Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development.

The warning of "global environmental crisis" is being sounded more and more frequently by scientists, politicians, and other observers. The doomsday predictors of the 1960s, like ecologists Paul Ehrlich(1) and Rachel Carson,(2) have been joined by an ever-growing chorus of doomsayers in the 1990s.(3) Rachel Carson's concerns regarding pesticides were prominent in the early 1960s; today, concerns about the potential myriad of ecological effects from global warming predominate. Loss of biodiversity from habitat destruction, pollution, and other threats is also a major present concern.(4)

The proliferation of environmental alarms has, as expected, been accompanied by claims of critics that the alarms are overstated.(5) Besides denying the existence or magnitude of environmental threats, these critics question the priorities of the leading environmental advocates and their focus on government regulation, rather than the market, to address those priorities.(6)

Underlying the debate over whether humans' demands on the Earth have exceeded its ecological carrying capacity is a debate over the propriety of economic growth, the primary goal for rich and poor countries and for most international institutions.(7) The doomsayers generally see humans' unbridled pursuit of economic growth as a major root of all or most environmental evils; their critics generally see growth as providing a solution to environmental problems.(8)

While this debate has continued, there has been increasing consensus behind the concept of "sustainable development," which became a global future through its adoption by the United Nations-sponsored Brundtland Commission in a 1987 report entitled Our Common Future.(9) That report defined sustainable development vaguely as development that "meet[s] the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future."(10) Although that concept has helped raise the prominence of environmental protection on national and global policy agendas, it has not unseated economic growth as the primary public policy objective.(11)

Some economic growth advocates argue that environmental and growth objectives go hand in hand--while growth improves the environment, growth likewise cannot continue without a healthy environment.(12) But growth advocates generally deny that growth and environmental protection are inconsistent objectives.(13)

Since the early 1970s, economist Herman Daly has been at the forefront of those who have questioned the economic growth paradigm of modern society and advocated an alternative, "steady state" economic model.(14) Daly's 1977 and 1989 books, Steady State Economics(15) and For the Common Good,(16) respectively, are leading treatises in the field of "ecological economics." According to an economist with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Daly has been

one of America's most articulate critics of our economic behaviors,

goals, and assumptions, defrocking the goal of economic growth

and bigger-is-better .... In all of his writing, Daly has challenged

our societal faith in economic growth and our denial of fundamental

ecological limits to that growth.(17)

In his latest book, Beyond Growth--The Economics of Sustainable Development,(18) Daly applies his views on the limits to growth to the popular concept of sustainable development. In the book's introduction, Daly observes that the Brundtland Commission's approach of vaguely defining sustainable development was a "good political strategy" for achieving consensus.(19) But Daly believes that vagueness is now a "breeding ground for disagreement" and a potential boon for opportunists.(20) Daly warns that widespread acceptance of the term "sets the stage for a situation where whoever can pin his or her definition to the term will automatically win a large political battle for influence over our future."(21) Daly's mission in Beyond Growth is to properly define sustainable development according to his "steady state" economic model and based on his notion of the ecological limits to economic growth.(22)

This Essay addresses Beyond Growth first from the practical perspective of whether Daly's steady state economic model provides a sufficiently clear framework for determining and implementing specific environmental protection policies. My conclusion is that the model does not provide a readily adaptable framework, nor does it indicate where existing environmental policies have erred. But Daly's model is nevertheless appropriate for redirecting policy discussions toward fundamental objectives that often get buried or ignored under the conventional economic growth paradigm.

Besides considering the practical implications of Daly's steady state model, this Essay also addresses the threshold theoretical debate, which Beyond Growth continues, of whether there are limits to economic growth. However, this Essay does not purport to resolve the limits to growth debate.(23) My objective is simply to identify and unravel the various components of the economic growth debate in order to attempt to understand what issues lie at the core of the debate and the extent to which those issues involve academic disciplines other than economics and the physical sciences. In simple terms, this Essay asks: what are Daly and the economic growth advocates really arguing about? The answer seems to be less about whether there are limits and more about identifying them and ensuring that the relevant limits are not exceeded. Notwithstanding Daly's reference to economics in Beyond Growth's subtitle, the limits to growth debate raises philosophical questions that should be brought to the forefront. My unraveling of the limits to growth debate also suggests that the pro-growth camp's microeconomic positions are inconsistent with their macroeconomic ones.

The last section of this Essay addresses a question which Daly poses in the beginning of Beyond Growth: What kind of moral philosophy is necessary to support a steady state model for sustainable development?(24) To Daly, only religion can provide the necessary ethical underpinning.(25) He castigates those scientists who view human evolution as an accident because he believes that view negates any sense of purpose to protect the environment.(26) This Essay suggests that Daly's criticism is unfounded.

I start by summarizing Daly's steady state model and the policies which Daly proposes for achieving sustainable development.

I. OVERVIEW

Beyond Growth is generally well organized thematically. The Introduction provides an historical overview of the concept of sustainable development as that concept has been viewed by classical economists, the World Bank (where Daly worked for several years in the mid-1980s), modern academics, and the U.S. Government's Council on Sustainable Development. Daly contrasts his views with each of these perspectives and, by so doing, provides a good summary of his book in the introductory chapter. Part I of his book, entitled "Economic Theory and Sustainable Development," is the heart of Beyond Growth because its three chapters explain Daly's primary thesis. In a nutshell, he claims that the growth of the world's economy has reached critical ecological limits. According to Daly, the macroeconomic policies that have promoted this growth are premised on a mistaken threshold view of the macroeconomy as essentially independent of the environment, thus capable of infinite growth.(27) Daly, by contrast, views the economy as a sub-set of, and ultimately constrained by, the environment.(28)

Viewing the economy as limited by the environment, Daly then argues that sustainable development should be defined as an "optimum" aggregate throughput of raw material inputs and waste outputs. Daly defines this "optimum" throughput as "both sufficient for a good life for [a country's] population and within the carrying capacity of the environment if generalized to the entire world."(29)

Daly's "steady state" label for this model is somewhat misleading. What is steady are the aggregate throughput of inputs and outputs, the carrying capacity of the environment, and the good life. But humans' use of that throughput need not be steady. Daly's model allows for development, which he defines as "[q]ualitative improvement in the use made of a given scale of throughput, resulting either from improved technical knowledge or from a deeper understanding of purpose."(30) Daly contrasts his vision of development with growth, which he defines as quantitative "increase in the physical scale of the matter/energy throughput" which sustains the economy.(31) Daly believes that growth, not development, as he defines those terms, is limited by the environment.(32)

Daly provides the thrust of his proposals for implementing his vision of sustainable development in Part II ("Operational Policy and Sustainable Development"),(33) Part III ("National Accounts and Sustainable Development"),(34) Part V ("International Trade and Sustainable Development"),(35) and Part VII ("Ethics, Religion, and Sustainable Development").(36) One of his primary proposals is to abolish growth in the gross national product (GNP) as the predominant measure of social progress.(37) In an oversimplified form, Daly's argument is that GNP is a function of the supply of natural resources and the human labor and technology for converting that raw natural capital into final products. Although GNP is commonly touted as a measure of a country's wealth,(38) the term does not count various social and environmental costs or, worse yet, it counts many of those costs as positive additions.(39) For example, GNP does not subtract from the value of producing automobiles the environmental costs of pollution resulting from their manufacture or use.(40) In fact, any public expenses incurred in reducing that pollution or in ameliorating the environmental or health costs of the pollution are counted as net additions to GNP.(41)

In For the Common Good, Daly and Cobb proposed a substitute national wealth accounting measure that would correct for the distortions of GNP.(42) As calculated under that and other similar measures, wealth in the U.S. has declined steadily since roughly 1970, while GNP has risen steadily during the same period.(43) In Beyond Growth, Daly reiterates the need for developing an alternative to GNP for measuring national wealth, although he recognizes the inherent difficulties in doing so.(44) But Daly insists that GNP growth should be scrapped as a benchmark for progress, whether or not there is a satisfactory alternative accounting measure to replace it.(45)

Daly urges that rather than blindly promoting GNP growth, government policies should discourage or encourage growth in population or per capita resource use according to their favorable or unfavorable effects on sustainability, sufficiency, equity, and efficiency.(46) Put another way, Daly urges policies that would "maximize the productivity" (i.e., efficiency) of natural resources in the short run, and "invest in increasing [their] supply" in the long run.(47)

Daly lists as chief among these policies shifting the tax base from income to throughput in order to internalize environmental production and consumption costs "so that the polluter and the depleter pay."(48) Daly recognizes that this approach is inherently regressive; however, he suggests that this negative effect could be remedied by imposing a stiff income tax on "very high" incomes and a negative tax on "very low" incomes.(49) In the last part of Beyond Growth, Daly further addresses equitable distribution of resources by proposing a limit on the income disparity between the rich and poor.(50) He suggests a factor of ten range based upon historical precedents, but notes that the precise limit is arbitrary.(51)

Daly also urges a policy of prudence in regulating industries whose ecological effects are uncertain,(52) and requiring an assurance bond in the amount of possible damage to further account for that uncertainty.(53) He also strongly urges tradable pollution permit schemes within the framework of total pollution limits.(54) Daly suggests as a general rule for nonrenewable resources, that they be depleted "at a rate equal to the rate of development of renewable substitutes."(55) Toward that end, Daly proposes using "all or part" of the revenue generated by nonrenewable resources to fund investments in renewables.(56)

Finally, Daly takes on free trade, urging "compensatory" tariffs that correct for differences among the extents to which countries internalize costs, thus making global markets more efficient in a conventional economic sense.(57) Daly notes that growth-induced free trade encourages rich countries to live beyond their means (i.e., unsustainably), by consuming the natural, non-renewable capital of other countries who are forced to sell off that capital in order to finance their own growth.(58)

II. A CLOSE LOOK AT DALY'S STEADY STATE ECONOMIC MODEL

The overview above shows that there are essentially three components to Daly's steady state model: the good life, an optimum aggregate throughput, and ecological sustainability. A close look at each of these components reveals that they are difficult to define individually and with respect to each other, thus providing weak targets for designing government policies. This section analyzes each of these components in detail.

A. The "Good Life"

What is the "good life?" Daly does not define the term, except to suggest that it is a level of affluence symbolized by that which would enable "one to have a glass of wine and a piece of meat with one's dinner."(59) This symbolic level of affluence begs numerous questions. For example, what level of educational, recreational, health, and other kinds of public services accompany the symbolic "wine and meat" level of affluence? What is the population density that accompanies this level of affluence? These questions may seem like details, but answering them is critical in planning an ecologically sustainable economy. For example, whether a region plans for schools with fifteen or thirty children per class may make a big difference in the amount of public revenue needed and, in turn, the natural resource demands of its revenue sources.(60)

Daly recognizes that there will surely be disagreement over the precise content of the good life, but he attempts to minimize the significance of this disagreement by stating that there can hardly be disagreement over its outer boundaries; "clearly, at one extreme life can be stunted by poverty, and just as clearly, at the other extreme life is not improved and is even harmed by surfeit and excess."(61) Daly's view that the lower boundaries of the good life can be readily defined rests on solid ground--poverty levels are often defined for purposes of various governmental programs. Admittedly, there is often disagreement as to the precise level at which poverty begins, but the range of poverty levels that have been used over the years is itself small relative to the range between rich and poor.(62)

The existence of a social consensus on an upper bound of the good life is more questionable. Surely the same entrenched western tradition which glorifies macroeconomic growth also honors unbounded individual economic growth. We revere people who rise from rags to riches more than those who simply attain the good life. Our heroes are highly paid entertainers and entrepreneurs whose surfeit and excess is the hallmark of their popularity.

While surfeit and excess are predominant characteristics of western culture, more and more people have been questioning this tradition, in part due to the writings of people like Daly. But even if there is an upperbound of wealth on which everyone could agree, it would likely be so high as to provide little help for designing policies to promote the good life component of Daly's steady state model. The question is not whether owning fifty Rolls Royces is counter-productive, but whether we need two cars or even one car per family to have a good life, because it is not at all clear that even a two car family is a symbolic level of affluence that can be generalized to the whole world at ecologically sustainable levels.

There is significant disagreement over the costs and benefits of surfeit and excess not only at the personal level, but also at the social level. There is no consensus as to whether excessive wealth is morally appropriate when viewed in relation to the middle or the opposite end of the wealth spectrum. There is also considerable dispute as to whether excessive wealth has net positive or negative economic, social, and environmental benefits to society as a whole. In short, it is uncertain whether there is even a consensus as to an upper bound for a good life, let alone as to the precise level of the good life. According to some observers, contrasting concepts of the good life lie at the very heart of environmental conflicts.(63) All would agree, however, that some level of environmental quality is a necessary component of the good life. This raises the question of how the good life component of Daly's steady state model relates to the ecological carrying capacity component of his model. Specifically, need there even be a good life component as long as some minimum standard of ecological health is being maintained? But can the latter be defined without regard to an accompanying human standard of living?(64)

Besides the problem of defining the good life, Daly's use of the concept in an economic model has been criticized indirectly because it invokes disciplines outside Daly's expertise in economics.(65) In a 1995 article, philosopher Mark Sagoff noted that if ecological economists like Daly reject traditional economic indicators of quality of life, "they strike their tents as economists and set out on the high seas of moral philosophy."(66) This criticism mistakenly presumes that the traditional economic quality of life indicators themselves lack philosophical underpinnings.(67)

In Beyond Growth, Daly acknowledges another criticism: that pinning sustainable development on some notion of the good life reflects an imposition of his personal tastes on those of others.(68) Daly rightly responds to this criticism that the public policy of promoting GNP growth above all other social objectives itself reflects an imposition of personal tastes on those of others; that policy does not simply reflect an aggregation of personal tastes.(69)

Another response to this criticism is that Daly's model does not preclude personal tastes about the good life because the model provides for qualitative growth (what Daly terms development), just not physical growth.(70) The former presumably provides people with a more than adequate framework for pursuing personal lifestyle preferences. Daly wants people to have the level of wealth symbolized by the consumption of wine and meat with every meal, but he does not demand that people actually consume those products.(71)

Despite the problems of defining the good life, Daly's focus on that concept is important because it reminds us of the need to reflect more deeply on our ultimate objectives and whether pursuing GNP growth will satisfy them. As Daly says, "[t]he mere existence of any numerical index of welfare [like GNP] is a standing invitation to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness--to serving the inevitably distorted reflection of reality represented in the index instead of directly serving the reality itself."(72) Daly's steady state model helps to remove the cloud that economic growth has placed on policy debates about what concept of social welfare governments should be trying to promote.(73)

B. Aggregate Throughputs

As discussed in Part I above, another component of Daly's steady state model is an optimum aggregate resource throughput.(74) Daly admits that defining the optimum level "is the big question for environmental macroeconomics."(75) But Daly insists that, like the concept of the good life, the optimum throughput need not be defined precisely; it simply requires what Daly considers a typical exercise for economists which is "dialectically reasoning with vague quantities in the support of prudent actions."(76)

Daly's description of the process for choosing an optimum aggregate throughput gives one little confidence that the optimum target is achievable or even definable. How is an aggregate even measured when resource inputs vary by their nature (e.g., BTUs of energy, grams of materials, gallons per minute of water) as do outputs (e.g., heat, water and air pollution, physical space occupied)? Are separate limits set for each category of inputs and outputs or is there a single measure of the aggregate throughput?

Even if aggregate throughput could be measured, is it a useful basis for a model of sustainable development? As Sagoff points out, small discharges of toxic wastes can be far more destructive than large discharges of benign wastes.(77) Hence, quantitative measures of total throughput bear "no clear relation to environmental quality."(78) Sagoff notes that once ecological economists like Daly make distinctions among qualities of throughput, "they would find themselves embarking on a path at the end of which mainstream economists... are waiting for them."(79) That path involves "address[ing] well-defined problems... rather than the size or scale of throughput as a whole" and "adopt[ing] a case-by-case approach that looks for regulatory solutions to specific market and policy failures."(80) In fact, Daly's policies for implementing his steady state model, as summarized in Part I above, resemble this mainstream focus. His policies address particular kinds of harmful inputs (e.g., tax non-renewable fuels) and outputs (e.g., total pollution loads).

As with the good life component of Daly's steady state model, the throughput component raises the chicken-and-egg question relative to the other components. Given the problems of defining an optimum aggregate throughput, is this component really a target to strive for directly, or is it simply the result of policies designed to ensure that the economy remains within the Earth's carrying capacity and provides for the good life? Unlike the concept of the good life, however, which at least serves to focus our attention on fundamental objectives, it is unclear what value the aggregate throughput component of Daly's model serves. To avoid confusion, perhaps Daly would be better to leave out all reference to aggregate throughput in his model.

C. Carrying Capacity

The third component of Daly's steady state model is the carrying capacity of the environment.(81) Daly refers to this component in abstract terms and does not address whether we are yet capable of defining this concept in precise, scientific terms.(82) Daly does offer the "precautionary principle" as a policy to accommodate lack of knowledge about environmental cause and effect.(83) Daly's policy dovetails with the burgeoning ecosystem approach to environmental protection which is itself a precautionary principle.(84) As Aldo Leopold, an early advocate for protecting whole ecosystems (what he called the "land"--an aggregate of "soils, waters, plants, and animals"),(85) said over fifty years ago:

[A land] ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meeting ecological

situations so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions, that

the path of social expediency is not discernible to the average individual.

Animal instincts are modes of guidance for the individual in meeting such

situations. Ethics are possibly a kind of community instinct

in-the-making.(86)

Daly's other policies for achieving an ecological carrying capacity deserve deeper consideration than he accords them. There is a big debate over the propriety of ecological taxes, a debate which Beyond Growth ignores. Daly's recommended policy of establishing and allocating total pollution loads makes no mention of the track record to date on that policy. For example, the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (CWA)(87) has for twenty-five years required states to establish total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of water pollution, and to allocate those loads among all polluters on given stream segments or watersheds.(88) The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to enforce this requirement for years until numerous citizen suits forced the agency to take notice.(89)

Besides being resisted, the TMDLs process is problematic. Some people question whether scientists can model watersheds sufficiently to provide meaningful load calculations on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis (even with a margin of safety to account for uncertainties, as required expressly by the CWA).(90) Of course, the pollutant-by-pollutant approach ignores the even more complex cumulative or synergistic effects of multiple pollutants. There is also a question about whether numeric loads have any value for non-point source pollution like urban and agricultural runoff which is hard to both quantify and control to precise levels.(91)

Perhaps most significantly, the TMDLs process only addresses water pollution. Yet, ideally, ecological loads should be set on a more holistic basis involving not just water pollution, but also air pollution, habitat destruction, and water quantity losses. This holistic approach is reflected in part in the ecosystem or watershed protection programs which are flourishing at all government levels and, in many cases, being initiated at the grass-roots level.(92) The question remains whether this kind of holistic approach to setting ecosystem limits is feasible. Modeling the physical/biological linkages is problematic and coordinating the diverse stakeholders can be an organizational nightmare.(93)

The U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA) provides another example of total loading approaches in the sense that it requires EPA to set national ambient air quality standards which are akin to total air pollution loads (for single pollutants). The CAA then requires states to develop plans for achieving those standards by certain statutory deadlines.(94) Viewed generously, the CAA program has had mixed success. Attainment deadlines for pollutants like carbon monoxide and ozone have been missed repeatedly and EPA has been loathe to enforce the CAA against states and municipalities.(95) Allocating portions of the total air pollution load is problematic. Reducing the contribution of cars to these pollutant loadings is as hard as controlling water pollution from runoff.(96) It is not just a matter of establishing numeric pollution limits; transportation and land use policies need to be reinvented. Lifestyles need to be changed. If the CAA's attainment program is the best model for ensuring that the economy remains within the Earth's carrying capacity, that goal may be unreachable! Of course, the CAA's model and TMDLs under the CWA might be more successful if they did not have to compete against government policies that place economic growth above all other objectives.

In sum, Daly's steady state model is long on vision but short on definition. As EPA economist Stallworth commented, Daly's "blueprint for the sustainable or steady-state economy falls short of the specificity required for policy relevance .... But Daly leaves us with precious little in the way of operational specifics .... I want to ask him: after we bum our economics textbooks, then what?"(97) The above analysis confirms Stallworth's criticism, especially with regard to the chicken-and-egg problem of how the three components of Daly's steady state model relate to each other. I personally believe that the carrying capacity component provides the framework for promoting the good life and that the ecosystem approach (including total pollution loading) is necessary for implementing both components. But I recognize that the practicality of this approach is far from proven.

Admittedly, criticizing Daly's steady state model for lack of specificity or policy direction is unfair in one respect. In Daly's view, "[t]he technical and economic problems involved in achieving sustainability are not that difficult. The hard problem is overcoming our addiction to growth as the favored way to assert our creative power ...."(98) Daly may be wrong in thinking that the technical and economic problems are not difficult, but he is surely right about the problems of overcoming our addiction to economic growth. Daly helps to shatter the economic growth mania which has completely overshadowed and frustrated environmental policies. Like the boy claiming that the Emperor has no clothes, Daly raises valid questions as to whether GNP growth has any valid policy and moral foundations as the primary measure of progress.(99)

III. UNRAVELING THE LIMITS TO GROWTH DEBATE

Whether or not we can or should shed our addiction to economic growth depends not just on whether that growth is an accurate measure of our welfare, but on whether there are environmental limits to growth. The debate over growth limits seems, at first blush, to turn on the seemingly simple question of whether the macroeconomy is constrained by the environment. But this question breaks down into several complex sub-issues, involving different kinds of limits and different concepts of growth. The following is an attempt to identify these sub-issues in order to determine where the crux of the limits to growth debate really lies.

A. Distinguishing Among Types of Limits and Concepts of Growth

In order to understand the limits to growth debate, it is important to distinguish among different types of limits. Using an oversimplified analysis, the physical components that may limit growth can be grouped roughly into two categories: inputs and outputs. There are two broad categories of inputs, one of which is the natural resources that are converted by humans for the production of goods and services. In turn, these production inputs can be broken down into two categories: fuel (e.g., oil, water for hydropower, sunlight, wind) and materials (e.g., trees for home building, metal for cars). The second broad sub-category of inputs consists of resources that are consumed directly by humans in their unprocessed or raw state (e.g., air for breathing, wetlands for flood protection, habitats for wildlife, vegetation for soil retention, open space for recreation, aesthetic enjoyment). Both of the two broad categories of inputs can be broken down into non-renewable (e.g., coal, oil, metals) and renewable (e.g., fisheries, wind, solar radiation) resources. Production inputs can also be cultivated (e.g., terrestrial crops, domestic livestock, farmed fish) and non-cultivated.

Outputs are essentially the waste products resulting from human use of physical inputs. Chief among these are air and water pollution, noise and light pollution, and human artifacts (e.g., buildings, roads, landfills) that simply take up natural space--including habitats--which produce resource inputs.

Inputs and outputs are related to the Earth's carrying capacity, which can be thought of as the Earth's ability to provide inputs for a given level of human use and, from a non-anthropocentric perspective, nonhuman use. The Earth's carrying capacity is affected in a complex way by the amount and/or kinds of inputs consumed and by the volume and/or nature of the outputs which that consumption generates.(100) Carrying capacity is often referred to as the Earth's ability to assimilate waste outputs. But the significance of that assimilative capacity is its relation to the Earth's ability to provide inputs. In other words, we care about how much pollution a watershed can assimilate in terms of its ability to continue to provide inputs to support human and nonhuman uses. Thus, for purposes of this Essay, carrying capacity will be discussed only in reference to the supply of inputs.

Viewed from the perspective summarized above, the limits to growth debate deals with the limits of the Earth's carrying capacity--its ability to provide different kinds of inputs. That ability is affected directly by the demands for those inputs, and indirectly by levels of outputs. In considering limits to growth, therefore, one must be careful to distinguish between different kinds of inputs and outputs, and the negative and positive relations among the two categories of physical components. For example, whether there are enough fossil fuels (production inputs) to generate further economic growth is a distinct question from whether the pollution (outputs) from growing consumption of those fuels will overwhelm the ability of the ecosystem to provide clean air and other atmospheric services (raw inputs) needed for our survival.(101)

Another distinction critical to an evaluation of the "limits to growth" debate is that between absolute and marginal limits. Absolute limits involve sheer quantities of resources without regard to the net costs and benefits of consuming those resources. For example, whether there is enough fossil fuel to support a certain level of consumption is a question involving the absolute limits of fossil fuels. Marginal limits, on the other hand, involve a weighing of costs and benefits. For example, even assuming there was an infinite supply of fossil fuels, the question remains whether there is a point at which the overall costs of consuming a given level of fossil fuels outweighs the benefits of flint consumption. From a more realistic perspective, if fossil fuels will ultimately give way to renewable energy sources like solar power, the question remains whether there is a point at which the marginal costs of consuming additional fossil fuels during that transition period outweigh the benefits of that consumption compared to the costs and benefits of more rapid conversion to a solar-dependent economy. Such a point, if it exists, could be considered a marginal limit to growth in fossil fuel consumption.

The marginal costs of most concern in the above examples are those arising from reductions in levels of raw natural resource inputs, like the marginal costs of reduced supplies of fresh air due to pollution from increased consumption of fossil fuels. In other words, the marginal benefits of consuming additional production inputs may exceed the marginal costs of the loss of raw resource inputs resulting from that additional consumption.

The concept of growth in the limits to growth debate also has multiple components that must be distinguished. Economic growth is typically measured by growth in a numerical index, like GNP, of the annual value of goods and services.(102) As Daly reminds us, GNP growth can be driven by increases in any or a combination of three components: consumption of natural resources (the inputs described above), the supply of human labor, and the ability of technology to convert a given level of natural and human capital into final goods and services.(103) Thus, in debating limits to GNP growth it is important to consider each of the three components of that concept.

While Daly's analysis of the components of GNP growth facilitates consideration of the overall limits to growth debate, his use of the term growth itself confuses that debate. As noted in Part I above, Daly defines growth in his steady state model not as growth in GNP per se, but as GNP growth driven by a quantitative increase in the physical scale of the matter/energy throughput which sustains the economy.(104) The question, then, is not whether there are limits to GNP growth per se, but whether there are limits to GNP growth driven by a quantitative increase in the scale of matter/energy used by the economy.

In sum, in order to evaluate the different sides in the limits to growth debate, it is necessary to clarify which components of the concepts of limits and growth are really at issue. The next section attempts to cut to the heart of the limits to growth debate based on this exercise of breaking down these concepts.

B. Resource Inputs and Limits to Growth

Daly's argument for limits to growth focuses on the first of the three components of GNP growth which he identifies--resource inputs. In other words, he is concerned with growth in the second and third components--labor supply and technological capacity--only to the extent that such growth results in increasing demands for resource inputs which run up against limits to that category of inputs. Thus, for example, Daly would not seem to mind if technology could create more and more goods with a fixed supply of inputs (i.e., within Daly's "optimum aggregate throughput") and within the Earth's carrying capacity. Daly likewise does not focus on increases in the supply of human labor if those increases could be sustained by a fixed resource input. We may doubt, as a practical matter, that the pool of human labor can increase without accompanying increases in resource inputs and/or technological improvements. But the important point here is that underlying a concern about environmental limits to GNP growth driven by labor increases is a concern about limits resulting from labor increases which are fueled, in turn, by growth in demands for resource inputs.(105)

In Beyond Growth, Daly is also careful not to rely on arguments regarding absolute limits alone; he repeatedly emphasizes marginal limits as well.(106) This emphasis is understandable, because Daly's case regarding absolute limits seems weak. Daly observes that the Earth ultimately contains a fixed supply of energy, regardless of how technologically creative humans are in consuming certain fuels or substituting new fuels for scarce ones.(107) This argument seems intuitively correct: even if all organic and inorganic materials on and beneath the Earth's surface could be consumed as fuel, the total supply of those materials is fixed because the Earth itself cannot be made larger. Similarly, renewable and cultivated production resources may be capable of being regenerated ad infinitum, but the quantity of those resources is ultimately fixed by the daily supply of energy from the sun and the terrestrial space and resources needed to convert solar energy.(108) In short, there are absolute limits to GNP growth driven solely by increases in the consumption of all fuel and raw materials.

The problem with these theoretical limits is one of timing. Given our technological success in tapping new energy sources thus far, it is hard to fear a shortage of energy in any humanly conceivable future time horizon. We may not yet be seriously promoting the development of solar and wind energy sources, but those sources can ultimately be tapped and are capable of generating levels of energy beyond that to which our fossil fuel dependent society is accustomed.(109)

Daly's case for absolute limits to production inputs may be stronger with respect to the natural inputs that support increases in agricultural production than with respect to limits on fuels. Surely limits on the capacity of new soil to form, on aquifer recharge rates, and on the available arable land all place limits on agricultural growth driven by increases in soil or water usage or in the amount of land used for agriculture. Optimists do not deny those limits, but claim that technological improvements like genetic engineering can spur continued expansion of agricultural output based on a fixed set of resource inputs.(110) Others argue that this claim has been accurate only until roughly the mid-1980s.(111)

The case for absolute limits on the Earth's capacity to provide raw resource inputs is stronger than that for limits on production resource inputs, especially if waste outputs continue to increase. Intuitively, it would seem that the Earth cannot absorb or assimilate an infinite amount of pollution or other by-products of human civilization while continuing to provide a baseline or sustainable level of raw resource inputs.(112) The substitution solution for production resource inputs (e.g., solar energy for depleted fossil fuels) seems less likely for raw resource inputs. It is far easier to have faith that technology will provide another fuel source when we exhaust our supply of fossil fuels than to believe that technology will develop substitutes for fresh air, clean water, and habitat if we exhaust the supply of those raw inputs (either directly, or more likely, indirectly by destroying those inputs with our waste outputs).

Daly's argument about the ecological limits to growth is the strongest, however, when limits are viewed in marginal rather than absolute terms. Borrowing from microeconomic theory, Daly argues that there is a point at which any benefits from GNP growth fueled by increased use of natural resource inputs will be exceeded by the costs resulting from the loss of raw resource inputs.(113) In plain terms, we may be able to triple our consumption of fossil fuels, but the local, regional, and global atmospheric environmental consequences may well not be worth it.

Daly suggests that GNP growth proponents ignore growth's marginal costs by claiming that the theory of marginal limits applies only where the growth of an economic unit is constrained by limits on some resource input.(114) According to Daly, while economists accept this circumstance at the microeconomic level, they generally reject it at the macroeconomic level because of their threshold view that, the environment does not constrain the macroeconomy.(115) Daly tries to refute this view with objective reasoning based on physical limits and the physical laws of thermodynamics.(116) In other words, Daly's premise for his claim regarding marginal limits is the existence of absolute limits. As discussed above, however, this is a hard sell as a practical matter, at least with respect to production inputs like fuel.

With respect to marginal limits to raw resource inputs, however, the pro-growth response does not seem to deny the existence of marginal limits. Rather, the response is that growth can remain within those limits.(117) According to this view, as limits on the raw resource component of carrying capacity are reached, the market prices for goods that deplete that component will rise and thus drive technological change for substitutes.(118) Daly questions whether the market can provide this function,(119) but he does not seem to oppose economic growth driven solely by technological improvements if that phenomenon could occur. As discussed above, technology-driven growth fits within Daly's concept of "development," which his steady state model makes room for.

From this analysis of the various components of the limits to growth debate, the crux of the debate seems to be whether and how the market can respond to ensure that the marginal costs of reduced resource inputs do not exceed marginal benefits. This issue itself has two sub-issues. One is how society values raw resource inputs like clean air, water, and open space.(120) The higher those inputs are valued, the sooner the point at which marginal costs will exceed the marginal benefits of growth.(121) Although the concept of value is a common one in economics, it is an inherently philosophical (including religious/spiritual) notion. Whether one values an additional shopping mall more than the wild grassland or forest on which it must be built simply cannot be answered by economists, although they can help solve the market's failure to reflect those values. Thus, beneath the complex economic and scientific issues in the limits to growth debate is a fundamental philosophical issue of the value of raw natural resources.(122)

The second sub-issue that seems to lie at the heart of the limits to growth debate involves the choice of the appropriate mechanism for ensuring that the carrying capacity is respected. This choice raises economic questions involving the ability of markets to reflect environmental costs and scientific issues involving the environmental effects of various economic activities. This choice also raises philosophical questions involving the extent of precaution necessary in light of the inability of economists and scientists to accurately predict cause and effect.

At one end of the spectrum of choices are those which focus on correcting the market's failure to reflect all environmental costs. At the other end of the spectrum are those choices involving how to directly set limits on the environmental impacts of economic activity. Daly's policies embrace both of these approaches. For example, fossil fuel taxes raise the price of those fuels and thus encourage conversion to solar energy.(123) Total pollution limits directly limit the impacts of the economy while also indirectly helping to ensure that the market for polluting activities reflects their environmental costs.(124)

Which set of policies is ultimately the best is a complex question that Daly does not attempt to answer. The important point for Daly is that growth advocates cannot claim that GNP growth can be driven by technological change without exceeding the Earth's carrying capacity, but then argue that environmental services must be sacrificed for GNP growth. As Daly says,

[i]f one is a technological optimist and believes that resources are

unimportant for the economic process, then one should not object to a policy

of limiting the resource throughput .... Such a policy would induce exactly

the technological advances that use resources more efficiently--the very

technology in which the optimists have so much faith.(125)

In other words, if changes in technology can foster economic growth without exceeding the Earth's carrying capacity, then the values of growth and carrying capacity should not be pitted against each other as they often are in the microeconomic context of disputes regarding specific projects. This point seems to have been buried in the confusing debate about limits to growth.

In sum, when the limits to growth debate is broken down into its component parts, it appears that the debate is less about whether there are limits than about where those limits are and how to remain within them. These issues raise not just complex scientific and economic questions, but philosophical ones as well. The "steady state" and "growth" labels for the alternative models proposed by the opposite poles in the limits to growth debate are misnomers because both models involve aspects that are steady (or fixed) and those that are not.

What are the practical implications from this analysis besides the need to change or clarify the terms of the debate? My analysis suggests that the environment/economy tradeoff that is commonly used to justify additional threats to ecological health(126) is a red herring, at least at the macroeconomic level, because growth advocates assure that growth can ultimately be driven solely by technological development.(127) Rather than debate which is more important without reference to environmental limits, we need to reach a consensus on where the environmental limits are in order to provide a framework for evaluating specific environmental policies and decisions about specific projects. The burgeoning ecosystem approach would seem to facilitate that consensus.

IV. FOR THE LOVE OF ACCIDENTS: EVOLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 

While Daly's case for the limits to growth is based on economics and science, he does not ignore the importance of philosophy when he asks, "What is required for us to break out of our default position of denial" about the limits to growth?(128) Daly warns that "[e]nvironmentalists and advocates of sustainable development really must face up to deep philosophical and religious questions about why their efforts ultimately make sense."(129) In Beyond Growth, Daly raises one of these deep questions indirectly by reflecting on the recent efforts of prominent scientists Carl Sagan, E.O. Wilson, and Stephan Jay Gould to make alliances with the religious community in order to protect the environment.(130) Daly accuses these scientists of being hypocrites because he believes that their scientific work negates the very sense of environmental purpose which they seek to evoke from the religious community,(131) Daly describes these scientists' view of

the cosmos [as] an absurd accident, and life within it to be no more than

another accident ultimately reducible to dead matter in motion. In their

view there is no such thing as value in any objective sense, or purpose,

beyond short-term survival and reproduction, which are purely instinctual 

and thus ultimately mechanical.(132)

According to Daly, "the obligation to care for the created world would not exist if randomness explains everything and purpose is declared a mere hallucination--if intentionality is not causative then we need not be concerned with ethics."(133)

Daly's own view is that we have "obligations to our Creator to care for Creation."(134) Daly is unclear, however, about whether these obligations can be found in "traditional theology." At one point, he implies that traditional theology does not offer a "solid base" for "loving nature enough to fight to save it."(135) In the next breath, he observes that "[a]ll traditional religions are enemies of the same modern idolatry--that accidental man ... is the true creator, and that the natural world is just a pile of instrumental, accidental stuff to be used up in the arbitrary projects of one purposeless species."(136)

Daly implies that the scientific materialists are partly responsible for this "idolatry,"(137) but it is unclear why. Unfortunately, Daly does not cite the three scientists directly, nor even list any of their writings in his bibliography. The view that humans are an evolutionary accident is fairly attributable to at least one of these three scientists. According to Gould, "[f]ortuity pervades the origin of any particular species or lineage. Homo Sapiens is a contingent twig, not a predictable result of ineluctably rising complexity during evolution."(138) The discussion below suggests that Daly is incorrect in concluding that this view inevitably contradicts any sense of purpose to protect the environment.

To begin with, the view that humans, like other species, are an evolutionary "accident" would seem to negate, rather than support, the "idolatry" that humans are the "true creator," thus endowed with the moral right to abuse the Earth. After all, the traditional religious notion that humans are somehow special among all living creatures in God's eyes has been used to justify ecologically destructive human actions.(139) As Gould himself states in support of the "post-modern" social critique of traditional dualisms and hierarchies, "[d]ualisms based on dominance may represent, most of all, the imposition of a preferred human order upon nature ...."(140) Again, Gould explains that "[o]ne reason why people are comfortable with the notion of not worrying too much about the environment is the view that we are the highest form of life and that we dominate nature by right ...."(141)

E.O. Wilson shares Daly's view of the importance of religion when Wilson states that a "creation myth ... seems to be an essential part of the human spirit ...."(142) But Wilson shares Gould's view that humans are not the focus of the story of creation. According to Wilson, "the narrative [of the creation myth] will find its starting point in the origin of the diversity of life."(143)

Daly and others rightly argue that the dominance idolatry need not logically follow from the religious notion that humans are special in God's eyes, if God views humans as stewards of the Earth;(144) but Daly is wrong to attribute that idolatry to the notion that humans are evolutionary accidents.

The question remains whether an evolutionary accident can have any sense of intrinsic value. Daly thinks not, based primarily on his doubt that humans could "love" or "fight to save" an accident, especially if humans themselves are accidents.(145) Daly's doubt that one can love an accident is not intuitively correct. Parents can deeply love a child even if the child's conception was an accident. Two adults can likewise love each other even if they met by accident. A child can likewise accidentally discover a stray animal and cherish that animal as a pet. In short, the world is full of accidents from which spring fountains of love. Of course, Daly might respond that the love flows because of some ingrained religious purpose; that is, in spite of the accidental origin of the loving relationship. But he has no greater empirical or analytical lock on this conclusion than does the view that reverence and love can arise among creatures that have evolved accidentally.

Accidents of evolution can not only love other accidents, they can love themselves. As noted above, Daly himself admits that the notion of accidental evolution supports at least the purposes of "short term survival and reproduction."(146) But why only short term survival? The concept of reproduction itself implies a purpose of long term species survival; if one did not care whether one's offspring survived, there would be little point in having offspring other than short term gratification. But surely our genetic urge to reproduce is driven not simply by a desire to enjoy one's offspring in the short term.(147) Thus, Daly cannot admit that accidental evolution can give rise to a purpose to reproduce, without also conceding that accidental evolution supports a purpose of long term survival.(148)

Survival itself can provide a powerful motive for protecting the environment if one recognizes, as many have argued, that survival is dependent on our adoption of an ecologically sustainable economy or, in other words, on our having greater respect for the laws of nature.(149) These laws include the laws of thermodynamics, to which Daly refers repeatedly as the basis for his conclusion that there are limits to growth,(150) and laws of ecology. The latter recognize the interconnectedness of physical systems including the adverse feedback mechanisms from encroachment of one species upon another.(151) Thus, even if one does not believe that nonhuman species have intrinsic value, ecological principles teach us that the preservation of those species is necessary for our own survival.(152) If human survival is dependent on ecological sustainability, Daly can hardly question that human survival can provide a useful ethical basis for achieving ecological sustainability, even if humans evolved accidentally.(153)

Gould's view of "accidental" evolution may promote an environmental ethic by fostering not only an ecologically enlightened purpose of long term survival, but also humility. If humans considered themselves as passengers on the same evolutionary boat as other species, rather than as specially chosen to manage all others, they might have more respect for nonhuman species and thus be less likely to destroy them. Viewing evolution as an accident suggests that humans and nonhumans are created equally; under this view, it is easier to conclude that nonhumans have intrinsic value if humans have such value. This is consistent with Daly's own view of the intrinsic value of nonhuman sentient beings.(154) It is also consistent with what Daly terms the "evolutionary understanding of kinship of human beings with other forms of life."(155) If Daly recognizes this kinship, he cannot logically deny E.O. Wilson's position that kinship (what Wilson calls "biophilia") provides the basis for an environmental ethic, even if its source is biological (i.e., genetic) rather religious.(156)

Of course, Daly might respond that no species which evolves accidentally can have intrinsic value. But this response implies that the only basis for morality is religion. That notion does not share wide support among many philosophers who derive moral value from the characteristics of an object (e.g., sentience, feeling), without regard to how those characteristics were created.(157)

Viewing our existence as an evolutionary "accident" also instills a sense of the precariousness of our existence and of the mysteries and wonders of creation.(158) Rather than promoting recklessness, these perspectives would seem to promote the kind of caring and caution that Daly urges. But whether one's precariousness, mystery, and wonder are greater under a view of evolution as an accident than under a religious view of creation (to the extent those two theories are necessarily inconsistent) is debatable. The important point, however, is that neither view of creation can claim a monopoly on those ecologically useful perspectives.

Because of our increasingly pluralistic society, it is difficult enough to achieve a consensus on the goal of sustainable development, let alone on the rationale for adopting that goal. Daly seems to recognize this difficulty in the last part of this book where he says that

if those who reject traditional religion--for example, scientific

materialists--can find within their purposeless, deterministic universe some

good reason for caring about the capacity of the Earth to support life,

then I am very happy to make alliance with them in the urgent task of

conserving it, and will temporarily put aside my belief that they are

in fact sawing off the branch on which they are sitting.(159)

Daly might not be such a reluctant ally with Sagan, Wilson, and Gould if he followed his own advice. Citing the "process philosophy" of Alfred North Whitehead,(160) Daly criticizes the scientific conclusion that evolution was accidental by arguing that our "starting point" should be "[w]hat we know most concretely and directly, unmediated by the senses or by abstract concepts ...."(161) According to Daly, that point is "our inner experience of purpose."(162)

But Daly has not taken his own advice to heart. He recognizes that scientists like Sagan, Wilson, and Gould are "usually trying harder to save the environment" than religious people.(163) Therefore, he should take those scientists' "inner experience of purpose" to save the environment as a starting point for rationalizing their research, rather than starting with what he considers the lack of purpose inherent in their scientific work. In other words, the scientists' environmental commitment clearly affirms their sense of purpose, so Daly must rethink whether their scientific conclusions really negate this sense. The scientists' reliance on religion to spur an environmental consciousness may simply reflect their practical opinion that religious morality has more mass appeal; this position does not necessarily mean that the scientists themselves lack a coherent sense of purpose (or even, perhaps, that they are not religious).

V. CONCLUSION

Herman Daly cautions that "[s]ustainable development will require a change of heart, a renewal of the mind, and a healthy dose of repentance."(164) Beyond Growth is yet another of Daly's attempts to spur that evolution. At a minimum, the book is valuable for reminding us that we must come to terms with the vague concept of sustainable development and for forcing us to rethink the moral and technical underpinnings of economic growth as the predominant goal of society. Because it has become deeply ingrained in our culture, the utility of growth is taken for granted, thus avoiding ongoing scrutiny. Daly's alternative "steady state" economic model requires further scrutiny, however, before it can be used to provide practical targets for public policies.

Which model--growth or the steady state--is the "best"? A piecemealing of the components of the limits to growth debate suggests at least a partial answer: the sustainable development and steady state economic models' seemingly contrary labels are misleading because the models share significant characteristics. Both models recognize that some things are steady and others are not. And both sides of the limits to growth debate appear to recognize that there are environmental limits and that the market needs help to ensure that it does not exceed those limits. Given these shared principles, the participants in the limits to growth debate should focus their attention more on identifying and reaching consensus on what the environmental limits are, and on how to ensure that markets do not cause those limits to be exceeded, than on debating the merits of the abstract and misleading concepts of growth versus steady state economies.

Of course, simply avoiding debates over abstract, misleading concepts of growth does not mean that the rest of the public policy exercise is a simple one. This essay suggests that identifying limits and the means to avoid exceeding them requires the application of not only economics and the hard sciences, but also philosophy. The increasingly popular ecosystem approach to environmental protection may well provide the analytical and institutional framework necessary for accomplishing this multi-disciplinary effort.

(1) See PAUL EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).

(2) See RACHEL LOUISE CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).

(3) See, e.g., LESTER R. BROWN ET AL., STATE OF THE WORLD 1996: A WOULD WATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY (1996) [hereinafter STATE OF THE WOULD]; SYLVIA EARLE, SEA CHANGE: A MESSAGE OF THE OCEANS (1995); AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE (1992); ANITA GORDON & DAVID SUZUKI, IT'S A MATTER OF SURVIVAL (1990) [hereinafter GORDON & SUZUKI]. Ehrlich himself has not flagged in his predictions of the global consequences of population growth. See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION (1990).

(4) See, e.g., BROWN, supra, note 3, at 2, 163-64; GORDON & SUZUKI, supra note 3, at 21-39; E.O. WILSON, IN SEARCH OF NATURE 193-99 (1996).

(5) See, e.g., Nicholas Eberstadt, Population, Food, and Income, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (Ronald Bailey-ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE TRUE STATE. OF THE PLANET]; JULIAN SIMON, THE STATE OF HUMANITY (1995).

(6) See, e.g., Eberstadt, supra note 5, at 4, 6.

(7) Compare, e.g., EHRLICH, supra note 3, at 161-64, with Eberstadt, supra note 5, at 6.

(8) Eberstadt, supra note 5, at 6.

(9) WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV. OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND REPORT].

(10) Id. at 40, 43.

(11) E.g., GORDON & SUZUKI, supra note 3, at 158, 169 (growth "is the holy grail of our political and economic systems").

(12) E.g., BRUNDTLAND REPORT, Supra note 9, at 334.

(13) E.g., Indur M. Goldany, Richer is Cleaner--Long-Term Trends in Global Air Quality, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET, supra note 5, at 339-77 (arguing anything that retards economic growth also retards ultimate environmental cleanup).

(14) David C. Korten, The Limits of the Earth--Paradigms Lost: The Bretton Woocks Vision of Endless Growth is Obsolete, THE NATION, July 15, 1996, at 14.

(15) HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY STATE ECONOMICS (1977) [hereinafter STEADY STATE ECONOMICS].

(16) HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD (1989) [hereinafter FOR THE COMMON GOOD].

(17) Holly Stallworth, Review of Herman Daly's Latest Book (visited Feb. 18, 1998) <http:// www.epa, gov> ("economy and environment" site) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's world wide web home page).

(18) HERMAN DALY, BEYOND GROWTH--THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1996) [hereinafter BEYOND GROWTH].19 Id. at 2.

(20) Id.

(21) Id.

(22) Id. at 2-3.

(23) For purposes of full disclosure, I would rule in Daly's favor if I were judging the limits to growth dispute.

(24) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 31-37.

(25) Id. at 216-24.

(26) Id. at 20, 21.

(27) Id. at 45-48.

(28) Id. at 48.

(29) Id. at 3. Daly defines sustainable development slightly differently in several places of his book. See BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 1, 3, 4-5, 9, 13, 28, 31, 32, 167. The definition above is a compilation of those definitions.

(30) Id. at 31. By this reference to "purpose" and subsequent discussion at page 37 of his book, Daly joins with others in suggesting that the modern addiction to growth is immoral regardless of the ecological limits to growth. See, e.g., FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 117-61 (1976); E.J. MISHAN, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH DEBATE 196-202 (1977).

(31) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 31.

(32) Id.

(33) Id. at 73.

(34) Id. at 97.

(35) Id. at 145.

(36) Id. at 201. Part IV ("Population and Sustainable Development") provides two case studies of ecological limits to population growth in developing countries. Part VI ("Two Pioneers in the Economics of Sustainable Development") is largely a tribute to the work of Frederick Soddy and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, whom Daly cites as providing the ground work for the modern school of steady state or ecological economics.

(37) Id. at 42. In a nutshell, GNP refers to the annual value of all goods and services produced in the economy.

(38) Id. at 27.

(39) Id. at 40-41.

(40) Id. at 33.

(41) Id. at 40. For another recent critique of GNP as a measure of progress, see Clifford Cobb et al., If the GDP is Up Why is America Down?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, at 59.

(42) FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 16, at 138-58.

(43) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 97.

(44) Id. at 98.

(45) Id. at 115.

(46) Id. at 219.

(47) Id. at 78.

(48) Id. at 15. The "polluter pays principle" has already been widely embraced, at least in theory. For example, one Canadian statute recognizes the "responsibility of polluters to pay for the costs of their actions." Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.S.C., ch. E-13.3, [sections] 2(i) (1992) (Can.).

(49) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 15.

(50) Id. at 220.

(51) Id. at 210. Daly justifies a limit on income disparity as necessary to support sustainable development, but he also argues that his proposal has religious roots that justify it independently. Id. at 205-15.

(52) Id. at 86. Otherwise known as the "precautionary principle," this policy is gaining popularity in a variety of environmental circles. See, e.g., Ludwik A. Teclaff, Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and International Water Law, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 359, 391 (1996).

(53) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 16.

(54) Id. at 52-57.

(55) Id. at 82.

(56) Id.

(57) Daly believes that global markets encourage production in countries that poorly protect the environment and worker health and safety, thus internalizing production costs the least. Id. at 146-47. Daly notes that the energy costs of transporting goods globally are typically subsidized, creating another inefficiency. Id. at 146.

Daly further attacks free trade on the ground that the theory of "comparative advantage" used to justify it is no longer applicable. Id. at 152. According to Daly, the theory's originator, economist David Ricardo, assumed a global market in which labor and capital were immobile, which assumption is no longer valid. Id. Daly likewise criticizes free trade as promoting debt which ultimately destabilizes the macroeconomy. Id. at 164.

(58) Id. at 164-65. Perhaps Daly's most strident attack on free trade is on purely social grounds. Daly argues that it reduces local self reliance and destroys peoples' sense of community. Id. at 64. According to Daly, "[g]lobalism does not serve world community--it is just individualism writ large." Id. at 148. In even harsher terms, Daly observes that

[t]he true road to international community is that of a federation

of communities--communities of communities--not the destruction of

local and national communities in the service of a single

cosmopolitan world of footloose money managers who constitute

not a community, but merely an interdependent, mutually vulnerable,

unstable coalition of short-term interests.

Id. at 164.

(59) Id. at 14. Daly apparently borrowed these symbols from Malthus, an originator of the limits to growth theory. Id.

(60) I do not suggest that there is a simple linear relationship between a region's levels of natural resource consumption by its revenue generators and levels of public services. If anything, the relationship would seem to be more parabolic than linear because at some point the public expenditures to remedy problems created by high levels of natural resource consumption detract significantly from expenditures for public services.

(61) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 221.

(62) Id.

(63) Jerry Valen DeMarco, The Long and the Short of Environmental Defence, in CANADIAN ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 235 (Alex Wellington et al. eds., 1997).

(64) I raise these questions not to suggest that we should forego striving to achieve a mini mum standard of living for all people or that we should ignore the social consequences of having wide gaps between the rich and poor. My question is simply whether there is a need to agree on a level of a good life for all in the same process as attempting to reach a consensus on the overall size of an ecologically sustainable global economy.

(65) See Mark Sagoff, Carrying Capacity and Ecological Limits, 45 BIOSCIENCE 610, 614 (Oct. 1995).

(66) Id.

(67) For a discussion of the ethical underpinnings of modern economics, see DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996).

(68) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 211.

(69) Id. Daly adds that continued growth simply is not "biophysically possible." Id. He then writes stingingly, "[t]he fact that both presuppositions of this objection are clearly wrong is indicative of the low level of argument that is customary in what currently passes for serious economic discourse." Id.

(70) Id. at 222-24.

(71) Id.

(72) Id. at 98.

(73) A recent example of that cloud is the "Growth Summit" convened last year by the Premier of Alberta, Canada. Rather than trying to define Albertans' ultimate quality of life objectives and determining whether economic growth would best suit those objectives, the summit took growth as a given and focused on how it should best be managed. See, e.g., Alberta Growth Summit (visited Jan. 28, 1998) <http://www.growthsummit.com/index1.html> ("welcome" and "overview" sites) (asking, as the Summit "theme," "[w]hat are the public and private sector policies and actions needed to ensure sustainable and broad based growth in Alberta?").

(74) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 58-60.

(75) Id. at 59.

(76) Id. at 68.

(77) Sagoff, supra note 65, at 615. Sagoff uses examples relating to waste outputs (detergents with and without phosphates; hair spray with and without CFCs), but one can imagine examples relating to inputs as well (e.g., fossil fuels versus solar energy).

(78) Id.

(79) Id.

(80) Id.

(81) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 3, 4, 9.

(82) Id.

(83) See BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 18 (arguing that where public health may be adversely affected, or environmental damage may be serious or irreversible, prudent action is required where there is also scientific uncertainty).

(84) For a discussion of the emerging "ecosystem consciousness," see Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protections, 25 ENVTL. L. 973 (1995); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994).

(85) ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 239 (1949).

(86) Id.

(87) 33 U.S.C. [subsections] 1251-1387 (1994).

(88) Id.

(89) William E. Taylor & Mark Gerath, The Watershed Protection Approach: Is the Promise About To Be Realized?, 11 NAT. RES. & ENV'T. 16, 17 (1996). There are currently lawsuits in twenty-three states seeking to force the Agency to establish TMDLs. Total Maximum Daily Load Program (visited Mar. 22, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl> ("TMDL Lawsuit Information" site). For a history of Congress' enactment of the TMDLs provisions of the CWA and of the lawsuits to enforce those provisions, see Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, [News and Analysis] 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,329 (July 1997), and Oliver A. Houck, TMDL 's, Are We There Yet? The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, [News and Analysis] 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,391 (Aug. 1997). See also Diane K. Conway, Note, TMDL Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 83 (1997).

(90) See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [sections] 4.18, at 283-84 (1986).

(91) Id. at 284-85.

(92) See, e.g., Adler, supra note 84, at 977-79 (describing the three major sources of the most recent revival of watershed thinking); Keiter, supra note 84, at 293-333 (examining the energizing concept of ecosystem management on the public domain); Taylor & Gerath, supra note 89, at 19-20 (describing four current watershed programs from around the country which provide good examples of innovative state approaches to watershed protection).

(93) See, e.g., Adler, supra, note 84, at 1088-04 (explaining the difficulties involved in resolving certain issues crucial to the success of future watershed programs).

(94) 42 U.S.C. [subsections] 7409, 7410 (1994).

(95) See generally Alan L. Mitchell, Transportation Planning and the Clean Air Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 927 (1995).

(96) See generally RODGERS, supra note 90, [subsections] 3.24-3.29.

(97) Stallworth, supra note 17, at 2-3.

(98) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 224.

(99) For a fascinating account on the extent to which, and reasons why, economic growth has become entrenched within our culture, see DANIEL QUINN, ISHMAEL--AN ADVENTURE OF THE MIND AND SPIRIT (1992).

(100) Carrying capacity is also affected by nonhuman factors, like ice ages, ecosystem evolution (e.g., forest succession), species evolution, and violent forces like meteors. These natural factors raise ethical and practical issues regarding humans' efforts to achieve an ecologically "sustainable" society.

(101) See, e.g., Patricia Fry Godley, The State of Play and Future of Fossil Fuels, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1997, at 3, 4 (noting that the biggest concern with respect to fossil fuels is not limits on the supply of fuels but on the Earth's ability to absorb greenhouse gases emitted through the consumption of those fuels).

(102) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 14; FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 16, at 8-9.

(103) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 110, 116. Natural resources are used both as inputs directly in the production process (e.g., metals for cars) and for sustaining the supply of labor (e.g., fish for human food) and technology (e.g., metal and wood for hammers).

(104) Id. at 31.

(105) Of course, this analysis ignores the social costs which may exceed the benefits of increases in either of those two GNP components. For example, technology development causes changes in social patterns which create instability and stress. On the other hand, technological progress has resulted in many new inventions which have improved human health. Whether there are marginal, non-environmental limits to GNP growth is a subject for another paper. See HIRSCH, supra note 30; MISHAN, supra note 30.

(106) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 7, 67-68, 86, 215.

(107) Id. at 34.

(108) Id. at 30.

(109) Sagoff, supra note 65, at 612. Of course, this point ignores limits on the terrestrial resources necessary to convert solar energy for human use. See BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 29.

(110) See, e.g., Dennis Avery, Saving the Planet With Pesticides, Increasing Food Supplies While Preserving the Earth's Biodiversity, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET, supra note 5, at 49-82 (arguing that high-yield farming is both our best defense against famine and beneficial to the environment).

(111) See, e.g., Gary Gardner, Preserving Agricultural Resources, in STATE OF THE WORLD, supra note 3, at 78-79 (noting that population growth has outpaced grain production since 1984).

(112) Admittedly, my intuitive notion is not shared by everyone, at least with respect to some raw resource inputs. For example, some scientists question whether there are practical or reasonably foreseeable limits on the ability of the Earth's atmosphere to assimilate pollution from the combustion of fossil fuels while continuing to provide functions that are essential for human survival. See, e.g., Robert C. Bailing, Jr., Global Warming: Messy Models, Decent Data, and Pointless Policy, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET, supra note 5, at 83-107 (arguing that scientific evidence contradicts the existence of a greenhouse crisis).

(113) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 40-42.

(114) Id. at 114. Under that theory, as the unit expands and its limiting resource becomes more scarce, the cost of that resource rises to the point where it is uneconomical for the unit to expand any further, that is, the unit's gross income is eclipsed by its costs.

(115) Id. at 45-52.

(116) Id. at 29-30.

(117) Sagoff, supra note 65, at 612-13.

(118) Id. Another argument is that while growth does not need more and more raw resource inputs, those inputs need growth. In simpler terms, the argument is that rich countries will do a better job of protecting the environment than poor ones. Id. at 614-15. This argument is not convincing. If the rich countries' growth economies are fueled by relatively cheap imports from countries with lax environmental standards, as Daly warns, BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 164-65, then it is a fallacy to separate the wealthy economies from the poor, environmentally unhealthy ones. In addition, while rich countries' environments may be healthy compared to those of poor countries, there remains the question whether the rich countries' economies are themselves ecologically sustainable. See, e.g., Janet N. Abramowitz, Sustaining Freshwater Ecosystems, in STATE OF THE WORLD, supra note 3, at 60 (noting drastic reductions of salmon and steelhead trout harvests in the Columbia River Basin); Adler, supra note 84, at 988-89 (noting rapid decline in aquatic ecosystems in the U.S.); Richard Haeuber, Setting the Environmental Policy Agenda: The Case of Ecosystem Management, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 14 (1996) (noting 158 ecosystems in the U.S. are either critically endangered, endangered, or threatened of being endangered).

(119) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 108.

(120) Id. at 87.

(121) Sagoff, supra note 65, at 618.

(122) A particularly difficult aspect of this philosophical issue is identifying the set of relevant "recipients" of environmental values, i.e., determining whether and which nonhuman entities are moral subjects in their own right. JEROEN C.J.M. VAN DEN BERGH, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 72-73 (1996). This aspect is important because the broader the scope of morally relevant entities, the sooner the marginal limits to economic growth will be reached.

(123) FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 16, at 291.

(124) Id. at 325.

(125) Herman E. Daly, Reply to Mark Sagoff's "Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economics," 45 BIOSCIENCE 621, 624 (Oct. 1995) [hereinafter Daly's Reply]. Given the discussion regarding aggregate throughput in Part II.B. above, I would rephrase Daly's quote by substituting "policies for maintaining the Earth's carrying capacity" for "policy of limiting the resource throughput."

(126) STEADY STATE ECONOMICS, supra note 15, at 5-6.

(127) Sagoff, supra note 65, at 610-11.

(128) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 18.

(129) Id. at 22.

(130) Id. at 19-20. Although Daly acknowledges the scientists' "highly informed and genuine concern about the environment," he refers to these scientists disparagingly as "part-time prophets calling for environmental repentance ...." Id. at 18-19. This reference is ironic, because Daly himself is a self-proclaimed economist "turned part-time [environmental] prophet" who expressly calls for a "healthy dose of repentance." Id. at 201.

(131) Id. at 19-20.

(132) Id. at 20.

(133) Id. at 218. Daly writes critically that "[c]alling for a moral compass in such a world is as absurd as calling for a magnetic compass in a world in which you proclaim that there is no such thing as magnetic north." Id. at 20.

(134) Id. at 224.

(135) Id. at 22.

(136) Id. Daly's criticism of the "instrumental" view of nature is ironic because Daly himself has been accused of fostering that same view by approaching environmental protection from an economic perspective. Sagoff, supra note 65, at 610. Daly's response to this criticism is that economics is a necessary instrument for upholding intrinsic human and nonhuman values. As Daly states, "[i]nstrumental value is by definition instrumental to the realization of intrinsic value, and without intrinsic value it would not exist." Daly's Reply, supra note 125, at 621. I believe that both views have merit. BEYOND GROWTH suggests that both the instruments and the values must be rethought if a truly ecologically sustainable economy can be achieved. BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 18-22. In addition, even the most state-of-the-art economic (and scientific) instruments have their limits. As Daly himself agrees, the precautionary principle is necessary to reflect limits in the ability to predict cause and effect. See BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 16. Yet, it is the underlying values that caution Daly to err on the side of environmental protection rather than against it. In other words, intrinsic values serve instrumental roles as well.

(137) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 18-22.

(138) Stephen Jay Gould, Reversing Established Orders, NAT. HIST., Sept. 1995, at 16.

(139) Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471-546 (1996).

(140) Gould, supra note 138, at 12.

(141) STEPHEN J. GOULD, FULL HOUSE (1996), quoted in William R. Wineke, The Accidental Tourist? Gould's Philosophy: We Humans Are Just Lucky To Be Here, WIS. ST. J., 1996 WL 12081856, at *3 (1996).

(142) WILSON, supra note 4, at 177.

(143) Id.

(144) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 22.

(145) Id. at 20-21.

(146) Id. at 20.

(147) It would be hard to imagine that wild animals are genetically driven to reproduce simply because of any short term gratification of rearing offspring, given the considerable work and risks required to feed and shelter them.

(148) Daly ridicules the scientists' emphasis on the genetic basis for the drive to protect the environment "for our children"--i.e, long term species survival--as negating any environmental purpose for those people who do not procreate. BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 22. "To read some biologists you would think that whoever does not manage to propel their genes into the next generation might as well never have lived!" Id. Daly incorrectly assumes that those who believe there is a moral obligation to safeguard future generations also believe that the only way to fulfill that obligation is to produce offspring. On the contrary, the ecologists like Ehrlich who are quite concerned about the welfare of people in future generations believe that we would do them well by generating fewer, not more, offspring. E.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH ET AL., ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT 956 (1977). Moreover, Daly's own ethic, that humans should strive to maximize the number of people that can be ecologically sustained at a good life over time, rather than simply maximizing the number of people over time, also implies that people as a species are driven to create and protect future generations. BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 220. Thus, Daly has no less of a chore of finding an ethical role for childless adults than do the biologists who he criticizes.

(149) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 1-23.

(150) Id. at 28-30, 191-98.

(151) Id. at 193-94. Gould states a related "predictable generality," that "balanced ecosystems must sustain more biomass as prey than as predators (the basis of the so-called ecological pyramid) ...." Gould, supra note 138, at 16. This rule has clear implications for human survival.

(152) See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 4, at 144 ("The truth is that we need invertebrates but they don't need us."), 190-91 (siding with the environmentalist world view that "human physical and spiritual health depends on sustaining the planet in a relatively unaltered state").

(153) Aldo Leopold's "land ethic" purported to place intrinsic value in ecosystems, but was in fact rooted in the purpose of human survival. For example, Leopold described an ethic, in ecological terms, as a "limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence." Id. He refers to the extension of ethics to the land as an "ecological necessity." Id. at 239. He also views ethics as "mode[s] of guidance," like animal instincts, "for meeting ecological situations so new or intricate... that the path of social expediency is not discernible .... "In this sense, Leopold views ethics as a kind of "community instinct in the making." Id. Leopold expressly ties his notion of respect for the land to the importance for humans of the food chain to which Gould refers as a key to ecological sustainability. Id. at 251-53; see also, Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 1269, 1281 (1993) ("[I]t is easy to see how the health of the land is of indispensable value to humans from a strictly utilitarian perspective. Without a healthy Earth, we cannot sustain healthy humans. Even if humans are the sole repositories of moral worth, the rest of nature is nonetheless worth in that its health is essential.").

(154) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 217.

(155) Id. at 20.

(156) E.g., WILSON, supra note 4, at 153-80 (discussing biophilia and the environmental ethic).

(157) E.g., JEFFREY OLIN & VINCENT BERRY, APPLYING ETHHICS 379-422 (3rd ed. 1992).

(158) Gould speaks of this precariousness when he comments, as paraphrased by Wineke, that humans are "remnant species that cling to existence despite the extinction of many of their related life forms ...." Wineke, supra note 141, at *4 (1996). Gould contrasts humans and other "more 'advanced'" species with bacteria, the "most successful form of life on Earth" because they "seem to thrive everywhere and under almost all conditions." Id. Wilson similarly argues for the protection of invertebrates, in part because "these little creatures that run the world provide us with an endless source of scientific exploration and naturalistic wonder." WILSON, supra note 4, at 144. Wilson also argues for the preservation of biodiversity, in part, because its complex mysteries can satisfy humans' "spiritual craving" for a frontier. Id. at 178.

(159) BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 18, at 201.

(160) Id. at 20.

(161) Id.

(162) Id.

(163) Id. at 21.

(164) Id. at 201.

MICHAEL WENIG, The Author is currently working for the Alberta Environmental Appeals Board to fulfill requirements for being admitted to the Alberta Bar. He is also in the second year of an L.L.M. program at the University of Calgary Faculty of Law, and has served there a sessional instructor in environmental law. For seven years prior to moving to Alberta in 1996, the Author was public interest environmental lawyer in Anchorage, Alaska, where he was Litigation Director for Trustees for Alaska. From 1985 to 1989, the Author was a trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Land & Natural Resources Division. The Author gratefully acknowledges the feedback provided on earlier versions of this Essay from University of Calgary Law Professors Jonnette Watson-Hamilton and Nigel Bankes. The Author also thanks Dr. Herman Daly for his feedback on ideas which were incorporated into this Essay. Finally, the Author thanks the International Society of Ecological Economics for sponsoring the "on-line" seminar on the book reviewed in this Essay (http.//csf.colorado.edu/isee/daly), and which provided the basis for several of the ideas discussed in this Essay.