BAHRAIN - The Changing Muslim Parties - Part 3.

The emirate of Bahrain, which keeps a low profile in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), was during the 1990s the state most affected by militancy. Like the other Middle East countries facing this problem, Bahrain began to feel the ripple effects by the mid-1990s. But in this emirate the problem of militancy - which in other parts of the Middle East basically involved a rebellion against the existing regime - was mixed with the issue of sectarian discrimination. The height of the militancy was in 1995-96 when there were fears of a spillover effect into the other GCC states, but this did not materialise.

Indeed, within the past four years, the regime in Bahrain has managed to bring the situation back under control. The approach towards dealing with militancy was quite similar to that which was applied in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc. It was a combination of (a) extremely tough security tactics against the militant groups, their leaders and their sympathisers, and (b) serious efforts at economic reform in order to remove at least some of the causes underlying the problem of militancy, such as unemployment.

The militant groups themselves have thus been marginalised almost totally, especially the ones advocating violent tactics. Those individuals who have advocated dialogue to resolve genuinely problematic issues - such as sectarian grievances - are being taken more seriously by the regime. There are still arson attacks or violent incidents, but these are few and far between. As such they do not have an effect more serious than that of disturbing public peace and discrediting the militants among local business circles, although some businessmen are said to have initially viewed militancy with a degree of sympathy.

The prospects for a further upsurge in militancy remain, but the potential for it to become a threat to the ruling Al Khalifa family is declining steadily. To some extent, this is because Bahrain now has a changed outlook following the accession to power of Emir Shaikh Hamad Bin Issa Al Khalifa in March 1999.

The generational change at the topmost level of leadership has already had a positive impact on the way in which both Bahrainis and outsiders assess the prospects for the emirate. A reform-oriented policy thrust is expected from the new emir, both on the economic and political fronts, although less on the latter.

Such optimism was not evident during the early to mid-1990s, when Bahrain seemed out of touch on several fronts. Although the emirate proved its worth as a strategic ally of the US during the Gulf crisis, politically and economically it seemed unable to adjust to global developments. The then Emir, Shaikh Issa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, as well as many of the ministers had been in their positions for decades and people saw no real prospect of dynamic policies emerging from among them (see following). With oil revenues low, Bahrain's economy was facing difficulties compounded by the fact that aid from neighbouring countries was affected by their own problems in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis.

Moreover, Bahrain's stature as an offshore banking centre was beginning to be challenged by the return of Lebanon as well as by the impressive opportunities being offered by Dubai, Qatar, Cyprus, etc. Unemployment was very high, especially within the majority Shiite community which resented the fact that the Sunni minority controlled all the levers of power. In such an environment, it was not difficult for the militants to get sympathy during the mid-1990s.

Despite the fact that the overall economic and political atmosphere in Bahrain has changed for the better, the emirate remains one of the less secure members of the GCC. As the smallest and least wealthy of the monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula, it had been the first among them to face the socio-economic problems of the post-cold war world.

These have included the difficulties arising from globalisation, challenges to the existing domestic political and economic order, and the spread of democratic tendencies in other parts of the world - not to mention the increasing complexity of the regional security situation. Bahrain is also less secure than other GCC countries in terms of its economic base, which depends on limited hydrocarbon resources.

Many observers say, however, that Bahrain could improve its situation over the coming years if it adopts the "Dubai model" and markets itself more aggressively as a hub for trade, transhipment, offshore services, etc. They add that such an improvement can be achieved only through a judicious mixture of economic reforms to attract investments and speed up domestic wealth generation as well as socio-economic measures that take into account grievances among the Shiite community. They note that Bahrain is sure to be assisted in such an endeavour by the wealthy GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, but also by the UAE and Kuwait.

For the regime, stability is the main priority, and whatever is perceived as posing a challenge to that will face the wrath of the state's security forces. The best example of this was the state's response to the sudden upsurge of politically motivated violence in December 1994, just as Manama was about to host a GCC summit.

It caught the regime by surprise, with leaders of the opposition tendency demanding a restoration of the National Assembly - which was dissolved in 1975 by the Emir, Shaikh Issa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, amid mounting domestic unrest. The government recovered rapidly and the police and internal security machinery moved rapidly and quite brutally to put a lid on the situation. The methods to combat militancy became steadily more sophisticated in the following years and, as a result, the Islamists of Bahrain are now virtually unseen and unheard.