Bill-O and the Fox: linkage and leverage in postwar Harlem politics, 1945-1950.

In 1945, change was in the air. The war was over, and millions of Americans celebrated the two-front victory over fascism and the homecoming of their loved ones. And nowhere was the celebration bigger than in New York. The crossroads of the world welcomed thousands back to America's shores, whether they came by ship or by airplane. Some would return for college careers under the G.I. Bill, while others would return to civilian jobs. For a returning Brigadier General named William O'Dwyer, the next stop would be a destination he had sought four years earlier--City Hall.

A former policeman, lawyer, and Brooklyn District Attorney, Democrat William O'Dwyer had run strongly against popular incumbent Fiorello La Guardia for mayor of New York City in 1941. La Guardia had won reelection back then, but four years later things were different. The mayor was attacked for spreading himself too thin; as Director of Civilian Defense, he shuttled back and forth to Washington each week, and his critics claimed that his defense work distracted his attention from important city business. La Guardia's weakening ties with the Republican Party made it all but certain that he could not get their nomination a fourth time. And the American Labor Party (ALP) was divided between its Communist and non-Communist supporters. It would be tough for La Guardia to balance his former coalition through yet another election. The mayor had also entertained frustrated ambitions for higher office, and he no longer looked forward to staying at City Hall. So he said good-bye.

Since their most charismatic potential opponent had decided not to seek reelection, the Democrats were optimistic about their chances in 1945. And the friends of "Bill-O" Dwyer prevailed upon party leaders to give the returning general one more try at the mayoralty.

O'Dwyer was born in Ireland in 1890, had spent time in Spain studying for the Jesuit priesthood, then changed his mind and sailed to New York in 1910. After a series of jobs as a construction worker, plasterer's assistant, coal fireman, and bartender, he became an American citizen in 1916 and joined the police force in Brooklyn. Attending law school at night, he eventually set up his own legal practice, and rose to become a city magistrate and Kings County Court judge. In 1939 O'Dwyer was elected Brooklyn district attorney, and his crusade against the "Murder, Incorporated" syndicate led to his solving more than eighty murders in two years. Democratic leaders portrayed him as a rival to Republican crime-buster Thomas E. Dewey, and pitted O'Dwyer against La Guardia for the mayoralty in 1941. Following his loss to "the Little Flower," O'Dwyer enlisted in the Army, where he did humanitarian work with the Allied Commission in Italy and was eventually promoted to brigadier general. His background and war work made "Bill-O" a strong candidate among Irish and Italian New Yorkers. He had the bearing of a determined fighter for justice. He was tall and broad-shouldered; when he was in a pensive mood he sported a trademark pipe reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes. Most importantly, O'Dwyer earned a reputation for independence. His efforts to distance himself from Tammany and run as a "New Deal" Democrat instead, combined with his seeking the support of the ALP's non-Communist wing, strengthened his appeal among Jewish voters. (2)

O'Dwyer had only taken an average of 24 percent of the Harlem black vote in 1941, compared to La Guardia's 50-plus percent on the Republican ticket alone. (3) In the four intervening years, particularly following the 1943 riots, Harlem had become an important political symbol. A candidate's popularity in Harlem gave an impression of his dedication to civil rights and racial harmony. So O'Dwyer had to improve his standing among Harlem voters. But whom among the black political leadership should he turn to first?

He was initially advised to consult Dr. Channing Tobias, a leading intellectual and NAACP official. Then other advisers told O'Dwyer that Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was now the leading figure in Harlem. But O'Dwyer did not know Powell, and what he had heard about him seemed too controversial for comfort. He also knew that to ally with one of these two leaders would mean alienating the other. Thus, he cast about for a third option, and one adviser suggested a man that he himself had worked with: J. Raymond Jones. (4)

John Raymond Jones, the man who would eventually earn the nickname of "The Fox" because of his political shrewdness, began his career with the Garvey movement during the 1920s. He had migrated to Harlem from St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, in search of a better economic future. The sound investment advice he received from his Garveyite friends eventually enabled Jones to become independent of the need for patronage jobs. This fact strengthened his hand as he learned the game of politics and began to change that game in his own favor. (5) As the Garvey movement declined and Jones carved out his own career in politics, his philosophy evolved from racial separatism to cultural nationalism. This meant that the best way for blacks to improve themselves was not by setting up an independent society (in Africa or anywhere else), but through local self-sufficiency within the existing society, which would in turn build the black community's leverage in achieving political power at higher levels. (6)

He put this philosophy to practice in the area of the local Democratic Party clubs. Jones and other young blacks were frustrated because they were denied admission to the all-white clubs (many of which were located in Harlem itself), and had to confine themselves to the segregated United Colored Democracy organization. This separate wing of the Democratic Party denied its black members the same per capita representation in the party as whites. In response to this, Jones and his colleagues began to form their own independent clubs. The formation of these clubs, combined with the continuous migration of blacks into New York City, eventually pressured Tammany Hall into accepting blacks as full members of the Democratic Party machine. (7)

John Kelly was one of the few Tammany leaders who led an integrated club, which was located in the 22nd Assembly District, slightly north of Harlem. In 1939, Kelly encouraged Ray Jones to run for leader of the 19th Assembly District, which was located in Harlem. Jones lost that election to his friend Daniel L. Burrows, eventually blaming Kelly for engineering his defeat in an act of "insensitivity" to blacks. In response, he helped Joseph Gavagan and Assemblyman Daniel Flynn oust Kelly from his position.

In 1943, Jones formed the black led, racially integrated Carver Democratic Club. He still saw the 22nd Assembly District leadership as too difficult to win, so he decided to challenge Herbert Bruce for his leadership of the 21st Assembly District that year. (In 1935 Bruce had become the first black Democratic District Leader elected in Harlem.) Jones lost, but his willingness to oppose Bruce on a Tammany ticket earned Jones respect from Tammany leaders Clarence Neal and Bert Stand. In fact, they respected him enough to let him mind the store: when Gavagan took a judgeship and Flynn joined the Navy in 1944, Tammany allowed Jones to remain as de facto leader of the 22nd Assembly District. His command was tenuous, because blacks only made up a third of the district's population, but nonetheless Jones gained experience in the mechanics of district leadership. (8)

The reapportionment of 1943 cut up Assembly District 22 and absorbed it into a new District 13. But Jones was rewarded for his loyalty to Neal and Stand when they had attempted to replace Michael Kennedy with Edward Loughlan as official Tammany Hall leader. The new District 13 was also divided, East and West, and they awarded Jones the official leadership of East District 13, a district half black and half white, in 1944. (9)

Jones now had a district power base of his own, but as a Tammany Democrat, his influence in city government was limited while La Guardia was still mayor. But as the Democrats looked optimistically to 1945, Jones saw the opportunity to extend his influence into City Hall. True, the candidate had to win first, but with La Guardia gone, that was likely. The trick was to convince that candidate that he needed Jones to help him win, and would continue to need his help in running the city. So Jones let it be known that he was available to William O'Dwyer.

Jones had reasoned that, in addition to La Guardia's immense popularity, O'Dwyer's problem in 1941 had been Manhattan. The former Brooklyn District Attorney had not been perceived as a Manhattan man, a liability in 1941. Therefore, Jones reasoned, if O'Dwyer could be persuaded that he needed to win in Manhattan to make his second try successful, and that the black vote was crucial for success in that borough, then it would only be a matter of time before O'Dwyer sought Jones's services. This is exactly what O'Dwyer did, partially because of his dilemma between Tobias and Powell, and partially because Jones had one of his own friends present to suggest "the Fox" as an alternative. (10)

It was Jones who suggested that both Tobias and Powell be made honorary co-chairmen of the O'Dwyer campaign in Harlem, positions that satisfied the egos of both men and avoided a direct conflict between them. The Fox also urged the candidate to guarantee the appointment of a black magistrate in return for Powell's support. This O'Dwyer did, and following the election he fulfilled his promise. Colonel Vernon C. Riddick became the city's first black magistrate shortly after O'Dwyer became mayor. (11)

O'Dwyer not only won the election, but he succeeded in capturing a majority of black votes in Harlem. On the Democratic ticket, he captured an average of 45 percent of that vote, and on the ALP ticket he won an extra 16 percent. (12) The new mayor rewarded Jones for his part in this victory by making him his personal secretary, and later making him a deputy commissioner at the Department of Housing and Buildings. The man whom O'Dwyer had made his unofficial "eyes and ears in Harlem" was now also the highest-ranking black official in New York City. (13)

Jones' specific responsibilities at Housing and Buildings involved the inspection and enforcement of safety and sanitation regulations. He used his contacts in the Carver Club, local civic organizations, the Borough President's Office, and the State Assembly to have new playgrounds built in Harlem. By the time he left the post in 1951, fifty playgrounds had been built, but the bureaucratic frustrations he was forced to encounter prevented him from doing more about building rehabilitation and rodent control. (14)

Once in a position to address a serious Harlem concern, housing, Jones discovered the limits of government power. But his accomplishments as an electoral wizard were being noticed outside the borders of New York City. As the 1948 Presidential campaign began, Ray Jones and Harry Truman began almost simultaneously to think about each other. (15)

The grandson of "unreconstructed" Southerners, Harry Truman demonstrated an amazing ability to overcome what he was "carefully taught." As he rose through the ranks of Missouri's Democratic political machine to reach the United States Senate, Truman abandoned his habit of using racial slurs and adopted a philosophy of giving blacks and Jews an "even break" like everyone else. During the war, Senator Truman reached national attention as the head of a committee that investigated inefficiency in the defense industries. By 1944, as Roosevelt prepared to run for a fourth term, Truman became the "Missouri Compromise" choice for Vice-President. Then in 1945, Roosevelt died. And the Man from Independence, Missouri became the new President of the United States.

Although Truman's most important concerns as President involved ending the war successfully, once that goal was accomplished he gave more attention to domestic concerns. What really alerted him to the nation's race relations problem were the rampant racial killings reported in 1946. The defeat of the Democrats in that year's Congressional elections also liberated Truman to take risks. He wrote his wife after the election, "For the next two years I'm going to do what I damn well please and to hell with all of them." (16) Truman felt free to buck the trends of mainstream politics and take stands for what he truly believed was right. Whatever his homespun impressions of blacks, he did have a firm belief that everyone should have equality of opportunity. He appointed a Committee on Civil Rights in 1946, and the following year that committee published To Secure These Rights, a report that urged stronger and immediate federal action to eliminate discrimination. One Committee observation that must have interested J. Raymond Jones was that New York's Stuyvesant Town controversy could have been prevented if express government regulations against housing discrimination had existed. (17)

Truman's political interest in blacks was sharpened after he received the following analysis from his confidante, Clark Clifford. The text of the memorandum's section on "The Negro" offered a crisp and realistic description of the Democratic Party's standing with black voters. As much of this analysis concerned New York State, it made it even more imperative for Truman to do business with J. Raymond Jones. First, it made the famous statement that "the northern Negro voter ... holds the balance of power in Presidential elections" because of their concentration in strategic northern states. Second, it singled out New York as the one such state that had supported a Republican in a major contest since 1932 (the candidate referred to was not Roosevelt's ally La Guardia, but Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Roosevelt's opponent in 1944 and Truman's opponent-to-be in 1948).

Dewey's support of an anti-discrimination law in the state in 1945 had led Bronx Democratic boss Ed Flynn to believe that the governor had gained control of the state's black vote as a result. (18) To make the situation worse for Truman, the persistent influence of southern Democrats in Congress prevented black voters from feeling permanently wedded to the Democratic Party, despite the previous sixteen years of New Deal-style legislation. The report recommended that the Democratic Party intensify its efforts to improve prices and housing in black neighborhoods, in order to keep the northern black vote securely in the Democratic column and prevent any chance of it swinging back to the GOP. (19)

The Clifford memorandum and the Civil Rights Committee's findings had helped to convince Truman to make history by desegregating the armed forces, and become the first President to address the NAACP. (20) But by the 1948 Presidential election, Truman was clearly revealed to be an embattled President. When the Democrats adopted the first aggressive civil rights platform in history, the entire Mississippi delegation and thirteen delegates from Alabama (including a Birmingham police commissioner named Eugene "Bull" Connor) walked out of the convention. The seceded delegates formed the States' Rights (Dixiecrat) Party, which nominated Strom Thurmond for President. And once again, J. Raymond Jones saw a candidate in need. (21)

Congressman Powell had once alienated Truman by calling his wife "The Last Lady in the Land," so "the Fox" got together with his old rival Herbert Bruce to plan the Truman campaign in Harlem. But rather than follow Bruce's approach and consider this campaign like any other electoral effort, Jones decided to cast the campaign as a civil rights crusade. He persuaded the Interdenominational Ministers' Conference to organize the campaign pageantry, and had his own Carver Club organization assume all expenses. (22) Then he approached his friend the mayor. To get O'Dwyer involved properly, Jones first convinced the mayor that he had to somehow make it up to Truman for having supported Dwight Eisenhower for the 1948 Democratic nomination. O'Dwyer suggested that he could invite Truman to New York during the campaign and declare a citywide day to honor the publication of To Secure These Rights. The mayor left Jones to organize the whole affair. (23)

On October 29, 1948, the plan was realized in an open-air rally in Harlem. Jones had invited various leaders of the NAACP and the Urban League, but no major figures from either group attended except Dr. Channing Tobias. Jones would later theorize that more prominent leaders did not come because Truman's chances were considered so slim. But nonetheless, Jones and O'Dwyer gave the rally everything they had. Truman came though the streets of Harlem in an open Cadillac. He went FDR one step further by not only driving through Harlem, but also stopping to address the people there (the first President ever to do so). When Truman and his wife arrived at the speaker's platform, they were greeted with the strains of "Go Down Moses" instead of "Hail to the Chief". This implicit comparison with Moses, who also fought against powerful forces in the liberation of oppressed people, visibly moved Harry and Bess. (24) When Truman made his pledge to continue his crusade for civil rights, he received the largest applause from any audience in the campaign. (25) And later in the day, with those cheers still ringing in the ears of the enthusiastic crowds, O'Dwyer made a discreet wink to Jones. They'd put Truman over. (26)

Truman's surprise election in his own right was a pleasant surprise to Harlem blacks, who had given him an average of 61 percent of their votes on the Democratic ticket, and an additional 7 percent on the Liberal ticket. Apparently, the strategy outlined in the Clifford memo worked. Governor Dewey, the man behind New York State's own FEPC bill, only received an average of 15 percent of black Harlem's vote. As it happened, the percent that Truman got in his 1948 Presidential campaign was greater than what blacks would give Dewey in any of his gubernatorial campaigns. In his 1942 gubernatorial campaign, Dewey received 48 percent to Democrat John Bennett's 40 percent; in his 1946 reelection campaign, Dewey received 41 percent to James Mead's combined Democratic, American Labor, and Liberal total of 56 percent; and in Dewey's successful bid for a third term in 1950, Harlem gave him an average of 38 percent, to Walter Lynch's combined Democratic and Liberal average of 53 percent. (27)

But the rewards to Ray Jones's political organization were mixed. Following the election, the President appointed William Hastie to the U.S. District court in the New York area, but Jones resented this because he wanted to get one of his own men in that post. So Hastie was relocated to a U.S. Circuit Court in Philadelphia. Whether Jones was satisfied by the next New York appointee is unknown, but this incident demonstrates that Jones had acquired some additional leverage in black Federal appointments as a result of Truman's success. (28)

At the opening of O'Dwyer's 1949 reelection campaign, Jones felt confident of the mayor's victory, because O'Dwyer had made many black appointments, and "the Fox" had helped him gain a reputation as a "friend of the Harlem community." O'Dwyer had even gone so far as to support Congressman Powell's reelection campaign in 1948. So the Mayor's reelection campaign was successful in Harlem (as it was throughout the city), despite the stiff competition in Harlem from ALP candidate Vito Marcantonio, whose civil rights rhetoric had been strong. (29) To hear Jones tell it in his autobiography, the campaigns to reelect O'Dwyer against Marcantonio for mayor, and to replace Communist Benjamin Davis with Earl Brown in the City Council, were not difficult at all. In actuality, both victories appeared to everyone except Jones like surprise upsets after a pair of seemingly uphill battles.

The mayoral election was a three-way contest between O'Dwyer, Marcantonio, and Newbold Morris, a protege of La Guardia who had gained the Republican and Liberal party nominations. The City Council election was between Davis, the only Communist Party member in America to hold an elected office (and whom Jones had supported four years earlier because of his civil rights aggressiveness), and Democrat Earl Brown, whom Jones was now supporting because Davis's Communist Party membership was becoming too great a liability. Marcantonio announced that he and Davis would run as a team in a crusade to bring more progressive government to the city. To New York Post reporter Ted Poston, who covered the 1949 campaigns in Harlem, Marcantonio's strategy was to pull enough votes away from O'Dwyer so that Morris would win. This strategy would work whether O'Dwyer lost the entire election, or if he won reelection but lost Harlem. In either event, Marcantonio could usurp the Democratic control over Harlem's assembly districts, leaving Adam Clayton Powell, a Marcantonio supporter, as the most powerful Democrat in Harlem. (30)

Jones, refusing to accept an ALP-takeover of his Tammany bailiwick, adopted an indirect strategy. Instead of attacking the popular Davis directly (and risking looking like a hypocrite in the process), Jones would couch the campaign in terms of democracy versus communism, targeting the Councilman (who was convicted and currently imprisoned for conspiracy charges) as the agent of a hostile foreign power. Jones's strategy was based, in Poston's words, "on the theory that the 'outsiders' [i.e. the Marcantonio-Davis team's Communist supporters, whose funding came from Soviet Russia] would alienate the voters before Election Day." (31) Despite Marcantonio's recognition of Jones as his true nemesis, and his aggressive attacks on Jones's base in the 13th Assembly District, "the Fox's" prediction of a Marcantonio-Davis defeat would come true. (32)

Both races promised to give the Democrats a run for their money. Marcantonio was relentlessly attacking O'Dwyer for supporting Stuyvesant Town's segregationist policies, allowing discrimination in public works projects, ignoring NAACP charges of police brutality, and putting nightsticks back in the hands of Harlem police officers after La Guardia had forbade them. In four years, Marcantonio charged, "Bill-O" had appointed only one black magistrate and no commissioners (Ray Jones was only Deputy Commissioner of Housing, but as the mayor would happily learn, that single appointment was enough to guarantee his reelection in Harlem.) Moreover, O'Dwyer only pledged an aggressive fight for civil rights after Marcantonio entered the race against him. (33)

Poston claimed that the ten-to-one odds against Davis, on the basis of party registrations alone, was counterbalanced by the Communist's status as the only black on the City Council, and his record of defending the Scottsboro boys, evicted tenants, and sit-down strikers. Jones, on the other hand, was organizing churches and fraternities against Davis and investing in widespread newspaper advertising. Although Brown was a correspondent for Life magazine, Davis outclassed him in oratory charisma, so Poston believed that the underdog Communist incumbent had a fighting chance. (34)

Davis's chances seemed to skyrocket when police attacked innocent women and children during a rally for him the Friday before the election. While a crowd of supporters waited for their Councilman, who had been freed on bail and was scheduled to appear on 125th street, a number of mounted patrol officers halted one of Davis's campaign trucks. When the campaigners began to chant against police brutality, the officers overreacted by rushing the crowd on the sidewalk, and beating back many civilians (including Poston, who was covering the event), with nightsticks. Many residents responded by throwing whiskey bottles at the police. After forty-five minutes, six patrolmen were left injured and six men were arrested. Davis's previous campaign rhetoric against police brutality now seemed justified, and a Tammany district captain claimed that the Democratic party had suffered more from the police attack than had any of the citizens beaten in the street. (35)

Indeed, the mayor took the blame for the actions of his policemen, and a new group called Independent Democrats for Norris produced a four-page tabloid called The Harlem Democrat, which urged voters to choose a straight Liberal ticket and "throw the O'Dwyer-Tammany regime out of office." But neither "Bill-O" nor "the Fox" bruised that easily. O'Dwyer took reports from both Jones and from Police Commissioner O'Brien, concluded that he was "satisfied with the police handling of the case," and announced that he would take no further action. Meanwhile, a presiding bishop of the African Methodist Church was encouraging the pastors in his district to preach against the communists for starting the violence. And the pastors of all Harlem's Roman Catholic churches assembled to denounce the "invasion". The communists, claimed the pastors, were "visitors, an outside element, and the Negro people of Harlem suffer[ed] the evil reputation of their actions." (36) The neighborhood's Protestant ministers (with the exception of Powell) followed suit a day later, reading an anti-communist manifesto prepared by the Inter Denominational Ministers meeting and distributed by a pro-O'Dwyer citizens' committee. (37) Apparently, Jones was able to keep his hold on the churches, so that they described the incident in the language that Jones had adopted at the campaign's onset.

Perhaps, then, it was no surprise that Marcantonio and Davis were both defeated, citywide as well as in Harlem. O'Dwyer's average vote in Harlem was 40 percent, and Marcantonio only garnered 33 percent. (38) A close second, but as far as Jones was concerned, a miss was as good as a mile. Citywide, O'Dwyer won a plurality of 49.1 percent (a total of 1,264,600 votes), while Marcantonio only won 13.8 percent (a total of 356,423). In the contested 21st Senatorial District, Brown won 63,030 votes to Davis's 21,962 votes. In J. Raymond Jones's 13th Assembly District, one of the Assembly Districts that comprised the 21st Senatorial District, Brown beat Davis by 21,924 votes to 8,339. Brown later explained his election in the simple terms of Harlem's aversion to Communism. But Poston uncovered evidence that Jones had promised to pay each of his district captains fifty dollars for every election district the Democrats carried. (39)

Whether or not the Democratic Party held the loyalties of Harlem voters, it certainly controlled the funds with which to sway their votes. And Ray Jones had proven himself to be a master of the election game, and of all the shady tricks of the trade. He had beaten a popular Congressman and City Councilman with long records of service to blacks, because he had spent years learning how Tammany Hall functioned, and slowly ascended the ladder until he was able to work the system himself. Marcantonio and Davis may have had more popular appeal, but in the nuts-and-bolts business of winning a campaign, they were simply "out-Foxed."

Shortly after his reelection, O'Dwyer was forced to resign because he was suspected of association and collaboration with organized gangsters. City Council President Vincent Impellitteri became acting mayor. "Impy", as he was nicknamed, was elected mayor in his own right in 1950, and had Jones resign from his housing commission because Jones had opposed him on an earlier issue. The election that put "Impy" in the mayor's seat had been close in Harlem. Ferdinand Pecora won an average of 35.7% on the Democratic ticket, plus an additional 4.5 percent on the Liberal ticket; Impy won 35.9 percent on his Experience Party ticket, but it was enough.

Following his firing, Jones left city government, taking a job as secretary to Judge Harold Steves of the Court of General Sessions. (40) He lost interest in the Carver Club, and in 1951 resigned as District Leader because he felt local district politics had become too involved with gangsters. To top things off, he had been snubbed by a new Tammany Hall leader who came to power in 1949:Carmine DeSapio. An era was over, and it was time for Jones to get out, at least temporarily.

By 1951, both "Bill-O" and "the Fox" were gone from city politics. However, by this time, Harlem as a political entity had "made the scene" with local and national politicians; the community was recognized as a place where votes needed to be sought, and to which rewards had to be given following the election. This in itself was a far cry from Harlem's political position twenty years earlier. But even as Black Gotham was strengthening politically, postwar demographic forces were accelerating the community's economic decline, making its political victories increasingly (and bitterly) hollow.

FIGURE 1:
AFRICAN-AMERICAN VOTE PERCENTAGES FOR PRESIDENT, GOVERNOR AND
MAYOR WITHIN SELECTED HARLEM ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS, 1945-1950

  The following tables present the average vote percentage won by each
major party in Harlem's Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Mayoral
contests between 1945 and 1950.
  The tables are based upon an analysis of selected election districts
within Manhattan that I determined to have been at least 90% African-
American at the time in which the election took place, following the
procedure which Nancy Weiss has used for Presidential elections between
1932 and 1940, and for the off-year elections of 1934 and 1938. For the
remaining years and contests, I correlated census tract maps of Harlem,
(isolating those which the census determined to be more than 90% black),
with the election district maps of Harlem located in the New York Public
Library. This procedure helps isolate the variable of the most probable
racial background of the communities in the districts analyzed.

Sources: "Official Canvass of the Votes Cast," City Record, 1928-1950.
Nancy Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age
of FDR_(Princeton: 1983), 308.

                            1945: Mayoral
         Democratic  Republican  Amer. Labor    No Deal
         O'Dwyer)    Goldstein)  (O'Dwyer)      (Morris)

A.D. 11    45.1        20.0        15.5           9.6
A.D. 12    41.8        18.8        16.3          15.3
A.D. 13    45.9        15.4        15.7          15.2
A.D. 14    46.1        14.0        17.2          12.6

                        1946: Gubernatorial
         Democratic  Republican  Amer. Labor    Liberal
         (Mead)      (Dewey)     (Mead)         (Mead)

A.D. 11    36.4        40.4        14.1           4.3
A.D. 12    39.2        41.1        12.0           3.4
A.D. 13    36.9        43.1        14.5           3.2
A.D. 14    39.1        37.7        15.2           4.3

                        1948: Presidential
         Democratic  Republican  Amer. Labor    Liberal
         (Truman)    (Dewey)     (Wallace)      Truman)

A.D. 11    62.0        15.6        11.3           8.0
A.D. 12    61.1        15.1        13.0           7.8
A.D. 13    59.9        17.6        14.6           6.3
A.D. 14    61.3        13.3        14.3           7.4

                        1949: Mayoral
         Democratic  Republican  Amer. Labor    Liberal
         (O'Dwyer)   (Morris)    (Marcantonio)  (Morris)

A.D. 11    36.1        12.0        38.1           6.8
A.D. 12    42.0        14.8        28.5           9.4
A.D. 13    39.6        15.8        32.1           8.3
A.D. 14    42.3        11.2        32.1           9.0
A.D. 16    38.1        13.1        34.4          11.4

                        1950: Gubernatorial
         Democratic  Republican  Amer. Labor    Liberal
         (Lynch)     (Dewey)     (McManus)      (Lynch)

A.D. 11    47.8        28.3         8.2           5.2
A.D. 12    49.6        29.7         6.5           5.2
A.D. 13    46.4        34.4         6.6           5.5
A.D. 14    48.2        25.8        10.2           5.2
A.D. 16    44.5        31.8        10.9           6.3

                                  1950: Mayoral
         Democratic  Republican  Amer. Labor  Liberal   Experience
         (Pecora)    (Corsi)     (Ross)       (Pecora)  (Impellitteri)

A.D. 11    37.5        11.8         6.6           4.6      31.1
A.D. 12    39.5        11.3         4.9           4.6      32.3
A.D. 13    35.8        12.1         5.3           4.5      35.5
A.D. 14    37.2         9.2         7.9           3.9      34.7
A.D. 16    28.6         8.1         8.5           4.8      45.9

FIGURE 2:
Voter Registration Totals and Major Party Enrollments for Harlem
Assembly Districts with the Largest Black Populations, 1945-1950.

(Note: The Total Registration figures represent the entire assembly
district, not just the black voters in each district, but they are the
best available measurement of registration in the most African-American
districts in Harlem.)

                                  1945: Mayoral
      Total         Total Demo. Registration     Total Repub. Registr.
A.D.  Registration  (& % of total registration)  (& % of total registr.)

11    34,244        22,129 (65.6)                 6,171 (18.0)
12    59,375        37,881 (63.8)                10,983 (18.5)
13    43,358        26,272 (60.6)                 8,326 (19.2)
14    26,734        17,505 (65.5)                 3,335 (12.5)

                                  1946: Gubernatorial
      Total         Total Demo. Registration     Total Repub. Registr.
A.D.  Registration  (& % of total registration)  (& % of total registr.)

11    21,583        11,542 (53.5)                 6,167 (28.6)
12    41,161        23,884 (58.0)                11,564 (28.1)
13    32,579        18,446 (56.6)                 8,336 (25.6)
14    18,167         9,090 (50.0)                 3,762 (20.7)

                                  1948: Presidential
      Total         Total Demo. Registration     Total Repub. Registr.
A.D.  Registration  (& % of total registration)  (& % of total registr.)

11    30,029        19,188 (63.9)                 5,505 (18.3)
12    54,491        35,458 (65.1)                10,435 (19.1)
13    41,525        25,772 (62.1)                 8,259 (19.9)
14    24,006        13,082 (54.5)                 3,121 (13.0)

                                  1949: Mayoral
      Total         Total Demo. Registration     Total Repub. Registr.
A.D.  Registration  (& % of total registration)  (& % of total registr.)

11    25,027        14,810 (59.2)                 3,437 (13.7)
12    41,795        28,184 (67.4)                 6,345 (15.2)
13    35,126        21,883 (62.3)                 5,145 (14.6)
14    20,530        10,306 (50.2)                 1,771 (8.6)
16    32,756        17,816 (54.4)                 3,634 (11.1)

                                   1950: Gubernatorial
      Total         Total Demo. Registration     Total Repub. Registr.
A.D.  Registration  (& % of total registration)  (& % of total registr.)

11    22,351        14,535 (65.0)                 3,846 (17.2)
12    42,689        29,253 (68.5)                 7,372 (17.3)
13    32,988        21,589 (65.4)                 5,775 (17.5)
14    20,191        10,728 (53.1)                 2,116 (10.5)
16    32,354        17,525 (54.2)                 4,446 (13.7)

                                  1950: Mayoral
      Total         Total Demo. Registration     Total Repub. Registr.
A.D.  Registration  (& % of total registration)  (& % of total registr.)

11    22,351        14,535 (65.0)                 3,846 (17.2)
12    42,689        29,253 (68.5)                 7,372 (17.3)
13    32,988        21,589 (65.4)                 5,775 (17.5)
14    20,191        10,728 (53.1)                 2,116 (10.5)
16    32,354        17,525 (54.2)                 4,446 (13.7)

Percentages calculated by the author. Registration figures taken from
the Annual Report of the Board of Elections in the City of New York,
prepared under the Direction of the Commissioners of Elections. (The
Annual Report is located in the New York City Municipal Archives).

(2) McKnickle, To Be Mayor of New York, 53-57. For insightful photographs of O'Dwyer, examine McKnickle's photographic insert section as well as te post-election "double-exposure" image in the New York Post, November 9, 1949, p.3.

(3) See Figure 1.

(4) John C. Walter, The Harlem Fox: J. Raymond Jones and Tammany, 1920-1970 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 83-84.

(5) Adam Clayton Powell's economic independence served the same function for him in his long career in community activism.

(6) Walter, p. 3.

(7) Walter, 4.

(8) Walter, 4-7.

(9) Walter, 4,7-8.

(10) Walter, 83.

(11) Walter, 84-85.

(12) See Figure 1.

(13) Walter, 89.

(14) Walter, 89, 94-96.

(15) Walter, 104-105.

(16) William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman," American Heritage, November 1991, pp. 55-68; David McCulloch, Truman, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992) passim.

(17) To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947), p vii-ix, 70.

(18) Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford (Box 23) Confidential Memorandum for the President (Rowe-Clifford Memorandum, November 19, 1947), sect A4 (d), "The Negro." The memorandum's view of Dewey's popularity among blacks in New York seems exaggerated when my own data in Figure 1 is considered. While Dewey won a small plurality in Harlem during his 1942 gubernatorial campaign, he definitely lost out in 1946 to the combined Democratic, American Labor, and Liberal Party vote for his opponent, James Mead. See Figure 1.

(19) Clifford Memorandum, ibid.

(20) McCulloch., 569-570; 587.

(21) Walter, 106.

(22) Walter, 106-107.

(23) Walter, 106-107.

(24) Walter, 106-107. Further details about Truman's Harlem rally are taken from William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman," American Heritage, November 1991, 64-66.

(25) McCulloch, 702.

(26) Walter, 107.

(27) See Figure 1.

(28) Walter, 107-108.

(29) Walter, 108-110; 1949 Mayoral Campaign Literature Collection, Fiorello La Guardia Archives, Fiorello La Guardia Community College, New York, New York.

(30) New York Post, November 2, 1949,pp. 3, 41.

(31) New York Post, November 2, 1949,pp. 3, 41.

(32) New York Post, November 2, 1949,pp. 3, 41.

(33) Martha Biondi, "The Struggle for Black Equality in New York City, 1945-1955" (diss. Columbia University, 1997), pp. 147-149.

(34) New York Post, November 3, 1949, p. 25.

(35) New York Post, November 4, 1949, pp. 1, 2, 7.

(36) New York Post, November 6, 1949, pp. 5, 28.

(37) New York Post, November 7, 1949, p. 3.

(38) See Figure 1.

(39) New York Post, November 9, 1949, pp. 3, 38, 39, 40.

(40) Walter, 114-116.

Durahn Taylor (1)

(1) Durahn Taylor is an Assistant Professor of History at Pace University.