Battalion reset: infantry, artillery or both?

On 3 November 2004, the 3rd Brigade (Stryker), 2nd Infantry Division (3/2 ID), finished the first Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) combat tour in Iraq and returned to Fort Lewis, Washington. Veterans of 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment (1-37 FA), the SBCT's artillery battalion, achieved many firsts during the brigade's standup and operations overseas. But few could predict the challenges associated with the unit's next mission: reset and prepare to redeploy to Iraq within 18 months as both an infantry and artillery battalion.

Reset operations provided the battalion many lessons learned and set an acceptable pace to develop readiness for the Army. These operations will become more common as the Army continues to rotate units overseas.

This article captures the lessons learned from the reset period and focuses on three core areas: personnel, equipment and training. We also identify a training strategy to prepare the battalion for its core artillery mission while training and equipping the battalion as the fourth infantry battalion in the brigade. (1) The intent is to help other artillery battalions in the same situation as the Army continues to transform and fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

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Personnel Reset (November 2004-February 2005). After its return from Iraq, 1-37 FA changed a great deal. Both the battalion and brigade commanders moved to new duties, and the battalion received a new command sergeant major (CSM). The field grade and battery command slate stayed the same during this period, which eased much of the turbulence during the personnel reset.

The battalion was overstrength, and the once cohesive unit now comprised two large groups: those who had deployed and those new to the Army. (2) The number of personnel actions these groups needed quickly overwhelmed the battalion's S1 shop.

Once Stop Loss was no longer in effect, about 150 highly trained combat veterans left the battalion. Those making a permanent change of station (PCS) needed to out-process, which included evaluations and end-of-tour awards. Because awards presented in Iraq covered only the time of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) rotation, the shop processed more than 150 awards during the period when many Soldiers on post, (including most of the S1 shop) were on block leave. Soldiers approaching their end term of service (ETS) date required both evaluation and award support as well as Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) processing and counseling. (3)

Soldiers newly assigned to 1-37 FA also needed major support from the battalion's S1. More than 65 new Soldiers were assigned to the battalion between 15 September 04 and the battalion's return. They were assigned to the rear detachment for the intervening three months.

Because most of the new Soldiers were fresh from advanced individual training (AIT) and many of the brigade's leaders were overseas, discipline problems plagued the rear detachment. The detachment was not equipped to efficiently process the more than 20 discipline actions required, so they were not processed until the battalion's chain of command returned. Processing, tracking and actioning the results of this discipline surge was a third priority for an already overworked S1 section.

During this period of turbulence, we quickly determined that the battalion should augment the personnel section with both NCOs and officers. Both the battalion commander's and the sergeant major's drivers became S1 clerks, and two of our lieutenants who were leaving the service were assigned to the S1. One of the lieutenants and a departing S2 NCO took charge of Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) actions and worked closely with both the batteries and brigade legal points of contact (POCs).

A newly assigned lieutenant and a 42A30 Personnel Services sergeant assigned to the S1 monitored incoming Soldiers' needs, including starting basic allowance for housing (BAH), settling travel vouchers, updating Soldier's Group Life Insurance, etc. They also ensured that batteries received an equitable distribution of personnel, based on the personnel turbulence in the unit.

The S1 and S1 NCO-in-charge (NCOIC) oversaw day-to-day operations and closely monitored departing Soldiers. Weekly staff calls and twice weekly meetings with battery executive officers (XOs) and the battalion XO ensured that all departing personnel received the support required.

Not every Soldier left the battalion with his awards and evaluation completed, but the battalion was more successful than most in the brigade. A leader formerly associated with the battalion remarked that, "Something will always get lost during a relief-in-place (RIP)." Given the scope of the personnel RIP that occurred between November 2004 and February 2005, the survival of the S1 section was remarkable, and the degree to which it achieved its mission was simply amazing. (4)

By early March, the most difficult phase of the personnel reset was complete, and the battalion end strength was slightly above its modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) allocation of 291 personnel. Soldiers would continue to leave the unit during the next six months, but the most significant period of turmoil had ended.

Throughout this personnel transition period, the S4 and the batteries focused on the reset milestone of equipment and property consolidation.

Equipment Reset (October 2004-March 2005). The equipment reset presented a different challenge for the battalion leadership. This reset was a three-phase operation that began in Iraq in October 2004 and ended in March 2005. The three phases were signing over the battalion's equipment in Iraq, accepting equipment left behind at Fort Lewis from both the installation and MTOE property books and integrating the equipment left behind with the equipment brought back from Iraq into a consolidated property book. To meet Army command supply discipline program standards, battery commanders had three complete change-of-command inventories during this six-month period.

Our sister fires battalion, 2-8 FA, supports 1st SBCT, 25 ID, and completed the transfer of authority with our battalion in theater in October 2004. Part of this transfer included signing over our howitzers, vehicles and the majority of our MTOE equipment, to include basic issue items (BII). The transfer began with close coordination during 2-8 FA's pre-deployment site survey and continued through 1-37 FA's occupation of Fort Lewis.

During the pre-deployment site survey, the 2-8 FA battalion XO went to Iraq with the proposed left-behind equipment list from 2-8 FA. In a series of overseas meetings, both battalions ensured that for each item that 2-8 FA would sign for in Iraq, a replacement item waited at Fort Lewis (left behind by 2-8 FA). If 2-8 FA suffered a shortage, 1-37 FA made up for it by leaving the equipment in Iraq. (5)

After settling on MTOE equipment distribution, 2-8 FA conveyed its needs for other equipment. This included eye protection, Garmin wrist-mounted global positioning systems (GPS), computers and other Iraq-specific gear. 1-37 FA batteries transferred this equipment to 2-8 FA and further accounted for it on an Iraqi installation hand receipt. (6)

2-8 FA had left its equipment and crew-served weapons at Fort Lewis with a Directorate of Logistics (DOL) contractor, so 1-37 FA could sign for it at the end of its block leave in January 2005. When 1-37 FA returned from block leave, the battery commanders immediately focused on signing for equipment from DOL's caretaker contractor, the installation property book office, and accepting military vans (MILVANs) returning from Iraq.

The personnel turmoil and lack of midlevel NCOs required younger sergeants to inventory and sign for their sections' MTOE equipment that had been left behind. Inexperience led to a failure to identify some shortages, especially among end-item components. Reasons for shortages ranged from unintentional bookkeeping errors committed by the 1st Brigade property book office (a four-man shop that successfully processed 31 battery-level changes-of-command in less than two weeks before the shop deployed to Iraq) to savvy NCOs assuming that "nice to have" equipment would be hard to come by in Iraq, so they sent it forward against the wishes of their chains of command. Unfortunately, the MTOE equipment discrepancies were not all identified until the battery change of command inventories of consolidated property books began in March and lasted through August.

Installation property also proved to be a contentious issue, as the commanders who had taken the guidon overseas were now required to sign for a complete suite of property while simultaneously accounting for a rear detachment that last had been inventoried by their predecessors more than 14 months before. Because the rear detachment hand receipts were managed by a different person at the installation property book office, two commanders did not know that a second hand receipt existed until their change-of-command three to six months later.

The battalion MILVANs arrived during the block leave period, and DOL moved them to make space for other deploying units. Finding the correct MILVANs became an adventure; moving them to battery areas where they could be unloaded was a greater adventure due to the limited amount of material handling equipment.

Overcoming the challenges of collecting each battery's equipment was a task that required each battery commander's total attention, but it was not the most difficult phase of the equipment reset. That challenge was consolidating the three different hand receipts into a single manageable property book with a reasonable expectation that all property would be accounted for and properly hand receipted.

In a similar operation to 1st Brigade's deployment, the 3rd Brigade's property book office had to assimilate 31 complete property books from 155 property sources, to include left-behind equipment property books, rear detachment MTOE property books, installation property book new issues, rear detachment installation property books and MILVAN contents. Commanders had to use all their property accountability tools to account for losses, but the report of survey was the most common.

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For 1-37 FA, this meant managing six MTOE reports of survey, three installation reports of survey and several individual property reports of survey all at the same time. The total accepted loss to the government was more than $250,000.

By mid-March, the battalion was manned, equipped and looked like a battalion again. After gaining accountability of personnel and equipment, much work still had to be done, such as installing radios, advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) and force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBC[B.sup.2]). These systems all required testing, calibration and verification.

The week before the first live-fire event in early March, the batteries were still signing for and installing equipment while conducting pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs). But the battalion was ready to refocus on training and preparing for the next OIF rotation, now only 15 months away.

Initial Training Reset (February-April 2005). Early during the reset phase the Arrowhead 3rd SBCT Commander made it perfectly clear that 1-37 FA must be prepared to execute traditional artillery missions and own and dominate its own battlespace, the same as our sister infantry battalions. Where does a battalion command team turn in order to develop the way ahead? Nowhere could we find the training strategy to achieve a balance between artillery proficiency and integrated infantry training, specifically Infantry Battle Drills 1 through 6, under an accelerated reset timetable. Moreover, the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model does not adequately address artillery battalions with in-lieu-of infantry missions.

To set the conditions for success during the training reset period, batteries had to complete the personnel and equipment phase, in that order, to ensure section chiefs, gunners and key leaders were assigned and equipment was accounted for at all levels. During this period, the battalion leadership simultaneously established a multi-focused training strategy and acquired the training resources to fulfill the brigade commander's guidance.

After section chiefs inventoried their new equipment, they focused on preparing for the battalion safety certification for key leaders, gunners testing and section certification. The new battalion CSM leveraged his experience as the Field Artillery's Master Gunner and completely rewrote the battalion section certification and safety certification programs. This was critical to ensure live-fire safety during two battalion-level live-fire exercises (LFXs) in March and April. By the end of March, each fire direction center (FDC) and howitzer section had completed live-fire certification.

At the end of the brigade's April field training exercise (FTX), the firing batteries had completed battery-level certification similar to the old Artillery Table XII. The headquarters service battery's (HSB's) specialty sections, including radar, meteorological (Met), survey, tactical operations center (TOC), and the administration and logistic operations center (ALOC), completed their certifications under the direction of the battalion XO, S3 or HSB commander. The battalion now was fully trained in artillery skill sets at the battery level and was capable of deploying with some risk.

A technique that might have made the initial battalion certification easier is Fort Sill's deploying several mobile training teams (MTTs) to help reset units. The Infantry Center, at Fort Benning, Georgia, currently deploys MTTs (7) to resetting infantry battalions, and this brigade benefited significantly from their efforts.

Throughout the year-long deployment to OIF, the battalion and the brigade fire support personnel had lost a great deal of their technical and tactical artillery experience due to the reality of operations on the ground. Most artillerymen had focused more on information operations (IO), civil-military operations (CMO) and in-lieu-of infantry missions during the deployment. As a result, the battalion's artillery and fire support proficiency suffered. The personnel turnover of approximately 50 percent during the reset also created a situation in which the MTTs were needed.

Having a fire support MTT help infantry battalion commanders train and certify their 13F Fire Support Specialists is essential to achieve reset milestones. Most 13F personnel in the infantry battalions gained a year's worth of combat experience but were not able to maintain their FA technical and tactical skills in theater.

We were unable to get a fire support MTT to help 1-37 FA reset. Recently certified observers on the hill processing digital fire missions for firing batteries would have enhanced the training and certification period through which 1-37 FA struggled in March and April 2005.

At the firing battery level, two MTTs for resetting battalions are required. One team should focus on the technical aspects of AFATDS and manual fire direction. Fire direction personnel also execute non-standard missions more frequently than their traditional missions in theater and lose much of their technical expertise.

Finally, the battalion's 13B Cannon Crewmembers need an MTT to help set up and employ the certification program. Currently, fires battalions do not have a higher headquarters to help in the certification process, and many BCTs cannot leverage the experience and knowledge from their sister fires battalions because those battalions also are going through either a deployment or reset. (8)

The actual composition and timing of the MTTs must be coordinated with the Department of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) at Fort Sill, based on the units' reset schedule.

The battalion accomplished a great deal in less than six months, but it still was not proficient at battalion- and brigade-level operations. The battalion also had not achieved the required readiness for its in-lieu-of infantry mission.

At this point, the reset process was making great progress, and the battalion now had to focus on an all-encompassing brigade tasker, Operation Warrior Forge 2005, and its preparations to execute area security operations.

Warrior Forge and Redleg Rifleman (May-October 2005). By May 2005, it had been six months since the brigade was in Iraq and the geometry of the battlefield had changed a great deal due to the enemy's evolving tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and Coalition and Iraqi successes. As a result, the brigade commander validated one key assumption: the battalion would have an area of operations (AO) during the next OIF rotation, and would be responsible for conducting full-spectrum operations against the enemy in a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield. (See the mission statement in Figure 1.)

Now with clarity of its mission, the battalion had to "adjust fire" and develop a new mission essential task list (METL) with a corresponding training strategy. (See Figure 2 for the 1-37 FA's METL.) At a minimum, the battery-level training had to include cordons and searches, establishing traffic control points (TCPs) and executing Infantry Battle Drills 1 though 6 to standard.

The greatest challenge the battalion leadership faced was developing the training needed to support turning the battalion into an infantry-focused organization while simultaneously maintaining the core artillery competencies. The adjusted training schedule also needed to fully develop the battalion's skills and expertise as infantrymen with the realization that it only had four FTXs before it deployed.

The first major exercise the battalion conducted was Operation Warrior Forge, the 2005 Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advanced Camp at Fort Lewis. 1-37 FA was responsible for executing the fire support lane that gave cadets the chance to complete the call-for-fire commissioning requirement and allowed them a day to interact with Artillery Soldiers to learn about the branch.

More than 3,000 cadets finished the training lane during the six-week course with ROTC allocating more than 10,000 rounds to execute the training. Also, the regional ROTC command received extensive engineer support, and the ROTC fire support committee worked with the battalion to achieve ROTC and battalion objectives during the exercise.

The battalion divided the ROTC training into three blocks. One firing battery was tasked to provide most of the fire support for the cadets for a two-week block. During the second two-week block, the firing battery supported an FA capabilities exercise for three hours in the early mornings of training days but otherwise could conduct battery training without interference from outside entities. (Battery commanders were advised to begin individual short-range marksmanship and basic squad-level maneuvers during this training time.) The third battery served as the battalion "Red Battery."

The battalion executed officer professional development (OPD) sessions and detailed relief-in-place briefings, so the training standards remained consistent for all cadets. Additionally, the OPDs allowed units to share unique lessons learned: B Battery briefed its peers on how to use engineer support to construct a firebase to standard, A Battery taught its peers how to conduct a two-gun raid and C Battery taught the battalion's leaders how to break down a prepared position efficiently.

Every two weeks, the firing batteries rotated through the different roles. HSB supported all ROTC operations with Met and radar, and the staff began to plan first quarter training opportunities. Also during this period, all three firing batteries changed commanders and field grade rotations occurred.

At the end of Warrior Forge, the battalion had achieved a baseline capability for area security missions similar to the training in FA tasks level achieved in April. Moreover, the battalion had fired more than 10,000 rounds safely, all leaders had had an opportunity to fire live missions, gunners had served as chiefs and all Soldiers were experts in their FA skills.

In July 2005, the battalion operations officer developed a training plan called "Redleg Rifleman" that finished preparing the battalion's Soldiers to conduct area security operations. Redleg Rifleman initially focused on individual Soldiers' infantry skills and ended with a battery-level force-on-force cordon and search during the brigade's October rotation to the Yakima Training Center, Washington.

In June, the S3 coordinated with the Army's marksmanship unit from Fort Benning to conduct a high-performance shooting course for the battalion officers at Camp Rilea, Oregon. This very intense, week-long course emphasized shooting with optics--advanced combat optical gunsights (ACOGS), electro-optical technology holosights (EOTechs) and M68 close combat optics--shooting on the move and behind buildings, using basic reflexive firing techniques and setting up and running a short-range marksmanship range.

While the officers conducted this training offsite, the battalion CSM and NCOs conducted similar refresher training and then began to train squads to conduct Infantry Battle Drills 1 through 6 at the military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) site. They used subject matter experts (SMEs) from the 1st Special Forces (SF) Group and senior NCOs from the infantry battalions to conduct the training.

When the battalion leadership was confident in the subordinate leaders' abilities in short-range marksmanship and the infantry battle drills, the battalion reorganized from battery-level operations into platoons. Specifically, the howitzer sections received the mission to fight as infantry squads or two four-man fire teams, when required; they had to retain the ability to conduct crew drills, when necessary.

We adopted much of the training methodology from the Engineer Branch to ensure balance in our artillery and infantry skills. For decades, the engineers have had to execute two missions: conducting engineer operations and fighting as infantry.

Every Soldier in the battalion belongs to a fire team, and each fire team leader trains his fire team. One team leader often is the ammo team chief, and the gunner leads the second team. As challenging as it was for our HSB, it was able to integrate the radar, Met and survey personnel, the field feeding team and combat repair team into fire teams. (9) Every fire team first conducted Battle Drill 6: Enter and clear a room with dry fire and blanks. The team then executed the drill with live ammunition during the day and night using optics and tactical lights. We validated the training at the state-of-the-art shoot house in September 2005 and developed a maneuver training lane using the urban assault course at the Yakima Training Center as the culminating event during the brigade LFX in October 2005.

This month-long training exercise was the capstone exercise for the battalion with three training lanes through which all three firing batteries rotated. The first training lane consisted of a firing battery providing close supporting fires for three maneuver company combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXes) at the MultiPurpose Range Complex (MPRC) on Fort Lewis. Each firing battery habitually is associated with an infantry battalion (three companies) to respond quickly as part of a Stryker ready task force mission.

The second lane focused on a firing battery conducting a live counterfire battle drill with the brigade fires and effects cell (FEC). At the same time, the battery received notional intelligence about a known enemy high-value target (HVT) that was using a main supply route (MSR) to smuggle weapons.

The battery was forced to establish a TCP to interdict and capture the HVT. The intelligence at the TCP forced the commander to the HVT's known location at the urban assault course. The battery commander received the mission to capture the HVT and had to develop a battery operations order (OPORD) and time line, rehearse the OPORD and then execute the mission.

During the execution phase, the HVT was not located at the objective but at another village several hundred meters away. The intent was to see how the commanders used initiative-based decision making to capture the HVT at the new location. At both locations the opposing force (OPFOR) occupied buildings. Both the OPFOR and battery personnel were issued simulated munitions (red/blue paint ball ammunition fired from an M16A2 with a substitute bolt) that actually hurt on impact on exposed skin.

The final lane consisted of each battery going through short-range marksmanship validation and a live-fire shoot house. The intent was to refamiliarize the Soldiers with reflexive firing techniques with optics. The new Yakima shoot house has a separate after-action review (AAR) facility where fire teams and squads can review their movement techniques and actions in each room.

The training was very realistic. Both friendly and enemy manikins in the rooms screamed and fell to the floor when shot. Initially, the battalion relied on the infantry SMEs to train senior leaders, but after several training iterations, our NCOs and officers could provide the expertise and oversight to ensure a safe live-fire event for the battalion.

The battalion focused on special skills training as it prepared for a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, in February. The special skills training consisted of several week-long courses, such as a Team Leaders Course and a Master Breachers Course.

The Team Leader's Course was similar to the brigade's pre-ranger course. It emphasized patrolling, nine-line casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), crew-served weapons training, marking a landing zone (LZ) and FBC[B.sup.2] training. With instructors from the 2-75 Ranger Regiment and several master breachers from the infantry battalions, the Master Breachers Course focused on manual, explosive and ballistic breaching techniques. Soldiers used these techniques on several steel and wooden doors and iron fences.

Both courses focused on small unit leadership, team building and instilling confidence in junior leaders. They also focused on developing well trained leaders with a solid foundation of initiative-based decision making.

Since the beginning of the "Redleg Rifleman" program in June 2005, the battalion has made significant progress toward turning the artillerymen into infantrymen. 1-37 FA has well trained firing batteries that also are highly trained as fire team and infantry squads. Before the MRE, the battalion focused on platoon- and battery-level maneuver operations. It also validated FA skill sets with gunners testing and howitzer and FDC certification.

During the MRE at the NTC, the scenario dictated a specific AO for the battalion. At that point, battalion-level maneuver operations included several convoy live fires and at least one mission that required massing the battalion's fires. Thus the battalion achieved a balance between artillery and infantry training proficiency from the individual level to battalion-level collective training.

1-37 FAs New Mission. The battalion's primary mission will be to control a portion of the brigade's battlespace as a maneuver task force (TF) and provide close supporting fires and counterfire for a forward operating base (FOB) or Stryker-ready TF, when necessary. To accomplish this mission the brigade's anti-tank company (C/52 IN) will be assigned to the TF. It brings 12 Stryker vehicles to the TF. Three will be the antitank guided munition (ATGM) Stryker variant, eight will be the Stryker infantry carrier variant (ICV) and one will be a fire support (FS-3) Stryker. (The company commander and XO each will have one of the ICVs.) These Stryker vehicles will give the TF commander an enhanced capability in his AO.

C/52 IN will give 1-37 FA a maneuver capability for the TF, either in an overwatch position or a support-by-fire position, and provide tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW) fires, as necessary. The Stryker vehicles also will transport Soldiers for an operation or on convoy security missions, enhancing force protection for the TF Soldiers throughout the AO. Finally, the Strykers will be prime movers for the M198 howitzers, replacing the five-ton trucks.

In TF 1-37 FA, a howitzer crew looks a lot like an infantry squad, not only on paper, but also in reality.

Resetting the Multi-Mission FA Battalion. Future resetting units first must identify just what is expected of the unit from its proposed future mission statement. Based on the contemporary operating environment (COE), a "pure artillery" battalion may be the exception; artillerymen more likely will have both a fire support and another role to play in an organization.

Ideally, resetting units need a comprehensive almost "off-the-shelf" training strategy for resetting units, training strategies geared toward a pure artillery battalion and (or) any combination of a transportation or infantry unit or even FOB management. These off-the-shelf training plans should be linked to the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) for future reset commanders to access.

Resetting units must recognize ahead of time the huge turnover in personnel and plan to augment their personnel and administrative section to keep pace with projected requirements.

In terms of equipment reset, commanders must develop an equipment synchronization matrix. This matrix is similar to how a unit builds combat power during reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) operations at the training centers. Specifically, it prioritizes which vehicles or howitzers per battery will go through contracted services first and what risk you can accept in terms of those vehicles that will not be ready for the first field exercise. Commanders also must decide which prioritized vehicles must have radios, AFATDS and FBC[B.sup.2] installed to make the required changes to the inherited fleet of vehicles.

The training reset can begin only after completing the first two phases, but the unit can develop a detailed training plan early. A unit cannot train a howitzer section or infantry squad before identifying the requirement for the section or squad and which sections will have the mission. The designated section or squad must have the equipment to train on. The unit must develop a realistic training strategy that takes into account the personnel transitions, section certification requirements, equipment availability and resources needed for training events.

Clearly, Fort Sill has a major role in facilitating and expediting the training reset phase. Because of the frequency of in-lieu-of missions and units' limited artillery experience in theater, battalions tend to lose a great deal of technical and tactical artillery-specific skills. Fort Sill must lead in developing specific MTTs based on the resetting units' organizations and coordinate with these units for the teams to help during the initial train-up period. Specifically, teams must address fire support elements (FSEs) across the Stryker brigades and modular BCTs, the FDCs at both the battalion and battery levels, and howitzer teams to support each fires battalion.

Reset operations are both challenging and rewarding. Leaders at every level can see real progress every day as they continue to assess their organization's readiness. Leaders also understand the links between personnel, supply and training readiness. This allows us to develop a generation of leaders who think holistically and can respond to multiple challenges simultaneously and a battalion that is agile, adaptive and ready to deploy, fight and win decisively--regardless of its mission.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Irrig commands the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (1-37 FA), part of the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (3rd SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, at Fort Lewis, Washington. He also served as the Executive Officer (XO) for the 75th FA Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and deployed as the 75th Exploitation Task Force in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003. He commanded D/1-5 FA (Alexander Hamilton Battery), 1st ID, at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Major Robert J. Bennett is the XO for 1-37 FA at Fort Lewis. He served as the S3 for 1-37 FA during OIF and for the majority of the reset period recently completed by the unit. Previously, he was the Deputy Operations Officer for Task Force Olympia, I Corps, in Mosul, Iraq. He also served as a Deputy Branch Chief in the Readiness Division, Army G3, at the Pentagon. He commanded Service Battery, 2-3 FA, 1st Armored Division, in Germany, deploying to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.

Endnotes:

1. During the battalion's first Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) rotation, the battalion executed missions across the spectrum of conflict, including managing the Tigress River Valley south of Mosul. The lessons learned from these operations were detailed in "Maneuver and Other Missions in OIF" by Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa in the March-April 2005 edition.

2. On 3 November 2004, the battalion had 495 personnel assigned and 291 authorized. This included both the personnel assigned to the unit in Iraq and 106 personnel, mostly 13B10s, who had been surged to Fort Lewis by the Human Resources Command (HRC) in anticipation of a personnel exodus after the Stop Loss/Stop Move was lifted.

3. Seventy-four Soldiers from 1-37 FA separated from the Army between December 2004 and February 2005.

4. One action that was not completed to standard was awarding the Combat Action Badges (CABs). The badge was not authorized until after the reset period. Gathering the required witness statements and submitting awards was difficult because many of the Soldiers involved had departed. Recognizing Soldiers who earned the award with other units under 1-37 FA was especially difficult. Because there were no excess personnel to augment the S1 shop to focus exclusively on the CABs, the requirement to execute this mission fell as an additional duty on four S1 Soldiers. The situation was exacerbated by confusion about the composition of the packet and a lack of published standards for its completion at the brigade, corps and Army levels. This action still is incomplete; however, significant progress has been made.

5. One example of unequal property books between sister battalions was Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBC[B.sup.2]) systems. Because 1-37 FA had a full complement of FBC[B.sup.2] systems in Iraq and 2-8 FA was not fielded completely based on the overseas need, 1-37 FA accepted a shortage of 16 systems in its new equipment set. The equipping challenge was limited to a clerical problem, but the training expectations of seasoned battalion leaders had to be downgraded as the equipment readiness status of the battalion declined instantaneously.

6. The Iraqi installation hand receipt process worked well for 2-8 FA as it transitioned with 4-11 FA, part of the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade in Alaska, the following year. Many of the advanced technologies purchased to meet immediate, in-theater needs remain there with the third rotation of SBCT fires battalions. Presumably, these capabilities will remain in place when 1-37 FA returns this summer. Given these technologies' approximate $1.2 million value added, the savings for taxpayers is significant.

7. Among the MTTs deployed from Fort Benning to Fort Lewis to support the 3/2 SBCT reset were the Mortar Leader's Course, Sniper Course, Master Breachers Course and a Warrior Fitness Team. A battalion in the brigade served as a host for each of these MTTs and garnered required resources for their training programs. Each battalion received the required number of slots to the courses, to include 1-37 FA (based on its area security mission).

8. As one example, 1-37 FA lost the ability to shoot digitally with gun display units (GDUs) on its return from OIF. It was not only due to the fact that many of the GDUs were unserviceable, but also to a lack of experience and knowledge in troubleshooting the GDUs, both in the FDC and on the gun line. An MTT from Fort Sill would have highlighted the importance of shooting digitally and ensured that the skills needed were in the battalion before it redeploys.

9. The field feeding team and combat repair team are assigned to the brigade support battalion but habitually are associated with the battalion for field exercises and deployments.

By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Irrig and Major Robert J. Bennett

RELATED ARTICLE: Fires Center of Excellence--Logo Contest

The Field Artillery School at Fort Sill and the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss are standing up the "virtual" Fires Center of Excellence (CoE) on 1 June. Ultimately, the ADA School will move to Fort Sill, physically establishing the Fires CoE.

The Fires CoE will be the Army's center of excellence for joint and coalition fires and the home of the Army's FA and ADA. This new center needs a logo.

The Chiefs of FA and ADA are sponsoring a contest to design the Fires CoE logo with the contest deadline 1 May. All military, regardless of whether or not they are FA or ADA, military retirees, military dependents and DA or other civilians are eligible to compete. The designer of the winning logo will receive $1,000 with the designer of the Second-Place logo receiving $300 and Third-Place winner receiving $200. The FA and ADA Associations are funding the awards. The winning logo potentially could become the Fires CoE logo.

The logo should be a simple, catchy full-color design. It should be crisp and clear and of high quality, making it easy to reproduce for use post-wide on items such as letterhead, conference folders, briefing slides, etc. The winning design also may be produced by Fort Sill as raised-surface plaques for walls, the main gate entrance, the front of podiums, etc.

The logo must be 8 by 10 inches with a 300 dpi quality. If submitted electronically, it also must be 8 by 10 inches in 300 dpi that is saved in jpg format at the medium setting, at a minimum.

Submissions must include the designer's full name, address, telephone number, email address and, as applicable, military rank, job and unit listed on a sheet separate from the logo. Submissions may be emailed to Ms Shirley Dismuke, Office of FA Strategic Communications, at [e-mail] or mailed to Commander, US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, ATTN: ATZR-T, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503. If FedExing the logo, send it to Commander, US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, 455 McNair Hall, Room 210, ATTN: Shirley Dismuke. The design must be received by 4:30 P.M. on 1 May. If contestants have questions, they can call Ms. Dismuke at commercial [phone]/3944 or DSN 639-8075/3944.

A panel of visual information and strategic communications specialists plus selected FA and ADA senior leaders will determine the winners from the anonymous contest submissions and determine if the First Place logo will be used as the Fires CoE logo. The judges' decisions will be final.

All contestants waive copyrights to the logo designs that become the property of the Fires CoE. Submissions will not be returned. The winners will be notified by 1 June with the logo printed in editions of FA and ADA magazines.

1-37 FA "rapidly" deploys by land, air or sea to a designated area of
operations and provides full-spectrum fires in support of the Arrowhead
BCT [brigade combat team]. Be prepared to conduct area security
operations as part of a brigade economy-of-force mission.

Figure 1: 1-37 FA's Mission Statement

Battalion
* Deploy.
* Conduct counterfire operations.
* Control delivery of fires.
* Conduct combat service support (CSS) operations.
* Execute battle command.
* On order, conduct area security.

Battery
* Deploy.
* Provide indirect fires.
* Conduct tactical moves.
* Defend battery area and materials.
* On order, establish traffic control points (TCPs).
* On order, conduct cordons and searches.

Headquarters Service Battery
* Deploy.
* Perform CSS operations.
* Conduct tactical moves.
* Defend battery areas and materials.
* On order, establish TCPs.

Figure 2: 1-37 FA's Mission-Essential Task List (METL)