Building a single military information network: problems.

There is a dramatic growth in importance and public relevance of information as it is having stronger influence on all aspects of public life with no exception. Various fields of societal activities are adopting on a broad scale new information technologies, methods and facilities for gathering, storing, processing, transmitting, disseminating and analysis of information and provision of varied information services.

Information has always been an inalienable part of combat activities because it has been used by commanders of all categories to estimate the situation and make battle or operation plans. However, the nature of combat operations in future wars will change significantly. This is due to an accelerated technical development of all types of weapons and radical upgrading of their specifications and performance characteristics, the development of weapons based on new physical principles. Modern weapons are steadily growing more accurate, destructive and it takes them less time to reach their targets.

Being adopted into operational service are systems of multiple-spectrum recognition, of automated target identification and other equipment that increases detection range at any moment of the day. The use in combat operations of precision weapons, weapons of great destructive power coupled with the employment of various high-speed systems of their delivery necessitates giving them high mobility and providing for dynamic dispersal of troops.

Operational situations under these new conditions will change very rapidly and the speed of operations will increase sharply. The C & C cycle will be considerably shorter: the collection, processing, transmission, analysis and distribution of information will be in real time. Hence, the planning of operations will be carried out, of necessity, simultaneously.

Obviously, the fluid operational situation calls for massive and intensive use of new information technologies, systems and equipment to accurately and timely estimate the situation, take the right decision and communicate it to the executing entities. Therefore, these systems and equipment are highly important in supporting combat operations under modern conditions. By way of example, a division of the U.S. Army now uses around 1,300 computers and, in accordance with ground forces modernization plan, a heavy U.S. division will be using more than 5,000 computers. (1)

Advances in new information technology, telecommunications systems, computer data processing, detection and accurate determination of target coordinates facilitates rapid location of friendly and hostile forces. The gathering and processing of information and friendly troops, the hostile troops and weapons data make it possible, with the aid of new information technology, to single out relevant information (a) from among the overall procured information for different places in the zone of combat operations and send it wherever it is necessary.

Getting relevant information too late or garbling it greatly reduces the effectiveness of employment of troops and weapons, especially the dispersal of troops and weapons and their decentralized command and control. Troops that effectively use the capabilities of information systems will have a better idea of the situation on the battlefield and a more accurate estimate of operations conducted by the friendly and hostile troops in areas that concern them.

Being better informed, under otherwise identical conditions, is a decisive factor of the actual correlation of forces of the opposing parties taking part in fighting and it largely determines the course and outcome of combat operations. In order to achieve operational superiority over the adversary, one should not be simply better informed than the adversary but also achieve information superiority, i.e., to get more accurate data on the situation before the adversary does and make prompt decisions to impose on the adversary one's own scenario of combat operations. In other words, information superiority consists in providing the friendly troops with more complete, accurate, reliable and timely information on the situation than the information available to the hostile C & C elements and the possibility of one's C & C system to take advantage of this superiority in combat operations.

Therefore, there will be information warfare during preparations for and in the course of combat operations with a view to win and keep information superiority over the adversary. Notably, this information warfare with its own tactics and operational art will include both offensive and defensive operations.

Offensive information operations are aimed to degrade the capabilities of hostile information systems by creating conditions that degrade the collection and use of data by the adversary or by arranging for using information available to the adversary for one's own ends. Offensive information operations include computer network attacks, electronic and physical suppression of hostile information systems, affecting them with electromagnetic pulses, breaking into information networks to inject false information, garble information and data or procure the necessary information about the adversary.

Defensive information operations aim to protect information systems against all types of effects undertaken by the opposing party which include physical security protection methods, cryptographic protection and all methods of fighting computer network attacks.

In order to get an overall picture of the dynamics of an operation or a battle in real time and have an opportunity for commanders of all categories to coordinate their moves through vertical and horizontal chins of command to the extent that is necessary to fulfill their combat missions, it is necessary to organize cooperation between all information systems supporting the given operation.

To ensure information cohesion and organize cooperation between all those involved in combat operations, there should be a single military information network (SMIN) that should support the creation and circulation of information flows supportive of the solving of all combat tasks, C & C tasks, provision of services to troops during preparations for and in the course of operations, as well as information interaction between government agencies, military administration agencies, generals and commanding officers and their staffs, all the armed forces both in peacetime and under conditions of military conflict. The SMIN should be a component of the country's single information network.

It is important at the same time for information resources to be accessible at any point around this network (given appropriate authorization). The SMIN's continuity could be made possible through the wide use of ramified landlines, radio, radio relay and tropospheric communications lines, networks of mobile radio communications and satellite communications systems resulting from a system integration of local and territorial information and telecommunication networks covering the entire vast military information network on land, water, under water, in the air and outer space.

The main component of the SMIN, as of any other information network, should be, we think, information infrastructure that determines the network's dimension and shape; supports the creation and circulation of information flows, the operation and development of the SMIN; organizes the collection, processing, storing, analysis, distribution and dissemination of all information circulating in the information network.

A military information infrastructure (MII) should consist of various interacting communications networks and computer networks, databases, databanks and banks of knowledge, local networks, application programs, user devices and combat weapons interfaces and means that provide security and other services for the transmission and processing of data in all spheres of military activities. We can regard as main characteristics of MII the qualitative and quantitative composition of infrastructure elements; spatial distribution of infrastructure elements; interconnection of infrastructure elements; information performance and throughput of its elements (b) and of the entire infrastructure.

Access to the MII should be given to all C & C centers, military bases, staffs, units, large strategic formations and combined units, on board aircraft, ships, combat systems, stations, in separate small units and separate combat entities. The user should have access to authorized information and information resources (without knowing their location) and be able to carry out automatic scanning of data he needs in the same way he would be browsing through the Internet. MII users should have "transparent" access to the information environment from anywhere in the SMIN at any time on the dial and have the option to work together with other users at distances from each other within the limits of the single military information network. It is an important task in the construction of the MII to organize open and closed data networks and determine conditions and rules of access to the latter.

The MII should be based on its communications infrastructure which can be organized by putting together the many already deployed dissimilar communications networks (fixed-site switched networks; mobile radio communications networks; data transmission networks, satellite-based communications systems; strategic, operational and tactical networks, etc.). Thus communications infrastructure will amount to a composite (united) communications network.

Interaction of all networks making up the united network, each of which has its own monitoring and control systems, will be essential in ensuring walkthrough services to participants in combat operations and coordinated actions of troops. Control of the composite MII network should make it possible to determine intensity of information flows, the volume and character of traffic and to carry out dynamic rerouting on the basis of knowledge of the united network's condition and priorities of messages circulating in the network.

The configuration, structure and characteristics of the united network can change rather frequently during combat operations because some of the channels and paths and various pieces of network equipment can be incapacitated due to physical, EW, computer and other hostile attacks. In order that the united network should remain serviceable in combat operations under such conditions, there should be a flexible and efficient system to control the composite network. We should keep it in mind that controlling the united MII network plays the key role in ensuring successful operation of the entire military information infrastructure.

Another MII component that closely interacts with communications infrastructure should be computer equipment infrastructure. Their interaction can be as close as to allow us to talk about single infrastructure of communications and computer equipment that is supposed to provide all services related to processing and transmission of data. In total, components of this single infrastructure make it possible to collect, process, analyze, distribute, disseminate, store and display data. Furthermore, the computer environment dynamically controls resources of the composite network and its management.

In addition to controlling the composite network, there should also be an arrangement to control the distribution of information which consists in the following. A control system--based on collecting, processing and analyzing information and data from the many sources and knowledge of information requirements of the troops--continuously distributes information between military units and weapon assets and determines where to send what kind of notifying or controlling information to achieve assigned objectives. It is usual practice, when sensitive information is to be transmitted, that the decision on distributing it is made by the commanding officer or the chief of staff whereas the control system provides the person in authority with computer and information facilities to make their decisions. In order to use the networks in the most efficient manner, there should be an opportunity to dynamically prioritize information flows on the strength of the operational situation of the moment.

Large-scale integration of networks and information resources can result in greater vulnerability of MII computers and software. Therefore, there is a need for tight and multilevel security arrangements while building a single military information network to minimize its vulnerability and frustrate various attempts to introduce undesirable and harmful information into the network.

In summing up, I would like to say that the construction of a single military information network is a rather long process calling for serious theoretical, military and economic estimates. The U.S. started on developing its Defense Information Systems Network early in the 1990s and work on the project is still in progress. Notably, transition to digital methods of transmitting the bulk of data, the creation of standard protocol integrated systems are planned for completion in 2005, whereas transition to an integrated system of communications using comprehensive automation of control and communications is scheduled for completion in 2015. (2)

It is our opinion that preliminary conceptual studies of the architecture of military information infrastructure and a single military information network of the Russian Federation should begin now.

NOTES:

1. Warfighter Information Network, Version 3.3. June, 1997.

2. Master Plan. Defense Information Infrastructure, Version 7.0. March 13, 1998.

Col. Gen. Ye.A. KARPOV

Candidate of Military Sciences

Lt. Gen. N.I. BURENIN (Ret.)

Doctor of Technical Sciences

Col. N.A. ZYUZIN

Candidate of Technical Sciences

(a) Relevant information is information of essential importance for solving a concrete problem in specified place and at specified time.

(b) Elements imply here the main components of the MII, such as communications networks, information resources, systems of information services, systems to control and develop the MII.