Black Sea Bids By Russia & Turkey.

Amid a flurry of diplomatic activities in Moscow and Ankara over the Caucasus earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took time off for an exceptionally important mission to Turkey, which might lead to a turning point in the security of a vast region the two powers historically shared. With Ankara planning a conference of the Caucasus republics, Moscow is working on a new web of regional alliances, drawing into Russia's memory as a power in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.

Lavrov's schedule has included an Extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels; a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in Moscow; visits by the presidents of the newly independent republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; three foreign minisers to be hosted in Moscow - Karl de Gucht of Belgium, Franco Frattini of Italy and Elmar Mamedyarov of Azerbaijan; consultations with the visiting UN secretary-general's special envoy to Georgia, Johan Verbeke; and consultations with Turkey - Lavrov went to Istanbul on Sept. 9 for at few hours' confidential talk with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan.

Asia Times Online on Sept. 12 noted: "During the year-long siege of the Russian fortress naval base Sevastopol in 1854-55 by the British and French, Tzarist Russia realized one or two home truths. One, that Turkey's role could be critical for the safety of its Black Sea fleet, and, two, without the Black Sea fleet, Russia's penetration into the Mediterranean would not be feasible. Most important, Russia learned that the original ground of a war may be lost, but the protagonists could continue with hostilities. When peace finally came with the Congress of Paris in 1856, the Black Sea clauses came at a tremendous disadvantage to Russia - so much so that within the year the tzar conspired with Germany's Otto von Bismarck, denounced the accord and proceeded with re-establishing a fleet in the Black Sea".

AToL added: "The timing of Lavrov's consultations in Turkey was noteworthy. US Vice President Dick Cheney happened to be in the region, visiting Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia, drumming up anti-Russia animus. Turkey didn't figure in his itinerary. Moscow shrewdly estimated the need of political dynamism with regard to Turkey. Moscow has taken careful note that unlike...[NATO and the EU), Turkey's reaction to the conflict in the Caucasus has been manifestly subdued. Ankara briefly expressed its anxiety over the developments, but almost in pro-forma terms without taking sides. On the one hand, Turkey is a NATO member...and it aspires to join the EU. It was a close Cold War ally of the US. Turkey will be the net beneficiary as an energy hub if any of the West's grandiose plans to bypass Russian territory and access Caspian energy materialize. It is the entrepot of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [crude] oil pipeline".

Russia is poised to be Turkey's main trading partner, with an annual exchange already nearing $40 bn. Invisible trade is also substantial, with 2.5m Russian tourists visiting Turkey annually and Turkish companies extensively involved in Russia's services sector. Russia supplies 70% of Turkey's needs of natural gas.

Ankara is promoting a "Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Pact", giving Turkey the option of remaining relatively neutral in this dispute, with Saudi Arabia playing a role in the background and its National Security Council chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan having visited Putin on Sept. 4 offering huge package of Saudi arms purchases and investments in Russia. In this, the Saudis are telling Moscow a joint Turkish-GCC initiative is to co-operate with Russia in preventing an alliance of extremist Sunni and Shi'ite groups from penetrating the Caucasus - all in return for a Russian pledge not to help Iran produce atomic weapons (see news12GCC-IranConfrtVsReconclnSep15-08). Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Moscow on Aug. 12 and discussed the proposal further with Putin and Medvedev.

Putin promptly welcomed the joint Turkish-Saudi/GCC proposal and agreed to have consultations on building up multilateral dialogues on all aspects of the Caucasus problem. The Russian approach was imperative to engage Turkey and Saudi Arabia, important regional powers which helped mitigate Russia's regional isolation in the crisis. It paid to involve Saudi Arabia and Turkey on Russia's side, as they did not form part of the Western peace initiative.

Turkey's influence in the Southern Caucasus is undeniable. Turkey's annual trade with Georgia amounts to $1 bn, a considerable volume by the latter's yardstick. Turkish investment in Georgia exceeds $500m. Turkey supplies weapons and provides training to the Georgian military. Turkey's ties with Azerbaijan have been traditionally close. Thus, Moscow took the perspective that the Saudi-Turkish proposal could provide the basis to work out mechanisms for enhancing regional stability and act as counter-weights to Western moves directed against Russian interests.

Lavrov on Sept. 9 told Babacan that, while "it is necessary at this stage to create appropriate conditions" for Ankara's peace bid, "including elimination of the consequences of the aggression against South Ossetia", "we absolutely agree with our Turkish partners that the groundwork for that interaction can and must be laid now". At the core of the Russian thinking lies the preference for a regional approach which excludes outside powers. Lavrov said: "We see the chief value in the Turkish initiative in that it rests on common sense and assumes that countries of any region and, first of all, countries belonging to this region should themselves decide how to conduct affairs there. And others should help, but not dictate their recipes... Of course, this will be an open scheme, but the initiative role here will belong to the countries of the region. This is about the same thing as ASEAN in South-East Asia, which has a lot of partners [10], but the ASEAN members define the work agenda for the region, and the region's life".

During Lavrov's visit to Istanbul, the two sides agreed about the "necessity of using more the already available mechanisms - the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation [based in Istanbul] and Blackseafor [regional naval force] - and developing the Turkish idea of Black Sea harmony, which is increasingly acquiring a multilateral and practical character".

At a news conference in Istanbul with Babacan, Lavrov added: "Essentially from the same positions we also champion what needs to be undertaken for a definitive resolution of the situation in Iraq on the basis of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that state. Also similar are our approaches to the necessity of a...peaceful settlement to the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear programme".

Lavrov brilliantly linked Iraq and Iran with a Russo-Turkish-Saudi/GCC regional framework on security and co-operation. But Moscow had its eyes set on the US military pressure in the Black Sea.

Moscow would like Ankara to continue to resist US attempts to revisit the 1936 Montreux Convention, which vests in Turkish hands control over the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles. The US was not party to that convention, which severely restricted the passage of warships through the two Turkish straits and virtually ensured the Black Sea as a Russo-Turkish zone. The Montreux Convention is critical to Russia's security. (During World War-II, Turkey denied the Axis powers permission to send warships to the Black Sea to attack the Soviet naval fleet based in Sevastopol).

AToL said: Washington has been mounting pressure on Ankara to renegotiate the Montreux Convention "so as to progressively convert the Black Sea into a preserve of NATO". Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria are NATO members; the US has military bases in Romania; the US is hoping to induct Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. AToL added: "Turkish resistance to the US entreaties regarding re-negotiating the Montreux Convention assumes great importance for Moscow". (During the current conflict in the Caucasus, Washington sought to dispatch two massive warships weighing 140,000 tons to the Black Sea to provide "aid" to Georgia, but Ankara refused permission on the grounds that such passage through the Bosphorus violated provisions of the Montreux Convention).

Moscow appreciates the nuance in Turkish policy. Moscow and Ankara have a shared interest in maintaining the Black Sea as their joint preserve. Ankara fears any move towards re-opening the Montreux Convention - negotiated by Ataturk against formidable odds - would open a Pandora's box.