Battlekings return to Baghdad as a maneuver battalion: doing more with less.

The 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA) Battlekings, the fires battalion in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division, returned to Iraq once again, but this time for a very different mission as a maneuver battalion. The Battlekings with their deadly M109A6 Paladin howitzers had proved instrumental in the 2nd BCT's drive to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I in 2003, but the character of "the fight" had changed during the intervening years. 1-9 FA's mission as a maneuver task force (TF) for OIF III involved building the confidence of the Iraqi people to help eradicate insurgents in our area of responsibility (AOR) and working closely with multiple assets to conduct operations out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Loyalty in Baghdad.

Although our infantry battalion counterparts in the 2nd BCT made our lean post-transformation fires battalion look like a dwarf, the Battlekings' duties and responsibilities remained on par with theirs. In addition to conducting full-spectrum operations in 163 square kilometers of southeast Baghdad, the battalion was tasked with camp force protection, security escort for a quick-reaction explosive ordnance detachment and main supply route (MSR) security. The Battlekings also had to be prepared to provide indirect fires via a platoon that remained "Hot" 24/7, but fires were not necessary during the deployment.

With the delivery of fires secondary to our maneuver mission, our operations required an efficient realignment that maximized resources without unduly increasing operational risks. During course-of-action (COA) development, the battalion staff (primarily comprised of combat veteran fire supporters) saw a unique opportunity for our lean fires battalion to demonstrate the advantages of effects-based operations (EBO). EBO uses valuable resources efficiently by maximizing both lethal and nonlethal capabilities against an enemy modeled as a system. Quite literally, our plan was to mitigate the manpower challenges we faced by working smarter and more efficiently.

Doing More with Less. Months before the deployment, it was clear that the battalion required some reorganization and additional training to shape itself for the broad range of missions it would undertake in Iraq. We quickly learned that personnel changes were a zero-sum game with most FA Soldiers coming into the division being assigned to the new fires battalion in the recently formed 4th BCT. Improving our "teeth-to-tail" ratio required a hard look at support requirements.

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Eagle Team. With the battalion's being stationed at a FOB, the requirements for both survey and communication sections were reduced. We formed a platoon of two patrol sections with these personnel and augmented them with Soldiers from the personnel and logistic staff sections. The headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) executive officer (XO) became its platoon leader. The new organization, which was one of the great success stories during our deployment, was given the name "Eagle Team."

Eagle Team was dual-tasked as the camp's quick-reaction force (QRF) and the command group's security detail. Due to aggressive training and competent, confident Soldiers, Eagle Team proved itself in a variety of combat situations. Eagle Team's training started at home station, continued through the mission readiness exercise (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, and culminated during reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) in Kuwait.

Forward Support Company (FSC) as an Infantry Company. Based on a need to improve the troop-to-task ratio, we made the FSC a "ground-owning" unit with two patrol sections formed from traditional support elements. The battalion maintenance section, reinforced by mess-section Soldiers, conducted countermortar/counterrocket patrols in a sprawling former Iraqi military base that had been reduced to an ominous moonscape of rubble and squatter huts. The distribution platoon formed the second patrol section to conduct logistic convoy escort and, ultimately, replaced a line platoon as the explosive ordnance detachment security escort detail once the brigade forward support battalion (FSB) began unit distribution operations.

Day after day, these two patrol sections validated the phrase that Major General William G. Webster, Jr., Commanding General of the 3rd Division, "drove" into us before deploying: "Every Soldier is a rifleman."

Civil Affairs (CA), Information Operations (10) and Force Protection. We formed a CA S5, IO S7 and force protection section around the battalion signal officer, fire direction officer (FDO) and chemical officer. The battalion fire direction center (FDC) and the meteorological (Met) section provided the bulk of the Soldiers for these staff sections. In the end, each member of the team had to work harder with one Soldier per 12-hour shift responsible for maintaining the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) connectivity and currency.

A sister fires battalion shared Met support for the Baghdad area of operations (AO). Ultimately, a pair of Soldiers with little supervision provided Met support for the division with the new organic mobile profiler system (MPS).

Battery Platoons as Patrol Sections. Each platoon within the two line batteries organized into two patrol sections. Each patrol section consisted of 20 personnel and four M1114 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) equipped with either an M2 or M240B machine gun. The platoon leader and platoon FDO served as the two patrol leaders. Because of leader attrition and environmental leave, platoon sergeants and gunnery sergeants also led patrols.

Tactical Psychological Operations Team (TPT) and CA Team Alpha (CAT-A). The brigade commander attached a TPT and CAT-A to our battalion shortly after the transfer of authority (TOA). We quickly learned that the TPT and CAT-A were invaluable. Each has a unique specific skill set, so we used them differently and rarely in conjunction with each other. Although they most often operated physically separate from each other, their effects were both complementary and tangible.

The TPT, secured by a patrol section, principally focused on the more adversarial essential effects tasks (EETs), while the CAT-A focused on more supportive EETs. The battalion S5 and S7 sections provided organic combat power and resources sufficient for the CAT-A to operate independently and securely throughout the AOR.

The distinction between the direct action patrol sections of the line units and the CAT-A provided a constructive layer of separation that we exploited during post-operational assessments and consequence management. In short, the Iraqi people quickly learned that when the patrol sections showed up it meant that an operation likely was underway, and they made themselves scarce. On the other hand, the CAT-A Soldiers spent a great deal of time interacting with the locals, so the Iraqis got used to seeing them and talking to them. This made it easier for the CAT-A to assess the attitudes in the neighborhoods we were responsible for.

Before deploying to Iraq, we did not fully appreciate how valuable the TPT and CAT-A would be as combat multipliers. They quickly became essential to every operation and enhanced the battalion's ability to conduct focused EBO.

Effects Planning and the Effects Working Group (EWG). During pre-deployment mission analysis, the lack of an active Coalition presence south and east of the AO was a major concern. To gain additional insight into the current situation, key members of the battalion planning staff deployed three weeks early to embed with the mechanized infantry battalion we were to relieve, including our battalion operations officer and intelligence officer. The planning staff arrived in Baghdad the week before the January 2005 elections and gained valuable experience that we used later in the October 2005 national referendum and the December 2005 national election.

The battalion planning staffing Baghdad also updated all of the military decision-making process (MDMP) products, to include increasing the specificity of the essential tasks associated with the initial combatphase. As aresult, the Battlekings executed their first battalion-level operation only two days after the TOA.

The dynamic battlefield within the Battlekings' AOR necessitated a deliberate and continual process to assess where we were, based on the commander's intent, and what we needed to change to achieve the desired effects. We used the decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) target methodology. This process resulted in the weekly effects tasking order (ETO). The ETO is an operations order (OPORD) derived from the EWG using the current brigade EETs cross-walked against the current lines of operations (LOOs).

Using the [D.sup.3]A process, the battalion could provide a coordinated and specific task, purpose, method and desired effect (TPME) for each patrol section or support element that went outside the FOB. (See the figure for the effects planning cycle.)

The EWG meeting was the most critical step in the effects planning cycle. The battalion commander, XO, operations officer, battle captain, S2, S5, S7, TPT chief, CAT-A commander, medical officer and each of the battery commanders participated in the EWG. It is important to note that the EWG meeting was not a series of briefings. Each participant already knew what resources were available in his element for the specific time period to be discussed.

During the meeting, the battalion leadership and key staff deliberately and collaboratively assessed the AOR and decided which resources to focus in what part of the AOR to achieve the commander's desired effects. Such a "lean" organization only could achieve the commander's desired effects by the synchronized, sequential or simultaneous application of all available elements of combat power--leadership, maneuver, firepower, protection and information on the battlefield.

The EWG agenda began with battalion intelligence, operations, CA and IO officers presenting updated staff estimates. Next, the leaders and planning staff systemically reviewed a five-week period. The process began with an after-action review (AAR) focused on Week-1 to consolidate information about recent operations' impact on the Iraqi people and Coalition Forces. This was important to ensure the battalion remained adaptable in such a fluid environment. The AAR also ensured we provided adequate resources to the patrol sections for future operations.

Next there was a back briefing about Week-0. During this back briefing, we used the AAR feedback from the previous week to update our intelligence assessment and refine our plan.

The third step was to plan week+1. The battalion operations officer provided the battery commanders, TPT and CAT-A the TPME for any missions or operations being conducted during that week.

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Finally, the battalion commander issued guidance for Week+2 and Week+3. The operations officer then prioritized or requested resources for future operations based on the enemy situational template and current trend analysis from ongoing EBOs. The TPT and CAT-A recommended focus areas and methods of employment to better achieve the commander's intent. Although Week+2 and Week+3 were not finalized, the analysis of available resources and desired effects for each period gave the battery commanders and staff enough information for planning and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

Leveraging Available Assets. The ability to identify potential future operations two to three weeks in advance proved essential to our success in leveraging all available assets and staying ahead of the enemy in our AOR. We were able to mass for offensive operations by synchronizing a variety of assets. Remarkably, the battalion's combat power would double or triple during battalion-level clearance or disruption operations that were conducted once a week, on the average.

Iraqi Police and Public Order Forces. The battalion quickly established valuable relationships with potential operational partners. The arrival of an Iraqi special police transition team (SPTT) to our FOB gave us an opportunity to establish a consistent relationship that provided access to an entire Iraqi public order brigade's worth of combat power.

Our battalion provided the SPTT living space, automation support, maintenance resources and staff products. Our close relationship with the SPTT paved the way for us to execute large combined operations with the public order brigade frequently. Depending on the troop-to-task needed for a specific mission, a line battery would have an attachment that might range from a company to a full battalion of Iraqi public order brigade soldiers.

Our ability to work side-by-side with the Iraqi forces helped the special police in their training mission and also built the local Iraqis' confidence in them. The increase in manpower also allowed the battalion to clear more areas and structures in less time and reduced the operation's overall risks.

US Military Police (MP). We formed a strong relationship with the general support (GS) MP battalion based in a FOB six kilometers away. The fact that the MP battalion included two National Guard FA batteries helped strengthen our friendship. The Battlekings synchronized the MSR security patrols with the MP patrols as an economy-of-force initiative.

The MP battalion also provided forces for our operations. Using the MPs to control routes leading into and out of the objective significantly reduced operational risks while ensuring that more individuals and Iraqi vehicles in the target area were searched and passively engaged by a patrol section. We used these passive engagements or interactions between patrol sections and Iraqi citizens to gauge sentiment and gather the concerns of the people.

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Another benefit of our relationship with the MP battalion was that it helped improve our cooperation with the local Iraqi police. The MP battalion had teams at each police station, coaching and mentoring their Iraqi counterparts. The battalion commander's sphere of influence (SOI) engagement plan was synchronized with a complementary MP battalion plan. The result was camaraderie between the Battlekings' patrol sections and the local Iraqi police. The Iraqi police routinely augmented the US MP elements on traffic control points (TCPs) during offensive operations.

The ability to communicate the commander's intent in Arabic and the unique cultural insights of local law enforcement professionals placed an Iraqi face on the perimeter of the operation and further reduced the threat to US Soldiers. More often than not, after each major operation, we further strengthened our relationships with the Iraqi police and public order brigade by conducting AARs with key Coalition and Iraqi leaders at the FOB. While certain themes on ways to improve future operations were always woven into the program, the event customarily was something closer to a dining-in with both Iraqis and US Soldiers sitting together, telling war stories and sharing ideas.

BCT Public Affairs (PA). The battalion also gave the brigade PA section office space in our headquarters building. Daily contact with the PA officer (PAO) and a constant feed of draft battalion press releases from the S7 section solidified a strong working relationship.

The battalion regularly asked for and received both print and video coverage from the PAO and Combat Camera. This gave us the opportunity to tell the "good news" story of Iraqis working to provide a safe and secure environment in Baghdad. Because the brigade's organic MP platoon provided security for the PAO and Combat Camera personnel, we also benefited from additional observation and combat power that further reduced our operational risks.

Division Assets. Another advantage of the five-week [D.sup.3]A planning cycle was the brigade staff had sufficient time to request division-level resources. It was rare for the battalion to conduct a large offensive operation without attack helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support. The battalion tactical operations center's (TOC's) ability to watch a live feed from the UAV on a large screen television in the operations center helped ensure a common understanding of the current situation across the team.

The synchronized effects of combined police (US and Iraqi) TCPs, the massing of line batteries with attached Iraqi public order brigade units, attack helicopters overhead and the TPT's loudspeaker element delivering audio messages detailing our expectations of the local Iraqi citizens within the objectives gave the Battlekings control of and the ability to react to almost any situation.

Generally, a few days after an operation, we sent the CAT-A into the objective area to conduct a post-operation assessment. This provided an additional passive engagement opportunity and a chance for local citizens to comment on the impact of the operation.

For those truly needy families, the CAT-A brought humanitarian assistance bags filled with food and common necessities. If there was any collateral damage from the operation, the CAT-A personnel ensured the Iraqi citizens understood the claims process and reviewed the claims cards for completeness and accuracy to facilitate payment.

1-9 FA Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). The battalion constantly changed many variables to stay unpredictable yet remain within the insurgent decision cycle. For example, we conducted battalion operations at least once a week with the objective locations, day of the week, time of day, amount of advance information provided to the Iraqis, ingress and egress routes, link-up locations and other variables changed for each operation. While physically demanding, the frequency of our operations allowed the battalion to clear the entire AOR many times and repeatedly mass resources in areas of higher insurgent activities.

After several months in Iraq, we realized that a key task of every operation had to be developing human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. As a result, when patrol sections cleared buildings, they interacted with the occupants and asked them questions about their neighborhoods. We often referred to this as a "passive engagement." If the patrol leader felt the occupant had information of value, elements of the intelligence section were called forward to question the occupant and develop sources.

In an insurgent environment where the enemy blends into the population, we found that HUMINT offers the highest chance of neutralizing insurgent activities. Our logic was simple--the more passive engagements our patrol sections conducted, the better our chances would be of finding that one cooperative Iraqi citizen with actionable information.

During the year-long deployment, the battalion intelligence officer was successful in developing a productive HUMINT network focused on the commander's effects guidance. In short, effects drove intelligence and intelligence drove operations. As the S2 produced actionable intelligence, the battalion used patrol sections to conduct precision offensive operations to isolate a target within a single structure.

We often used snipers to mitigate the risk of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in our AOR and were fortunate to have four snipers on our team. More often than not, if trend analysis identified increased IED contact within a defined area, the battalion planned a sniper operation.

Before deploying from Fort Stewart, Georgia, we took advantage of a mobile training team (MTT) sniper course to train four Soldiers. The early deployed planning staff procured sniper weapons from leave-behind equipment stocks, including both M14 models and a large caliber M107 weapon.

All sniper operations were deliberately planned, rehearsed and well resourced with a forward-positioned security element, retransmission team to facilitate communications and periodic UAV coverage to observe dead space. Snipers gave us the ability to target a high-risk area without placing a patrol section on the contested route.

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In January, the Battlekings returned to Fort Stewart. Our Soldiers had executed more than 25 battalion-level offensive operations to shape and control the battlespace, resulting in the capture or elimination of 154 terrorists, the seizure of hundreds of weapons (including two D30 howitzers and one S60 air defense gun), the destruction of more than eight and one-half tons of enemy ammunition caches and explosives, and the rescue of six hostages kidnapped by rebels near Salman Pak. While each of our assets were able to execute objective or target-based operations independent of each other, the coordinated application of all their effects allowed us to do more with less.

As a maneuver battalion in Iraq, we took great pride in executing the missions the Army needed us to execute and being members of the most flexible branch in the Army--the Field Artillery.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Merkel commands 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and deployed the fires battalion for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III. Previously, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff for the 1st Infantry Division in Germany where he deployed as part of Army Forces-Turkey during OIF I. He was the Executive Officer (XO) for the 1st Division Artillery (Div Arty}, XO of the 1-7 FA and Chief of Plans for the 1st Division, deploying to Kosovo as part of Korea Force 1A. In the 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, he commanded C/1-320 FA and, later, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), 101st Div Arty. He is a graduate of the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Major John G. Clement is the XO for 1-9 FA at Fort Stewart and, previously, the battalion's Operations Officer, deploying in that capacity for OIF III. In addition, he was the 3rd Division's Fires Planner. He was a Company Fire Support Officer (FSO), Battery Fire Direction Officer (FDO), and Battery XO in 3-319 FA (Airborne), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He commanded HHB, 3rd Div Arty, then moved to 3-41 FA, where he was a Task Force FSO, S4 and Commander of A/3-41, also in the 3rd Division. After his second command, he was assigned to the Army Staff in the G2 Foreign Intelligence Department at the Pentagon. He is a graduate of SAMS.

By Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Merkel and Major John G. Clement