Betraying conservative principles.

Impostor: How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy, by Bruce Bartlett, New York, Doubleday, 2006. 310 pp.

BRUCE BARTLETT is widely known in conservative circles principally through his syndicated column which normally focuses on economic and fiscal concerns. Writing from a libertarian and free trade perspective, his columns are invariably informative, often identifying and elaborating on existing and emergent problems in these areas. Over the years, even among those on the Left, he has gained a reputation for being honest, straightforward, and principled. Thus, it comes as no surprise that his book, the main purpose of which is "to disabuse people of the idea that George W. Bush is a conservative president who has relentlessly pursued a conservative agenda," has received so much attention.

Now, to be sure, most thoughtful observers of the American political scene have long realized that Bush, whatever he may be, is no conservative--at least as the word conservative was generally understood before he took office--despite the mainstream media's persistence in referring to him as such. While the significance of Bartlett's book is manifold, its most immediate goal is that of setting the record straight, i.e., informing a much wider public of what was apparent to observers; namely, Bush's fiscal and economic policies, far from being conservative, have in fact alienated most libertarians and traditional conservatives who have long identified with the Republican Party.

While some reviewers have quibbled with Bartlett's analysis and conclusions by citing certain particulars--e.g., Bush did identify the problems with social security funding, he did push for tax reductions on capital gains and dividend income, he did successfully push for the Central American Free Trade Agreement--there can be no gainsaying that Bartlett presents compelling evidence for his charge. Take, for example, the enormously troublesome issue of farm subsidies. As Bartlett notes, by 1996, through the elimination of "a number of subsidies and regulations," we had finally moved "a long way toward creating a free market in agriculture." Yet, in 2002, ignoring his campaign promises to encourage "a more market oriented agriculture policy," Bush signed into law a farm bill that "raised spending by almost $90 billion above previous law" and would, by Congressional Budget Office estimates, cost $470 billion over five years--almost $100 billion per year." Or, for another, take pork barrel spending which, although only a minuscule portion of the budget, clearly reveals Bush's lack of fiscal responsibility. When it comes to dispensing pork, as Bartlett remarks, "the Bush years are in a class by themselves": The record for such projects during the Clinton administration was in 2000, 4,326 projects at a cost of $17.7 billion; whereas under Bush the number of projects and costs has risen precipitously, "from $18.5 billion and 6,333 projects in 2001 to $27.3 billion and an amazing 13,999 project in 2005." Noteworthy is that Bush has yet to use his veto power to restrain these or other excesses, the first president since John Quincy Adams to refrain from doing so for a full term.

What clearly upsets Bartlett the most and served as the catalyst for this book was the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. This act he firmly believes "may well be the worst piece of legislation ever enacted." And, as he explains, the responsibility for this act falls squarely on the shoulders of the Bush administration, which gave the highest priority to its enactment. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding its passage bring into question the integrity of both the Bush administration and the Republican leadership in the House. The initial estimates of the new drug program were deceptively manipulated and underestimated by the administration to help secure its passage, and only through the application of unprecedented pressure on conservative and libertarian recalcitrants and a brazen disregard of procedural rules did it manage to squeak by the House. What renders the measure so disastrous in Bartlett's estimation, however, is its long-term cost, realistically estimated by the Medicare trustees to be $ 18.2 trillion. As he observes, "It's hard to put such a number into a context that people can understand--they can barely comprehend billions, let alone trillions. But, according to the actuaries, $ 18.2 trillion in present value terms is equivalent to 1.9 percent of the gross domestic product forever," Concretely this would amount to approximately a quarter of trillion dollars in 2005, "more than all the corporate income taxes collected ... and 26 percent of all personal income taxes." "In other words," Bartlett continues, "the individual income tax would have to rise by 26 percent immediately and forever just to pay for the drug program.

Bartlett's indictment of Bush goes well beyond merely his fiscal irresponsibility. His professed free trade policy is belied by his pandering to special interests for short-term political gains. Moreover, as Bartlett takes pains to show, his protectionism has come at inopportune times, even "sabotaging multilateral trade negotiation." Likewise, he has not only abandoned the goal of deregulation, he has sought "pro-business regulation"; that is, as Bartlett explains, regulation that runs counter to the free market principles by favoring large corporations seeking "to stifle their competition." His tax policies, which "ultimately added up to very little economically" in Bartlett's view, manifested a lack of vision: while he might have employed his position at the outset to realize a flat tax system, we have instead a "tax code" that is "much more complicated and more riddled with gimmicks and loopholes than it was before Bush took office." Serious tax reform, on Bartlett's showing, will require that "much of what Bush has accomplished will have to be reversed." Additionally, inaction in important areas related to trade and economic growth also characterizes the Bush administration, perhaps the most notable being the lack of any initiative in significantly altering the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in reaction to the Enron scandal. Bartlett points to a growing consensus that the terms of this act--particularly burdensome on small and medium sized businesses--have served to inhibit "new business formations, investment, entrepreneurship, risk-taking, and job creation."

Nor does the indictment end here. On the contrary, Bartlett points to significant shortcomings with Bush and his administration that ultimately raise crucial questions about the health of the American political system. Drawing to some extent upon his experiences in the Reagan and the Bush I administrations, Bartlett makes a convincing case that White House operations are, to say the least, seriously flawed. A large part of the problem, in his view, stems from Bush's "disdain for serious thought and research to develop policy alternatives," a disdain that also came to characterize his staff. Bartlett points to the early resignation of John DiIulio, who had been appointed as head to the newly created Office of Faith-Based and Community, and the forced resignation of Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. For his part, DiIulio noted the lack of "meaningful, substantive policy discussions," whereas O'Neill, over a period of eighteen months, was never able to obtain any "guidance [from Bush ] on the direction of economic policy." In fact, Bartlett notes, the consensus among close White House observers is that the administration's economic policy, if it could be called that, is driven by purely political considerations. Over time, he writes, the National Economic Council "suffered by being a policy organization for a president who had little interest in the subject unless it advanced his political fortunes," while the analyses of the Council of Economic Advisers simply "didn't count for much in the Bush decision-making process."

In many ways the most alarming of Bartlett's charges is that Bush makes "major policy decisions" "quickly ... without any apparent analysis or thought" and "stick[s]" to these decisions "with an absolute certainty that is almost religious in its intensity." Moreover, Bartlett remarks, unlike other presidents, Bush shields himself from advisers outside administration circles, confirming what many of his critics have contended, namely, that he operates in a "bubble." To this point he quotes Richard Clarke: "He [Bush] has a very narrow, regulated, highly regimented set of channels to get advice." He notes as well the observations of other advisers that Bush also lacks intellectual curiosity, as evidenced by his "unwillingness to study issues in depth before making decisions."

Other concerns with far-reaching implications for our constitutional order emerge from the "starve-the-beast" strategy which, Bartlett contends, the Bush administration pursued from the outset. According to this strategy, tax cuts will result in higher and higher deficits that, in turn, will eventually lead to demands for spending cuts. The only problem, as Bartlett notes, is that--contrary to the widely held belief among conservatives and libertarians--practice does not conform with theory: "The fact is that if one has only recent data upon which to base one's analysis, it is all in exactly the opposite direction--tax cuts actually seem to cause spending increases." As he sees it, "the whole starve-the-beast theory has been turned on its head. Instead of bringing about spending cuts by deliberating raising the deficit, as the original theory supposed, tax cuts have become a substitute for spending cuts." Yet, starve-the-beast, in Bartlett's judgment, has unfortunately become a substitute, albeit an ineffective one, for the restraint, discipline, and prudence required to control federal spending. In any event, he is convinced that tax increases are inevitable, largely due to the enormous costs of the drug prescription program. While he concludes that the onerous task of raising taxes "may fall upon [Bush's] successor ... it will be Bush's fault," since he cut taxes without making any effort to reduce or control expenditures. Indeed, so severe will the fiscal problems become that Bartlett sees little alternative but the institution of a value added tax, long the bane of libertarians and conservatives.

What, then, of the fundamental concerns and issues that arise from Bartlett's analysis, issues that bear upon the health of the American political order? They arise from the picture he paints of Bush and his administration and, by indirection, of the Republican legislative leaders and the stark realization that, by all evidences, the Democrats are no better. This is to say, Impostor documents more than just fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the Bush administration: It raises once again a troubling question that has become even more acute in recent decades, namely, what caliber of political leadership is the American political system providing? Consider only the presidency: Clinton lacked a moral compass and, if Bartlett is essentially correct, we now have an intellectually challenged president who is also incapable of acknowledging errors or mistakes. To be sure, as Lord Bryce observed, given the nature of the American political environment, we have little reason to expect that "great men" will be elected president. Yet, he did not regard it beyond the realm of possibility that our presidents could be morally fit, responsible, and sound administrators with sufficient foresight and common sense to use their authority to avert fiscal crises of the first order. Nor can this concern about the competence and character be confined to presidents. Whatever may be said about the deficiencies of our recent presidents applies even more so to the elected representatives: only a very small fraction exhibit the chief virtue of the "fit character" which Madison describes in the Tenth Federalist essay, i.e., the capacity to sublimate partial, selfish interests to the common good. In sum, as Bartlett shows, our political leaders seem incapable of fiscal restraint. Nor, in the last analysis, are the people who, thanks to the largesse of their representatives, enjoy the bounties of big government. In light of this, we are obliged to ask, whether profligate spending, and with it the growth of centralized government, are inevitable, an inherent outgrowth of modern democratic politics. If this be so, then what can be expected by way of popular reaction when the day of reckoning comes?

At various places and without much elaboration Bartlett suggests that other issues such as the Iraq War and immigration may have also eroded Bush's conservative image. This is certainly the case so that it is probable that Bartlett's book is simply the first of series that will deal with other aspects of Bush's betrayal of conservative principles. Nevertheless, despite the policies of the Bush administration, Bartlett has not given up on the Republican Party serving as a repository of and vehicle for the realization of conservative policies and principles. He yearns for the timely emergence of a "serious conservative challenger for the Republican nomination"; he hopes that the Party will not experience a "serious defeat ... before its current leadership is sufficiently discredited to allow new faces, voices, and ideas to emerge." In sum, as he puts it, the Party needs to "get ... back on track as the party of small government before it loses what is left of its principles, reputation, and heritage."

His comments on this score raise important questions concerning the future of American conservatism as Bartlett and many others of his persuasion understand this conservatism. Assuming, arguendo, that this conservatism had captured the soul of the Republican Party prior to Bush II, what of today? Hasn't the Bush II administration permanently altered the character of the Party to the extent that it is no longer hospitable to these principles? What is one to make, for instance, of the polls that still show strong Republican rank-and-file support for President Bush? What of the loyal support he has received in pursuit of his policies from congressional Republicans? Can the Party, as Bartlett suggests, turn on a dime and return to its old ways? Perhaps of greater significance in the long run is this: Does the term "conservative," after being abased and misused over the years by Bush, by functionaries in his administration, and by the mass media, still possess the meaning in the wider society that Bartlett and others attach to it? Is not the political climate now such that in the decades ahead, even in intellectual circles, there will be wrangling over what is "genuine" conservatism or who is a "real" conservative? And will this not eventually serve to render conservatism virtually devoid of meaning, at least in the public mind? But there is another likely, even more dreadful, scenario. Perhaps, after the failure of Bush policies advanced under the banner of conservatism, an indelible stigma will attach itself to conservatism. Put otherwise, beyond the damage that Bartlett painstakingly documents, Bush may also have managed to render conservative and conservatism dirty words.

GEORGE W. CAREY is Professor of Government at Georgetown University.