BAHRAIN - The Mechanics Of Co-operation With The US.

The way in which Bahrain would co-operate with the US in it war against terror would be determined mainly by existing defence agreements and understandings, as well as a tradition of quiet behind the scenes bilateral diplomacy. Expert observers say that any specific ad hoc requirements that the US may have would be dealt with through the channel of backstage diplomacy.

They note that such assistance being provided by Bahrain is not likely to become public knowledge. Defence agreements between the US and Bahrain go back several decades. It began in 1949, when Bahrain became the "de facto home port" for the Commander of the Middle East Force of the US. Since then, military ties have expanded steadily. Bahrain became the site of a US Military Administrative Support Unit in 1971 and an Office of Military Co-operation (OMC) was established in 1986.

However, the Gulf crisis was a turning point as the emirate became one of the key hubs for US (and British) forces that launched an attack against Iraqi troops in January 1991. After the war, a Defence Co-operation Agreement (DCA) was signed in 1991, allowing the US access to Bahraini bases during military-related emergencies. It also permits the pre-positioning of equipment. In 1993, Bahrain became the base for the Commander of the US Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT).

In the subsequent years Bahrain emerged as the host for the headquarters of the US Navy's newly constituted Fifth Fleet in the Gulf, with nearly 3,500 US troops based in the country. In October 1995, the US decided to send 18 F-16 jets to the emirate in order to compensate for the temporary absence of an American aircraft carrier from the Persian Gulf. Since then, Bahrain has also emerged as a favoured port for rest and recreation for American troops serving across the Gulf region, in view of its relatively liberal atmosphere.

In any event, the US regards the relationship with Bahrain as "mature" and sees Manama as being trustworthy - especially in the matter of not diverting high technology to third countries. There has been a strong sense of continuity since the death in 1999 of the former emir, Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al Khalifa. His son and current ruler Shaikh Hamad is regarded as a strongly pro-Western ruler, and his moves towards democratisation have made American dependence on Bahraini base facilities politically comfortable from the perspective of Washington.

In return for its assistance and provision of facilities, the US will be expected to provide both financial and military aid. Such a relationship also has a long background. Estimates of the US share of Bahrain's arms imports are vague, with figures ranging between a low of 50% and a maximum of about 95%.

In view of its small size, population and limited oil and gas resources, Bahrain has never been a major arms buyer relative to the other members of the GCC. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the ruling family had pledged to increase the military budget in a big way. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, Bahrain had prepared a big arms shopping list just like the other GCC member states. Planned purchases included additional fighter planes, transport aircraft, helicopters, missiles, armoured personnel carriers and battle tanks.

And like the other GCC states, except Saudi Arabia to a small extent, Bahrain has to acquire all its weapons from abroad because it has no domestic arms manufacturing capability. Funding constraints have come in the way of acquiring all requirements projected at the time. It was envisaged that some financing for these purchases would come, apart from Bahrain's own funds, out of security aid packages provided by its main suppliers: the US, Britain, Germany and France; Saudi Arabia also provides aid for defence purchases.