Burundi: what sanctions meant on the ground.

In reaction to the coup d'etat led by Pierre Buyoya on 25 July 1996, seven countries - Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia and Cameroon - imposed an economic embargo on Burundi. The sanctions had clearly stated objectives: to end the illegality of the regime by exerting pressure to restore the constitution and National Assembly; lift the ban on political parties; and bring about unconditional negotiations between the warring factions.

The sanctions, however, ended up staying in place for nearly two and a half years. During this time, Mr. Buyoya gradually complied with the stipulated conditions, although the role of the embargo in bringing about this change remains controversial. Apart from launching an internal debate and participating in external negotiations, he initiated a series of political reforms that culminated in the establishment of an internal partnership in June 1998 and the expansion of the National Assembly to include representatives from all political parties and civil society.

On 23 January 1999, regional Heads of State finally acknowledged the headway made in the peace process and suspended the sanctions, albeit insisting that they could be reinstated if progress faltered.

There has been much debate about the political, economic and humanitarian impact - and thereby overall usefulness - of the sanctions. It is widely acknowledged that the sanctions did not achieve their desired short-term political effect. Much has also been said about their rather inconsistent and inefficient implementation. As time passed, neighbouring countries' borders became increasingly porous as businessmen from throughout the region found ways to circumvent the restrictions, resulting in large-scale profiteering that benefited a small group of entrepreneurs. This inevitably led to the creation of a parallel economy which undermined and largely replaced legal market activity. The fact that neighbouring countries themselves were often guilty of violating the sanctions, coupled with increasing reports of dissension among the "imposers" themselves, i.e. the neighbouring Heads of State, further undermined their credibility.

It has, in fact, proven difficult to discern between the specific effects of the embargo and the general effects of over five years of civil strife, insecurity, population displacement and restricted access. The lack of an effective monitoring system and reliable indicators has further hindered the ability to differentiate the effects of the crisis and the embargo.

Even before the current conflict, spurred by the assassination of the first democratically elected President, Melchior Ndadaye, on 21 October 1993, Burundi was one of the poorest countries in the world, with an annual per capita income of only $160 and 90 per cent of the population surviving on subsistence agriculture.

What little existed of Burundi's industry was dominated by a brewery and marginally enhanced by some food, chemical and textile processing. Furthermore, nearly all bilateral aid, upon which Burundi was heavily dependent, was gradually reduced after the events of October 1993 and nearly frozen after the coup in 1996.

Nonetheless, the sanctions clearly exacerbated an already declining economic situation, placing large segments of an impoverished population under even more hardship. The strain of rising fuel and food prices, compounded with a significant currency devaluation and stagnant wages, led to greatly reduced purchasing power. The general price index rose by 36 per cent over the course of the first year of the embargo, while the average weekly household expenditure for basic food items increased by as much as 120 per cent. Prices of public transportation, medicine, education and building materials, and vehicle spare parts also increased. The agricultural sector suffered from a lack of seeds, and the production of coffee and tea was curtailed as insecticides became scant and increasingly expensive.

Six to twelve months after the imposition of the embargo, prices began to stabilize at these higher levels as alternative supply lines were established, in particular for fuel, which determined prices of other goods. Still, the general population continued to make do with less, and inflation remained high.

As Burundi was no longer allowed to export coffee and tea, which accounted for as much as 85 per cent of export earnings, official government revenue diminished and foreign reserves were depleted. This led to decreased government spending and further cutbacks in the social services sector, placing the international humanitarian community under increasing pressure to make up for the shortfalls, particularly in the area of health.

The embargo had a direct impact on the operations of humanitarian agencies, even though a series of exemptions were granted for the import of fuel and relief items. Still, many organizations encountered long delays due to a cumbersome bureaucratic process in which each import first had to be cleared by the Regional Sanctions Coordinating Committee. This often required the involvement of United Nations offices in three different locations - Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania - and absorbed precious time and resources.

Goods remained blocked in neighbouring ports, often for weeks and months at a time, instead of reaching the intended beneficiaries. While it may be argued that sanctions played a role in bringing the Burundian Government to the negotiating table, thereby encouraging compromise, critics maintain that the resulting economic decline prevented rather than encouraged the implementation of peace agreements. They suggest, for example, that a depressed economy cannot provide alternate sources of income for those fighting in the rebellion or belonging to the army. The Buyoya Government has argued all along that the sanctions actually undermined the peace process and that political reforms were an inherent part of its plans from the outset.

There is now widespread consensus among the international community that sanctions should not stymie or substitute for policy initiatives geared toward reconciliation. Clearly, all other alternatives to achieving political objectives should be explored first, without hurting the general population through sanctions. The international community initially accepted the sanctions, supporting the efforts of regional leaders to solve their own problems. The United Nations, however, refrained from officially endorsing the embargo. And as the imposition of sanctions entered its third year, international pressure to lift them began mounting. Most of those advocating the lifting of the embargo argued that it had "outlived its usefulness" and pointed to its impact on the poor and vulnerable.

It will take some time for the more long-term impact of the suspension of the embargo to be felt in Burundi. The resumption of international flights and a slight recovery in the strength of the local currency have been the most tangible effects so far. The positive psychological effect, although less easily measured, has probably been more significant. For the Government, the end of the embargo signals a certain legitimacy, and for the Burundian population, it has led to a lessening of the economic decline that has weighed so heavily upon them in recent years.

In view of the progress made in the political arena and the inextricable links between peace and development, the time is now for the international community to contribute towards peace-building and the revitalization of the economy. Calls for the gradual resumption of development aid to assist Burundi on the road to recovery are gaining strength. While the provision of humanitarian aid in the less secure western-most provinces must continue, community reinforcement, rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in the more secure eastern and central areas will help Burundian families to resume normal, self-sufficient lives. In order to support both peace-building and economic growth, special emphasis should be placed on initiatives that reactivate small business and offer increased employment opportunities. Such initiatives are an essential part of the strategy of constructive engagement being promoted by the United Nations system in Burundi and its partners.

Note: For more information on the social and economic situation in Burundi, as well as the response of the United Nations, see "Choosing Hope: The Case for Constructive Engagement in Burundi" (available through the UNDP Department of Public Affairs, New York).

RELATED ARTICLE: Sanctions and Their Impact on Third States

The imposition of sanctions on a State often hurts not only the targeted culprit, but also third countries whose economic ties with the sanctioned State have to be severed.

The consequences of such punitive measures - trade embargoes, suspension of sales or orders, disruption of production due to the absence or higher cost of supplies, loss of jobs and the ensuing increase in social expenditures - are especially painful for developing countries. Under Article 50 of the United Nations Charter, such States are entitled to international assistance, in order to make up for their losses.

However, assessing the actual cost of a country's compliance with internationally imposed sanctions is not an easy task. To get a better insight into the problem and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 52/162, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs convened an expert group meeting on the subject from 24 to 26 June in New York.

The purpose of the meeting was to solicit the views of internationally renowned experts on key substantive issues related to: developing a possible methodology for assessing the consequences actually incurred by third States as a result of preventing or enforcing measures; and exploring innovative and practical measures of assistance that could be provided by the organizations, both within and outside the United Nations.

Experts recommended that, among other things, the Security Council, when considering the imposition of a sanctions regime, could ask the Secretary-General to prepare an advance assessment of the potential impact of sanctions on third States, which would be an essential factor in minimizing collateral damage. Following the imposition of sanctions, the Secretariat should monitor their effects and timely inform the Council on specific needs of affected States. In most severe cases, the Secretary-General could appoint a Special Representative and/or dispatch a fact-finding or evaluation mission.

The cost of assistance provided in mitigating the effects of sanctions on third States might be covered by applying the funding procedures similar to those adopted for peacekeeping operations, which are financed by Member States, the group suggested. In that respect, the experts agreed that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were well placed to provide financial assistance and, in emergency situations, "are in a position to take prompt action to adapt and expand their operations, facilities and policies to provide financial support to the most seriously affected countries".

Source: Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of provisions of the Charter related to assistance to third States affected by the application of sanctions (A/53/312).