Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement and Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe.

Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement and Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe by Angel Rabasa et al. RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org/publications/index.html), 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 2006. Part 1: 226 pages, $30.00 (softcover), available free at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG429.pdf. Part 2: 214 pages, $25.00 (softcover), available free at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/ BAND MG430.pdf.

Parts 1 and 2 of Beyond al-Qaeda comprise a study led by RAND senior policy analyst Dr. Angel Rabasa and developed under the auspices of Project Air Force, a RAND-US Air Force partnership focused on studies and analysis. The first volume, which deals with the global jihadist movement formally known as al-Qaeda, considers the group's ideology and operational strategies; part 2 examines organizations outside al-Qaeda that pose a threat to the United States.

In part 1, Rabasa delineates the ideological orientation of al-Qaeda, which stems from the work of Egyptian theorist Sayyid Qutb, regarded as the father of Islamism. Rabasa asserts that Qutb's ideas are no more than a juxtaposition of Marxist-Leninist thought merged with Islamic ideals. However, this interpretation is but a shadow of the whole picture. It is from the ideological framework of al-Qaeda that Rabasa devotes a great deal of consideration to the insurgency under Abu Musab al-Zargawi, who, Rabasa notes, died just as the text went to print in 2006.

With respect to the strategy to defeat al-Qaeda both as a group and as a movement, Rabasa proposes a four-pronged assault: attack the ideology, break the links between the global and local jihads, deny sanctuaries, and strengthen the capabilities of frontline states to confront local jihadist threats. Operationally, we have been successful in the last two elements of Rabasa's strategy. However, with respect to the lines between the global and local jihads, our performance has thus far been lacking. To effectively break the deluge of bodies willing to commit to global jihad, we must address the impetus behind the local jihads. The text's sole deficiency is its minimal coverage of the apocalyptic orientation of al-Qaeda found in ancillary literature such as the Day of Wrath by Safar al-Hawali, an ideological influence of bin Laden. If we truly wish to attack the ideology of al-Qaeda and soundly defeat it, as suggested by Dr. Rabasa, we must address its apocalyptic undertones.

In part 2, Rabasa outlines the ideological and operational frameworks of both Hamas and Hezbollah. One point of criticism (albeit trivial) with respect to this volume involves the fact that Rabasa spends considerable time on the militant Islamist movement al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, one of whose members was Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the "blind sheikh," who serves as a spiritual leader of the cell behind the first bombing of the World Trade Center. However, Rabasa does not delineate the nature of the relationships that Rahman mentioned--relation ships critical to understanding the ideological foundation of al-Qaeda. Rahman worked closely with Ramzi Yousef--the nephew of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad-and spent time with Ayman al-Zawahiri during their incarceration after the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. After their release, al-Zawahiri and Rahman went to Pakistan and became involved with Abdullah Azzam, a disciple of Sayyid Qutb, and Azzam's protege, Osama bin Laden. Azzam received credit as a cofounder of Hamas, and the Abdullah Azzam Martyrs' Brigade bears his name.

Rabasa and his team devote considerable analysis to implications for the US Air Force, particularly emphasizing the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and special operations forces. One criticism worthy of further examination concerns the need for appropriate training of allied forces. To successfully fight the global war on terrorism, we must provide war fighters the necessary skills to take on the jihadists in a tactical capacity. Rabasa lucidly addresses the fact that Airmen in combat-support roles with non-US ground forces need to maintain a sense of operational flexibility to accomplish the mission. Analysts trained in the culture and languages of the jihadists will help solidify the strategy to divide the global jihad from the local one.

Overall, both volumes of Beyond al-Qaeda are valuable. Rabasa's lucid and timely analysis has implications for the defense community and nation as a whole. This exceptional scholarly work clearly spells out the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the strategies necessary to defeat it not only as a group but also as an ideological movement.

Maj Ojan Aryanfard, Michigan Wing, Civil Air Patrol St. Clair Shores, Michigan