BELMONT COMMISSION SET PERILOUS PRECEDENT.

Byline: Stuart Timmons

THE Belmont Commission has spoken. Despite a divided vote weighted by fierce dissent, the seven-citizen panel has recommended to proceed with construction. Los Angeles is still reeling.

How did they get there? As a paid commission researcher for the last three weeks of its procedures, I watched the inside process of an effort some jokingly called ``Commission Impossible.''

A lack of standards, of procedure and, more than anything, of time has deepened what commission counsel Ira Reiner is calling ``a disaster'' for L.A. Unified.

Belmont's disastrous implications reach much further.

One might call a commission the court of least resort. It was able to set its own very ambiguous rules and sometimes break them while still sounding official. For example, the commission heard presentations and opinions, but nothing near a courtroom standard of testimony. The style of the commission minutes even discouraged the use of the word ``testimony.'' Presentations were not, after all, under oath. And bias, while sometimes uncovered, wasn't always. But when justifying their votes, those voting to proceed with construction forcefully invoked ``testimony'' and ``experts.''

In perhaps the most crucial area, expertise was steadfastly ignored. Hydrogen sulfide gas is one of the undeniable hazards at Belmont. The health impact of low-dose amounts that Belmont students may likely be exposed to is in serious doubt.

But in its health assessment of this gas, the federal Environmental Protection Agency calls further studies of long-term low level exposures imperative. The commission heard one researcher's findings of permanent brain damage caused by levels found at Belmont.

But in justifying his yes vote, Dr. Ira Monosson said that there are ``no known health effects associated with low-level repetitive exposure'' to this gas.

This ignored a standard set twice by the commission to base its decision on credible trends in knowledge. Dr. Monosson repeatedly dismissed scientific concerns about low-dose hydrogen sulfide. His cynical use of the ``known effects'' loophole may well subject future Belmont students, staff and neighbors to serious harm.

Who was allowed to speak - and for how long - had no firm procedure. The half-hour presentation of one of Belmont's most credible critics, Dr. Bernard Endres, was cut short due to time constraints. When invited to finish at another date, he was again cut short.

In contrast, consultant Dr. George Linkletter was granted 2-1/2 hours, though he didn't use all his time. Linkletter was hired by Gibson Dunn and Crutcher, a major law firm defending another major law firm in a malpractice suit brought by LAUSD over Belmont.

Was a balance of viewpoints and a thorough airing of them allowed? Hardly.

Though chartered as independent from LAUSD, the commission was subject to substantial influence by Barry Groveman, a potential candidate for district attorney who selected all seven commissioners, and environmental consultant Angelo Bellomo, who is affiliated with a firm that has billed millions for Belmont work and regularly advised the commission.

Groveman and Bellomo are both on the Safety Team, a crisis unit created to deal with the toxic schools scandal of which Belmont is a centerpiece. And Ira Monosson has served in at least one case as an expert witness to defend LAUSD in an environmental damage suit.

Much of the research and discussion on which the commission's recommendation was based occurred in three committees. But those committee meetings were rarely public. Spin and outright misrepresentation were sometimes caught and corrected on the commission's public record.

Shortness of time shortchanged a complete inquiry. A researcher at that meeting asked whether, instead of answering build or don't build, could there be a third option: We need more time to decide.

The answer was no, even though many committee researchers became visibly upset at the rushed schedule upon receiving assignments. And at least two commissioners asked for a time extension.

The denial meant the scientists could only verify risks posed by contaminants previously identified. They couldn't verify that the site was properly evaluated.

The failure to identify all hazards at Belmont is the one reliable constant in more than 10 years of investigations. Underscoring that point is the absence of a seismic study. This data, which will show basic pathways of gas migration, will not be available for months. Without it, a remediation plan is an incomplete proposal.

The commission's 60-day time frame precluded a thorough basis for appraising Belmont's safety.

As well, many of the experts who assured the safety of the cleanup plan for Belmont admitted they had insufficient time to review data about the site's complex challenges. Dr. David Jackson, an academic, and Dr. Tad Dabrowski, an environmental consultant, told the commission they had only a matter of hours to review the documents provided and they hadn't finished reading them.

Despite their limited and qualified review that Belmont could be made safe, the commissioners cited their opinions as authoritative when voting to build.

The commission was charged with evaluating the safety of Belmont. However, it veered into an unchartered referendum on overcrowding at one school. Tearful accounts of miserable overcrowding and disrepair at the current Belmont High School were a regular feature of public comment. These inequities at Belmont were acknowledged by every commissioner.

But thousands of students and staff in dozens of LAUSD schools struggle with equally deplorable conditions. They never had the chance to make their case - or to beg for relief.

The tragic referendum of the Belmont Commission far extends its local area. It sets a precedent for disguising environmental injustice as a community triumph. It encourages school kids to be used as lab rats for untried remediation technology, ``setting a new standard of risk'' in the words of Commissioner Maribel Marin.

And it invites the owners of tainted land to look toward taxpayers to bail out their toxic liabilities.

Since its inception, Belmont's bad decisions have been propelled by false ``emergency'' time frames, research that has been repeatedly proved inadequate, and uncertain protection of its future inhabitants.

The flickering green light of ``Commission Impossible'' is, sadly, more of the same.

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Photo

Photo: Construction on the Belmont Learning Center could continue despite the hazards of the site.

David Sprague/Staff Photographer