BAHRAIN - Sunni-Shiite War Dangers.

Salafi provocations against Shiites in modern history date back to the second half of the 1990s, when the Taliban after taking power in Afghanistan discriminated against, as well as killed many, Shiite Afghans. But after the US-led war toppled the Taliban and destroyed the bases of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in late 2001, parts of Bin Laden's network moved to northern Iraq through Iran and others took refuge in Iran itself. So for a brief period there was a sort of modus vivendi between the Shiites and the Salafi groups.

After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, however, the dangers of Salafi-Shiite conflict became serious amid some signs of an impending US-Shiite alliance in Iraq. Such a conflict would have serious implications for both Bahrain and the adjacent Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia where, as in Bahrain, the majority of the population is Jaafari Shiite - the sect of the theocracy in Iran and of the Shiite communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc.

Salafi groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda in Iraq - the mainly Kurdish and partly Turkmen Ansar Al-Islam, Ansar Al-Sunnah, and other organisations - who were focussing their attacks on the security forces and other public servants before the Jan. 30 elections, have since turned their attention to the Shiites, particularly in Baghdad and in the "Death Triangle" south of the capital, killing over 100 of them in various suicide attacks in the past two weeks. Strict checks of motor vehicles by security forces have led suicide bombers to resort to other means, such as carrying explosives on cycles or on their person. This is not the first time that there have been concentrated attacks on Shiite targets. Last March and in August 2003 to end-2003, there were such attacks, particularly during the most important day of Ashoura observed by Shiites. In Pakistan, which has had a history with the Sunni-Shiite divide extending over 20 years, the rift gets sharpened around Ashoura, with an increase in the number of attacks on Shiites by Sunni militants.

Iraq, which had been free of Shiite-Sunni violence under Saddam's Baathist regime that banned Ashoura rituals, has overtaken Pakistan in the sharpness of the sectarian divide. The number of Shiites killed by Salafi suicide bombings and other means since August 2003 is said to have exceeded 700. But none of the Shiite community leaders has issued casualty figures to the public in Iraq.

Zarqawi has made it clear that one of his objectives in Iraq is to trigger a Sunni-Shiite war, having repeatedly called for attacks on Shiites whom he describes as apostates and idolaters. The leaders of the Shiite community in Iraq have been determined not to retaliate against the Sunnis for the Salafi attacks. Fear of such a dangerous conflict has spread throughout the GCC region, where the rulers have been alarmed by the danger. This is one of the angles which has made the six GCC member-states cautious about Iraq - having become a trend-setter in sectarian terms.

On the other hand, the Arab identity of Iraq's Shiites, as well as the Sunnis, remains a strong factor against such a sectarian war; and the same goes for most Shiites along the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. The Iranian Shiites consist of two main ethnic groups, the Persians and the Azeris, with Kurdish, Turkmen and Arab Shiite communities being much smaller. The strength of this factor was desmonstrated during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s: a large number of Iraqi Shiites, some of them occupying senior positions in the Iraqi armed forces, fought valiantly against the Iranian army and repulsed repeated efforts by Tehran to induce large-scale desertions. There is no reason to believe that the Arab identity of the Shiites has since been diluted and that they now think of themselves more as Shiites than Arabs.