Bringing the lessons of prison riots into focus.

Hindsight is always 20/20. After riots like New Mexico and Attica shook the criminal justice community, corrections practitioners began to take stock of lessons they could learn to help prevent similar tragedies from occurring. Large, crowded institutions are ripe for rioting, and this includes most American prisons today. The prison at Santa Fe was filled beyond capacity at the time of the 1980 riot. Approximately 1,136 men were housed in an institution designed for 900. Roger Morris, author of The Devil's Butcher Shop, observed that New Mexico district judge Edwin Felter approved a consent order to reduce crowding and improve living conditions in the prison. However, the majority of the issues discussed by the consent order went unchanged until the riot took place almost four years later (For further information, see related article "The Duran Consent Decree," on page 66). The prison in Attica, N.Y., also was crowded when the 1971 riot occurred. This institution was designed for 1,200 but had a population of 2,225.

In many cases, crowding may be only the tip of the prison riot iceberg. The prison crowding trend will continue into the future through the ongoing use of sentencing guidelines, which tend to inflate the number of individuals serving time. Classification procedures to separate violent from nonviolent inmates are being used to place the violent ones in facilities where their destructive attitudes are kept in-check. It is just one of many strategies being implemented to improve crowded conditions and reduce the likelihood of rioting. Crowding cannot be eliminated, but the following suggestions can help corrections practitioners prepare and plan ahead using lessons others unfortunately have learned the hard way. Hopefully, Attica and New Mexico will not happen again.

Emergency Response Teams and Riot Plans

Lesson number one: Emergency response teams in institutions are important. This is based on the simple observation that a prison riot will expand to as many wings of a prison as possible. An emergency response team can take action quickly to prevent expansion.

Institutions should develop riot plans so staff know what is expected of them. Instruction in this area should be implemented during both initial staff training and refresher programs. Issues emphasized may include proper use of access keys, locations of entrances and use of deterrence equipment (such as gas and smoke munitions). Practice scenarios can be carried out during the training of new officers to help them learn their responsibilities.

In 1992, Gelb reported numerous examples of emergency response team successes in ending prison dots. In the early '90s, an emergency response team quelled a riot at the Carl Robinson Correctional Center in Endeld, Conn. Approximately 400 inmates had set two buildings on fire. A Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) used tear gas to subdue ring leaders and retake the institution. Across the country in Deer Lodge, Mont., five inmates were killed and several correctional officers taken hostage at a riot at the Montana State Prison. A tactical unit emerged to rescue these hostages.

Limiting Contraband

Because drugs can increase the potential for spontaneous violence, contraband control can help prevent prison riots. Prison violence can escalate to an assailant homicide, or even spread throughout the institution as a riot. Staff can increase cell searches, add metal detectors at checkpoints in an institution, and search vehicles entering institutions to reduce weapons and/or drags inside.

Useem and Kimball found that homemade beer had played a role in the 1980 Santa Fe prison riot. Inmates began plotting to control the institution during a beer party in Dormitory E-2 on the evening prior to the takeover. At the State Vocational School for Girls in Montana, the 20 inmates who took part in the 1964 riot were intoxicated on fingernail polish remover fumes.

Maintaining Security

Another important lesson to be learned from past prison riots is the crucial role of security. Both Attica and Santa Fe had security problems. Sue Mahan, a criminal justice professor at the University of Central Florida, noted that precipitating events for these riots were comparable. The Attica riot spread after a defective iron gate was broken. Similarly, the riot in Santa Fe erupted when the glass to the control center was broken and the prison's locking devices were accessed. Correctional officers made a crucial mistake by leaving the south corridor grille open. As Morris discussed, it was fairy common practice to leave the security grilles open during the night. In fact, the grilles often were neglected because it was easier for commanders to surprise correctional officers who may have been sleeping.

Officers must be taught to follow security procedures when making rounds. The officers at Santa Fe should have locked the security grille, which would have prevented the taking of the control center. The officials at Santa Fe also learned that bars around a control center are more effective than "shatter-proof' glass. The inmates at Santa Fe broke into the control center after the glass surrounding it had been broken. Better planning could have prevented this riot.

Knowing Your Facility's Weaknesses

A national study conducted by the South Carolina Department of Corrections in 1973 found that there was a greater chance for a riot in correctional institutions where inmates thought active recreational programs were inadequate. Inmates at Attica, for example, had limited access to recreational activities. The Attica commission reported that recreation was limited by cold winter weather, a tight budget, security restrictions and a lack of indoor facilities. Almost all recreational time was spent in the yards, and this time was affected, sometimes reduced, by subfreezing weather from November to March.

Some states, where the winter weather is severe, have built underground basketball facilities so that inmates can exercise year round. Inmates need to be able to let off steam in a constructive manner.

Conclusion

There is no foolproof way to prevent prison riots. Effective communication with inmates, first-class training of officers, carefully maintained security, and diverse inmate programs can be barriers to riot eruptions. Hopefully, this article has helped you assess your facility's strengths and weaknesses in riot prevention and maybe even given you ideas for developing new ways of dealing with old problems. It is reassuring to know that your prison system has responsible teams available if and when your prison reaches its boiling point.

Fast Facts

* According to the book Prison Violence in America, a total of 260 riots were reported in the United States between 1971 and 1983. The primary reported cause was racial problems, and the second most reported cause was inmate dissatisfaction with rules or privileges. The study also revealed that most prison riots in this time period involved 25 to 49 inmates. Only 18 riots involved 500 or more.

* The 1973 national study done by the South Carolina DOC found that most prison riots between 1971 and 1983 lasted less than six hours. Furthermore, results revealed that force, or show of force, was used to end 72 percent of the cases reported.

* Communication between inmates and prison officials is crucial. The South Carolina national study also found that, as the amount of contact time between the warden and inmates decreases, the incidence of riots increases. Successful wardens spent more than 25 hours per month in direct contact with inmates.

REFERENCES

Alpert, G., and R. Hawkins, 1989. American prison systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

American Correctional Association Committee on Riots and Disturbances. 1990. Riots and disturbances in correctional institutions. College Park, Md.: American Correctional Association.

Braswell, M., R. Montgomery and L. Lombardo. 1994. Prison violence in America. Cincinnati, Ohio.: Anderson Publishing Company.

Crews, G., R. Montgomery and R. Garris. 1996. Faces of violence in America. Needham Heights, Mass.: Simon and Schuster Custom Publishing.

Federal Bureau of Prisons. 1988. A report to the attorney general on the disturbances at the federal detention center. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. (February).

Gelb, B. 1992. The effectiveness of prison tactical teams. Corrections Compendium. (November).

Hirliman, I. 1982. The hate factory. Agoura, Calif.: Paisano Publications.

McCuen, S. E. 1968. Guards quickly put down prison inmate disturbance. The State. (April).

Morris, R. 1983. The devil's butcher shop. New York, N.Y.: Franklin Watts.

South Carolina Department of Corrections (collective violence research project). 1973. Collective violence in correctional institutions: A search for causes. Columbia, S.C.: State Printing Company.

The official report of the New York Special Commission on Attica, 1972. Attica, N.Y.: Bantam Books, Inc.

Useem, B., and P. Kimball. 1991. States of siege. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Wunder, A. 1995. Corrections systems must bear the burden of new legislation. Corrections Compendium. (March).

RELATED ARTICLE: Handing Riot Negotiations

The book Faces of Violence in America discusses the importance of negotiations in dealing with prison riots. Negotiations are especially vital when hostages are involved. Staff handling the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary riot, which began on Nov. 26, 1987 and lasted 11 days, used the following principles to guide riot negotiations by federal authorities:

1. The paramount concern was the safety of hostages.

2. A policy of endless patience ensured the safe release of hostages.

3. No person held hostage had any authority.

4. No detainee would be released while holding another person under duress.

5. Negotiations would continue as long as hostage safety was ensured.

6. There would be an attempt to maintain consistent composition of the core negotiating team.

7. There would be no immunity granted from prosecution.

RELATED ARTICLE: Prison Riots in the future

Author's Note: The future of prison riots is frightening to consider. Corrections Compendium (1995) predicts that the U.S. prison population will increase 51 percent by the year 2000. The chances for prison riots will increase accordingly. Futuristic approaches soon may be seen as solutions. The following simulates how a prison riot controlled by 21st century technology may play out. When reading, take into account that in December 1996, NASA really did launch a spacecraft to explore Mars. Scientists now are speculating that humans could set up a lunar rocket-refueling station or possibly a human colony in the next 50 years. Technological changes may make a situation like the following more plausible than we might think.

The Happy Valley Redirection Institution had just broken out into a riot. Riots had been events that took place in prisons back in the 1980s. A riot at that time was defined as an incident involving 15 or more inmates which resulted in physical injury or property damage. Riots, however, were a thing of the past. Warden Batman shook his head in disbelief as he tried to figure out how such a tragedy could happen. Maybe, he thought, the robot correctional officers had malfunctioned; they had been overdue for tune-ups. On the other hand, they were low on ammonia-sensitive fluid, necessary to detect the presence of humans in darkness. Robots were so complex, but thankfully he still had 25 human correctional officers in the institution.

One clear mistake was his decision to allow the inmates one night without serotonin. He had wanted them to have a fun night, but never thought things would get out of hand. It was known that high levels of serotonin control aggression. He should not have forgotten. He was no fool; he had no undergraduate and masters degrees, which were standard requirements for wardens in 2010. He had studied the Time Bomb Theory of prison riots developed by Dr. Vernon Fox. He knew the South Carolina National Study which determined that a larger planned capacity increased the potential for riots. He even remembered the Camp Hill riot. Furthermore, Mars University was no second-rate earth-like institution. He was proud to wear his MU sweater.

He imagined explaining the riot to his supervisors. He would tell them that the riot only proved that prisons built on land were a thing of the past. The decision in late 2005 to build prisons either on the floors of oceans or as part of orbiting space stations had been proven to be the proper direction for corrections. He also knew, regrettably, that the old excuse of riots resulting from improper food would not fly in 2010. All new inmates were tested for chemical imbalances that might cause deficiencies, dependencies, or toxicities. Furthermore, vitamin megadoses were standard treatment.

On a positive note, he remembered that no property damage could occur; all furniture was fireproof and unbreakable. Also, human staff would remain unharmed because inmates had received drug-induced amnesia treatments to forget violent learned behaviors.

Suddenly the solution hit him like a bolt of lightening. He would simply end the riot - which was nothing more than inmates running aimlessly around the institution - by pressing the sound al arm. This modern device produced high intensity sound waves which would knock inmates unconscious for several minutes. He did not hesitate to hit the activator, and the inmates dropped like flies. Fortunately, all the human correctional officers wore riot helmets to protect their eardrums. As a precaution, they sprayed the more aggressive inmates with sticky foam; they would not escape, or move for that matter.

The riot was over. He still would have to write a riot report and submit four faxes: one for officials on land, one for those in the oceans, one for those in space, and one for his files. As the inmates were returned to their temperature-controlled cellular units, he relaxed. Perhaps his career was not over and he could still retire after the standard six year career. Research showed that humans burned out after the end of the sixth year.

Burned out! He laughed at the antiquated 1980s term.

Reid H. Montgomery Jr., Ph.D., is an associate professor at the University of South Carolina's College of Criminal Justice.