Bush and Clausewitz.

With respect to world affairs, one can reasonably ask if George W. Bush knows what he is doing. He has refused to permit the United States to participate in a number of multinational accords that received overwhelming international approval, such as the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the International Criminal Court. Now, with almost no international support, except perhaps from the United Kingdom, he is planning to go to war with Iraq--an action that has the potential to destabilize the entire Middle East and lose for the United States whatever Islamic support the war on terror still is able to maintain. As a result, Bush's policies have generated an unprece-dented degree of foreign hostility toward the United States from friends and foes alike. To more than a few critics, in fact, the administration's foreign policy is synonymous with recklessness.

Why is this so?

Well, like most of his predecessors, Bush entered the White House with almost no knowledge of or experience with the intricacies of international relations. As a consequence, he has been compelled to rely heavily on his chief national security advisers--Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice. While these advisers brought with them to the White House a wealth of military expertise, they had little or no experience conducting diplomacy. And while Powell certainly has come to appreciate the importance of multinational diplomacy, the president's other chief national security advisers obviously haven't. Furthermore, given Bush's relative inexperience with international affairs, it isn't surprising that his preference has been for unilaterally applied military solutions to international problems rather than for the more demanding requirements in obtaining multinational support. And this unilateralist approach has done little to encourage either friends or enemies to do the bidding of the United States.

For a more effective alternative, the president would do well to study and apply the principles of the great nineteenth-century Prussian political theorist Karl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz taught that military power can't operate effectively in a political vacuum or without the reinforcement of diplomacy. At the same time, diplomacy can't be effective without the power to back it up. Yet power not tied to diplomatic goals becomes meaningless if not counterproductive. It is the function of a nation's political leadership, Clausewitz insisted not only to define the goals that diplomacy and power are to pursue but also to direct and coordinate both to ensure that national goals are achieved.

Bush's inability to perform these tasks is at the root of the mess he has made of international relations. He has been unable, for example, to envision a diplomatic settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has also been unable to conceptualize the characteristics of a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq once he has invaded and vanquished that country. As a result, his stated desire to overthrow Hussein has generated considerable criticism within the United States, as well as ignited overwhelming opposition from friends and allies. Yet international cooperation could make the difference as to whether or not the invasion succeeds this side of the entire Arab world exploding in a fury of violent anti-Americanism.

It seems obvious that if the United States is going to end the threat posed by Iraq's alleged ability to produce weapons of mass destruction--let alone win the war on terrorism--the Bush administration will have to engage in multinational diplomacy. Among other actions, the United States will have to re-create the antiterrorist coalition that existed briefly after September 11, 2001--a coalition that was disrupted by the administration's reversion to its earlier unilateralist approach and its emphasis on overthrowing Saddam Hussein.

So, if the Bush administration expects friends and allies to cooperate with the United States in fighting international terrorism, it will have to learn to take their views into account instead of continuing to take their support for granted or acting as if it isn't needed,

Ronald E. Powaski, Ph.D., is a professor of history at Cleveland State University. An updated version of his most recent book Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race will be published by Oxford University press in January 2003.