BRINGING IRONIC (AND UGLY) SLICES OF HISTORY TO LIGHT.

Byline: Rich Martin Special to the Daily News

Title: ``Secret and Sanctioned''

Author: Stephen F. Knott

Data: 185 pages, Oxford University Press; $27.50

Our rating: Four Stars

It's a standard reaction to contemporary problems: Bemoan the ills of the moment and eulogize the Founding Fathers for their wisdom.

But even they seem to be taking a beating these days. A cover story in Atlantic Monthly criticizes Thomas Jefferson for being a racist, and this book takes aim at the myth that our Founding Fathers were all apostles of freedom and executive restraint in their foreign policies.

``Secret and Sanctioned'' is really two books. The first traces covert actions - from espionage to assassination attempts to bribery - undertaken by presidents before the Cold War. The second, which reveals the author's agenda, shows how this past has been distorted by modern critics, particularly the Church Congressional Committee in 1974 in the wake of Watergate. Knott writes that his book, complete with suggestions for change, is a rebuttal of ``those who have misrepresented America's clandestine past and have used this distorted history to assail the conduct of America's Cold War presidents and the agency that did their bidding.''

Knott shows some fascinating and occasionally ugly slices of history and succeeds in showing that American presidents consistently have bypassed Congress (usually with its consent) in dealing with sticky foreign problems. He is not afraid to tackle all American icons, starting with George Washington, who authorized three kidnap attempts of King George's son - but which never were attempted.

Most importantly, Washington initiated the Contingency Fund, which allowed funds for the executive branch to use as it saw fit - without congressional oversight. All the president had to do was to tell Congress how much was spent, but not what it was used for.

James Madison is one of the presidents who has been mythologized, and Knott's revelations about him are particularly juicy. Madison's operatives helped overthrow Spanish rule in west Florida and established a secret army in east Florida.

Far from idyllically democratic, Madison and other Founding Fathers trusted secret diplomacy and secret agents and distrusted Congress with any secrets at all.

Knott spares no one in his well-researched, carefully footnoted book. William Henry Harrison conspired to overthrow the Hawaiian monarchy. James Polk carried on a campaign of disinformation and propaganda to convince Maine residents to accept a British territorial proposal and stave off conflict.

John Tyler conspired to return Santa Anna to power. Thomas Jefferson tried to oust the ruler of Tripoli - who had taken U.S. hostages - and replace him with a friendlier ruler. (A deal was made, then reneged on.)

Woodrow Wilson is considered a pure-of-faith Democrat, but he, too, was a believer in covert action. During his administration, the U.S. Army hired four Mexicans to poison Pancho Villa but the attempt failed. (It is not known whether Wilson knew of this plot, Knott writes.)

Knott makes a good case that, in virtually all administrations, ``The prevailing opinion in the United States supported executive control of clandestine operations as an essential component of American foreign policy-making.''

The Church committee report concluded that the executive branch, ending a long tradition of restraint and respect for the Constitution, had abused its power during the Cold War - thus letting Congress off the hook for such CIA excesses as the overthrowing of Muhammed Mussadegh in Iran in 1953 and a coup against Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. But Congress did have oversight at the time.

For a long time, the system was that committee chairman (this later included senior members of Congress) were briefed on major covert actions. The CIA made major mistakes, but they were not errors solely made by the executive branch. There was a consensus until the mid-'70s that the CIA should have ``broad authority by the president and Congress to take whatever measures were necessary to protect the interests of the United States and the interests of the `Free World.' ''

Knott says that, under the new system, the CIA is poised between the executive and legislative branches, which contributes to delays and vacillation.

Members of Congress on intelligence panels (and who are therefore told of plans) who oppose any action can go public before it happens. The result, Sen. Fritz Hollings, D-S.C., says, is an agency of ``cautious bureaucrats who avoid the risks that come with taking action, who fill out every form in triplicate.''

The author proposes an end to the ban on assassinations and the elimination of various intelligence panels. Knott calls for the restoration of the system before 1974, when senior members were told of covert actions beforehand.

Knott is certainly correct to criticize the pious righteousness (and incorrect history) of the Church committee report. There is no legalistic way to prevent the stupidities and excesses of the CIA, and it is folly to believe that the United States always must act morally when dealing with other nations.

The author also makes the point that sometimes covert action can prevent war, and it is foolish not to allow ourself that option. He is right there as well.

It is clear that the pendulum has swung in the United States: After a period in which a clear consensus of decision makers (and the public) favored executive control of various dirty (overseas) tricks, Congress revolted after excesses were revealed. The public soured on the war in Vietnam and the CIA has been in low repute.

Now the situation is changed again. Knott makes a good point that recent foreign-policy failures - Iran is the best example - are due in large part to poor intelligence.

But to blame all of those problems on congressional meddling just doesn't work. And if we go back to the old system, isn't it possible the same mistakes will be made? Without major reform, the CIA won't be ready for the autonomy.

There's one last issue: Knott would have us believe that the new rules are foolish and constricting, but one could just as easily conclude that American presidents have been in the wrong for abusing their authority.