Between the lines: a textual analysis of the Gaza-Jericho agreement.

Since the signing of the Gaza-Jericho accord on 13 September 1993, the primary focus has been on the ambiguity and vagueness inherent in the agreement, or on what the agreement does not say. It is true that the issues which form the substance of Palestinian existence, or non-existence, are left out of the agreement altogether, their postponement a reflection of the asymmetry of power in the regional environment. Yet the text of the agreement brings up entirely new issues that will affect the future of the Palestinian people, issues which need to be addressed in their own right.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon what the agreement does say and the implications involved in the actual wording and focus of the text. These observations will be followed by an overall conclusion, in which the larger issues introduced by this agreement into the Palestinian-Israeli relationship will be identified.

PREAMBLE 

The government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.

The introductory sentence to the agreement addresses the concerns of the Israeli side, while barely touching upon those issues most crucial to the Palestinians. There are explicit and unambiguous references to the end of confrontation and conflict, peaceful co-existence, security, and historic reconciliation. However, there are no corresponding references to withdrawal, freedom, or self-determination.

The Palestinian concerns appear to be covered by three very ambiguous phrases. The term "mutual legitimate and political fights" is one of them. In this construction, the two adjectives "legitimate" and "political" bear no direct connection to each other by virtue of the insertion of the word "and" between them. However, it is an improvement upon Camp David, which refers only to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." The term "mutual" serves to apply the entire statement to both peoples. This would seem to place Palestinian and Israeli political rights on the same moral plane, thus implicitly affirming the Palestinian fight to the same conditions the Israelis now enjoy.

The reference to "dignity" is a product of the Palestinian historical legacy. There can be no experience more humiliating than life under a belligerent military occupation by a foreign power. For 27 years, Palestinians under the post-1967 occupation have been killed, imprisoned, tortured, beaten, coerced, and otherwise oppressed both as individuals and as a people. The reference to "dignity" represents their demand that all such indignities come to an end, foremost among them, the control of their persons, their land, and their resources by a foreign power.

The third reference, to a "just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement," is left over from historical pan-Arab sensitivities about separate agreements. This derives from Henry Kissinger's step-by-step approach to peacemaking, which was correctly believed to represent a strategy of "divide and rule", aimed at weakening the Arab side through political and geographical fragmentation.

Arab attempts to resist separate political negotiations failed on the first order when Anwar Sadat decided unilaterally to travel to Jerusalem in 1977. Egypt's return to the Arab fold a decade later facilitated the acceptance of the remaining Arab parties to the Madrid formula of bilateral negotiating delegations, with the stipulation that the final settlement would be "comprehensive." The purpose of the term "comprehensive" in the Palestinian-Israeli agreement is to downplay its separateness to Arab states and to place it within the overall Madrid framework.

The terms "just" and "lasting" are borrowed from U. N. Security Council Resolution 242 and convey the conviction of the Palestinians that peace will not be "lasting" unless it is "just," which means that at least a portion of their fundamental rights must be recognized and implemented.

ARTICLE I: AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations ... is ... to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council ... for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The term "Council" carries obvious administrative overtones. In fact, its origins can be traced back to Camp David, which refers to the establishment of a "self-governing authority (administrative council)." A corresponding legislative term, had one been intended, would have been something akin to "constituent assembly."

By specifying "the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," the passage implies Israeli recognition of "Palestinian people" in other than the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of Palestinian peoplehood as a whole. At the same time, its placement at the beginning of the agreement under the heading "Aim of the Negotiations" introduces the document as applying to only one sector of the Palestinian people, those "in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," with "sector" being defined and categorized based on current place of residence.

While this may be positive in that it recognizes the Palestinian people as a whole, it legitimizes the concept that those sections of the Palestinian people expelled from their homeland in 1948, as well as their descendants, will not be party to the interim arrangements in any fashion. The result is to fracture the Palestinian people, such that some Palestinian segments are part of the agreement while others are not.

It is clear that the elected council is intended for the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, yet nowhere does the document offer a precise definition of the term "West Bank," thus evading the issue of whether or not East Jerusalem and its annexed suburbs are part of that territory. It must be assumed that any default categories work in favor of the stronger party, meaning that these areas are not necessarily considered for the purposes of the agreement as belonging to the territorial unit of the West Bank, although the subject is left open to future debate.

The use of the term "transitional period" is noteworthy. This happens only in Article I and twice again in Article V, where it appears as a title. Elsewhere, the document employs the term "interim period." By contrast, "interim" does not appear at all in Camp David; instead, the more dynamic term "transitional" is employed throughout.

One can speak of an "interim government" between two military dictatorships in Haiti or Central America, whereas in South Africa a "transitional government" was inaugurated to carry the country out of apartheid and into a constitutional democratic system guaranteeing equal rights for all races, a change of historic proportions. The same could be said for the Soviet Union toward its end; Mikhail Gorbachev was often referred to as a "transitional figure."

The concept of "transition" carries the implication of historical change through forward, irreversible motion. The word "interim," however, refers simply to an interregnum, which, in the words of a Washington Post editorial, is "dependent on Israeli consent for further evolution."(1) In short, if the Palestinians are to enjoy a "transition," they can expect real and historic change, away from occupation and toward independence. If the upcoming stage is "interim," however, it could indicate nothing more than a period of restructuring for an existing occupation.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of 242 and 338.

The "whole peace process," of course, is understood as the Madrid process begun in October 1991. The placement of the interim arrangements within the Madrid framework is to underscore the concept that this agreement and those that will follow are elements of a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli problem.

Although the reference to 242 and 338 affords the document some grounding in international law, its meaning is ambiguous enough to be subject to ex post facto revisionism, which has indeed occurred in recent years. The passage "secure and recognized boundaries" has often been utilized to legitimize the occupation of whatever territory Israel decides is necessary for its security, in spite of the clause "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" which appears in the preamble. These areas could include some or all of the following: East Jerusalem and its surroundings, land along the length of the Green Line, especially at Israel's narrowest point and in the denser settlement areas, some of the high ground in the West Bank hills, and the strip of land on the West Bank's eastern frontier running parallel to the Jordan River.(2)

ARTICLE III: ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

The key word in this passage is "political." This carries the implication that the Council will become the nascent political authority for "the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." It is unclear how this affects the status of the PLO as the political representative of all the Palestinian people, inside and outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a status recognized by the Israeli prime minister himself.

The agreement specifies that the Palestinian police will "ensure public order," but it does not say under whose authority. This is particularly troublesome in light of Article VIII, which calls for the elected council to establish the police force after its inauguration - whereas here it is assumed that an already-established police force will provide security for the elections themselves.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

While the language specifying the withdrawal dates are categorical, this language is not. Thus, the 13 July date was never intended to be sacred. It was a "goal."

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

This is intended to convey the idea that the elections do not constitute the full realization of the Palestinians people's legitimate rights, but an "interim preparatory step" toward that end. Moreover, the elections will "prepare" the Palestinians to assume even greater responsibilities in the future. The fact that this particular step is deemed "significant" seems to imply that, with limited autonomy, the Palestinians will be considered well on their way to achieving their "legitimate rights" and fulfilling their "just requirements."

This brings us to the term "legitimate rights," which is neither defined nor explained. There is no adjective indicating the nature of those rights or whether their character is national, political, or otherwise, although the preamble, above, contains a reference to "legitimate and political rights."

The same problem holds true for the term "just requirements." It is not clear who will be the judge to decide what is "just" and what the Palestinian people "require." The entire phrase, "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements," is borrowed verbatim from Camp David.

Finally, the passage seems to include all the Palestinian people, not just those in the West Bank and Gaza, in contrast to the reference in Article I above. The use of the term "Palestinian people" without any geographical disclaimer implies that the Palestinian people in their entirety, regardless of place of residence, possess certain "legitimate rights."

ARTICLE IV: JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

While the use of the word "territory" is significant in itself, since it acknowledges that Palestinian jurisdiction involves land and not just functional spheres, the absence of the words "all" and "the" before "territory" is hauntingly reminiscent of the 242 interpretation debacle. It leaves unclear how much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is actually covered by the Palestinian jurisdiction.

However, the quotation that follows, referring to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, favors the interpretation that the word "the" should be inferred in regard to jurisdiction. To combine the two terms leads one to the conclusion that jurisdiction covers a "single territorial unit" called the "West Bank and Gaza Strip," which is synonymous with "West Bank and Gaza Strip territory."

This leads back to the conceptual problem introduced in Article I, the question of how the "West Bank," even in its totality, is to be defined. Truly interesting is the concept of a single territorial unit with boundaries up in the air. A "single unit" implies unity, tangibility, indivisibility. Yet the definition of this unity remains a complete unknown.

The question also arises as to whether the territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza will be preserved after the interim period or only during it. The possibility is left open that the Israelis could detach East Jerusalem, its surroundings, or any other territory they wish to retain after the interim period has expired, since the integrity clause will not necessarily continue to apply.

ARTICLE V: TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

Normally, one might have thought that the clock toward final status would have begun upon the entry of the agreement into force, yet this stipulation has built another two-month delay into the process. Since the Israelis missed the December 13 deadline to begin withdrawal, the two months were extended to six months, and the five year countdown began on 13 April 1994 instead of 13 October 1993.

It is also worth noting that this is the first place in the agreement where the Gaza-Jericho aspect is mentioned, whereas the West Bank and Gaza is mentioned at the beginning, in Article I. What could prove to be problematic is the overlapping relationship between Gaza and Jericho on the one hand, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the other, with the fragmentation this entails among the Palestinian people, as elaborated on further below.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

This article allows the final status negotiations to convene sooner rather than later, despite the original intention to delay them until two years after the start of the interim period. In fact, the language seems to prefer it this way. It is even conceivable that final status talks could occur simultaneously with the interim talks themselves. The statement takes into consideration the possibility that changes in the situation on the ground might necessitate the introduction of core issues, such as settlements, Jerusalem, or other tangible aspects of the occupation, early in the negotiations. In fact, the term "as soon as possible" in itself conveys a sense of urgency.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

Of course, the explicit inclusion of Jerusalem in the final status negotiations counters the assertion by Israelis of both major political parties that Jerusalem, East and West, is the unified, eternal capital of Israel. Instead, East Jerusalem and its annexed suburbs are placed on the negotiating table, although somewhat separately from the rest of the West Bank. In addition, the fate of the 1948 refugees is relegated to final status negotiations.(3)

The question of borders is more interesting, because it is impossible to know from this language whose borders with whom or what are being alluded to. The reference must be to borders between either Israel and an independent Palestine or Israel and Jordan, for it would not be possible to establish "borders," in the true sense of the term, between Israel and a non-sovereign entity that does not fall under the jurisdiction of another sovereign entity (i.e., between Israel and a Palestinian non-state entity outside the Jordanian umbrella).

In essence, borders could be negotiated between Israel and a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, or between Israel and a Palestinian entity under its control on the one hand, and the state of Jordan on the other, or between Israel and a Palestinian state.

Another example of the major difficulty in the terminology used throughout the agreement is found in the same passage. The term "relations and cooperation with other neighbors" begs the question: Whose relations with them? Whose cooperation with them? The Palestinians', the Israelis', or both together?

If it refers simply to Palestinian relations with "other neighbors" (translation: Arab states), then its inclusion in the declaration of principles is unnecessary. The same holds true for the Israelis acting alone. By default, then, the phrase infers that the Palestinians, as an Arab people, cannot undertake normal bilateral relations with other Arab peoples (who are relegated to the miscellaneous category of "other neighbors") except in combination and consultation with Israel. This subtle formulation means, in a sense, that the intention is to create a situation whereby the Israeli and Palestinian entities merge their regional policy-making apparatuses to the point of being indistinguishable.

This language can only serve to relegate the future Palestine, starting with the interim phase, to the status of an Israeli protectorate instead of being an Arab polity in its own right. It will serve the additional useful function of standing as Israel's bridge to the wider Arab World. This means that any state, even an Arab state, wishing to build relations with the Palestinians must, almost by definition, ask Israel's permission, since Palestinian foreign policy can be made only in coordination with Israel's own. To take this a step further, the terminology conjures up the image of future Arab-Israeli multilateral discussions with Israel and the Palestinians sitting on one side of the table, and Arab states sitting on the other side.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached during the interim period.

This works both ways. Although it affords the Palestinians some protection against being frozen into an interim eternity, Israel can argue the clause protects them from an evolutionary process, by de-linking the actual substance of the two phases in this way.

ARTICLE VI: PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task ... will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

The phrase "Jericho area," first introduced here, is repeated over and over throughout the document. In the debate over the size of the Jericho enclave, the agreement tends to support the Palestinian interpretation of a larger area. When one speaks of a metropolitan "area," this normally refers to a city as well as the surrounding areas that nominally belong to it. When we speak of San Francisco, we mean a geographically small city containing half a million people, but when we speak of the San Francisco "area," we are referring to an entity many times larger, an area containing over four million people.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force.

If the clause is enacted "with the view to promoting economic development," then conspicuously missing from the spheres of authority are those actually

concerning economic development: investment, labor, and banking, to name but a few. Nor is the economic issue specified in Article V as one of the major issues to be discussed in final status talks. Although Article V leaves the door open to negotiate "other issues of common interest," a miscellaneous category, the specific absence of the economic authority issue from both the interim and final status domains is ominous. This factor encourages the assumption that full control by Palestinians over their own economic matters is not up for negotiation. It implies that this work is not to be undertaken independently, but only in close coordination with Israel. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that a full one-third of the document deals specifically with issues of coordination and cooperation, centering primarily around the economic aspects (see below).

The reference to building the Palestinian police force prior to the inauguration of the elected council raises a curious inconsistency. Specifically, it appears to contradict Article VIII, which assigns responsibility for establishing the police force to the council itself, after it has assumed office.

ARTICLE VII: INTERIM AGREEMENT

2. The interim agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

The mention of all three branches of government as well as the independent judiciary is, of course, encouraging of democratic development. However, the legislative authority is specifically constrained by Article IX, which is ominously entitled "Laws and Military Orders," rather than "Legislative Authority of the Council." The combination implies that Palestinian legislative activity will take place within the framework of military laws in force in the spheres excluded from the autonomy structure, which are, of course, the most important from the standpoint of personal liberty.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

It is interesting to note that the land and water authorities are lumped together with the economic development authorities, particularly when we remember that it is the question of land that constitutes the essence of the Palestine problem. The issue is not one of land as an economic resource, but as a political right. Since the sovereignty of modern nation-states is defined geographically, for any nation to be summarily relieved of its land by force is to be denied one's right to exist as a nation. Including the land component in this section which deals with economic issues, while deferring negotiation over the real land issue until a later date, seems to trivialize the importance of the land and disguise its true place in the conflict.

Additionally, nowhere is it explained how a land authority tallies with the limited authorities of the Council itself, which do not include land. The water authority, on the other hand, poses no contradiction because it is specifically an "administration" authority, which is by definition delegatory in nature.

As to the other authorities listed here, it is not clear that they will be the sole responsibility of the elected council, since economic authority in general is not included as a Palestinian sphere of authority during the interim phase. It is more likely that these aspects will fall under the joint Israeli-Palestinian domain, through the cooperation and coordination clauses, below.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

The withdrawal of the military government apparatus from the West Bank and Gaza does not mean that Israel will surrender its control of the spheres not transferred to the elected council. The reality, stipulated in the Minutes to Article VII(5), below, is quite the contrary. This leads to legitimate questions regarding the meaning and nature of the Israeli withdrawal.

ARTICLE VIII: PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

The Palestinian police force is to be established not only in Gaza and Jericho, but in "the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." However, it is an obvious fact that the Palestinian police will not operate in East Jerusalem or its annexed suburbs. The absence of this limitation from the language, by taking the exclusion of the area for granted, seems to imply that the city of East Jerusalem is not regarded by the document as an integral part of the West Bank.

The article states that the police force is to be created by the elected council, yet this responsibility has already been undertaken and carried out by Yasser Arafat.

The passage refers to the security of "Israelis," not "Israeli settlers." In fact, nowhere in the agreement is the term "settlers" to be found (although the term "settlements" is mentioned later in the agreement in Annex II(3)(b), right next to the term "Israelis," as spheres of authority from which the Palestinians are to be excluded).

The obvious question posed by this article, however, is the following: Who guarantees public order when the settlers come into conflict with local Palestinians, something which is bound to happen? Whose security takes precedence? Without language building an equivalency between the two, the default goes automatically to the stronger party, as is the nature of power politics.(4)

Finally, the concept of external threats, mentioned with no explanation, must be explored further, so as to try to figure out why it would have been included at all. To whom is an external threat posed? If it is Israel, then given Israel's hegemonic military status in the region, are these external threats real or imagined? If the external threat is to the Palestinians, then it is surmised that Israel is declaring its readiness to defend the Palestinians from attack by Arab states, an absurd formulation. More likely, the threat is defined as being to Israel and the Palestinian entity taken together, since Israel would presumably be attacked by Arab states through the West Bank or Gaza. If the threat is to both, in this manner, then the article assumes that the interests of the Palestinian entity are identical to those of Israel. Or are Israel and the Palestinians in fact a single entity?

The terms "internal" and "external" are taken for granted and, thus, not defined. The usage of "external" in a "threat" context implies established Arab states. Hence the question is: Are the West Bank and Gaza Strip external to Israel or are they not? If they are not, then the likelihood of an agreement for eventual Palestinian statehood would appear to be diminished.

ARTICLE IX: LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

At first glance, one might wonder why the first point in this article, which is presumably intended specifically to limit the legislative power of the elected council to the agreed upon spheres or "authorities," and to further contain its power within the bounds of the interim agreement, would appear under a heading concerning military orders. When viewed in combination with the second point, however, it becomes clear that the focus of the article is to ensure that Palestinian legislative activity will take place within the framework of existing military law.

The statement implies that military laws will cease to be in effect in the spheres delegated to the Palestinian authority, although this cannot be certain. However, it is not as relevant. Military laws applying to the spheres of health, welfare, education, tourism, culture, and direct taxation are not as important as those relating to issues of freedom of expression, assembly, the press, and other basic liberties, such as freedom from punitive indirect taxation, all of which presumably fall under the Israeli category of security. Thus, the article ensures that the Palestinians will not have the authority to legislate their freedom, or to protect basic civil liberties, since military orders relating to the security sphere will remain under Israeli jurisdiction.

The requirement that both sides will "jointly review" military orders in spheres not delegated to Palestinian authority, given the asymmetry of power, is not meaningful. What is meaningful is that the agreement, in a sense, legitimizes their continued existence by default.

ARTICLE X: JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE 

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

This Liaison Committee stands at the center of all the joint committees that are being established under the agreement to deal with "issues requiring coordination." These are enumerated and outlined in vast detail in Articles XI, XII, and XVI, in the minutes to Articles VII and VIII, and further in Annexes II, III, and IV. Taken together, they incorporate almost every element of the Palestinian entity's economy, its foreign relations, its Arab relations, and its internal police and intelligence functions, into the realm of "cooperation and coordination."

The question in the back of everyone's mind is whether this Liaison Committee and its subordinate committees will become an institutionalized, official form of collaboration, albeit an involuntary one, or whether the communication will be conducted between equals. The fear that the outcome is weighted toward the former is quite legitimate, owing to the vast imbalance of power.

ARTICLE XI: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Interestingly, the article refers not to "the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israel," but to "the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel." This language fragments the West Bank and Gaza, which are supposed to constitute a single entity, and at the same time, attaches both fragments to Israel.

To state that promoting development in all three areas (not two areas) is in the mutual interest is to infer that Israel is an undeveloped country and that it needs Palestinian cooperation in order to reach a higher level of development. Obviously, these presumptions are ridiculous. Israel is a First World, highly developed economy; the Palestinian territory is, by contrast, a Fourth World, dependent economy, devastated by a quarter century of belligerent occupation.

The intent of the statement is contained in its other half, which presumes that it is in the Palestinian interest to cooperate with Israel in undertaking its economic development. Yet clearly it is not. If the overriding interest of the Palestinians is to achieve independent statehood, then it would seemingly be more in their interest to develop their economy independently of and separately from Israel's, and to seek cooperation from Arab states and other members of the international community, both state and non-state actors, rather than from Israel.

Specifically, the article places the subject of Palestinian economic development within the realm of negotiation, and ultimately, under a joint Israeli-Palestinian authority, instead of squarely under the decision-making apparatus of the Palestinian authority. In situations of extreme power imbalance, the concept of joint authority gets translated in real terms into the authority of the stronger power in the partnership.

ARTICLE XII: LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them ....

If the previous article removes internal economic decision-making from the exclusive purview of the Palestinians, then this article does the same with the Palestinian entity's political relations at the Arab level.

This is extremely important. Cooperation arrangements are to be negotiated "between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand." The question is, why are the Palestinians not on the same "hand" as Jordan and Egypt?

The answer is as follows: Israel and the Palestinian entity are first to "cooperate" with each other at the micro-level, as outlined in the previous article, and then the resulting partnership is to forge cooperation arrangements with Arab states, as a single unit.

It seems that these stipulations are intended as cooperation arrangements between Israel and the Arab states, with the Palestinians as Israel's ticket to the Arab World. The Palestinian entity is simultaneously deprived of its rightful place in the Arab World. It basically mandates that Israel's cooperation arrangements with Arab countries are to be negotiated with Israel and the Palestinians sitting on one side of the table and the other Arabs sitting on the other side. This is not cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis but, rather, a fusion between the two - with the Israeli side predominant - and subsequent cooperation between the new singularity and Jordan and Egypt.

One could go so far as to say that the language expressed herein carries the Palestinians to the Israeli side of the peace table as a hostage to alleviate Israel's regional isolation. Thus they are used as a tool to legitimize Israel's political entry into the region by standing at its "side."

.... These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common interest will be dealt with by this committee.

This terminology is borrowed wholesale and verbatim from Camp David. It affirms the concept of the original 1967 exiles returning to the West Bank and Gaza in principle, but the chosen term, "admission" rather than "return" sounds as if the Israelis are granting them a privilege rather than acknowledging their rights under international law. Moreover, the familiar absence of the definite article leaves the open possibility that not all of them will be allowed to return. Similarly, there is no mention of their descendants.

This is further complicated by the fact that the language addresses only the 1967 refugees to the exclusion of the 1948 refugees. Thus, one more dimension is added to the segmentation of the Palestinian people, slicing them and their problem again by holding the knife at a different angle. Examples of this fragmentation of an already fragmented problem have been multiplying since the start of the Madrid process. The apparent purpose is to create divergent interests among different sectors of the Palestinian people by instituting crosscutting cleavages among the different facets of Palestinian existence.

In the case of the exiled populations, segmentation proceeds as follows: First, all the refugees are separated from those who "live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." Then, the 1948 refugees are separated from the 1967 refugees. Finally, the 1967 refugees themselves are dissected into two parts: those who lived in Palestine in 1967 and their children born in exile.

ARTICLE XIII: REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

This is "redeployment in," not "withdrawal from" the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It would appear to be inconsistent with Article XIV, which mandates "withdrawal from" the Gaza Strip (and Jericho). However, it is not, because the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitute a "single territorial unit." The Gaza Strip and Jericho area constitutes a subset of that unit. In short, "withdrawal from" applies to the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, whereas "redeployment in" applies to "the West Bank and Gaza Strip." Of course, the redeployment will take place only in the areas where a withdrawal has not already been effected.

It is clear that redeployment is to occur after the withdrawal; it can be postponed until "not later than the eve of elections." However, it does help to lessen the likelihood of Israeli interference during the election process.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

This is not to say that Israel will necessarily redeploy its military outside populated areas, only that it agrees to be guided by the principle that it should do so.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force, pursuant to Article VII above.

"Specified locations," if the precedent of Camp David is taken into consideration, are probably located inside the West Bank (but not the Gaza Strip). Moreover, this clause falls under the category of "further redeployment," which comes at a later stage, yet which still leaves the Israeli military stationed in the West Bank.

In addition, this "gradual" implementation is totally open-ended due to the absence of either a deadline or explicit definition of "specified locations." In Camp David, Israel proposed the re-deployment of its forces to "specified security locations." That formulation seems narrower in scope because of the limiting term, and would thus appear to leave a much thinner physical occupation in place.

Expectedly, there is no mechanism by which Israel is held accountable if its "redeployment" is not as expected. What happens, for instance, if Israel decides to "redeploy" its forces to newly-constructed facilities in and around East Jerusalem?

ARTICLE XIV: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

(see discussion below of Annex II).

ARTICLE XV: RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee....

If a particular dispute were resolvable "by negotiations," then it would presumably have been resolved during the original negotiations. This mechanism simply transfers the impasse from the political negotiation teams to the negotiators comprising the Joint Liaison Committee.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

If this were to have any meaning, that mechanism would have been specified here, before any disputes had a chance to present themselves.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through reconciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Again, Israel has a veto on the very creation of an arbitration committee and is not explicitly bound by its rulings even if it is established. Furthermore, the concept of "establishing an Arbitration Committee" implies that any such body will be made up of Israelis and Palestinians, rather than outside, neutral forces not subject to Israeli pressure. Were it to be an effective arbitration mechanism, this decision-making apparatus would be independent of the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the power imbalance between them. It would cover all disputes, and its decisions would be binding on both parties. This, however, is not the case. Needless to say, the committee also has no enforcement mechanism. This means that in the case of any dispute in which the Palestinians are the aggrieved party, the power imbalance will ensure that the grievance is never fully or substantively addressed.

ARTICLE XVI: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

(see discussion below under Annex IV).

ARTICLE XVII: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

The agreement is currently in force and has been since 13 October 1993.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Since the annexes and minutes constitute an integral part of the agreement, they too will be analyzed in some detail.

ANNEX I: PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process....

This seems to include any Palestinians who might live in West Jerusalem as well as the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem and its annexed suburbs. Thus, it detracts from the separateness of East Jerusalem.

The nature of participation is not explicitly spelled out here because it will be specified in a future agreement. However, judging from declarations by the sides, it has apparently been taken to mean that Palestinians in Jerusalem (rather than Palestinians from Jerusalem) will be allowed to vote but not to stand for office. This would mean no East Jerusalem representation on the elected council for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

2. The election agreement should cover ... the following:

a. "The system of elections....

The system of elections, whether balloting is by party list or individual candidate, by region or nationwide, and other related matters, is normally an internal affair. Here, its every detail is subject to negotiation.

b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition....

Certainly the inclusion of international observers will be of great help to the Palestinians in their first experiment with nationwide elections on their national soil. This should serve to create some kind of accountability during the election process, on the part of both the PLO-Fateh and the Israeli government.

However, that Israel should be able to dictate the "personal composition" of international observers is reminiscent of its remarkable achievement in 1991, where it acquired the right to veto individual members of its diplomatic adversaries, the Palestinian delegations to Madrid and the bilateral talks in Washington. This requirement could bear negatively upon the impartiality of the observer team.

c. ... rules and regulations regarding [the] election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station....

Again, Israel will have an important say in the mechanics of the election campaign, through involvement in the formulation of its "rules and regulations." Here there could be complications arising from a host of different issues.

Israel could demand, for instance, that former prisoners convicted of armed operations against Israel may not run for office. Indeed it could deny Palestinian opposition parties, who have come to be defined by their opposition to the Gaza-Jericho agreement, the right to propose candidates for office unless they change their position. This very ominous possibility is presaged by Israel's unwillingness to even release such people from prison, which is certain only to reinforce their opposition stance.

In short, the language leaves the field wide open for Israel to disrupt the Palestinian electoral process and skew the results toward the party with which it is currently engaged in the political process, an intervention from which that party would not benefit over the long run. This phrase forces the process of formulating election rules, normally an internal matter that would be subject to an open debate between the people and their leadership, into the privacy of the negotiating room between Israel and the PLO.

As for the radio and television stations, some important questions follow from the language, especially related to the question of censorship. The question is, who will license these broadcasting stations, the Israelis or the ISGA? Will they be subject to the Israeli censor, will there be a new Palestinian censor, or will there be no censor? Will the stations be officially run by the national authority or will they be independent of governmental authority? The question is one of free speech, and whether the Palestinian right to a free press should be subject to negotiation.(5) According to this language, the Palestinian mass media is to be organized not by the Palestinian people on the ground, on their own initiative, but probably by the Palestinian authorities through "agreed arrangements" with the Israelis.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

The ambiguity of this language affecting the 1967 exiles is well-known and need not be discussed in detail here. It is important to note, however, that while it leaves the door open for future discussion of their specific problem, it again refers explicitly to those actually forced out in 1967, not to their children or grandchildren.

In addition to further segmenting the Palestinian problem, as discussed above, this language legitimizes Israel's expulsion of the 1967 Palestinians and their continuing state of forced exile by implicitly characterizing their right of return as impractical. This is the kind of clause that places the agreement outside the bounds of international law and in a position contradictory to it.

ANNEX II: PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration or Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal or Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

Of course, this article offers the withdrawal of regular Israeli soldiers, but not the settlers, who represent a gray area between civilian and paramilitary status.

Also in this article is the second stage of the geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people currently living in Palestine, already separated into two larger pieces (Palestinian citizens of Israel inside the 1948 areas and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip). The interim arrangements as stipulated here will apply to a subset of the second category, those who "live in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area," while other arrangements will presumably apply to Palestinians living in other areas of the larger territorial unit of the West Bank and Gaza.(6)

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

This clause would not have contained any enforcement mechanism had Israel failed to negotiate an interim agreement and complete its withdrawal by the prescribed deadline of 13 April. Obviously, once the schedule gets out of kilter, the delays on each successively missed item begin to add up. If future deadlines are missed, such as the elections deadline (which was missed in July 1994) or the deadline(s) for the beginning and end of final status talks, the structure and credibility of the agreement could gradually be undermined.(*)

3. The [withdrawal] agreement will include....

a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

The term "Palestinian representatives" is intended as a euphemism for Fateh and the other groups that remain, in a de facto sense, under the umbrella of Arafat's PLO by virtue of their support for the agreement. Fateh, in essence, has been given certain facets of Israel's authority which it will continue to exercise until the council is inaugurated.

This brings up the entirely new issue of the future relationship between the PLO and the elected council. There are several options: Fateh could dissolve itself, it could fuse with the council, it could cede its authority to it, or it could continue to exist parallel to it, with no clear apportionment of authority between the two. Since the first three options have already been ruled out, the question revolves around the fourth.

Perhaps Fateh might strive to influence the policies of the elected council and try to direct it unofficially under the banner of national unity, but this could prove difficult if the opposition parties participate. If the opposition parties are not allowed to participate, then the elected council will resemble a one-party state, with potentially explosive consequences. In either event, there is no clear delineation of the lines of authority between Fateh itself (as separate from the ISGA) and what may or may not be a multi-party elected council following the latter's inauguration. If these contradictions are not resolved, they could create internal problems later on.

b. Structure, powers, and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

These are some of the spheres that Israel is reserving for itself. The concept of "foreign relations" is interesting, since the PLO already has a foreign affairs apparatus of its own.

The phrase "other mutually agreed matters" implies that several more issues have been reserved by the parties for exclusive Israeli control, yet perhaps the sides did not want to publicize the nature of those issues.

c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

The article seems to place responsibility for internal security not in the hands of any political authority, such as the PLO or the elected council, but in the hands of the police force itself. Nor does the stipulation place that police force under the control of any political entity. It is as if the police is to hold its own separate, self-contained sphere of authority.

Since the police officers coming from Jordan and Egypt (although Jordan is hardly "abroad" from a West Bank perspective), belong to the Palestine Liberation Army, the stipulation that they should be "trained as police and police officers" is intended to convey the idea that they will no longer constitute a paramilitary force but will execute a simple police function.

d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

There is a difference between an international and a foreign presence. An international presence infers multilateralism under the authority of a transnational institution such as the United Nations. The term "foreign," on the other hand, more likely implies the United States and perhaps a few of its allies, as in the American-led multinational force which entered Lebanon following Israel's invasion of that country in 1982.

Use of the word "temporary ... foreign presence" in this context carries a hidden meaning: It implies that one does not currently exist, and thus, that the Israeli occupation presently reigning in the West Bank and in parts of Gaza does not itself constitute a "temporary ... foreign presence."

e. ... establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

This clause refers to liaison and cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian intelligence services. According to high-level sources, these committees are already formed and may have already reached an agreement pertaining to their function.

However, the institutionalization of intelligence cooperation by treaty presents a fundamental danger to Palestinian internal harmony and well-being. The prospect of a Fateh secret police acting in coordination with the Shin Bet to hunt down members of Palestinian opposition groups they jointly consider to be dangerous might be too much for the Palestinian psyche to bear and has the potential to destroy the legitimacy of all Palestinian institutions that have become part of the agreement.

f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

The placement of this stipulation under the withdrawal protocol seems a bit strange, to say the least. Its proper place would normally have been under Annex III, the "Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs." However, its placement here mandates that an "economic development and stabilization program" be not only a part of this agreement, but part of the interim agreement as well. This says something more about the extent of involvement Israel wants in the workings of the Palestinian economy, something which would normally fall under the category of internal affairs. Apparently, no stone is left unturned.

g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

This represents a de facto corridor only, not a sovereign one. The term "safe passage for persons" implies that the corridor will not necessarily be a Palestinian corridor, and that Israelis will not only be using it but also controlling it.

And while it will probably be open to all Israelis, it will not necessarily be open to all Palestinians. The phrase does not signify that Palestinians inherently possess the right of safe passage and transportation, simply that "arrangements" for passage will be made. By omitting the word "all" before "persons," in the classic 242 style, the phrase allows the Israelis to be able to deny to certain categories of Palestinians safe passage, or any passage, through the use of their permit system, just as they have done in the past.

There is another concern to be raised in this context. Why is the corridor to run from Gaza to Jericho rather than between Gaza and the West Bank? This seems to run counter to the concept of "the West Bank and Gaza" as a "single territorial unit." The understanding inherent in the Gaza-Jericho formula is that it is only a temporary arrangement, hence the label "Gaza-Jericho First," which appears to have since been dropped from usage. Wherever the corridor is built is where it will remain, given the expenditure of funds and labor it would require. It is legitimate to wonder why a permanent corridor would be constructed atop a temporary foundation.

There is only one possible avenue of speculation, that the intent is to bypass East Jerusalem, the natural point of entry to the West Bank. This is logical in light of the fact that connecting roads between Gaza and Jerusalem already exist and would not need to be built from scratch. There is no reason to go to all the trouble of building a direct road from Gaza to Jericho unless the intent is for Jericho to eventually replace East Jerusalem as the nerve center of Palestinian life.(7)

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: a) Gaza-Egypt; b) Jericho-Jordan.

This is the origin of the border-crossings impasse that erupted during the interim talks. It appears that, as called for in the Cairo Agreement, "coordination" has been translated on the ground into the presence of a token Palestinian terminal and a Palestinian flag at the crossing, just enough to legitimize Israel's control of it.

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Articles VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

This appears to shed some light on the question of where Fateh authority in the occupied territories will come from prior to the inauguration of the council. Since "the offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority" will be located inside the territory, it follows that the interim authority cannot be officially run from the PLO headquarters in Tunis. Once Arafat has been in Gaza for a while, however, he will likely find that his freedom to maneuver independently of Israel will drop dramatically, because he will be living on a virtual island, one that is completely surrounded by Israel.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

In effect, in matters covered by "these agreed arrangements," Gaza and Jericho are not an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other matters, they are. This constitutes a fragmentation within a fragmentation.

There is a positive aspect to it for the Palestinians as well, one which might outweigh this small negative. By declaring that the status of Gaza and Jericho will not be changed in the interim period, the phrase implies that the partition of the West Bank and Gaza, an integral whole, is only for practical reasons, that it is transitional, temporary, and without real substance.

ANNEX III: PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program ... which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include ... plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

This article does not give Palestinians any right to their own water. It specifically places the matter up for further negotiation, while hinting that Israel will have rights to and be involved in the "equitable utilization" of Palestinian water resources (referred to here as "joint water resources"), both "in and beyond" the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase, and sale of electricity resources.

Again here, Palestinian resources are to be voluntarily shared with Israel, while all aspects of resource management are to be decided jointly.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This program may also provide for the construction of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

There is only one purpose cooperation in the field of energy could serve, given the lack of substantial deposits of oil and gas in Israel or the occupied territories, that is, an open door to the Arab World. The pipeline proposal clearly falls into that category. As for the petrochemical industry in the Gaza Strip, it would seem that such an undertaking could be accomplished by the Palestinians themselves with international help but free of Israeli interference.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

Again, this seems like something the Palestinians are perfectly capable of doing by themselves, with the help of international non-state actors.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

Again, the Gaza port is something that the Palestinians can build by themselves with international help. The intent of the second portion, the building of communications and transportation links to and from the Arab World, falls within Israel's preemptive normalization strategy, assaulting the Arab World with normalization initiatives before (or without) giving back the occupied lands.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade ... which will encourage local, regional, and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

Normally, the creation of free-trade zones is a prelude to economic union, or even, in the case of Europe, indicates an intent to undertake a future political unification. The Palestinians have not yet had the chance to openly debate whether they even want an economic union, although it is well-known that the Israeli foreign minister favors such an outcome.(8) In mentioning free trade zones, the agreement assumes the Palestinian people are interested in moving in that direction.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry ... which will ... promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer, and science-based industries.

As Sara Roy has warned in a recent article,(9) cooperation with Israel in industry could be instrumental in the creation of a dependency relationship between the Palestinian and Israeli economies. Israeli entrepreneurs, in combination with wealthy Palestinian expatriates, would combine together to invest in these industries, while Palestinians will continue to form the cheap labor. The only real difference is that these industries will be located in the occupied territories, alleviating the need for Palestinians to enter Israel for work.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

If Palestinians are to be working in industries partly owned by Israelis, then certainly cooperation in labor relations, as well as regulations, will be necessary. This is not to say that the outcome will be in favor of the Palestinian worker.

As far as social welfare issues are concerned, it is difficult to comprehend in what aspects of their social welfare the Palestinians would require input from Israel. Additionally, it is important to note that social welfare was supposed to be one of the spheres of authority for the Palestinian elected council, as stated above in Article VI(2). Now, it has apparently entered the realm of "cooperation."

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes, and data banks.

The assumption here is that individual Palestinians and Israelis, rather than their respective leaderships, are inclined to become intimately involved with one another at the societal level.

10. An environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

Environmental protection is an example of a matter that genuinely requires cooperation, by its very nature.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

This is a good example of an issue where cooperation could very well be harmful. If the Palestinians are going to enjoy a free press, it will have to be independent of their own leadership, not to mention independent of Israel.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

It would seem as if every detail of almost every issue requires coordination, even in spheres that presumably fall within the Palestinian authority. This has tremendous implications for independent Palestinian development.

ANNEX IV: PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

This section, which follows directly from its predecessor, contains further elaboration within the categories of economic development and stabilization at both the local (Palestinian) and regional levels, which allegedly "require cooperation," both between Israel and the Palestinians and between the two of these acting together and regional Arab states.

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a development program for the region, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the OECD, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

The multilaterals are thus to become the medium of cooperation through which Israel and the Palestinian entity will jointly undertake, with the help of the international donor and investment community, to develop the region. This will give Israel a leading role in developing the Arab World.

What is interesting is the order of participation. The process begins at the initiative of Israel and the Palestinian entity, who ask the G-7 to recruit "other interested states" for the program. The Arab states, which are the target of any "regional development program," are included as an example of a category of "other interested states," as an afterthought, and barely that. Even the OECD states come first in the list of afterthoughts.

This article, along with several others, places the Palestinians and the Israelis on a single side of the table opposite "regional Arab states."

2. The Economic Development Program will consist of two elements:

a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and Gaza Strip;

b. a Regional Economic Development Program.

This is straightforward enough, yet once again, the West Bank and Gaza are separated from the Arab World.

A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:

1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.

Of course, those who need the houses the most, the forgotten 1948 refugees in Lebanon and Syria, will not be included here.

2. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.

3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation, and communications, etc.)

4. A Human Resources Plan.

5. Other programs.

Each of these elements, industry, transportation, communications, and human resources, are already covered in the preceding Annex III. And, as stated earlier, all of them could be accomplished by the Palestinians themselves, with international help brought in as they deem necessary.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

Note, of course, the term "may consist" instead of "will consist." Israel cannot presume to speak for the Arab states, even though it has already taken it upon itself to outline their development priorities for them.

1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.

2. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

3. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal.

4. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.

5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.

What these five elements have in common is that they were arrived at without consultation with the Arab states that would be most affected by such cooperation. Yet these areas do represent legitimate fields in which the Arab states might or might not wish to consider cooperation. Those listed below are much more presumptuous and interfere directly with the sovereignty of Arab states.

6. Interconnection of electricity grids.

7. Regional cooperation for the transfer []], distribution, and industrial exploitation of gas, oil, and other energy resources.

This is very important. Who gave Israel the right to a say in the development of Arab oil? Since Israel has no oil, it is clear that the "cooperation" is in one direction only. Similarly, the agreement assumes that the Arabs intend to "transfer" and "distribute" oil to Israel.

Finally, the placement of "oil" after "gas" in the list, is slightly misleading, as if to minimize its visibility.

8. A Regional Tourism, Transportation, and Telecommunications Development Plan.

Again, it is unclear that the tourism industries of the Arab states would want to cooperate with those of Israel. The work of arranging multiple destinations within a single region for travellers who desire it is usually done by professional travel agencies.

9. Regional cooperation in other spheres.

To wrap up, then, the economic development category for the West Bank and Gaza includes: social rehabilitation, including housing and economic development and stabilization and regional development, construction; small and medium business development; infrastructural development, including water, electricity, transportation and communications; and human resources.

The regional development category includes: a Middle East Development Plan and a Middle East Development Bank; exploitation of the Dead Sea (including Jordan); a Med Sea - Dead Sea canal; de-salination and other water projects; agricultural development and the prevention of desertification; inter-connection of electricity grids; the transfer, exploitation, and distribution of gas, oil, and other energy resources, presumably from the Arab states to Israel; regional tourism, transportation, and telecommunications development; and other spheres.

So, what is left to the Palestinians, or Arab states for that matter, to do by themselves?

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

ARTICLE IV

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

So again, both prior to and following the inauguration of the council, the powers transferred to the Palestinian side will cover, in terms of their jurisdiction, "West Bank and Gaza Strip territory." Again, just as with Article IV itself, the term "West Bank and Gaza Strip territory" is not defined, and the definite article (i.e., "the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip") is excluded.

The details of final status talks are alluded to here for the first time, conveying a sense of continuity and linkage. Included as an item in the final status talks is the issue of "military locations." Presumably these "locations" would be within the occupied territories, or they would not need to be negotiated. This would tend to be indicative of some kind of permanent Israeli military presence in some part of the West Bank or Gaza in perpetuity, thus precluding full sovereignty.

2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres, and authorities transferred to it.

In Article IV itself, jurisdiction is over everything except the final status issues, some of which are listed. Here, jurisdiction is narrowed to apply to only those spheres explicitly transferred to it. This has the effect of transferring the default categories to Israeli jurisdiction.

ARTICLE VI(2)

The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities, and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians ....

Israel does not have an explicit veto over the personalities who will assume the specified powers, but this clause, by bringing up the subject of the individual names, may give the Israelis a de facto voice in the matter.

ARTICLE VII (2)

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

If the point on coordination and cooperation had not been emphasized enough earlier in the agreement, here is another repetition for good measure. Since it is left out of Article VII's among the items to be included in the interim agreement, it is specifically included here. The focus of this language is on coordination and cooperation as ends in themselves, not for the purpose of reaching some larger goal that could not be achieved by either side acting alone. Not only are the two sides agreeing to coordinate their activities, they have also required that the manner and the details of such coordination, at least in the interim phase, be written into the treaty.

ARTICLE VII(5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

This clause seems to negate the article to which it is attached. What good is the withdrawal of the military government, some might legitimately ask, if Israel is still going to exercise the same powers it did prior to the withdrawal?

The powers in question are primarily the repressive powers of military rule. The transfer of many of the social and bureaucratic spheres to the Palestinian council will of course remove those unnecessary burdens from the shoulders of the Israeli state.

The question emerges: If the Israeli military government itself is to be withdrawn, then who will enforce Israel's right to exercise the powers not transferred to the Palestinians?

ARTICLE VIII

The Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard ....

"In this regard" refers to Article VIII. In other words, the establishment of the Palestinian police force by the elected council is undertaken in cooperation with Israel, as agreed upon in the interim agreement. However, the police force has already been established, but under the direction of Yasser Arafat rather than that of a still non-existent elected council.

ANNEX II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

In using the term "civilians," the agreement sees no difference between Israelis within the Green Line and those who have set up camp in the settlements. Secondly, by separating the "Israelis" from the "settlements," the agreement implicitly recognizes that the Israeli military might have to enforce security for Israeli settlers in Gaza and Jericho outside the settlements themselves.

And a related question comes up as well. Who is going to protect Israeli settlers travelling "freely" through Gaza and Jericho? This responsibility obviously falls under the term "security of Israelis", which belongs to the Israeli military. If the settlers are traversing Arab roads, so will Israeli soldiers, who, although they will supposedly have withdrawn from Gaza and Jericho, will now have the right to come in and out at will. Nor is there is any authority entrusted with protecting Palestinian civilians from Israeli settlers.

CONCLUSION

It is necessary now to expand from the specific and address the larger picture, by identifying the underlying themes and implications of the text for the future of the Palestinian people. While the agreement holds out a small hope for the Palestinians to attain some form of quasi-statehood for what they often call "a fraction of the people on a fraction of the land," it is unlikely that they will be allowed to evolve into real independence because of the language in the agreement and Israel's limitations on its elasticity in practice.

There are some other negative ramifications, more specific but also quite severe, which must be brought out into the open if they are to be prevented from full realization. Some of them have already begun to manifest themselves, while others, which have yet to do so, can still conceivably be neutralized if they are addressed quickly and squarely. Some have international implications, while the effect of others will be limited to the immediate regional system. Here, several of these major new issues that have been introduced into the Israeli-Palestinian arena as a result of the agreement are identified and briefly addressed.

First, the declaration of principles stands outside the bounds of international law and runs contrary to it, both in particular and as a whole, through its affirmation of the legitimacy of the most important facets of occupation. At the same time, it has politically (not legally) superseded, indeed replaced, international law as the sole framework within which the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is being addressed. The only real connection of the agreement to international law is in the early mention of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, the implementation of which is deliberately delayed until final status negotiations, and the interpretation of which is still in question.

The other relevant Security Council resolutions and international legal conventions are essentially disregarded. For instance, legitimation of the settler presence in any form runs contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which specifically prohibits the transfer of civilians of the occupying power to the occupied territory. Israeli settlements in particular are declared illegal on this basis, as expressed in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 446 and 452.

The Palestinian Right of Return, sanctioned specifically by U.N. Security Council Resolution 194 and generically by the International Declaration of Human Rights in Article 13(2), which accords every person "the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country," is ignored by the agreement. There is provision for the return of perhaps some of the 1967 exiles, who are categorized euphemistically as "displaced persons," but there is no statement on the future of the 1948 exiles, whose fate is ostensibly relegated to final status negotiations under the heading of "refugees."

Existing Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem have been totally contravened. The position of international law on East Jerusalem is crystal clear, as evidenced by the passage of volumes of Security Council resolutions on the subject.(10) However, following the February 1994 massacre of Palestinians in the West Bank city of Hebron, the United States refused to support a proposed resolution draft that referred to East Jerusalem as part of the occupied territories, on the ground that the agreement places the subject up for negotiation. This method of argumentation, that a bilateral agreement should take precedence if it comes into conflict with established international codes, would set a destructive precedent if allowed to stand.

Likewise, the provisions for the settlement of disputes make no reference to international forums. Hence, disputes arising out of various aspects of the agreement are to be settled outside the international legal framework. This policy has been extended in practice, such that disputes originating outside of the actual agreement are likewise placed beyond the reach of the international community, and within the restraining boundaries of the negotiating process. This has the effect of eliminating accountability not only from the negotiations themselves, but from all matters concerning Israelis and Palestinians.

Since the agreement for all intents and purposes stands above international law and in outright defiance of it, and because of its all-encompassing scope in practice, there remains no independent authority empowered to define what actions are in violation of the day-to-day human and national rights of the Palestinian people, and to put a stop to such actions. The Palestinian side is thus left with no way in which to seek outside redress of grievances, whether they stem from the agreement or not. If the Israeli side, on the other hand, believes it is the aggrieved party, it can simply act unilaterally to redress the grievance, as a result of its status as the stronger power. Therefore, while couched in the language of equals, the agreement ultimately subjects the Palestinian existence, both present and future, to a vertical relationship with Israel based upon the reigning asymmetry of power.

A quite different theme underlying the agreement is the proliferation of artificially-created inter-Palestinian cleavages. Indeed, the agreement's failure to meet the minimum Palestinian national consensus has resulted in a new form of segmentation on political grounds, which in many cases reinforces the geographical cleavages described above. This has become an extremely sensitive issue among Palestinians both inside and outside Palestine. What now exists is a population divided between those in support of the agreement, and by extension, of the group in power that signed it, and the opposition, consisting of parties which stand against both the agreement and the group that signed it, which they contend stepped over numerous Palestinian red lines by doing so.

The latter is not a classic case of political opposition. Rather, the groups and individuals which oppose the agreement have become extra-system players, a phenomenon the Palestinians have not known before (aside from politically insignificant renegades such as Abu Nidal). Indeed, not only groups but major segments of the population have been relegated to extra-system status within the Palestinian body politic. The entire Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon and Syria, now under the leadership of the opposition alliance due to apparent neglect by Arafat, falls into this category.(11) This has had the effect of fragmenting the Palestinian nation into supporters and opponents of the agreement, both ideologically and geographically.(12) The agreement has, in essence, become the system.

As if to confirm this hypothesis, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, when asked if Arafat represents the Palestinian people, responded that he only represents those who support the accord.(13) This structural segmentation of Palestinian peoplehood, on the basis of an issue external to itself, lowers the possibility of the formation of a "loyal opposition," and hence, raises formidable obstacles to the continuation of Palestinian national and democratic politics.

Third, the "peace process" is not running entirely parallel to the actual situation on the ground. This has transpired because political actors in both Washington and Tel Aviv have eliminated all elasticity from it. This has had the effect of rendering the process so rigid that it lacks the ability to adapt itself to and hence, remain connected with, the progression of real-time events. A sense of denial has been built into the process over time, such that the expression of "pessimism," regardless of the actual situation in the occupied territories, is interpreted as a rejectionist ideological position rather than an objective conclusion. Likewise, "optimism," which has become synonymous with support for the "peace process," is expressed even at times when the situation obviously does not warrant it. In essence, it has become politically unacceptable to describe the objective conditions on the ground and then make predictions accordingly.

The point is that the more the agreement is used to force the parties to deny the tangible realities as they exist, the more it will become a figment of the participants' imagination. If this trend continues, the agreement will lose viability over the long-term, as the divergence between its peaceful and good-neighborly pronouncements and the reality of continued bloodshed becomes wider than what the credulity of either the Palestinian or Israeli people can bear. The result could be that the agreement, and both leaderships that signed it, could eventually be accused by their constituencies of being out of touch with reality as it is, and hence, removed from their positions of leadership in one way or another.

A fourth feature inherent in the overall tone of the agreement is its tendency toward the creation of an economic and political dependency relationship between Israel and Palestine. This aspect has been thoroughly dealt with elsewhere and need not be elaborated upon here.(14) However, the fact that one-third of the accord is devoted to a detailed discussion of the elements, spheres, and methodologies of cooperation and/or coordination is evidentiary to this underlying intention. Almost every economic activity, down to the last minute detail, is subject to coordination or cooptation, and hence, to control by Israel as the stronger power.

At the same time, the agreement, if the text is implemented in its entirety, will provide the Israelis with access for the first time to the resources and markets of Arab countries, in which they will not find it difficult to gain the upper hand, given the advanced state of the Israeli economy compared to the Third World economies around it. Such lopsided "integration" will also afford Israel greater opportunities to apply political pressure directly on Arab leaders in attempts to influence the Arab decision-making process itself.

Economic boycotts and political ostracism will end, immigration of Jews from overseas will probably increase, and a region-wide environment of normalization will enable Israel to grow in economic strength by several orders of magnitude, as private capital finally deems it safe to invest in Israel. Thus, the Israelis will no longer need to rely on political donations in the form of foreign assistance from the United States and others, because their economy will finally be able to stand on its own foundations.

Finally, in the realm of political relations, the cooperation and coordination clauses, through the manner of their wording, effectively intend to detach the Palestinians and their issue from the Arab arena and incorporate them into the Israeli one, while simultaneously providing the Israelis with a bridge they can cross to obtain access, both political and economic, to the wider Arab World.(15)

In the wake of this historic regional crossing, the Israelis hope to catalyze the emergence of a new Middle Eastern state system, dominated by Israel and marked by the death of the Arab identity, to replace that which had previously been known as the Arab state system. In this way, the Israelis will at last gain the legitimacy they have always sought, the only real source of longevity and one that, in the final analysis, can only be afforded them by the indigenous peoples of the region.

NOTES

1. The Washington Post, 1 February 1994.

2. During a visit by this writer to the area in the fall of 1993, a senior official of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies admitted privately that Israel was committed to annexing an additional 12 percent of the West Bank as a quid pro quo for the inevitable Palestinian demand for a West Bank-Gaza corridor in final status talks. That 12 percent is over and above the prior annexation of expanded East Jerusalem. It includes the areas mentioned above, including what he called "Israel's traditional water sources," but excluding the land along the Jordan River, which he believes Israel can forgo.

3. Actually, the issue of the 1948 refugees has not been postponed at all. It is being discussed now and in secret, in clear violation of the agreement. Shortly after the signing, a proposal was raised quietly by Washington and Tel Aviv to transfer most of the 1948 refugees presently residing in the Lebanon camps to the north of the country, and eventually, to the desert area of southwestern Iraq. Several regional governments have been consulted, while the refugees themselves have not. Iraq, suffering under a comprehensive trade embargo, would have little say in the matter.

4. An early sampling of this was seen in Rabin's handling of the settlers in the aftermath of the Hebron massacre in February.

5. There already is censorship in the Palestinian broadcast media. Furthermore, Israel tried to assign Arafat's radio station the very same frequency currently being used by Ahmed Jibril's Al-Quds radio based in Damascus, in an attempt to prevent this very popular station from reaching its Palestinian listeners in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

6. A major example of this fragmentation can be found in the Cairo Agreement, which separates Palestinians of Gaza and Jericho from other West Bank Palestinians at border crossings.

* Recent statements by Rabin and other Israeli leaders indicate that the military "re-deployments" may be frozen until after the Israeli elections in June 1996, thus delaying Palestinian elections until some subsequent date.

See Article XIII for the stipulation that the re-deployment will occur "not later than the eve of elections for the Council," which clearly places the Palestinian elections after the Israeli re-deployment.

7. In a Washington Times article of 3 March 1994, Jericho was referred to as the Palestinians' "would-be capital."

8. See Shimon Peres' recent book, The New Middle East, for an elaborate description of this vision.

9. Sara Roy, "Separation or Integration: Closure and the Economic Future of the Gaza Strip Revisited," in Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1, Winter 1994.

10. Including 252, 267, 271, 298, 476, and 478, as well as explicit references to the occupied half of Jerusalem in the anti-settlement resolutions.

11. The author conducted a two-week visit to the Palestinian camps in Lebanon in June 1994. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have received neither financial support nor political attention from Arafat since the signing of the Oslo accord. Hence, no support for Arafat could be found anywhere in the camps except inside the heavily-guarded office of the Palestine Red Crescent, run by Arafat's brother. Fateh branches in Lebanon which were with Arafat right up until the signing have since disavowed him and joined the opposition alliance.

12. The ideological effect can be seen in the way the meaning of the Palestinian flag inside the occupied territories has become distorted since the agreement. Displaying the flag in the West Bank and Gaza is currently interpreted as support for Arafat, Fateh, or the agreement, rather than as a symbol of Palestinian nationhood, its former meaning. This is confirmed by a personal experiment conducted by this author on a visit to the area at the end of 1993, as well as by reports of Israeli patrols stopping Palestinian cars not displaying the flag.

13. On the 5 February 1994 edition of "Evans and Novak."

14. See Sara Roy, op. cit.

15. Some analysts in the region fear that the first step is the Benelux option with Jordan, by which Israel could liquidate that country's separate identity and then dominate it politically, using the Palestinians as a bridge. Under the cover of confederation, Israel could implement a new Labour Party incarnation of a Jordan-is-Palestine option without ever having to physically expel anyone from the West Bank. Interview with Naji al-Hadithi, Iraqi Deputy Information Minister, during this author's visit to Baghdad, Iraq, May/June 1994.

Laura Drake, a Middle East specialist in Washington, is a doctoral candidate in international relations at The American University.