Between Russia and the West: Hungary and the illusions of peacemaking, 1945-1947.

DURING THE last twenty years many books have been written about the transatlantic migration of the intellectuals who, fleeing from Hitler, came to the United States during the 1930s and early 1940s, many of whom enriched American cultural life and learning. Much less attention has been paid to the refugees from Soviet-occupied Europe during the late 1940s, of whom Professor Stephen Kertesz is one of the most distinguhished. A former scholar of international law, then a diplomat and envoy, he resigned his important post in 1947, leaving his native Hungary and settling eventually at Norte Dame, where he has spent the last 35 years teaching and writing. In accord with his unusually consistent and honorable career, Between Russia and the West, published in the 81st year of his-life, deserves a high degree of respect; but there is, for American readers, more to this book than another milestone in the distinguished career of a foreign-born scholar. This book--part memoir, part history, part political analysis--is an account of the tribulations of Hungary during the twilight years 1945 to 1947, when people could still entertain hopes of an eventual Soviet withdrawal from their country. For many reasons--and not only because of the Russian's presence and their malevolence--the room within which Hungarian statesmen, politicans, and diplomats could maneuver was extremely constricted. That men such as Kertesz failed was not their fault. Kertesz describes the one-sided, sloppy, and often dishonest procedures of the peace-treaty "negotiations" in Paris in 1946-47; but again, for American readers this is not where the main value of the book lies. What Professor Kertesz's judicious account provides is the very opposite of the usual view of American diplomacy during those years. This view is that American foreign policy reacted to the Soviet Union too hastily and too strongly, contributing thereby to the development of the cold war. The contrary is true. As late as 1946, Stalin was not quite sure what the United States would do. By the time American diplomacy, statesmanship, and public opinion began to react to the Soviet subjugation of certain portions of Eastern Europe--at first, with considerable hesitation--it was too late. I am not saying that the United States was in a position to butt the Russians out of Europe after they had won the war. Few Americans would have gone along with that. But, as George Kennan wrote in 1945, "We have consistently refused to make clear what our interests and our wishes were. . . . We have refused to name any limit for Russian expansion and Russian responsibilities, thereby confusing the Russians and causing them constantly to wonder whether they are asking too little or whether it was some kind of a trap." Professor Kertesz cites this assessment--at that time an unusual one--approvingly, with every reason. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that he began his professional career as a judicial expert, a scholar of international law. His latest book is a model of calm and honest judgment.