Battlefield decisions of a battalion commander.

Where do the battlefield and the decisions you, as the battalion commander, start and end? How many decisions do you make on a battlefield? What are those decisions?

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), between 20 March 2003 (the start of the ground war) and 1 May 2003 (the day President George W. Bush declared major combat over), as the commander of 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System--2-4 FA (MLRS)--I made only four real decisions.

As a battalion commander, if you start early, you'll make few decisions on the battlefield--your battalion will make them without hesitation and in the flow of military operations. Several factors contributed to that (see the figure).

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We all have seen the war movies where the military leaders make decisions and give orders throughout the movies. The classic movie Patton comes to mind.

But, truly, how many command decisions did General George S. Patton, Jr., really make in that movie? Not many. Mostly he conveyed his presence, personality and passion to speak to his subordinates and allowed them to make decisions.

During a 1942 interview, General Patton said, "My theory is that a commander does what is necessary to accomplish his mission and that nearly 80 percent of his mission is to arouse morale in his men." (1) These words indicate General Patton believed he could influence the battlefield without making decisions on the battlefield itself.

We are not "General Pattons." But some of you will command a battalion in a fight or conflict. And many others will be the command sergeant majors, executive officers, S3s and battery/company commanders or first sergeants of battalions in conflict.

So, where and when do the "battlefield" and the decisions start? Experience tells me that the battlefield starts before one ever assumes command. This is reiterated by the classic speech George C. Scott forcefully delivered as General Patton in the beginning of the movie. (2) Consequently, the decisions also start before command.

What decision affecting a future battlefield can you possibly make before assuming command? The decision of what kind of a commander to be.

Colonel Charles R. De Witt (now retired) once talked to me about the tendency to have two kinds of military leaders: the ones who look down and into the units they command and the others who look up and out of the units. The focus of the down-and-in commander is strictly on the unit with no concern for what is going on around him. The danger is in not seeing the big picture and not understanding where the battalion fits into that picture.

The up-and-out commander's focus is on the big picture and where the unit fits. The danger is in risking not understanding the personality and capabilities of his unit.

However, a third type of commander focuses down-and-in, and, every so often, peeks up to see what else is going on. How often the commander looks up depends on the situation. For example, once rumors of deployment surface, his peekup times come more often.

This third commander has the advantage of understanding his unit and its capabilities yet still seeing the big picture. He can count on his experience and military education gained over many years to assess the situation and know where his unit fits.

Needless to say, senior commanders also will provide information about where the unit fits in, in the form of mission and intent, task organization and organization for combat. The situation, itself, will dictate where the unit fits: peacekeeping, peace enforcement or major combat operations.

But you can decide before the big day what kind of commander you want to be.

While in the PreCommand Course, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, many Army senior leaders will visit you. Each will talk about his individual style and (or) philosophy of leadership. Several members of my PreCommand Course believe former Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki provided some of the best advice: "Continue to be who you are--that's what got you here."

This is another decision you make ahead that will set the stage for every decision you make during your command.

As a battalion commander, you are a leader. Former Chief of Staff of the Army General J. Lawton Collins said, "Leadership combines the necessary qualities of character, integrity and a willingness to work, which leads to a knowledge of their profession." (3) Sun Tsu says, "Leadership is a matter of knowledge, trustworthiness, humaneness, valor and strictness." (4)

These definitions and many more describe leadership without considering what action it generates. Consequently, I offer this definition as a basis for what follows: "Military leadership is the ability to motivate Soldiers and units to achieve beyond their own perceived capabilities." Inherent in this definition are not only the characteristics we all believe make a good leader, but also the need to create an action with an end result--leaders are people of action.

Will the commander make other decisions having an impact on the battlefield before reaching the actual battlefield? Indeed. The biggest of those is believed to be the tone of the command. Will you exude "Warrior Ethos" and encourage your unit to do the same? There are an unbelievable number of opportunities to inculcate Warrior Ethos in your battalion: talking to Soldiers at the command maintenance formation; walking through the battalion area and speaking with one or two Soldiers at a time in the motor pool and supply rooms; making remarks at events like promotions, reenlistments, hails and farewells, and NCO induction ceremonies; ensuring the unit conducts tough, realistic and meaningful training; looking for the training value inherent in routine taskings and capitalizing on them; volunteering for taskings with the greatest training value, such as live-fire demonstrations; ensuring Soldiers are fit and disciplined and more.

Of course, your actions indicate (or not) your Warrior Ethos. Do you attend training; are you seen doing tough physical training (PT); do you wear your seatbelt, Kevlar, and body armor; do you look like a Soldier and hold your subordinate leaders to the same standard; and more?

In order to be a credible leader, you can't be an anomaly to the Soldiers you lead. They must know you are fair and consistent. Your personal involvement and effort in counseling individuals and mentoring the battalion's junior leaders will have a positive impact. This means teaching your charges that they are American Soldiers requiring character, integrity, honesty and the willingness to demonstrate those traits at all times.

Soldiers who don't understand the Warrior Ethos and don't make them part of everyday life will fail to see and gain lessons from training that could keep them alive and healthy on the battlefield. Those lessons include everything from wearing a seatbelt while in the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and staying at nametag defilade while in the track to knowing everything about their weapons and how to employ them. Soldiers must move, shoot and communicate and do those tasks well--along with everything associated with them.

All that exacting training is not easy. However, if you train Soldiers and teach them the Warrior Ethos, then you will eliminate the need for you to make decisions in the future. If you know the personalities in and the capabilities of your well trained, confident unit, then you will be comfortable with your subordinates making most decisions.

The part about peeking up every so often and seeing what is up-and-out comes into play here. You must know your brigade commander--don't let him be an anomaly to you. It is easier to get to know some brigade commanders than others, but it is your responsibility to get to know him, not his.

So, how many decisions does the battalion commander really need to make on the battlefield? I submit very few--your subordinates make them. Of course, as the battalion commander, you always have the prerogative of changing any decision made by your subordinates, if you have to. But long before they are making decisions in combat you have given them the flexibility and built their confidence in making those decisions, "calibrating" them when you had to. The subordinates and Army gain from good decision making at the lowest possible level.

This leads you to many actions. The fire plan will come, the restricted operation zone (ROZ) will be designated and your route-of-march to the new position will be given to you based on the locations of friendly units, the enemy situation and the availability of resupply and support assets. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) will be drafted for your approval and practiced during training, and the situation will fall neatly into the purview of those SOPs.

You will make some decisions based on the higher commander's intent and your understanding of the battalion's situation. For example, the situation at Wake Island on the morning of 8 December 1941 led Commander Winfield S. Cunningham, overall commander of forces on Wake Island that day, to his decision. He could not attack the Japanese; he did not have the resources to take the fight to the enemy. He could not retreat because he lacked the assets to move all the Soldiers, sailors, marines and civilian construction workers from the island. Consequently, only two courses-of-action remained: defend or surrender. Commander Cunningham mounted a successful defense, one still talked about with awe today, more than 60 years later. (5)

The orders from higher headquarters drive much of your decisionmaking process: to attack or defend, to displace or not based on the higher commander's intent and the mission statement. These considerations and more will focus your battlefield actions.

In the Battle of Gettysburg, in July 1863, Colonel Joshua Chamberlain's decision to execute a bayonet attack was a product of both the situation and orders from higher headquarters. His orders from Colonel Strong Vincent were to "hold ground at all cost."

The reason Colonel Vincent issued this order was that Chamberlain's 20th Maine occupied the extreme left of the Union Army's line. Had the Confederates passed the 20th Maine, they could have flanked the Union forces and the battle may have been lost.

After repulsing several attacks by Confederate forces, Colonel Chamberlain realized his men's ammunition was nearly gone, and they could not withstand another assault on the position. At this point, the situation, as he later remarked, was that "it was imperative to strike before we were struck by this overwhelming force into a hand-to-hand fight which we probably could not have withstood or survived. At that crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough." (6) As history has shown, Colonel Chamberlain's forces charged the Confederates, took them by surprise and drove them back. By his own admission, Chamberlain's orders and the deteriorating situation led him to his decision. Like Cunningham's decision at Wake Island, we still talk about Chamberlain's decision today.

So what's left, what decisions does the battalion commander really have to make on the battlefield? In addition to those driven by higher headquarters or the combat situation, you make decisions when things seem out of the ordinary--are not covered in SOPs or training, go against previous guidance and orders, or require you to assume unusual risk.

In combat in Iraq, 2-4 FA only required four battalion commander-level decisions.

1. During the initial phase of major combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2-4 FA had the task of crossing 200 kilometers of desert sand with fully loaded wheeled vehicles. The higher commander's intent was for the battalion to "push combat power as far forward as possible as fast as possible." The battalion was hindered by the most significant obstacle in Iraq: the desert sand.

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I immediately changed the battalion's task organization to ensure we would be in position to provide the maneuver forces lethal fires in support of their tactical objectives. I task organized the firing elements to consist of only 110 vehicles--predominately tracked vehicles, HMMWVs and a few ammunition resupply vehicles--and 276 personnel to travel for four days in the sand. This core of the battalion moved with limited logistical support. I put the remaining logistical and recovery elements, consisting of 90 vehicles and 210 personnel, under the command of the battalion executive officer and gave them a route on more solid surfaces for maneuverability. During much of the four days, the two elements did not have communications and risked never linking back up.

The payoff, however, was huge. The firing elements pushed forward with great speed and reached a future firing location within only hours of launching 42 Army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) in support of Coalition objectives, meeting the higher commander's intent.

This situation calling for a decision clearly was under circumstances outside the purview of SOPs, assumed the risk of never reconsolidating the battalion and was not covered in any guidance from any higher headquarters. The other option was to keep the unit together. Without the decision to task organize and accept some risk, the battalion would not have reached the firing area in time to support the maneuver forces. Success was possible for many of the considerations mentioned, not the least of which is knowing the personality and capabilities of the executive officer, who would ensure the logistics elements linked up with the battalion at the designated location, no matter what.

The up-and-out commander is unable to make this type of informed decision.

2. Every unit involved in OIF had to determine the value of equipment and ammunition versus the dangers to Soldiers left guarding non-functioning equipment. 2-4 FA was no exception.

Very soon after crossing into Iraq, an M88 recovery vehicle broke down. At 55 tons, nothing else in the battalion (except another M88) could recover the disabled vehicle. I decided to leave the non-mission capable M88 and conserve the three remaining for higher priority missions, specifically to recover our M270A1 launchers. No Soldiers remained to guard the downed M88; we abandoned it.

You would think that this was an easy decision, one that did not require the battalion commander's attention. But Soldiers are taught strict property accountability, and battery commanders spend much time in garrison accounting for property. Taking care of and accounting for their equipment is engrained in them from the very beginning of their service.

So, I had to make the decision and set the tone for the remainder of the operation. As 2-4 FA moved toward Baghdad and beyond, the battalion faced similar situations on many occasions. Some circumstances involved enemy vehicles disabled as a result of unexploded ordnance or vehicle accidents. The battalion abandoned non-mission capable HMMWVs, ammunition vehicles and trailers (still containing valuable ATACMS rounds), M577A3 command post vehicles and other trucks and trailers. We recorded the location of the vehicles for future recovery, if possible. But no Soldier remained behind to guard a vehicle.

This served to validate Soldiers as our most valued resource. It also was the right decision that had an unexpected positive impact. The valued Soldiers became more confident and more lethal. Soldier-accountability became an overt source of pride for the unit and the great senior NCOs of the battalion.

This same value of Soldiers is depicted dramatically in the 2002 film We Were Soldiers. In the movie, there is a scene when the brigade commander asks Lieutenant Colonel Moore, "Hal, how many men do you have battle ready, give or take?" Moore turns to his command sergeant major and then replies, "395 exactly." (7)

After returning to Kuwait, 2-4 FA sent teams to all the locations at which we had abandoned equipment and ammunition. Some were recovered. We returned to the US without 14 vehicles and trailers and several ATACMS. However, we came back with every Soldier.

3. The morning after crossing through the Karbala Gap, 2-4 FA was arrayed along the north side of a very narrow, east-west paved road just north of Karbala. The firing elements were spread along the length of the road, approximately 15 to 20 kilometers. I felt the need to make personal contact with each battery commander and set out to "circulate on the battlefield." General Patton said, "The more senior the officer, the more time he has. Therefore, the senior should go to forward to visit the junior." (8)

This circulation was beneficial beyond making personal contact with subordinates; it allowed me to get a firsthand look at the area and situation. I found several destroyed enemy vehicles and personnel. I also discovered, what appeared to be, several small Bedouin encampments along the south side of the road.

In combination, these facts led to the possibility that some of the dead personnel could be from the suspicious looking camps. As night fell, retribution could be forthcoming in the form of attacks against the battalion. After returning to the command post, I directed the battalion operations officer to plan a move. The purpose was to put distance between the battalion and the potential threat from the camps. 2-4 FA began displacing as soon as we determined the new location.

That night, several other units in the area of the camps came under small attacks. It is not certain if these attacks were conducted by members of the "Bedouin" camps, but 2-4 FA was not the object of these attacks. The situation surmised prompted the decision to move the battalion. However, that decision would not have been possible without the solid relationship between myself and the brigade commander--my understanding of my flexibility and limitations.

4. Before crossing the Euphrates River into Baghdad, 2-4 FA's mission changed from general support (GS) to V Corps to GS reinforcing (GSR) to the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery. This change required us to place one firing battery in a position area cleared for ATACMS fire while the other batteries moved forward to fire rockets for the close fight. This left the ATACMS battery many kilometers away from any friendly force.

In an effort to increase security, the battery commander aggressively patrolled an area several kilometers outside the battery perimeter. One of these patrols discovered a cache of 160 cases of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

The battery sent an immediate request for emergency ordnance disposal (EOD) up the chain of command. The battery commander was concerned that, as night fell, it would be easy for one dissident to whisk away a couple of RPGs and fire them at the battery. This concern was further heightened by the deaths of three US Soldiers in an RPG attack the previous day. As the day progressed, it became apparent that EOD would not make it to the RPG cache.

I made the decision to have the battery destroy the RPGs using internal assets. specifically the emergency destruction (ED) kits in each launcher platoon. This decision clearly was outside the purview of any SOP--we had no SOP for the use of the ED kits, and no one could recall the last time we had trained on using the kits. This lack of training created the risk of injuring and (or) killing unit Soldiers.

However, because of my intimate knowledge of the battery, I knew the first sergeant and one of the platoon sergeants had once been instructors for MLRS operations, including ED kits. Furthermore, higher headquarters had not issued guidance for this eventuality. The battery destroyed the cache using the ED kits successfully and safely.

Would the battery have come under RPG attack had we not used ED kits to destroy the RPGs? We will never know. The only thing that is certain is the battery did not come under RPG attack that night.

Again, many of the decisions made earlier impacted this decision, not the least of which is knowing the personalities of the battery first sergeant and trusting his advice and judgment.

Alright, so where and when do the battlefield and decision making really end? They end on the parade field on the day most don't want to come when the brigade commander takes the battalion colors from you and hands them to another lieutenant colonel, the new battalion commander.

This is when the battlefield and your decisions for the battalion end.

* Having intimate knowledge of the people in the unit and the
  personalities and capabilities of the subordinate leaders.
* Understanding the training and capabilities of the unit as a whole.
* Understanding the higher commander's intent--several levels higher--
  and where the battalion fits into the intent.
* Knowing not to make decisions when the situation and orders from
  higher headquarters empower your Soldiers and leaders to act.
* Ensuring the battalion understands your expectations and standards.
* Ensuring that you, the battalion commander, are not an anomaly to your
  battalion.
* Establishing a working relationship with the brigade commander so you
  know what you can and cannot do.

Factors Causing the Battalion Commander to Have to Make Few Decisions
on the Battlefield

Endnotes:

1. Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., 19 Stars (New York: Random House, 1971), 260.

2. Parton (Twentieth Century Fox, 1969).

3. Puryear, xi.

4. Sun Tsu (transfated by Thomas Cleary). The Art of War (Boston: Shambhala, 2000), 427.

5. Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Retired). World War II Commemorative Series (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1992), 20-25.

6. National Parks Services Teacher Resources. http://www.nps.gov/gett/getteducation/teachguide.htm.

7. We Were Soldiers (Paramount Pictures, 2002).

8. Puryear, 260.

By Lieutenant Colonel Billy F. Sprayberry

Lieutenant Colonel Billy F. Sprayberry commanded 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery (2-4 FA), 214th Field Artillery Brigade, from June 2001 until June 2003. During that time, he deployed the battalion to the Gulf for Operation Iraqi Freedom, firing 240 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and 168 rockets in support of Coalition Forces, including firing the first ATACMS Unitary and Block 1A missiles in combat. Currently, he is the Chief of Targeting for the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps in Italy. Among other assignments, he was the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light) in Alaska; FSO for the Opposing Force at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Division Target Analyst in the Fire Support Element of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in the Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. Also in the 101st Division, he commanded two batteries: C/2-31 FA and C/5-8 FA.