Betty J. Birner and Gregory Ward, eds. 2006. Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning: Neo-Gricean Studies in Pragmatics and Semantics in Honor of Laurence R. Horn.

Betty J. Birner and Gregory Ward, eds. 2006. Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning: Neo-Gricean Studies in Pragmatics and Semantics in Honor of Laurence R. Horn. (Studies in Language Companion Series 80.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. pp. xi + 350.

For nearly four decades Larry Horn has been championing a version of Gricean pragmatic reasoning in the analysis of a wide range of linguistic phenomena. These analyses began, I believe, with a presuppositional analysis of the two awkward particles only and even (Horn Presuppositional: only was revisited in Horn Exclusive), which was quickly followed by an examination of the semantic properties of the logical operators in English (Horn Semantic) and then by possibly the most comprehensive discussion of natural language negation ever seen (Horn Metalinguistic, Natural). Along the way, Horn recast the Gricean picture of contextual inference (Horn Taxonomy) by introducing Q and R principles (so-called in deference to Grice's first Quantity maxim and his relation maxim, respectively) together with the Division of Pragmatic Labour and he has applied these new tools to a broad range of linguistic phenomena (e. g. Horn Given, Duplex, Economy, John, Iff among many others). Also along the way, Horn has provided a running commentary on the intellectual state of pragmatics, and its disciplinary neighbours (e.g. Horn Pragmatic, Hamburgers, Said, Pragmatics, Presupposition, Pragmatics: Presupposition, Pragmatics." Implicature, Implicature, Border, Speaker, NeoGricean) These survey papers, in their own right, provide an excellent introduction, from a certain point of view, to contemporary semantics, pragmatics and the uncertain and controversial relations between the two.

In the book under review, Betty Birner and Greg Ward have assembled eighteen papers by prominent linguists and philosophers, and, indeed, the odd computer scientist, to celebrate Horn's enormous contributions to semantics, pragmatics and to the discipline of linguistics more generally. Given Horn's extra-ordinary track record over the years this festschrift is, if I may say, with no disrespect to the editors, a little late in coming. But perhaps the present volume, to put the matter in a broader context, can be viewed as the first of several that may appear over the next few years, and which may attempt to engage with neo-Gricean pragmatics more generally and Horn's own contribution to its conceptual development in particular. There is much in this (highly controversial) field that deserves the closest and most careful scrutiny.

A first step in this examination might be assisted by Kent Bach's short paper "The top 10 m isconceptions about implicature" (21-30). Bach is also a neo-Gricean, of sorts, and his distinctions between what is said, impliciture--an implicit weakening, strengthening or specification of what is said--and implicature are gaining some currency as the recognition of their usefulness begins to ripple out (e. g. Horn Implicature, 21-24; Border, 23-27). His discussion of some of the alleged misconceptions is very interesting. He is happy, for example, to dispense with the category of conventional implicature (c.f. Horn Implicature, 6; Toward, 53-62) and given Grice's own unhelpful remarks on this category its removal from the taxonomy is probably a useful step. And he argues, in addition, that scalar implicatures are really conversational implicitures, which makes him, I think, a little more neo-Gricean than Horn, But although Bach's cautionary remarks about how to interpret the original ramshackle Gricean proposals (c. f. Horn Pragmatic, 130; Turner Special) are very plausible there is one "misconception" that does not need to be corrected. It is that "implicatures can't be entailments." It seems to me that they can't: implicatures are cancelable, entailments aren't. These two cells in the taxonomy must be kept apart--they contain quite different creatures. End of story. (On this matter I am, quite clearly, a little less neo-Gricean than either Bach or Horn.)

Another step in the examination can be taken with Francis Jeffry Pelletier and Andrew Hartline's "On a homework problem of Larry Horn's" (281-93) and Jerrold Sadock's "Motors and switches: An exercise in syntax and pragmatics" (317-25). Pelletier and Hartline argue that the neo-Gricean's analysis of disjunction--positing a semantic inclusive disjunction from which exclusive interpretations are contextually derived (c.f. Horn Border, 33-35)--fails when there is more than two disjuncts. They suggest that what is needed is not some general mechanism for binary and beyond-binary disjunctions, for no such mechanism can be provided, but one mechanism, the neo-Gricean's, for the binary cases and another mechanism for the non-binary cases. The problem, as yet unsolved, is to determine the character of that second mechanism. Here, then, is one place where we may be seeing the limits of the neo-Gricean approach. Sadock's paper is in the same general ball park. It is a little unusual in that it was written, but not published, more than twenty years ago. Sadock defends its inclusion by saying that the paper represents the sort of thinking that Horn's early work put on a firm basis in the 1970s. The focus is the difference between the validity of argument patterns that are formalised with the material conditional and "natural" arguments using the word "if": some intuitively valid arguments can be shown to be formally invalid, with the material conditional, and some intuitively invalid arguments can be shown to be formally valid. Sadock's example, well-known in the literature, is:

Premise: If you throw switch S and switch T, the motor will start;

Conclusion: Therefore, either if you throw switch S the motor will start or if you throw switch T the motor will start:

(which is formally valid but intuitively invalid). There are some parts of Sadock's argument where the analysis really does show its age--the casual appeal to a rule of operator spreading, for example, is not something that would be tolerated these days, I suspect, without a full type-theoretic and model theoretic formalisation. But, with a charitable gesture, the central claim of the argument can be taken as: "Classical logic can be preserved in this case as in others by copious applications of pragmatic reasoning" (318). If we accept this proposal to be what the paper is setting out to establish then there is a couple of points to be made here. The first is that Sadock, like many, if not most, if not all neo-Griceans ignores the letter, and indeed the spirit of one of Grice's "killer" quotes. The quote is this:

the final test for the presence of a conversational implicature had to be, as far as I could see, a derivation of it. One has to produce an account of how it could have arisen and why it is there. And I am very much opposed to any kind of sloppy use of this philosophical tool, in which one does not fulfill this condition. (Grice Presupposition, 187)

where I take "a derivation" to be some sort of a proof-theoretic object in a contextual logic. So, the first point is: neo-Griceans employ the various notions of implicature (and they make reference to "pragmatic reasoning") but rarely, if ever, do they "cash out" their claims with the relevant kind of contextually sensitive proof theory. The second point to make, with reference to the particular details of conditionals, is that the assumption that conditionals express propositions, and so can be either true or false, is an assumption that is based upon a very unnatural intuition. It is not an intuition that I share, nor is it shared by a good number of others (the names of Ernest Adams, Anthony Appiah, Richard Bradley and Dorothy Edgington spring immediately to mind). Instead, a more natural intuition is that conditionals express probabilities, or, equivalently, degrees of belief and that the probability value (degree of belief) of a conditional is the probability (degree of belief) of its consequent given the probability (degree of belief) of its antecedent. Truth-conditional semantics, employing either classical logic or one of the more recent new fangled alternatives, just isn't the right place to start for the semantic analysis of conditional sentences. Or, to recast slightly, a sentence from Horn (Presupposition, 304) conditionals do not readily accept truth-conditional modelling. The Gricean, and neo-Gricean (and Davidsonian, incidentally) strategy to preserve as much of classical logic as possible for the semantic analysis of a natural language is blunted on conditional sentences. Here, then, is another place where we may be seeing the limits of(neo-) Gricean approaches. Note that the option of considering a probability semantics was not a live one for Grice: "! am no kind of expert in the theory of probability" (Grice Aspects, 80).

Two of the papers are on the topic of negation and a third is on the sister topic of presupposition. Frederick J. Newmeyer, in "Negation and modularity" (241-61), argues that the correct account of negation in English requires purely syntactic constructs and that therefore the syntax of negation in English supports a modular approach to language. This paper appears to me as an odd inclusion as the approach is neither neo-Gricean (as per the subtitle of the collection) nor is the topic one in semantics and pragmatics (ditto), except in opposition. Scott Schwenter, in "Fine-tuning Jespersen's Cycle" (327-44), (c.f. Horn Flaubert, 187-92) makes the interesting case that the evolution of (1) neg + verb to (2) neg + verb + emphatic neg to (3) neg + verb + obligatory neg to (4) verb + neg, as found, by Jespersen, in French, English and Danish, does not generalise to Catalan, Italian and Brazilian Portuguese. The particular problem is that the label "emphatic neg" in stage (2) is, first, usually left undefined, so the precise status of this stage is indeterminate and. second, a more accurate and sensitive category, permitting the generalisation to other varieties of Romance, is information structure. The important feature of stage (2) negation is that it is restricted to denials of activated, salient discourse-old propositions. This kind of analysis, appealing to information-structure-type "stuff," Schwenter acknowledges, is already anticipated in Horn (Lexical, Natural). It is one that could profitably be rolled out across more of a language, and across more languages.

Presuppositions are sometimes defined as those inferences that survive negation (c.f. Horn Showdown, Presupposition). In "Where have some of the presuppositions gone?" (1-20), Barbara Abbott examines the distinction between "soft" and "hard" presupposition triggers and attempts to account for the fact that some presuppositions are more easily contextually neutralizable than others. This is a very interesting paper, which deserves a comprehensive response. I will, however, in the present context, limit my discussion to just one point. With reference to data like (1) and (2):

(1) a. The King of France is wise.

b. The King of France is not wise.

c. There is a King of France.

(2) a. Bill is sorry that it is raining.

b. Bill is not sorry that it is raining.

c. It is raining.

she says that both (la) and (2a) "entail their respective presuppositions" (3) and so "we will need to be careful to distinguish entailments that are presupposed from what I will call "ordinary, simple entailments," which are not also presuppositions" (3). This notion of "entailment that is also presupposed" seems to me to be a problematic one, and for the reason, to refer back to earlier discussion, that presuppositions can't be entailments. Presuppositions are cancelable, entailments aren't. To say that presuppositions are also entailments is on a par with speaking of chalk as being cheese. These two cells, to repeat, in the taxonomy must be kept apart --they contain quite different creatures. End of story. But, having said this, this is, in many respects, a possibly excellent, and, a certainly provocative paper and I hope the author will return, at greater length, to this topic.

Horn (Toward, 60) quotes, approvingly, the following lines:

If we are interested in the logical form of natural language (as opposed to the logical form of English only) we need analyses that "travel well." We cannot be satisfied that our analysis works for our own language if it fails as an analysis of most other languages in the world. (Ludlow and Segal Unitary, 436)

It may be the case that two contributors to this festschrift read the same paper. Donka Farkas, in "Free choice in Romanian" (71-94), examines the several Romanian equivalents of English free choice any and, after a long and detailed trip through the territory, concludes that what she calls an "indefinitist" view that generalises Horn's scalar approach provides a useful descriptive and theoretical handle on the Romanian facts. Anastasia Giannakidou, in "Polarity, questions, and the scalar properties of even" (95-116), examines three Greek counterparts to English even: akomi ke, oute, and esto. The problem seems to be that English even licenses distinct presuppositions in positive and negative sentences. Solutions to this problem resort to either scopal or lexical ambiguities. The behaviour of Greek akomi ke seems to provide evidence for a wide scope analysis; the behaviour of oute kan seems to provide evidence for a negative polarity item analysis and the behaviour of esto seems to provide evidence for a flexible scale analysis. These two papers on Romanian and Greek show the potential of a contrastive neo-Gricean semantics and pragmatics as an approach to analyses that "travel well."

Some of the contributors pursue semantic/pragmatic ends without explicitly exploiting neo-Gricean means. Greg Carlson and Gianluca Storto, for example, in "Sherlock Holmes was in no danger" (53-70), exam ine the covert variable approach to the semantics and pragmatics of certain context-sensitive lexical items. This is an approach which has become somewhat fashionable of late and its net effect, if successful, is to "domesticate" some of the unruliness of context sensitivity by placing it within the relatively well-behaved, and certainly better understood, domain of the semantic. Carlson and Storto are not wholly convinced. They review some of the objections to covert variables but find that although there are problems for analyses that employ them, there is nothing that decisively and conclusively refutes such analyses. In this context, they offer an alternative approach based on situations where these are posited as parameters of evaluation. They propose that situational parameterization applies to all (non-logical) lexical items. It is helpful, I think, to re-introduce the notion of situation for the examination of the semantics/pragmatics interface in this way. This notion has been a little too long in the wilderness. (Events, of course, have had a much happier time of it.) Pauline Jacobson, in "I can't seem to figure this out" (157-75), discusses the can't seem construction which has distinct semantic--seem-not-can--and surface--can-not-seem--scope properties. She argues that (1) can here is really a quantifier over occasions and that (2) seem here is really an assertion hedge, and that (3) if(l) and (2) go through then the construction yields to a fully compositional analysis.

A higher neo-Gricean content is discerned in Micheal Israel's "Saying less and meaning less" (137-56) and in Andrew Kehler and Gregory Ward's "Referring expressions and conversational implicature" (177-93). Israel's paper is, initially, at least, a rather puzzling piece because the author wishes to combine neo-Gricean pragmatics and cognitive semantics to produce something that he calls "NeoGricean Cognitive Grammar." This presents something of a puzzle because the kind ofpragmatics introduced by Grice maintains a number of heuristically useful distinctions: what is said vs. what is implicated; what is conversationally implicated vs. what is conventionally implicated; what is particularly conversationally implicated vs. ... etc (see Horn Pragmatic, 121 for a useful summary diagram). Cognitive linguistics, on the other hand, is an inquiry that collapses distinctions: syntax collapses into semantics; semantics collapses into pragmatics; the lexicon into the encyclopaedia ... etc. The project of "blending," as Israel calls it, neo-Gricean pragmatics and cognitive semantics would seem to do considerable violence to the essential character of each. I am certainly one of those, mentioned by Israel on page 139, who find the blend incongruous (and, I might add, completely implausible and ill-advised). But let us follow Israel a little further to see where he takes us. He says:

   I propose a compromise between those who would place a clear
   boundary between semantics and pragmatics, and those who view
   meaning construction in general as a dynamic process which is in
   some sense pragmatic from start to finish. The solution is to
   accept the basic distinction between two kinds of meaning (what is
   said vs. what is implicated), but to refuse the assumption (common
   among those who enforce this distinction) that either sort of
   meaning has any ontological priority over the other. (139)

We now ask two questions: (i) Are there people who place "a clear boundary" between semantics and pragmatics? (My sense of the literature is that more people assume an overlap: see Horn (Pragmatic, 121) for how the overlap might look diagrammatically.) (2) What is meant by "ontological priority?" I suspect that the people being referred to here, who make this assumption, are labouring under one of Bach's top ten misconceptions:

Grice did not intend his account of how implicatures are recognized as a psychological theory or even as a cognitive model. He intended it as a rational reconstruction. When he illustrated the ingredients involved in recognizing an implicature, he was enumerating the sorts of information that a hearer needs to take into account, at least intuitively, and exhibiting how this information is logically organized. He was not foolishly engaged in psychological speculation about the nature of or even the temporal sequence of the cognitive processes that implement that logic. (Bach, this volume, 25: emphases added)

There are further questions to ask about Israel's views on the relationship between "the logical," which he seems to acknowledge as part of the story, and "the psychological," which he clearly endorses in his use of mental space "technology." But here I propose to leave the matter, and to make a note to keep an eye on the future development of the Scalar Model of Polarity andNeo-Gricean Cognitive Grammar. It may just be that we are here witnessing the emergence of a new paradigm.

Kehler and Ward's paper similarly attempts a blend, this time of neo-Gricean pragmatics and Princean discourse analysis (e.g. Prince Toward, ZPG). They are interested in the pragmatics of referential form and in a tightly argued and convincingly illustrated paper, quite typical of these two authors (c.f. Kehler and Ward, Constraints, Semantics), they first show the limitations of analyses that resort to notions like uniqueness and cognitive status. They propose, instead, a familiarity analysis in which, as they say, "a speaker's failure to use a referring expression that indicates hearer-familiarity conversationally implicates that the referent is in fact nonfamiliar to the hearer" (177). But whereas, from the language at the beginning of the analysis, the reader feels able to assume that one--or rather two--"monocausal" explanations for the choice of referring expressions are being replaced by a third ("mono-causal" explanation), by the end of the analysis this assumption must be considerably weakened. The last two sentences of the paper read:

... we suspect that choice of referential form is governed by a system of heterogeneous factors across many dimensions. From this brief discussion of referring expressions and Quantity-based implicature, it should be clear that no single dimension--whether it be uniqueness, givenness, or familiarity--is adequate in and of itself, and that a complete account of the relationship that holds among the various referring expressions of a language will have to take additional factors into account. (192, emphases added.)

Once again, it seems, the complexity of the facts of reference has beaten back its assailants. The last word on these facts has yet to be spoken.

Two papers depart from the usual syntax-semantics-pragmatics format of the Peircean/Morrisian/(possibly Gricean) semiotic trichotomy, and their authors embrace a form-function, or syntax-pragmatics, semiotic dichotomy, in one, "Impersonal pronouns in French and Yiddish: Semantic reference vs. discourse reference" (295-315), Ellen Prince examines French on and Yiddish men and finds certain features that these pronouns share. She runs these, and other features, through Centering Theory and concludes, contra Discourse Representation Theory and File-Change Semantics, that two accounts, one for semantic and one for discourse reference, are required to accommodate the facts of reference. This analysis is convincing- to a degree. What I miss is attention to some of the foundational issues: Prince's assessment of the relative merits of Centering Theory and neoGricean pragmatics, for example, would have gone a little way to satisfying the little philosopher in all of us who are drawn to semantic/pragmatic questions. In the other paper, "Inferential relations and noncanonical word order" (31-51), Betty Birner picks up and runs (quite fast) with a Princean theme. The starting line is Prince's attempt to improve the resolution of focus on what I shall, perhaps too crudely, call information structure. In place of one of the usual dichotomies, Prince argues that"information" should be examined with cross-cutting parameters and so may be (i) discourse-old and hearer-old; or (ii) discourse-new and hearerold; or (iii) discourse-new and hearer-new. The fourth logical possibility, that of discourse-old and hearer-new, is assumed, by Prince and those who have taken a Princean perspective on information packaging (e. g. Kehler and Ward Constraints, 387; Semantics, 236) to be non-occurring "since presumably an addressee who is attending to the discourse would be aware of previously evoked information" (33). This gap in an otherwise elegant paradigm is unfortunate. Enter Birner. She proposes, with reference to sentences exhibiting non-canonical word order, that the notion of discourse-old information be widened such that it includes more than only information that has been explicitly invoked in the prior discourse. Enter inferrable information, and specifically bridging inferences which, Birner argues with exemplary illustration, are discourse-old and hearer-new. Thus, all the cells with exemplary illustration, are discourse-old and hearer-new. Thus, all the cells in Prince's four-cell classification of information structure have content. But this elegance comes, I think, at a price and this price is already acknowledged, at least by implication, in Birner's conclusion. 1 quote:

   under the account proposed here, discourse-old information includes
   not only that which has been explicitly evoked in the prior
   discourse, but in fact all information that is inferentially
   related to the prior discourse.... It remains for future research
   to provide a more fine-grained typology of inferential relations
   (49, emphasis added)

The analysis is persuasive--to a degree. What I miss, once again, is attention to some of the foundational issues. For example, "inferential relations" are rather coarsely cut, in the present analysis, into identity, elaborating and bridging relations. These are, I suspect, not only coarse but also vague. The question is: Why introduce this catalogue of "inferences" when there exists already the passably serviceable one of (neo-)Gricean implicatures (and their various subdivisions)? The deeper, more foundational, question is: What is the relation between the templates assumed in the semiotic trichotomy and dichotomy? I would have liked to have seen some discussion, in either this or the previously discussed paper, of the merits of trading in a conversational pragmatics for a functionalist pragmatics (c.f. Horn Pragmatic, 114) and of moving from a semantics/pragmatics interface to a syntax/pragmatics interface.

This book also contains the following papers: "Discourse particles and the symbiosis of natural language processing and basic research" (117-35), by Georgia Green; "Indexi-lexicography" (195-215), by Steven Kleinedler and Randall Eggert; "Why defining is seldom 'just semantics': Marriage and marriage" (217-40), by Sally McConnell-Ginet; and "A note on Mandarin possessives, demonstratives, and definites" (263-80), by Barbara Partee.

This is a very fine festschrift for a very deserving fcstschriftee. The careful reader of this collection will learn much of interest and of importance, both in methodological strategy and in concrete analysis (although not always on neoGricean themes nor on the semantics/pragmatics interface). There is further work to do, of course, especially, from a more foundational perspective, on the character and dynamics of Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean pragmatics. But if the careful reader takes the trouble and goes beyond this collection to (re-)examine first hand Horn's back catalogue--and, indeed, takes further trouble to study the literature with which Horn engages--then a rigorous education in some of the richest and most exhilarating and imaginative linguistic reasoning can be had. This book does not, alas, contain a Horn Bibliography (tut, rut). I trust that the find out more of neo-Gricean pragmatics and its strategies for dealing with the semantics/pragmatics interface.

Other Works Cited

Grice, Paul. Aspects of Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.

--. 1981. "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature. Radical Pragmatics. Ed. Peter Cole. London: Academic Press, 1981, 183-98.

Horn, Larry, 2006a. "The Border Wars: A Neo-Gricean Perspective." Where Semantics Meets Pragmatics. (Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface 16.) Eds. Klaus von Heusinger and Ken Turner. 21-48. Oxford: Elsevier, 2006, 21-48.

--. "Duplex Negatio Affirmat ...: The Economy of Double Negation." Chicago Linguistic Society 27, (1991): 80-106.

--. "Economy and Redundancy in a Dualistic Model of Natural Language." 1993 Yearbook of the Linguistic Association of Finland. Eds. Susanna Shore and Maria Vilkuna. Helsinki: Suomen Kielitieteellinen Yhdistys, 1993. 33-72.

--. "Exclusive Company: Only and the Dynamics of Vertical Inference" Journal of Semantics 13 (1996): 1-40.

--. "Flaubert Triggers, Squatitive Negation, and Other Quirks of Grammer." Perspectives on Negation and Polarity Items. Eds. Jack Hoeksema, Hotze Rullmann, Victor Sanchez-Valencia and Ton van der Wouden. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001. 173-200.

--. "Given as New: When Redundant Affirmation Isn't" Journal of Pragmatics 15 (1991): 313-36.

--. "Hamburgers and Truth: Why Gricean Explanation is Gricean." Berkeley Linguistics Society 16 (1990): 454-71.

--. "From if to iff: Conditional Perfection as Pragmatic Strengthening" Journal of Pragmatics 32 (2000): 289-326.

--. "Implicature." The Handbook of Pragmatics. Eds. Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 3-28.

--. "All John's Children are as Bald as the King of France; Existential import and the geometry of opposition?' Chicago Linguistic Society 33 (1997): 155-79.

--. "Lexical Incorporation, Implicature, and the Least Effort Hypothesis?' Chicago Linguistic Society 14 (1978): 196-209.

--. "Metalinguistic Negation and Pragmatic Ambiguity?' Language 61 (1985): 121-74.

--. A Natural History of Negation. Chicago/London: The U of Chicago P, 1989. Expanded ed. Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2001.

--. "Neo-Gricean Pragmatics: A Manichaean Manifesto." Pragmatics. Ed. Noel Burton-Roberts. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 158-83.

--. "Pragmatic Theory." Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey. Volume 1, Linguistic Theory: Foundations. Ed. Frederick J. Newmeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988. 113-145.

--. "Pragmatics, Implicature, and Presupposition." International Encyclopedia of Linguistics. Volume 3. Ed. William Bright. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992. 260-66.

--. "Pragmatics: Implicature." International Encyclopedia of Linguistics. 2nd Edition. Ed. William J. Frawley. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. 381-84.

--. "Pragmatics: Presupposition." International Encyclopedia of Linguistics. 2nd Edition. Ed. William J. Frawley. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. 384-87.

--. "Presupposition and Implicature." The Handbook of Contemporary Semanatic Theory. Ed. Shalom Lappin. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996. 299-319.

--. "A Presuppositional Analysis of Only and Even." Chicago Linguistic Society 5 (1969): 98-107.

--. "The Said and the Unsaid?' The Ohio State University Working Papers in Linguistics No. 40 (1992): 163-92.

--. "On the Semantic Properties of Logical Operators in English?' Bloomington, Indiana: The Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1976.

--. "Showdown at Truth-Value Gap: Burton-Roberts on Presupposition?' Journal of Linguistics 26 (1990): 484-503.

--. "Speaker and Hearer in Neo-Gricean Pragmatics." Wai Guo Yu Journal of Foreign Languages 164 (2006): 2-20.

--. "Toward a New Taxonomy for Pragmatic Inference: Q-based and R-based Implicature." Meaning, Form, and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications. Ed. Deborah Schiffrin. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown UP, 1984. 11-42.

--. "Toward a Fregean Pragmatics: Voraussetzung, Nebenggedanke, Andeutung." Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive and Intercultural Aspects. (Mouton Series in Pragmatics 1.) Eds. Istvan Kecskes and Laurence R. Horn. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2007. 31-69.

Kehler, Andrew and Gregory Ward, "Constraints on Ellipsis and Event Reference." The Handbook of Pragmatics. Eds. Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 383-403.

--. "On the Semantics and Pragmatics of 'identifier so'." The Semantics/ Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View. (Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface 1.) Ed. Ken Turner. Oxford: Elsevier Science, 1999. 233-56.

Ludlow, Peter and Gabriel Segal. "On a Unitary Semantical Analysis for Definite and Indefinite Descriptions," Descriptions and Beyond, Eds. Marga Reimer and Anne Bezuidenhout. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. 420-36.

Prince, Ellen F., 1981. "Toward a Taxonomy of Given-New Information." Radical Pragmatics. Ed. Peter Cole. London: Academic Press, 1981. 223-55.

--. "The ZPG Letter: Subjects, Definiteness, and Information-Status. Discourse Description: Diverse Linguistic Analyses of a Fund-Raising Text. Eds. William C. Mann and Sandra A. Thompson. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1992. 295-325.

Turner, Ken, ed. "Special Issue on Neo-Gricean Pragmatics." International Journal of Pragmatics 14 (2003): 1-170.

Ken Turner

University of Brighton