Book on censorship not interested in censorship.

Hollywood v. Hard Core, by Jon Lewis (New York University Press, p.376), promised, in its subtitle, to explain "How the Struggle over Censorship Saved the Modern Film Industry." One expects an analysis of Hollywood censorship history and of how past censorship has affected modern Hollywood.

But it's not so simple. In the introduction, Lewis explained that censorship alone was not that interesting. He stated: "What began as a ... little history of the 1968 MPAA film rating system became [an] expansive political, legal, and social history of American cinema." Why he or his editor chose a title that misrepresented the book is never justified. Perhaps Lewis was right, and censorship is better served as a cog in the larger Hollywood machine. Maybe the author was actually onto something.

Unfortunately, he wasn't.

The book began with a chapter titled "How the Blacklist Saved Hollywood." Like the misleading book title, the chapter name is also inaccurate: Lewis' point was that the uproar over the Blacklist destroyed studio-run Hollywood and forced a more (if only slightly) egalitarian system to emerge. To claim that the Blacklist saved the industry disregards the hundreds of professionals whose lives were ruined by the Communist witch-hunt. This serves as an early indication that Lewis was apt to choose sensationalism over truth.

On its own, the chapter was not without merit. Lewis focused on the indictment of the "Hollywood Ten:" 10 industry players suspected of Communist activities. Lewis noted that, like most of the indictments that followed, six of the "Hollywood Ten" were Jewish, and those who were not were actively anti-racist and pro-social equality. Though it had nothing to do with the "hard core" censorship of the book's title, the chapter showed that the Blacklist was used by conservative Christians to socially and professionally exile powerful Jews, while ensuring that progressive social messages would be kept out of films.

But in his study of the Blacklist, Lewis never once mentioned Senator Joe McCarthy, the government official who is synonymous with the Blacklist. Even if Lewis believed that McCarthy was unfairly scapegoated, leaving out the poster-boy of anti-Communism made the chapter incomplete.

The second chapter focused on Hollywood finances, the studio system and anti-trust cases; but it also failed to tie into the "hard core" theme.

"What Everyone Should Know about the Motion Picture Code and Ratings" is a history of the Production Code Administration (PCA). It included a few good examples of films that pushed the envelope in terms of sex, violence and drugs. Primarily, though, it showcased a plethora of local legal censorship battles. Lewis went into great detail in some cases (such as with 1959's Jacobellis v. Ohio, in which theater manager Nico Jacobellis defied a police order and screened Louis Malle's foreign film, Les Amants), while naming and referring to others without explaining their origin (such as in the case of Hoyt v. Minnesota).

The next chapter, "Hollywood v. Soft Core," began with Jack Valenti, as president of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), establishing the 1968 ratings codes for movies. Originally these were G, M and R (general, mature and restricted audiences); they were later altered to G, PG, PG-13, R and NC-17 (general; parental guidance; parental guidance and not suitable for children under 13; restricted to under-17-year-olds unless with parent; strictly restricted to under-17-year-olds).

Movies rated "X" were not given a production seal by the MPAA and, to this day, may not be shown at legit cinemas. The MPAA failed to copyright the "X" rating as they did the others, so pornographers still use it to advertise their material as pornographic.

Lewis pointed to a strange 1967 case in which Chicago authorities allowed Joseph Strick's film adaptation of James Joyce's literary classic Ulysses to screen for three days at Chicago's Walter Reade's cinema without a city permit. "At the same time, the Chicago board took a firmer stand against two exploitive features," soft core films Rent-a-Girl and Body of a Female, which local distributor Chuck Teitel wanted to screen with equal freedom, since "All three films had been found obscene by the local censorship board." Proving that censorship boards were drawn to power as much as pornographers to money, "Reade, a more mainstream and wealthy player, received preferential treatment," said Lewis, also pointing out that "Reade had the money to support opposition candidates in upcoming elections."

"Hollywood v. Hard Core," the next chapter, delved into rougher material, focusing on 1972's Deep Throat and comparing it to The Godfather--that year's most popular mainstream film. Lewis also examined pornography's connection to sensual art-house fare, which was not treated as obscene due to famous auteurs, such as Bertolucci's Last Tango in Paris.

Lewis claimed that "the struggle for legitimacy was lost [by pornographers] in June 1973; the decision in Miller v. California saw to that." However, he did not explain the Miller case for another 30 pages, until the next chapter. The Miller case, according to Lewis, ensured that "with the exception of a few venues in a few major cities, the public, theatrical exhibition of hard core was pretty much eliminated nationwide by the end of 1973."

Chapter "Movies and the First Amendment" looked at obscenity in America from the American Revolution on. But, like the rest of the book, this chapter over-used legal cases without properly tying them to one another or to the larger "hard core" censorship theme.

The last chapter, "A Quick Look at Censorship in the New Hollywood," was a shallow exploration of censorship since 1973, including Matt Stone and Trey Parker's battle with the MPAA to get their (Paramount-owned) movie South Park: Bigger, Longer and Uncut an "R" rating. Lewis stated: "However mad Valenti [got] at Parker and Stone, he [was] no doubt happy for Paramount. South Park was a huge hit for the studio...." This is another good example of Lewis not considering the implications of his words. Why would Jack Valenti, president of the MPAA, care whether or not a studio makes money? Lewis never explained.

In his introduction, Lewis said the book is "structured less like an academic history than a novel," which turned out to be its biggest flaw. That Lewis did this on purpose, disregarding chronology and cause-and-effect relationships in order to purposefully present "a cast of fascinating characters ... plot suspense, and narrative reversals," is embarrassing; since his characters are one-dimensional, his plot convoluted and bland, and his narrative reversals pointless, one never actually knows what Lewis is trying to say.