Building the tactical-level Joint Fires Team (JFT).

Joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) talking to a pilot: "Follow the highway leading north until you cross the railroad track, and then turn right over a dark oily looking street. On the left, you will see a large yellow building, looks like a supermarket.

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"Well, that's not it. It's on the second floor of the two-story gray building on the higher ground just behind the yellow one."

This "talk-on" actually occurred September 1950 during the battle for Seoul. However, it easily could have been a JTAC talking a close air support (CAS) aircraft onto a target today.

CAS is an enduring mission, the basic premise of which has not changed appreciably since biplane aircrew members dropped handheld bombs in World War I. Now B-1s patrol over Afghanistan, waiting for a call from a JTAC. In both cases, conditions on the ground required a response from the air to resolve a situation in favor of friendly forces.

The Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) at Eglin AFB, Florida, has the mission to "act as US Joint Forces Command's (JFCOM's) lead agent to investigate, assess and improve the integration, interoperability and operational effectiveness of Joint Fires...." Joint Publication (JP) 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support defines "joint fires" as "fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective."

A subset of joint fires, "joint fire support," also is defined in JP 3-09, as "joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious and special operations forces to move, maneuver and control territory, population and key waters." A very important element of joint fire support is joint CAS (JCAS). JP 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for Close Air Support defines "CAS" as "air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

While JFIIT works many issues outside the JCAS mission area, JCAS is a key enabler of joint capabilities and a foundational part of our work. There is good reason for this. If the services can conduct efficient and effective JCAS, they have the fundamental ability to be successful in other joint mission areas, such as joint suppression of enemy air defenses (JSEAD) or joint combat search and rescue (JCSAR) missions. As a subset of joint fires, JCAS at the tactical level is critical and so is its training and the organization of the JCAS team.

CAS Historical Changes. Beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing into the 1980s, a very subtle but distinct change took place in the CAS world. It was a change that took nearly 20 years for the CAS community to figure out.

Since its inception, CAS had been conducted visually. Either on the ground or in another airplane, the tactical controller had to see the target and the attacking CAS aircraft.

To begin an attack, the CAS aircraft departed a controlled initial point (IP) and then, based on guidance from the controller, the pilot visually acquired the target and maneuvered to point his aircraft at it.

The primary reason to point at the target was to bring weapons to bear. The pilot needed to use his aircraft as a "pointer" to release either gravity or forward firing weapons. The controller visually confirmed the airplane was on the right target based on his observations of the CAS aircraft's nose position, attack axis and perceived ground track. Based on the controller's visual observations, once he was satisfied that the CAS aircraft was engaging the correct target, he cleared the pilot to drop his weapon(s).

This was how CAS was conducted in Operation Desert Storm, Vietnam and Korea. In fact, those same procedures essentially developed in the 1940s during World War II and remained virtually unchanged for more than 50 years.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, the advent of aircraft technological advances and precision weapons (laser-guided bombs), infrared target designation systems and (or) night-vision devices brought two more capabilities to the CAS mission. The first was increased precision, enabling the bomb to hit very close to the desired aim point consistently. The second, the aircrafts' standoff attack capabilities, was more subtle, and the CAS community's lack of perception of it for more than 20 years caused a significant delay in exploiting precision weapons.

With the fielding of laser-guided bombs, aircraft no longer had to "point" at the target for weapons release. To employ a laser-guided bomb successfully, the attacking aircraft could execute an offset, level or high-altitude attack.

With the advent of upgraded laser-guided bombs and improved infrared target designation systems, the potential to exploit this capability increased, and the attacking aircraft could employ precision weapons from a standoff attack. Attacking aircraft no longer had to roll in or point at the target to employ their weapons, and the most effective attack platform was not limited to just fighter aircraft in a standard diving attack.

Several new developments seriously affected traditional CAS employment, including global positioning system (GPS) weapons, digital transfer of information, robust command and control systems, collateral damage consequences and a permissive combat environment that allowed the use of non-traditional CAS aircraft (bombers).

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The procedures developed during World War II and refined in Korea and Vietnam remained the same until Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) when the TTPs caught up to the advances. Not officially published until the 3 September 2003 revision of JP 3-09.3, JCAS TTPs were used extensively in OEF and OIF. These procedures were the first comprehensive change or update in CAS TTPs in more than 50 years.

The concept of "direct" and "indirect" controls of CAS were eliminated and replaced with three types of controls: Types I, II and III. These were designed to capitalize on current and potential advances in weapons and systems technologies. Also, based on lessons learned from OEF and OIF, Types I, II and III controls were reviewed and updated with Change 1 to JTTP 3-09.3 that was released on 2 September 2005.

The 2005 change clarified the descriptions for Types I, II and III CAS controls and provided an example of each. Type I control is used when the JTAC must visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target for each attack. Type II control is used when the JTAC requires control of individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release/launch. Type III control is used when the JTAC requires the ability to provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement, subject to specific attack restrictions. Type III control does not require the JTAC to visually acquire the aircraft or the target; however, all targeting data must be coordinated through the supported commander's battle staff.

During the past three and one-half years, service interest and investment in JCAS has expanded as joint operations have increased. JP 3-09.3 was the first to publish a change as part of an out-of-cycle revision. Simultaneously, employment using non-traditional CAS aircraft became routine. Additionally, the Army, Air Force and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) agreed to standardize training requirements for JTACs and established the joint fires observer (JFO) position to aid in executing Types II and III CAS. The services also established various training facilities that are accredited to train both JTACs and JFOs.

Building the JCAS Team. Given these improvements, what does the future hold for JCAS? Where do we place our emphasis? The answer lies in the JP 3-09.3 definition, "Air action ... detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces." To provide and maintain a capability to integrate CAS fully into a ground force's fires and maneuver, the joint forces must place more emphasis on joint fires training at the tactical level (brigade combat team, or BCT, and below) that results in close working relationships between fire support element (FSE) and tactical air control party (TACP) members.

Case in point: a statement consistently repeated at the combat training centers (CTCs) is "Army FSE/fires and effects cells (FECs) and TACPs are not training effectively together to form a cohesive team that the brigade staff can coordinate and execute joint fires with." Other oft repeated phrases are, "The only time FSEs and TACPs train together is during CTC rotations and, occasionally, during brigade field training exercises" and "TACPs, FSEs and brigade staffs should seek every opportunity to train together." The preceding statements may sound trite, but how do commanders and leaders approach and resolve these issues?

Brigade FSOs, air liaison officers (ALOs) and their senior NCOs must adopt the following home-station training practices to foster closer and more effective FSE and TACP working relationships.

* Focus on overcoming service cultural differences. The services must build an effective joint team by holding FSE and TACP events in each other's facilities. This allows team members to familiarize themselves with each other's strengths and weakness. Each must get to know the other members of the team and build esprit de corps. Even social events are important to mitigate the "us versus them" mentality.

* Align JFOs and JTACs and their respective unit training calendars. These assets must routinely train as a team during live-fire events and in call-for-fire simulators. Air support operations squadron (ASOS) operations officers should incorporate JTACs and their aligned JFOs when using the indirect fire-forward air control trainer (I-FACT). The Army must align the JFOs and their JTACs in JFO courses and joint fires and effects trainer system (JFETS) simulations.

ASOS also should coordinate to have aligned FSE personnel and JFOs participate in CAS mission scenario practical exercises as outlined in Air Force Instruction 13-112, Volume 1, Terminal Attack Controller Training Program, Paragraph 2.5.8. CAS mission practical exercises are training scenarios that provide trainees (JTACs and, when incorporated, JFOs) an opportunity to practice airstrike control planning, coordination and execution but does not involve control of actual aircraft.

* Learn to move freely on each other's communication nets. FSE and JFO personnel should conduct weekly communications checks in conjunction with their TACP counterparts. They must capitalize on these weekly checks by expanding them into combat skills development training. The sessions should include JCAS scenarios that involve and challenge JTACs and their JFOs and, ideally, their FSE and TACP counterparts.

When practical, they should conduct cross-training on each other's equipment, i.e., AN/PRC-117F, Mark VII laser rangefinder, AN/PRC-148, infrared zoom laser illuminator designator (IZLID) pointer and defense advanced GPS receiver (DAGR).

* Integrate TACP TTPs in BCT tactical standing operating procedures (SOPs). The BCTs must conduct joint training events during brigade and battalion staff exercises, "walk and shoots" and brigade combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs). Training exercises, if planned and resourced correctly, will provide brigade and battalion staffs and TACPs opportunities to integrate airpower into schemes of maneuver.

These actions will enable leaders to tailor training better to maintain perishable skills (JTAC call-for-fire training and JFO Type II and III CAS targeting communications) and sustain proficiency in core competencies. Some units already may operate under these team building steps, at least in part. However, the concept of habitual relationships must become ingrained at all levels--in spite of the turbulence of personnel turnover, whether deployed or at home station.

Proposed Joint Fires Team (JFT) Organization. Systems and capabilities will continue to improve as they have since the first days of warfare. However, these improvements alone will not translate to increased JCAS effectiveness.

We must focus on building the joint team that can capitalize on future technological advances. If we are going to transform into a truly joint fighting force, then we must revamp our approach to JCAS by organizing our FSE and TACP personnel into a JFT. The intent is to give this team the ability to integrate and control all fires, i.e., CAS, artillery, mortars, rotary-wing close combat attack, rocket and naval surface fires.

At a minimum, the JFT should consist of a JTAC, FO/JFO and their radio operators. Integrating these teams into training events such as platoon live fires and company CALFEXs will hone their combined skills and develop a very capable team that can focus all fires at the tactical level.

JFT equipping, training and manning should be a joint endeavor. The exact composition and location of these teams need to be decided.

One example of an operational requirement for JFTs is the Army's recently formed reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition battalions. As the eyes of the BCT, the brigade now can look deeper then ever before, especially with multiple unmanned aerial systems, but the brigade must have the ability to destroy the enemy as he is acquired. JFTs would be a key asset that brigades could leverage to execute their missions. This is especially true given that JFTs frequently would be in the most advantageous positions to see the enemy and would have the critical ability to integrate all supporting fires.

The joint fires community must capitalize on the momentum in the JCAS mission area. Once we view JCAS as a joint task under the control of a JFT, we will be one step closer to ensuring we consistently meet the ground commander's desired effects. We cannot afford to wait another 20 years or for another war to capitalize on the potential we have in our hands right now.

Colonel David R. Brown, USAF, is the Commander of the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT), Eglin AFB, Florida. In previous positions, he was the Director of the Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Joint Test Team and Deputy Commander of Detachment 2 of the Air Force Operations Test and Evaluation Command, also at Eglin. Among other assignments, he commanded the 82nd Aerial Targets Squadron, Tyndall AFB, Florida. He is a Command Fighter Pilot with experience in F-4s, F-117s and F-106s.

Lieutenant Colonel Steve D. "Cowboy" Hughes, USAF, is the J33 Air-to-Surface Division Chief in JFIIT. He is the former Commander of the 391st Fighter Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, is a graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, and has 19 years operational flying as a Command Pilot in the F-15E "Strike Eagle" with nine months of combat experience in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Major David J. Ell currently is the J34 Ground Combat Division Chief in JFIIT. Previously in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, he was the Division Artillery S3 and, during OIF, a Battalion S3 and Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO). He commanded D Battery, 319th Field Artillery, in Vicenza, Italy, and B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (2-319 AFAR) in the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Chief Master Sergeant (Retired) Timothy M. Finn, USAF, is a Close Air Support Analyst in the Air-to-Surface Division of JFIIT. He served 31 years on active duty and filled positions in tactical air control parties (TACPs), air support operations centers (ASOCs) and the CAS Cell at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air base, Saudi Arabia. He also performed duties as a terminal attack controller (TAC).

By Colonel David R. Brown, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Steve D. Hughes, USAF; Major David J. Ell; and Chief Master Sergeant (Retired) Timothy M. Finn, USAF