Bombarding the Marianas: joint fires at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. (World War II).

The war was lost when the Marianas were taken away from Japan and when we heard the B-29s were coming out... we had nothing in Japan that we could use against such a weapon.

Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni

Commander-in-Chief of Japanese Home Defense

"Campaign in the Marianas"

United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Phillip A. Growl

The campaign to capture the Mariana Islands from the Japanese is especially worthy of close study by the joint fire support planner because it was a campaign dominated by the employment of fires at all levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. It was fought to capture airstrips from which to carry on a campaign of strategic bombing against the Japanese homeland.

Operational success was ensured by the neutralization of the Japanese anchorage and naval airbase at Truk and the defeat of a strong counterattack by a Japanese carrier task force. At the tactical level, the amphibious assaults were made possible by extensive preparatory bombardments and the constant application of joint firepower to support land operations. Thus, the application of strategic firepower against the enemy was the ultimate goal of a campaign that was won by the use of joint fires at the operational and tactical levels.

Strategic Environment and Operational Planning. By spring of 1944, the course of the Pacific War had turned against Japan. Powerful Japanese fleets had been fought to a standstill at Midway and the Coral Sea, and Japanese island garrisons in the South and Central Pacific had been overcome and annihilated by American and Australian forces. Furthermore, American land-based and carrier-based aircraft were routinely bombing Japanese forward anchorages, such as Rabaul and Truk. American submarines also were roaming freely, interdicting Japanese sea lines of communications by attacking military and commercial cargo shipping.

The two-pronged advance by General Douglas McArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, which started as a compromise born out of interservice rivalry, had actually became a source of strategic strength. It already was eroding Japan's limited capabilities and keeping its leadership off balance. (1)

By 1944, General McArthur had won presidential approval for his "return" to the Philippines. (2) However, the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific Theater, Admiral Nimitz, persisted in the belief that a thrust through the small atolls and islands of the Central Pacific would shorten the war at less cost to the United States. Such a thrust would cut Japanese lines of communications to the strategic resources of Southeast Asia and defeat the Japanese Navy, thus isolating Japanese army units in the Philippines and on the Asian mainland.

This approach also was favored by General "Hap" Arnold and the Army Air Forces (AAF). The capture of airstrips in the Marianas would place the AAF in a position to launch long-range strategic bombing attacks on the Japanese homeland and interdict the north-south sea lanes that linked Japan to its sources of oil, foodstuffs and raw materials in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. (3)

By this stage of the war, United States forces had acquired a wealth of practical experience in the conduct of amphibious operations. Beginning with the campaigns for Guadalcanal, New Guinea and the Solomons in the South Pacific and the Gilberts and Marshalls in the Central Pacific, all the armed services had been working together under difficult circumstances to plan and execute these complex operations.

In preparation for Operation Forager, the assault on the Marianas, Admiral Nimitz assembled a powerful joint force consisting of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious vessels, landing craft and numerous escorts. (4) Operational command was entrusted to Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander of the 5th Fleet.

Task Force 58, a fast carrier group under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, would provide escort and cover for the amphibious forces. These forces would be commanded by Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner and consisted of the Northern and the Southern Amphibious Assault Groups. Turner assumed personal command of the Northern Group, which would invade Saipan and Tinian. It included the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions with the Army National Guard's 27th Infantry Division in reserve and the XXIV Corps Artillery in general support (GS).

Once ashore, Marine General Holland Smith would assume command of land operations, grouping all forces under the V Amphibious Corps. The Southern Assault Group, under Rear Admiral Conolly, would invade Guam. Its land component, III Amphibious Corps under Marine Major General Roy S. Geiger, included the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, a corps artillery headquarters and the 77th Infantry Division in reserve. (5)

The coming operations clearly demanded joint planning and execution of fires. Initially, naval aviation and gunfire would serve as the primary means of fire support. In addition, units from the Seventh Army Air Forces would strike at long range from the recently captured airstrips in the Marshalls and, later, would be transferred to captured airfields in the Marianas to provide close air support (CAS). Finally, organic and supporting Field Artillery units would provide close and GS fires for the land battles.

The tactical plans incorporated the experience gained from previous battles in the Central Pacific. The US Marines had suffered enormous casualties in the assault on Betio Island in the Tarawa atoll, and the desire to prevent future bloodbaths animated all operational and tactical planning. (6) In the campaign for the Marshall Islands, fire support planning had been far more thorough and comprehensive, and as a result, the assaults on Kwajalein and the other atolls in the Marshalls were much less costly than Tarawa. (7) However, campaign planners of all services were aware that the Marianas offered a far tougher "nut to crack."

In contrast with the small atolls of the Central Pacific that offer few places to hide and no opportunities for defense in depth, the Marianas are substantial islands. Their varied topography includes rough hills, thick jungle, nearly impassable coastal swamps and mangrove thickets. The islands are of volcanic origin and have many caves that could afford an enemy formidable natural defenses. They also have man-made terrain features, such as rice paddies, sugarcane fields and substantial towns. (8)

Thus, the Marianas Campaign would be carried out in a very complex topographical and maritime environment. It would consist of four distinct phases and one supporting operation to be executed in the event of a Japanese naval counterattack. (See Figure 1.)

The campaign would start with a preparatory phase with the objective of bringing the amphibious assault forces safely to their attack positions off the islands. This would be followed by amphibious assaults on the three target islands--Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The islands then would be captured and all enemy resistance eliminated. Finally, American forces would consolidate and reorganize.

If the Japanese Navy were to challenge the invaders in a major fleet action, the US Navy would have to execute a major contingency operation to safeguard the landings and defeat the Japanese at sea. Capturing the Marianas would be followed by the building of forward naval bases for the fleet and landing strips capable of handling the AAF's new B-29 long-range bombers.

From an operational perspective, firepower would be the decisive element of combat power. Firepower would enable US forces to isolate the target islands, facilitate the opposed landings and ensure victory on the ground.

In any encounter with the Japanese fleet, firepower would decide the issue.

Preliminary and Supporting Operations. In April 1944, the AAF started their "softening up" operations with airstrikes on Guam, Saipan and Tinian from airfields in Eniwetok in the Marshalls. (9) In addition, a separate air campaign against Truk, the principal Japanese naval base in the Central Pacific, was conducted to neutralize this base and isolate the target islands in the Marianas. The United States wanted to ensure air superiority before the assault landings. (10)

The decision to "bypass" Truk was based on the understanding that air power would suffice to neutralize this and other Japanese airfields in the Caroline Islands. (11) The Japanese at Truk were repeatedly pounded in savage bombing raids. Although they managed to repair their airfields and fly-in some reinforcements, The Japanese forces at Truk were rendered ineffective.

This aerial campaign continued right through the invasion of the Marianas and denied the Japanese defenders any significant air support. Indeed, on the day of the invasion of Saipan, Truk was the object of an especially punishing bombing raid to ensure that its airplanes would not sortie against the American invaders. (12)

Despite the neutralization of Truk, the Japanese Navy managed to assemble a sizable fleet to challenge the American amphibious task forces. (13) This Japanese fleet clashed with the US Navy in a series of engagements from 3 May to 24 June 1944. The fighting culminated in the climactic Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June 1944) and resulted in a decisive American victory. (14) The battle was nicknamed "The Marianas Turkey Shoot" by US sailors because it was, in essence, an attritional contest decided by the superior equipment and training of the American naval aviators and anti-aircraft gunners. (15)

The neutralization of Truk and the defeat of the Japanese Navy in the Central Pacific were critical enabling operations that ensured the safety of American amphibious forces in the Marianas and proved vital to their success. Both victories were won through the use of superior aerial and naval firepower.

The Application of Fires at the Tactical Level--One Play, Three Acts. Although all three main islands in the Marianas group shared common characteristics, each had its own peculiarities that planners had to consider. In addition, with the capture and habilitation of land airfields and the changing conditions at sea, the sources of fire support changed as the campaign progressed. For example, once Saipan was captured, it served as a platform for artillery attacks into Tinian and air attacks into the other islands. (16) (See the map in Figure 2.)

The first island to be taken was Saipan. The amphibious assault was set for 15 June 1944 with the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions spearheading the landings and the Army's 27th Division in reserve. It was preceded by four days of intensive naval and air bombardment, two days of minesweeping operations and preliminary reconnaissance landings to prepare the beaches. (17)

American commanders had learned from bitter experience that the only way to avoid terrible casualties in an amphibious assault against prepared positions was to execute a massive and thorough schedule of preparatory fires using all means available. (18) The heavy bombardment continued throughout the assault with armed landing craft infantry (LCI) firing machineguns, rockets and 40-mm cannons into the beach defenses. This pattern of heavy preparatory bombardment was repeatedly employed in all other amphibious assaults with slight variations.

The assault on the next objective, Tinian, was one of the most heavily supported in the Pacific war. It was noteworthy in that Field Artillery based on Saipan provided effective preparatory fires and continuous fire support for the assault and subsequent land operations.

Tinian, a smaller island, lay only three to four miles south of Saipan, well within range of land-based artillery. Indeed, scarcely a week after coming ashore at Saipan, 155-mm "LongTom" guns were bombarding Tinian.

Soon, the XXIV Corps Artillery served as the controlling headquarters for a massive grouping of artillery tubes registered on Tinian. By the middle of July, an impressive 13 battalions of Army and Marine artillery of various types were firing on Tinian. (19) The landings on 24 July were prepared by an especially heavy air, land and sea bombardment. (20)

The final objective in the Marianas was Guam. This is the largest of the islands and includes sizable mountains to the south. Despite the challenging terrain and the desperate fanaticism of the doomed Japanese defenders, the assault and capture of Guam benefited from lessons learned in the previous operations.

Admiral Turner, the commander of the amphibious force fully understood the importance of firepower as a "battering ram" to crack tough defenses and save the life of friendly troops. "My aim," he said, "is to get the troops ashore standing up." (21)

No resources were spared in the preparation for the landings. The initial bombardment was savage. But it was not merely the volume of fire that was significant, but also its increased precision and sophistication.

Close support was assured by organic mortars plus the Marines' Pack 75 howitzers. In addition, 105-mm howitzers of direct support (DS) battalions were transported in DUKWs (amphibious vehicles) close on the heels of the infantry assault. (22) These amphibious vehicles also proved invaluable for ammunition resupply during the initial stages of the assault. (23)

Despite relatively lightly opposed landings made possible by thorough fire support plans, savage close fighting on all three islands continued for some time. Desperate defenders launched suicidal banzai attacks. Well-concealed snipers and machineguns also took a heavy toll. Casualties mounted, especially in the mountains and thickly vegetated areas of Saipan and Guam.

This only proves that despite overwhelming firepower and air supremacy, the infantry always must root out determined enemy soldiers. However, it is clear that in the absence of this firepower, friendly casualties would have been intolerable.

Fire Support Assets and Coordination. The level of joint cooperation in fire support achieved in the Marianas Campaign was remarkable, given the degree of service independence during World War II. Because fire support assets and weapons did not operate under a single chain of command, the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used were the result of practical experimentation in joint warfare under combat conditions.

Both Army and Navy organizational structures were subdivided. The Army included both the ground forces and the AAF. The Navy's fire support assets included naval gunfire, naval aviation and the Marine Corps -- a service with its own artillery and aircraft. All these elements had their organic means of fire support. All would be needed.

Beside direct fire systems, such as tanks and armed amphibious tracked vehicles, called amtracs, the ground forces had organic indirect fire support weapons in the form of mortars of various sizes. Each Marine division was supported by an artillery battalion, and each Army division had four artillery battalions in its division artillery. In addition, V Amphibious Corps was supported by the XXIV Corps Artillery Headquarters under Brigadier General Arthur M. Harper, which included two battalions of 155-mm howitzers and two of 155-mm guns plus other units assigned as the situation demanded.

Similarly, the III Amphibious Corps formed a corps artillery headquarters under Marine Brigadier General Pedro A. del Valle. (24) The most important function of these corps artillery headquarters was to serve as the principal fire support centers for the coordination and integration of all operational fires in the land battle.

The corps artillery also served as a clearinghouse for targeting information. It worked closely with the force G2 and used its assigned light spotter aircraft to gather targeting information, conduct damage assessments and control fires. (25) In addition, senior fire support coordinators from the Navy and the AAF worked closely with their Army and Marine colleagues to coordinate, deconflict and schedule fires.

Given its complexity and joint nature, the ad hoc fire coordination arrangements proved remarkably efficient and flexible. As an example, Navy vessels, ranging from battleships to destroyers, were assigned DS missions to specific infantry units. (26) Two or three vessels provided fires to an infantry regiment or battalion, and their fires were controlled by naval liaison officers in radio contact with the ships. All caliber of weapons were used for this mission, but the most effective type was the 5-inch naval gun, a medium gun that proved to be particularly accurate. (27)

Fire Support Platforms and the Effects of Fires. Aircraft were, and still are, the farthest ranging firepower platforms. B-24 medium bombers and P-47 fighter-bombers of the AAF initiated the preparatory phase of the Marianas Campaign from airfields in Kwajalein more than 1,000 miles away. The air raids continued right up to the assault landings and throughout the land operations.

Once Saipan was captured, its airfields provided Army planes a base within the theater from which they provided protection to the airfields and GAS to ground troops. In addition, Navy and Marine planes attacked the islands from aircraft carriers and also provided GAS. Throughout the campaign, air power proved its great flexibility. The weather too, was generally good, and was not a major impediment to flyers.

The AAF B-24 medium bomber could carry a formidable payload, including bombs weighing 500, 1,000 and even 1,500 pounds. Other planes, such as the P-47, served as fighter-bombers. They could deliver bombs and make strafing runs with their machineguns and 4.5 inch rockets. These rockets were relative newcomers to the battlefield but proved very effective.

Another relatively new weapon was the incendiary bomb. These bombs were used to clear dense sugarcane fields to facilitate the ground attack. (28) In addition, light observation aircraft were extremely useful as aerial forward observers and scouts.

Of all the types of firepower the Japanese experienced, naval gunfire was by far the most feared. (29) When asked how he could tell naval gunfire apart from regular artillery fire, a Japanese prisoner laughed bitterly and assured his captor that this was not difficult to determine when one was at the receiving end. (30)

Naval gunfire proved to be devastating and remarkably accurate in DS to the infantry, but its most valuable contribution was as a deep attack weapon. Large caliber long-ranging guns of up to 16 inches proved to be excellent for attacking bunkers, caves and troop concentrations out of contact with friendly forces. These guns were so powerful that the safe stand-off distance from friendly troops was 1,500 yards for preparatory fires and 2,500 yards for other missions. (31)

However, as in other campaigns, most commanders agreed with Brigadier General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commander of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in operations in Guam, about his assessment of Field Artillery. He said, that for close support of the Infantry, "...artillery was the most effective weapon employed during the operation." (32) This assessment was echoed by Admiral Tumer, who commented: "Field artillery is much better qualified for this type of fire by reason of its greater accuracy and smaller burst patterns." (33)

Artillery fire was abundantly available in the form of 75-mm Pack howitzers organic to Marine regiments, Army 105-mm DS artillery battalions, and 155-mm howitzers and 155-mm Long Tom guns with the Army's XXIV Corps Artillery. Artillery fire was immediately responsive in the DS role and was effective in all weather conditions. In addition, the high-angle capabilities of howitzers and mortars were particularly effective in engaging enemy entrenchments in defilade or reverse-slope positions.

Field Artillery weapons also were used in unorthodox ways, often in a direct fire mode against enemy entrenchments and pillboxes or to stop banzai charges. In one instance, "Pack howitzers were dragged to within thirty-five yards of the infantry front lines to fire pointblank at the onrushing enemy. 'Arms and legs,' reported one observer, 'flew like snow.'" (34)

The human effects of firepower proved to be at least as significant as the physical destruction they wrought. Even against so determined and fanatical an enemy as the Japanese, the physical and emotional effects of bombardment were devastating.

They suffered greatly in their seishin--a word that means not so much "morale" as "psychological well-being." After several days of successive attacks, "scattered outbreaks of serious loss of spirit" occurred. After another week, the spirit of some of the men deteriorated so badly that they "could not perform their duties in a positive manner." (35)

Interestingly, the Japanese sense of shiki, or soldierly duty, remained high. (36) Thus, while firepower degraded their hopes of victory or survival, it could not break their devotion to duty.

Nonetheless, the powerful stunning effect of bombardment by heavy weapons often can be decisive. The human factor, impossible to quantify, can be critical to the success of an attack. From the comments of stunned prisoners, it appears that heavy firepower did achieve decisive effects in the Marianas. (See Figure 3.)

Back to the Future. It is clear the success of major forcible-entry operations like those carried out in the Marianas Campaign depend on the availability and application of a wide variety of fire support assets. The study of such operations provides many lessons for today's capabilities-based force. As we move from strategically forward-deployed forces to expeditionary forces, the likelihood of conducting forcible-entry operations in an immature theater increases. (37)

The lessons of the Marianas Campaign are as pertinent today as they were almost 50 years ago. Fire support assets must support the campaign plan at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level, planners must ensure they allocate sufficient firepower assets to support the theater commander's objectives. Operational commanders must, in turn, reallocate firepower assets and establish a workable joint command and control structure that allows these assets to be used to maximum advantage. In certain circumstances, the commander's objectives are best attained by the application of fires; in others, firepower enables maneuver. In all cases, however, firepower employed against well-chosen targets saves lives.

At the tactical level, the complex issues of command and control of fire support assests from all services must be addressed to ensure they may be brought to bear at the correct time and place. Even a rich, technologically advanced and well-supplied force, such as the American amphibious task force that attacked the Marianas, never has "enough" fire support to satisfy commanders and soldiers who must face the enemy. Therefore commanders and planners must continuously assess battlefield conditions and shift assets as needed.

In addition, soldiers must demonstrate versatility and improvisation. For example, in the Marianas Campaign, Marines used captured 25-mm dual-mounted cannons to provide direct fire support to pinned-down troops. (38) In addition, because the Americans had achieved total air supremacy, the fire-power of the anti-aircraft artillery was used in a direct fire mode to support ground forces. (39)

One of the most important effects of fires is suppression. Suppression, however, is a temporary effect. Thus, to be effective, fire must be coordinated with maneuver in assaults that follow closely on the heels of preparatory fires.

In all situations where direct frontal assaults are inevitable, fire support often spells the difference between success and failure, between survival and death. This was clearly evident in the Marianas, a campaign that was waged for the strategic objective of securing a strategic firepower advantage over the enemy's homeland. The forceful and massive application of firepower at the operational and tactical levels made this objective possible. The testimony of stunned Japanese survivors validated the effectiveness of suppression as an effect of fires.

The Marianas Campaign was a joint operation. In the 21st century, joint operations will be the norm, not the exception--a fact recognized in the Army's most recent doctrinal field manual, FM 3-0, Operations. The FM states, "The strengths of each service component combine to overcome the limitations or reinforce the effects of the other components. The combination of multiple and diverse joint force capabilities creates military power more potent than the sum of its parts." (40)

The use of joint forces means that battlefield operating systems (BOS), such as firepower, cut across branch and service boundaries. Firepower and fire support are no longer the exclusive purview of artillerymen. Firepower has become a "system of systems" and military professionals must employ all available assests in the most effective way to achieve the desired effects on target at the appropriate time.

As we transition to an effects-based firepower community, it is imperative we develop integrated doctrine for employing fires at all levels. Fifty years ago, the pace of events permitted the ad hoc evolution of practical solutions to the challenges of joint warfare; tomorrow, the battlefields of the future will not allow us such luxury.

Finally, firepower weapons and artillery, specifically, were developed to create breaches, "crack down" fortifications and pierce otherwise impregnable enemy defenses. Today, artillery and firepower in general continue to serve as the battering ram that enables maneuver, sometimes serving as the catalyst for victory through attrition.

In our day, attritional warfare has been given a bad name, evoking nightmarish visions of murderous trench warfare. But we must not forget that whenever maneuver is not feasible and it becomes necessary to literally punch a hole or charge into the mouths of cannons, overwhelming firepower and attrition warfare is often the best, sometimes the only, solution.

We also must remember that, when we adopt attritional warfare, we are seeking to visit the effects of overwhelming and sustained firepower upon the enemy while protecting our own troops from enemy fires. When the effects of attritional warfare are brought to bear on the enemy, it can demolish his will to resist and minimize friendly casualties. Thus, the old maxim, "Artillery conquers, infantry occupies" is realized.

Combat is never simple. But, in some situations, such as on the Marianas Campaign, firepower can well be the decisive element of combat power, while in others, it might be an enabling or auxiliary element. In all cases, however, the proper application of fires remains an essential element for victory.

Figure 1: Employment of Operational Firepower in the Marianas Campaign

               Mission                    Purpose

Phase I        Achieve air superiority.   Protect amphibious
Preparation    Shape the battlespace.     forces in their
                                          approach to the
                                          objective.

Phase II       Maintain air superiority.  Enable successful
Amphibious     Neutralize shore           amphibious
Assaults        defenses.                 assaults.
               Shock/demoralize           Minimize friendly
                defenders.                casualties.


Phase III      Achieve air supremacy.
Land           Achieve firepower          Defeat Japanese
Operations      dominance.                ground forces.
               Support the close fight.



Phase IV       Support the close fight.
Consolidation  Maintain air supremacy.    Secure the islands.



Supporting     Defeat the enemy fleet.    Eliminate the threat
Naval                                     to American naval
Contingency                               and amphibious
Operations                                task forces.


               Tasks                        Sources of Fires

Phase I        Neutralize enemy airfields.  Long-Range AAF
Preparation    Destroy enemy aircraft.       Bombers
               Destroy/neutralize selected  Navy Carrier Aircraft
                installations.

Phase II       Destroy/neutralize enemy     Naval Gunfire
Amphibious      shore batteries.            Naval/Marine Aviation
Assaults       Destroy anti-aircraft guns.  Artillery Based on
               Destroy enemy vessels.        Saipan (for Assault
               Provide close support to      on Tinian)
                ground forces.

Phase III      Counter battery fire.        Army/Marine FA
Land           Support the close fight      Navy/Marine CAS/BAI
Operations     Interdict enemy LOC.         Naval Gunfire
               Achieve/maintain air         AAF CAS/BAI
                supremacy.
               Provide protective fires.

Phase IV       Support the close fight.     Army FA/Mortars
Consolidation  Maintain air supremacy.      Marine Artillery/Mortars



Supporting     Destroy/sink enemy ships.    Naval Aviation
Naval                                       Naval AAA
Contingency
Operations


               Effects

Phase I        Attacks on the Marianas
Preparation    and Truk effectively
               neutralized enemy airfields.


Phase II       Firepower assured the
Amphibious     success of the amphibious
Assaults       assaults and kept friendly
               casualties relatively low.



Phase III      Firepower made a critical
Land           contribution to the combat
Operations     power of ground maneuver
               forces, especially when
               assaulting prepared
               positions.

Phase IV       Firepower helped crush
Consolidation  enemy resistance while
               minimizing friendly
               casualties.

Supporting     The Japanese fleet was
Naval          crippled and forced to
Contingency    withdraw with catastrophic
Operations     personnel and equipment
               losses.

Legend

AAA = Anti-Aircraft Artillery

AAF = Army Air Force

BAI = Battlefield Air Interdiction

CAS = Close Air Support

LOC = Lines of Communications
Figure 3: Fire Support Platforms and Weapons Used in the Marianas. The
characteristics, capabilities and limitations of these weapons as well
as the missions assigned to them reflect those of World War II and not
their modern descendants.

Type of Platform  Principal Missions    Main Weapons

Naval Vessels     Preparatory Fires     16" Gun
                  Deep Fires            14" Gun
                  Direct Support (DS)   8" Gun
                                        5" Gun

Aircraft          CAS                   Bombs
                  BAI                   Napalm "Fire Bomb"
                                        Machinegun
                                        4.5" Rocket
                                        Cannon

Tube Artillery    DS                    155-mm Howitzer
                  General Support (GS)  155-mm Gun
                                        105-mm Howitzer
                                        75-mm Pack Howitzer

Mortars           DS                    4.2" Mortar
                                        80-mm Mortar
                                        60-mm Mortar

Rocket Launchers  DS                    Explosive Warhead

Type of Platform  Capabilities

Naval Vessels     Large Volume of Heavy Caliber
                   Fire
                  Greatest "Shock Effects"


Aircraft          Capable of Achieving Tactical
                   Surprise
                  Shock Effect
                  Good for Attacking Deep Targets


Tube Artillery    Responsive Fires, Especially DS
                  Good Accuracy
                  Capable of Predictable Fire
                   Patterns
                  Well-Organized Command/Control
Mortars           Very Responsive
                  High-Angle Fire Effective Against
                   Targets in Defilade
                  Excellent for Illumination
Rocket Launchers  High Volume of Fire

Type of Platform  Limitations

Naval Vessels     Flat trajectory produces relatively
                   high probable error.
                  Flat trajectory makes it difficult
                   to hit targets in defilade.
                  Heavy seas affect accuracy.
Aircraft          Limited time on target
                  Difficult to direct to targets.
                  Slow response times.



Tube Artillery    Required dedicated prime movers.
                  Effectiveness depends on good and
                   timely observer-to-shooter
                   communications.

Mortars           Effectiveness depends on good and
                   timely observer-to-shooter
                   communications.

Rocket Launchers  Not as accurate as tube artillery.

Endnotes:

(1.) Ronald Spector, in common with other students of the Pacific War, describes the American two-pronged strategy in these words: "Against all common sense, against the dictates of military doctrine, against the essence of Roosevelt's message to Churchill. the Pacific was divided into two theaters....The traditional elements of careerism and doctrinal differences within the armed forces had combined to produce a monstrosity." Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Vintage Books. 1985), 144-145.

(2.) Murray Williamson, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World (Cambridge, MA: Belknsp Press, 2000), 340.

(3.) Ibid., 339.

(4.) During WWWII, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an ad hoc organization that served the President and coordinated joint national military strategy at the highest level. In 1944, it was comprised of Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and CINC of the US Fleet; General George C. Marshall. Chief of Staff of the US Army; and General Henry H. Arnold, Commander of US Army Air Forces. Philip A. Crowl, "Campaign in the Marianas," United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960), 1-2.

(5.) Spector, 301-302.

(6.) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate. "The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944," The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 690.

(7.) Edwin P. Hoyt, To the Marianas: War the Central Pacific 1944 (Hew York: Van Nostrsnd Reinhold, I 980), 4.

(8.) For an extended discussion of the military aspects of the geography of the Marianas, see Crowl, 21-30.

(9.) Vern Haugland, The Army Air Forces Against Japan (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948). 187.

(10.) "B-24 raids and, later still, B-29 attacks kept Truk neutralized." Haugland, 188.

(11.) Craven, 676.

(12.) Ibid., 690.

(13.) A Japanese fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Ozawa sailed with the intent of defeating the American fleet in a general fleet action and then destroying the amphibious task force off the Marianas. Operation A-Go ended in dismal failure for the Japanese. For details of the Japanese plans, see Samuel Eliot Morison "New Guinea and the Marianas: March 1944- August 1944," History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol.7 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1953), 213-216.

(14.) For a detailed narrative of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, see Morison, 213-321.

(15.) "This was the greatest carrier battle of the war. The forces engaged were three to four times those in preceding actions like Midway, and victory was so complete that the Japanese could never again engage on such a scale." Morison, 278.

(16.) Crowl, 287.

(17.) Craven, 690.

(18.) Crowl, 42.

(19.) Henry I. Sham, Bernard C. Nalty and Edwin T. Turnbladh, "Central Pacific Drive," History of US Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 7 (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Marine Corps, 1965), 351.

(20.) The guns and howitzers controlled by the XXIV Corps Artillery expended 24,536 rounds of all types prior to the Tinian landings. The day before the invasion, three battleships, five cruisers and 16 destroyers joined the bombardment. Sham, 361-362.

(21.) Ibid., 457.

(22.) Ibid., 452.

(23.) Ibid.

(24.) Ibid., 435.

(25.) Ibid., 361.

(26.) Crowl, 130.

(27.) Ibid.

(28.) Sham, 364.

(29.) Crowl, 131.

(30.) Ibid., 130.

(31.) Ibid., 131.

(32.) Sham, 576.

(33.) Crowl, 130.

(34.) Spector, 320.

(35.) Crowl, 336.

(36.) Ibid., 337.

(37.) "Initial entry forces need to be interoperable and flexible enough to handle unforeseen circumstances, Initial entry forces require enough combat power to establish and protect lodgments and begin simultaneous shaping operations immediately upon arrival." Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001), 3-6.

(38.) Crowl, 78.

(39.) Sham, 577.

(40.) FM 3-0, 2-6.

Major Prisco R. Hernandez, Army National Guard (ARNG), won first place in the US Field Artillery Association's 2002 History Writing Contest with this article. He is a full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AG/R) officer serving as a Training Officer in the 4th Brigade, 75th Division (Training Support) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He served as the S3 in the 1st Battalion, 120th Field Artillery, an M109A5 howitzer battalion in direct support to the 32d Infantry Brigade, Wisconsin Army National Guard. He also has served as a Battalion Operations Officer, Mechanized Infantry Company Commander, twice as a Company Executive Officer, Rifle Platoon Leader and Anti-Armor Platoon Leader. Major Hernandez holds a master's degree from Indiana University and a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. He won the prestigious national 2001 Distinguished Article Award from The Army Historical Foundation, Arlington, Virginia, for his Field Artillery Association 2001 History Contest Second Place article: "The Spanish Civil War: The German Ko ndor Legion, A Firepower Force Package in Combat."