synchronization and the practical TTP to be applied.

This article has examined some details of CAS requests and underscored that the broader fires and effects realm is about how to think. All Soldiers should seek professional military education in joint air-ground operations as a step toward bolstering both competence and confidence in thinking through their complexities.

Colonel Julius E. (Sonny) Clark III, Aviation, is the Director of the Army Joint Support Team of the Combined Arms Center for Training, Hurlburt Field, Florida. The organization provides education and training in joint air-ground operations to all services and the Special Operations Command plus operational support for the Battlefield Coordination Detachments (BCDs). In his previous assignments, he was the G3/5/7 for the US Army South in Puerto Rico; Senior Aviation Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana; Commander of 3d Battalion, 2d Aviation (3-21 AV) in the 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Brigade S3 of the 18th Aviation Brigade and Executive Officer of the 159th Aviation Group, both in the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. For his last job in Field Artillery before transferring to Aviation, he was the Flight Operations Officer for the last Division Artillery Aviation Platoon in the 2d infantry Division in Korea.

By Colonel Julius E. Clark III, AV