Becoming a combat analyst.

The summer of 2008 brought with it a novel experience--that of being a combat analyst in the air mobility division (AMD) of the combined air and space operations center (CAOC). Prior to this deployment, I considered myself a relatively seasoned analyst. I hold a masters degree in operations research (OR) from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), and my two previous assignments covered the dynamic range of possible capacities in which analysts typically serve. My first assignment as a major command (MAJCOM)-level personnel analyst emphasized short, quick-turn analysis augmented with an appropriate smattering of staff work. This is a sharp contrast to my current assignment as a logistics analyst, conducting months-long, exacting studies. I knew from conversing with previous combat analysts that the experience would be more similar to my former job than the latter. As my departure date approached, I took more than an idle interest in knowing what skills were most salient for a combat analyst.

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The CAOC environment was remarkably similar to my previous experience in some ways and notably different in other aspects. I was assigned to the AMD's Strategy division, which conducted assessments of the effectiveness of air mobility operations as well as developed strategies to mitigate potential, long-term mission impacts. The AMD itself is set behind the combat operations floor, which is always photographed as the quintessential element of the CAOC; but other than a lower ceiling, AMD has all the same attributes. The space is open, allowing complete visibility of the entire division; Predator video feeds line its walls; and it frequently has a furor of energy that more closely resembles the New York Stock Exchange, than a typical office. Dust tends to permeate the ventilation system and gradually covers any undisturbed area in a light, brown coat. The bare walls, openness, and dusty concrete floor almost give the effect of a workshop, as if you expect to stumble upon a band saw, lathe, and drill press somewhere amongst the rows of personnel. I quickly learned some things are immutable as a combat analyst--most of your existence is still spent within the confines of a computer monitor. Yet other things are very different--"I don't need that right away," means you have the luxury of tomorrow morning (not next week) to complete it. So it is with these and other observations that I quickly began to identify the skills most certain to lead an aspiring combat analyst to success. Although it is difficult to precisely categorize each, I will talk about three main areas: technical skills, communication skills, and getting the 70 percent solution.

Technical Skills

With a cursory look, it seems almost assured that the technical skills of a combat analyst are inherent in any analyst. After all, despite the jests made regarding our limited social skills and charisma, no one would disagree that analysts earn their keep by bringing a powerful amalgamation of math, computers, and, most importantly, critical thinking to bear on problems. Most of us have been to AFIT, and holding a masters degree in OR is almost a career must. Want the left null-space of arbitrary matrix A? No problem! We've been taught about simulation, multicommodity network-flow problems, linear programming, nonlinear programming, integer programming, dynamic programming, statistics, and finding the average wait time of a Markovian queue. And that's just the math side of things. Bring computers into the mix and we can use programs such as SAS to crunch statistics, MatLab to crunch numbers, and Arena to crunch simulations. So the question is: Are the technical trappings of a combat analyst inherent in all this?

The answer, of course, is yes, but in the same way David was inherent in the original block of marble Michelangelo sculpted. Being a combat analyst is about focusing technical skills on a few key areas (chipping away the excess marble) yet still retaining the residual imprints of the more esoteric aspects of OR skills. Critical thinking, the most important skill learned at AFIT, is universally applicable. However, while some advanced OR techniques may be occasionally employed, in general the exigency and ambiguity of the deployed environment precludes their use. I often performed analyses to address questions or offer recommendations covering considerably large aspects of theater air mobility. These efforts could have taken a year and required the full arsenal of OR skills, but I only had a few days or a week. Such efforts require a skillful, back-of-the-envelope, common sense approach--rapture the essence of the problem, not every detail. This also requires proper handling of ambiguity, which I'll discuss in the third section.

In my experience, the most mathy skill a combat analyst needs is a solid knowledge of statistics. The AMD was a data-rich environment with passenger and cargo records for every sortie. Unfortunately, quantity and quality are not always synonymous. A large portion of my job was reconciling this sortie data using flight-crew inputs, two online mobility databases, and information from AMD's mission executioners. Though validating data is quite droll, I became very attuned to the data's underlying quality. It was common for multiple data sources to disagree on a sortie' s quantity of passengers and cargo. The data was fraught with inaccuracies and uncertainty as is much of the data collected in an operational environment. It is critical to be not only cognizant of this uncertainty but able to quantify it and not make more precise predictions than the data can support. Knowledge of regression analysis, ANOVA, and time-series forecasting is also useful as these techniques are quick and easy for time-critical analyses.

The combat analyst also needs to focus on a specific set of computer skills. Here's a list of the analysis software available to a combat analyst: Excel, Excel, Excel, and Excel. Get my point? Sophisticated analysis software is simply not there. I built and relied on countless pivot tables for analyzing and reporting data. I also used several of Excel's built-in statistical products. Perhaps it's considered a bit lowbrow, but Excel can do a lot. Also critical are programming skills in Visual Basic (VBA), which can be used to automate Excel's operations with macros. Many tasks require repetitive actions to such as clicking and dragging data, aggregating disparate data sources, conditioning data, computing metrics, and generating reports. The ability to automate these processes with VBA not only saves time but may be the only way they're possible--especially if recurring. Additionally, an incoming combat analyst may inherit VBA products from a predecessor that have to be modified or maintained during the rotation. I worked with many Excel products that had evolved over multiple deployments into towering edifices of worksheets and macros.

It is clear that, in terms of technical skills, simplicity is key. Elaborate OR techniques require resources that simply don't exist in a deployed environment. It is no irony that the best analysis effort I saw was done by a second lieutenant, a self-taught VBA and Access expert with no formal OR training, who used his skills to automate the theater's commercial carrier, cargo bidding process.

Communication Skills

It's a quirk of nature, but it often seems as though apt mathematical and communication abilities are cut from the same stock, leaving a mind with more of one with less of the other. Don't get me wrong--I've met plenty of analysts who are regular Benjamin Disraelis in their expression, but as a combat analyst, it's often easy to overlook the fine-tuning necessary to communicate successfully. A combat analyst will interact primarily with two groups of people: peers and senior leaders. It is important to understand the goals and style of communication required for each.

Virtually all the analyses I did while deployed involved a team composed mainly of operators--air mobility pilots and navigators. The operators brought air mobility experience; whereas, I brought the technical expertise. Communication is the bedrock for this relationship to be successful. For an analyst, it is important to ask questions and achieve a competent level of operational knowledge required for the job. Reading regulations and operating instructions will tell you everything about a process except how it really works. The only way to acquire a pragmatic, operational picture is by asking. Conversely, the combat analyst must communicate and interject, if necessary, with the requisite actions to make the analysis sound. The operators I worked with in AMD Strategy were incredibly intelligent and quick-thinking but lacked in-depth knowledge of analysis tools. My value was to offer suggestions for statistical and analytical techniques and to explain them in a way a nonanalyst could understand. I also spot-checked the analyses for problematic areas. In this way, we were able to develop both operationally realistic and analytically sound products.

Communicating with senior leaders is an entirely different matter. The same rules apply as back home only more so. It's about brevity, brevity, brevity. Many AMD analysis reports began with a BLUF (bottom line up front) section. This concept should frame communication with senior leaders. A senior leader is ultimately looking for a recommendation, not data. No more of the analysis should be presented than required for the senior leader to be comfortable with the results; and it should be distilled to its most salient points--the foremost one being the recommendation. To emphasize this, the deputy combined forces air coalition commander (DCFACC) mandated that every brief have a purpose slide highlighting its relevance. Furthermore, the format of the weekly status brief, traditionally dominated by data, was changed to a high-level, dashboard format. Under the new format, the DCFACC only examined data if an area failed to meet standards; otherwise, it was superfluous. Although many were skeptical of the new format, the brief's time was halved while simultaneously increasing attention on problematic areas.

Communication skills are easy to overlook, yet critical to a combat analyst. It's easy to become infatuated with technical details while failing to both gather operator inputs and report the results effectively to senior leaders. The latter is the most common offense. I've found it useful to keep a list of forbidden phrases in mind to never utter before senior leaders (in deployed and nondeployed environments), to include: "I wrote a macro...." "the standard deviation is.... ""here's the regression equation...." "the way the heuristic works is....." and many others.

Getting the 70 Percent Solution

What exactly is a getting the 70 percent solution? Let's start with an example.

Suppose you' re asked to conjecture on the impacts of more or less air mobility assets. Where do you start? How in depth do you want to go? You could compute the average passengers and cargo such an aircraft is expected to carry and base it on that. But doesn't this ignore the fact that the remaining aircraft could be loaded more or less efficiently as a result? Would the effects be confined to one geographical area? Okay, how about doing a detailed simulation of the intratheater environment? But how would I know how to characterize the ground times, maintenance events, and passengers and cargo loaded? Isn't the data on passengers and cargo pretty inaccurate? If the data's inaccurate, can I do anything? In addition, doesn't this need to be done by close-of-business tomorrow?

This exactly illustrates a problem requiring a 70 percent solution, which is more art than science. It's about finding the best way to narrow the irreconcilable difference between the resources available (time, quality data, information, software) with the colossal problems facing you. How much fidelity is really necessary? With air mobility, I found the data scarcely supported analyses deeper than back-of-the-envelope. Furthermore, even if the data were perfect, the uncertainty of air mobility itself in a warlike environment precluded precisely determining a decision's effects. So an intricate analysis would be akin to measuring with a micrometer then drawing with a crayon and cutting with an axe. I don't have a prescribed process for getting the 70 percent solution. It requires a combat analyst to be familiar with the nuances of their particular environment. However, it's something every combat analyst should be consciously trying to master.

Senior leaders faced with complex, ambiguous choices want something better than a coin-flip. A 50 percent solution would be irresponsible but a 70 percent solution can make all the difference.

Conclusion

Success as combat analyst requires specialized abilities. Technical and communication skills must be honed to meet unique demands of the deployed environment. Also a combat analyst must finely balance the resources at hand with the sheer scope of analyses requested by senior leaders to find an adequate, 70 percent solution. For analysts like me, with backgrounds steeped in AFIT, it is quite an adjustment. However, with some fine-tuning, analysts will find themselves ready to meet the challenge.

You can discover what your enemy fears most by observing the means he uses to frighten you.--Eric Hoffer

If you don't know where you are going, you might not get there.--Lawrence Peter (Yogi) Berra, Baseball Player

Obstacles are those frightful things you see when you take your eyes off the goal.--Henry Ford

Captain John Flory, AFLMA