Beating the odds at Inchon. (History-Struggle for Freedom).

The success of the daring amphibious assault at Inchon is a testimony to the genius of General Douglas MacArthur and to the fighting ability of the courageous men he led.

On September 12, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur boarded the USS Mount McKinley as it left Japan on the way to the South Korean port of Inchon and perhaps the most desperate gamble of his long military career. He was about to send 40,000 men ashore at a place where his experienced colleagues and civilian superiors considered victory to be "nearly impossible." If the mission planned for September 15th failed, the forces he was committing to it would be lost, and so would 100,000 men under siege in the Pusan perimeter 180 miles to the south.

MacArthur himself would write in his book Reminiscences, "All over the ship the tension that had been slowly building up since our departure was now approaching its climax." In American Caesar, William Manchester reported that the general couldn't sleep and "continued to tread the deck, thinking aloud. He knew he was gambling ... knew they might be sailing toward a disaster." But he also knew that the "risks and hazards must be accepted." And so they were.

Avoiding an "Asian Dunkirk"

Less than three weeks earlier, Admiral Forrest Sherman had summarized why so many felt MacArthur's plan impractical, even bordering on reckless. He told the general and other senior officers, "If every possible geographical and naval handicap were listed--Inchon has 'em all." But the amphibious assault at Inchon less than a month after Admiral Sherman uttered his grave apprehensions was such a marvelous achievement that it is hardly excessive to label it one of the most spectacular military exercises in all history. How it was accomplished in the face of even greater negativity than Sherman's is a testimony to the genius of General Douglas MacArthur and the ability of the U.S. and Allied military personnel he led.

Inchon became necessary after June 25th, when a huge Soviet-trained North Korean Army, equipped with fast-moving tanks and virtually all the tools of modem warfare, overran the South Korean capital of Seoul in a surprise attack and moved swiftly southward. The ill-prepared and ill-equipped forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) were no match. The UN Security Council authorized member nations to render assistance to the beleaguered ROK troops. With UN approval, the United States immediately put Tokyo-based General MacArthur in command.

MacArthur immediately sent occupation troops from Japan to halt the progress of the Communist forces. During a quick trip to Korea, he saw firsthand evidence of the disarray and inadequacy of the South Korean forces. Working with General Walton Walker, he merged many bewildered ROK soldiers into the American units under what they designated "the buddy system." Nevertheless, the American-led forces, outnumbered 20 to 1, were forced to retreat toward the port city of Pusan at the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula. Brave as they were, it seemed certain that they would be pushed into the sea in what many observers speculated would become a vast "Asian Dunkirk," a reference to British forces who desperately exited France early in World War II. But Walker's skill, buttressed by his order to his men "to stand or die," slowed the Communist advance and bought time for MacArthur's eventual masterstroke.

What to do and how to do it? How would MacArthur keep all of Korea from falling into the hands of Communists whose incredibly brutal treatment of civilians and combatants alike had already been demonstrated? How would he protect Walker's men from annihilation? The answer, already brewing in the brain of this military genius, called for cutting the enemy's supply lines by attacking him where he least expected it--at his rear.

Overcoming Resistance

Korea's terrain is mostly mountainous. Most movement from north to south passes through Seoul. Twenty miles west of Seoul lay Inchon, the port city on the Yellow Sea. If Seoul were to be recaptured and the enemy's supply lines cut, Inchon was the key. But this second largest port in South Korea was noted for some of the world's highest tides, the sea rising and falling twice each day by as much as 30 feet through its narrow channels. In addition, it had no beaches, only seawalls and piers, and at low tide only mud flats. Still, MacArthur insisted that an amphibious landing could be accomplished despite these incredible obstacles, which, he claimed, were actually assets because the Communist forces would not expect such a bold maneuver.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Omar Bradley opposed the idea, believing that amphibious landings were obsolete. President Harry S. Truman also objected and was especially negative about the plan to use the Marine Corps he had contemptuously labeled "Fancy Dans." Hoping to dissuade MacArthur, Bradley sent Army Chief of Staff General Collins and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Sherman to Japan.

On August 23rd, MacArthur gathered four generals, four admirals, and a number of lower-ranking officers in Tokyo to discuss his plan. Sherman and Collins presented Washington's opinion that the proposal was ill advised, and Collins even suggested an alternate operation aimed at Kunsan, to Inchon's south. In American Caesar, Manchester quoted one general officer's assessment that success at Inchon was "a 5,000-to-1 shot." But MacArthur's response focused on the advantage of surprise. After insisting that the bulk of the Communist forces had left Seoul vulnerable and were far to the south with extended and overexposed supply lines, he confidently predicted that the Navy and the ground forces would get the job done. He told the gathered brass, "Inchon will succeed and it will save 100,000 lives." By the time he had finished championing his plan, he had won the day. Sherman and Collins went back to Washington, where they briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On August 29th, MacArthur received a reluctant green light from the Pentagon.

Army and naval forces were hastily gathered and briefed on their roles. Some of the forces came from the States, others from shipboard duty as far away as the Mediterranean. Less than a week before the September 15th assault, MacArthur received another message from the Joint Chiefs, implying, but not insisting, that the whole operation be scrapped. In Reminiscences, MacArthur indicated his suspicion that Truman, Bradley, and newly installed Secretary of Defense George Marshall were establishing an alibi for themselves should the operation fail. His response assured them that chances of success were "excellent."

MacArthur knew that the First Marine Division, now under his command, contained battle-hardened veterans from various World War II campaigns. Alongside them were experienced naval personnel fully prepared to conduct an amphibious assault. There were also combat-ready pilots whom MacArthur could count on for air support. He understood more than anyone the fighting capability of these men. He trusted their ability.

The Landing

The operation's first phase called for seizing the island of Wolmi-do on September 15th. Only 1,000 yards wide and connected to Inchon by a two-mile-long stone causeway, it stood in the way of success. On the night of September 13th, four cruisers and several destroyers moved into the harbor, expecting to draw enemy fire from Communist emplacements that could then be targeted and destroyed. Attack aircraft from carriers arrived to blast the island. Twenty-four hours later, more than 250 ships moved into position for landing 40,000 troops. At 6:30 a.m. on the 15th, one hour before the day's first high tide, a Marine battalion stormed Wolmi-do and secured it in less than two hours with only 17 of its men wounded. Left ashore with no reinforcements available until the next high tide 12 hours later, they killed or captured 400 North Koreans. The first objective had been accomplished.

The Allied forces took Inchon itself the next day. U.S.-led troops, armed with artillery and tanks, poured ashore and pressed on toward Seoul. In just two days, they captured Kimpo airfield west of Seoul. The Communist supply lines to the south were now severed. A mere 11 days after the initial landings, and after some heavy fighting, Seoul had been totally recaptured and the operation was a complete success. In the Inchon-Seoul operations, MacArthur's daring flanking maneuver had defeated upwards of 30,000 enemy forces at a cost of 530 dead and 2,500 wounded.

To the south, the beleaguered General Walker noticed a change of heart in the massive North Korean forces on his front even before Seoul was retaken. Spurred on by MacArthur's order to attack instead of simply hanging on, Walker launched a savage assault to the north. The North Koreans were caught in a classic hammer-and-anvil attack. They resisted initially but immediately recognized that they would no longer be supplied and would soon face a simultaneous attack from behind by MacArthur's forces to the north. In The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur, Frazier Hunt reported that the tide of war had been so "completely reversed" that the North Koreans "were no longer the trappers but the trapped." In effect, the Communist troops simply gave up. Major General Courtney Whitney would later summarize this amazing turn of events: "[The Reds] abandoned their arms and equipment; tanks, artillery, trucks and small arms littered the highways all over South Korea. The total of enemy prisoners rose to 130,000. In one bril liant strike--and against the advice of all his superiors--MacArthur had turned defeat into victory and virtually recaptured South Korea."

Congratulatory messages flooded MacArthur, now back in Japan. None captured the essence of the triumph and the greatness of its commander better than a dispatch sent by the British Chiefs of Staff. It stated:

We send you our warmest congratulations on your brilliant victory. We have admired not only the skill with which you have conducted an extremely difficult rear guard action against great odds over many anxious weeks, but equally the bravery and tenacity with which the forces under your command have responded to your inspiring and indefatigable leadership. We believe that the brilliant conception and masterly execution of the "Inchon" counter stroke, which you planned and launched while holding the enemy at bay in the south, will rank among the finest strategic achievements in military history.

Three months after it had begun, the Korean War was essentially over. Victory was achieved in a matter of weeks with minimal loss of life, and Communism was dealt a stunning defeat. But as it turned out, the Korean War was not over. Political forces in Washington and at United Nations headquarters in New York "snatched defeat from the jaws of victory" when a second phase of the conflict began with the entry of hordes of Chinese Communist troops. (For information on the political betrayal, see the article on page 19.)

MacArthur protested the incredible restrictions placed on his men. But President Truman soon relieved him of command and the war continued until the summer of 1953, when a cease-fire arrangement was concluded. But a cease-fire does not terminate a conflict, and the state of war remains in effect even to this day.

Had MacArthur been allowed to continue as he wanted, the Chinese Communist forces in Korea would have been destroyed, the anti-Communist, Nationalist Chinese (on Taiwan) would have retaken their country, and much of the history of the second half of the 20th century would have been altered.

MacArthur was not only a brilliant strategist, he was also 100 percent American. He may have been removed from command by an individual whose stature never approached his, but he earned a place in history that no one can take away.

Millions of Americans were stunned, angered, and bewildered by Truman's peremptory and disgraceful dismissal of our nation's greatest living military leader, the hero of Inchon and a hundred other battles. The general's historic speech before a joint session of Congress on April 19, 1951, upon his return from Korea, spoke to their hearts when he declared:

In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory. There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means--where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer....

Americans, who a scant five years earlier had been victorious over the combined Axis powers, knew instinctively that MacArthur was right.

Enormous throngs of his grateful countrymen materialized to shower their affections and support on the old soldier wherever he appeared in public, If he had run for the presidency himself, as he was constantly urged to do, he would have made a formidable candidate. MacArthur was determined, however, to just "fade away." He did purposely fade from public activity, but the brilliance of his military leadership, and especially his crowning moment at Inchon, shines undimmed.

RELATED ARTICLE: The Secret Heroes of Inchon

William F. Jasper

Navy Lieutenant Eugene Franklin Clark tensed in the darkness and prepared to open up with his machine gun on the advancing line of North Koreans. Time was running out. He had to get past them, get to the beach, and take the sampan across the channel to Palmi-do Island. He had to be there soon to turn on the light at the Palmi-do lighthouse. So much depended on it.

Dual invasions were underway on the night of September 14, 1950. As the huge Allied armada of more than 250 ships under General MacArthur neared the port of Inchon, a much smaller force of Communist soldiers was landing on the tiny island of Yonghung-do several miles off Inchon. The success or failure of the larger invasion rested largely on the outcome of the deadly drama playing out on that small island, where hundreds of North Korean Reds were landing in the dark from junks and sampans. On Yonghung-do, one American, Lt. Clark, and a ragtag band of anti-Communist Korean villagers were fighting a desperate battle against the invaders.

It was the culmination of an incredible, two-week covert operation involving almost daily gun battles, hand-to-hand fighting, nightly reconnaissance missions, and constant heart-pounding action. When General MacArthur had announced his choice of Inchon for the invasion, all the U.S. and Allied military services reacted negatively. The odds against success at Inchon, one adviser said, were 5,000 to one. If that was so, Lt. Clark figured, then the odds against his mission succeeding were easily 10,000 to one! MacArthur was well aware of the daunting challenges that nature alone posed at Inchon: the world's greatest tide fluctuations; fast currents; narrow channels; treacherous mud flats extending for miles. But in addition to these problems, he must also overcome whatever man-made defenses the North Koreans had established. He had reason to believe that Inchon had not yet been heavily fortified. But he must have accurate, up-to-date intelligence on many things--or risk total disaster.

Had the Reds mined the harbor or its approaches? A single ship sunk in the narrow channel would stop the invasion cold in its tracks. Would it be possible to have signal lights to guide the ships through the dangerous straits? What size guns were on the islands and hills guarding the harbor? It was especially important to find out this information concerning the fortress island of Wolmi-do. How many guns were there and where were they placed? The ships, landing craft, and troops would be strung out in long lines, facing a potential gauntlet of deadly enfilading fire. How many enemy troops were at Wolmi-do and in Inchon itself? How deep was the mud? How soft? Would it hold a tank? An Amtrac (amphibious tractor)? A soldier? Were there barbwire coils, land mines, or other obstacles on the mudflat "beaches." Were there gun placements atop Inchon's buildings overlooking the harbor? How high was the sea wall? What kind of ladders or other climbing equipment would the landing forces need to climb the sea wall? These and a host of other crucial questions had to be answered. And they had to be answered within two weeks, before the U.S.-led forces landed at Inchon.

The "impossible" task of obtaining this vital intelligence fell to Lt. Eugene Clark. Along with two South Koreans he had handpicked for this seemingly hopeless commando mission, Clark landed on Yonghungdo and quickly subdued the small North Korean garrison and their collaborators. Arming loyal villagers, Clark established the island as a base from which to carry out his reconnaissance. Displaying almost super-human courage, determination, and resourcefulness against overwhelming odds, Clark and his doughty band of recruits accomplished a series of extraordinary commando operations that surely earn them top honors in the annals of military exploits.

Operating much of the time on only two to four hours of sleep per day, Clark and his men repeatedly penetrated enemy lines in death-defying missions to measure the sea walls, explore the mud flats, determine enemy troop strength, locate the gun placements, and determine if and where mines had been laid. They accomplished this while fending off raids against their own island base by Communist troops from garrisons on nearby islands. Lt. Clark even armed several fishing junks and sampans with machine guns and conducted some of the first naval battles of the Korean War in the island channels around Inchon. In addition to the hazards inherent in these armed conflicts and commando raids, Clark also survived a typhoon, poisonous vipers, Inchon's deadly currents, and the perilous mud holes that nearly sucked him down to a terrifying death. Most of his brave South Korean comrades in arms were not so fortunate; they sacrificed their lives so that the Inchon invasion might succeed.

Thanks to Clark's commandos, Inchon was a success. They provided the crucial information enabling the aerial bombers and naval gunners to knock out the enemy gun emplacements and troop concentrations. Lt. Clark did make it to the Palmi-do lighthouse to provide the guide beacon for MacArthur's ships. Thanks to Clark's raiders, the assault forces knew where to land and how to scale the sea walls, and Inchon was taken with incredibly low casualties to U.S. forces.

For his "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity" the Navy awarded Lt. Clark the Silver Star. To this, the Far Eastern Command added the Legion of Merit. The story of his clandestine actions at Inchon, however, remained virtually unknown until last year, when his account of the mission was posthumously published, under the title The Secrets of Inchon.