B/377 PFAR: platoon-based fires in Afghanistan.

Two years after the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), B Battery, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Regiment (B/377 PFAR) and Task Force (TF) 1-501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR)--TF Geronimo--deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Upon deployment, the question was how to effectively employ cannon artillery and get the guns into the fight. The battery leadership studied the enemy, terrain, culture and many lessons learned from the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions and 10th Mountain Division during their OEF tenures.

Upon official notification of the battery's deployment order, 3-6 FA, 10th Mountain Division, sent an informative secure internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) email to the battery commander stating, in part, "OEF artillery battery operations are 3200-mils out from anything our leaders or Soldiers had ever experienced."

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The best insight into forthcoming operations was to break away from the battery mindset and prepare to split the unit into two three-gun or even three two-gun platoons. Independent, split-battery, 24-hour continuous combat operations became the norm.

Distributing fires in support of combat operations throughout noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs) would be strongly favored over mass for both maneuver and their supporting artillery. Simply put, to cover all elements with fires, we needed to rapidly adapt and organize our battery--six guns and a one-gun "float"--into a platoon-based battery.

The purpose of this article is threefold: to offer techniques that facilitate platoon-based cannon artillery operations, to highlight some of TF Geronimo's combat experiences in OEF and to explain why artillery platoons, when properly equipped and manned, best provide maneuver elements what they need to win on today's battlefield.

Initial Combat Operations. In early November 2003, TF Geronimo closed on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno with 852 combat-ready paratroopers tactically positioned to conduct continuous combat operations. FOB Salerno is southwest of Kabul along the Afghani-Pakistani border. (See the map in Figure 1 on Page 30.)

The firing battery occupied and began constructing a six-gun, 6400-mil fire-base while establishing and maintaining a 24-hour firing capability to support the TF. It was during this timeframe that the TF received a warning order (WARNO) to prepare to deploy two howitzers and associated personnel and equipment via airlift for an indefinite tasking in support of Kandahar Airfield with a sequential, on-order mission to support Bagram Airfield as part of base defense plans.

It is important to note that AO Geronimo covered more than 10,000 square kilometers and has flat terrain within the Khowst Bowl and mountainous, rugged, restrictive terrain along the Pakistani border. In perspective, AO Geronimo is more than three times as big as the "box" at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, and twice as large as the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California.

During mission analysis, questions requiring immediate attention were "How will this tasking degrade capabilities and affect responsiveness? Can the battery maintain the 24-hour counterstrike requirement? Will this limit the ability to provide indirect artillery support of maneuver operations outside the wire?"

The answers to these questions were forthcoming. But, for the time being, the order necessitated that B/377 PFAR establish at least one two-howitzer firing platoon to operate independently for a sustained, multi-month duration.

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Methodology. Why split-battery platoon-centric operations? The answer is tied to adapting our capabilities to counteract the enemy's advantages during a counterinsurgency. Given the size, spectrum and austere environment of our battlespace and the fleeting enemy we were fighting, centralized planning and decentralized execution was the preferred course-of-action (COA).

A significant task during any counterinsurgency fight is the ability to collect actionable intelligence while separating the enemy from the populace, drying up enemy safe havens. The expectation that maneuver companies can accomplish this essential task alone is invalid. If we are to mass our combat power at the critical time and place, then distributive and decentralized operations involving every available Soldier is the most feasible option for accomplishing the task.

The greatest challenge for our Artillerymen was how to maintain indirect fire support coverage for each maneuver element throughout these operations. The TF commander's intent for fires would not change during the decentralized process: "Get the guns into the fight." We understood that anything short of meeting this intent could jeopardize the mission.

Without question, Soldiers faced many non-doctrinal tasks throughout GWOT. Certainly Redlegs in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF are performing these non-doctrinal tasks as a rule, not as exceptions.

If distributive operations throughout noncontiguous AOs are to remain strongly favored over mass and artillery fires continue to support all maneuver operations, then artillery batteries, or in this case, artillery platoons, must be organized and equipped to support these distributive ops.

Reorganization Techniques. Unfortunately, when operating as a separate battery, the manning and equipment needed to split a unit "come out of hide." Fillers from other FA batteries or the FA battalion staff are not part of the equation. Our unit started this process with our howitzer sections. (See Figure 2 on Page 31.)

Outfitting our gun crews within the three-platoon concept was the easy part: we assigned first and second howitzer sections in first platoon, third and fourth howitzer sections in second platoon, and fifth and sixth howitzer sections in third platoon.

The next part, command and control ([C.sup.2]), was more challenging. We needed three leaders for [C.sup.2] of these platoons, but our challenge was in deciding whom to task and how much risk we were willing to accept.

After much deliberation, we assigned our battery operations officer--who was excess on our modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE)--the duties of the 1st platoon leader, the fire direction officer (FDO) as the 2d platoon leader and the battery executive officer (XO) as the 3d platoon leader. The platoon leaders' respective platoon sergeants were our chief of firing battery, gunnery sergeant and the most senior howitzer section chief.

Creating three fire direction centers (FDCs) from one proved our biggest challenge. Fortunately, our headquarters platoon sergeant (also excess to the MTOE) was a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13D4P (Parachutist) FA Tactical Data Systems Specialist who provided expertise throughout this process. His technical creativity enabled the unit to outfit three separate, fully mission-capable and certified platoon FDCs.

During this internal battery transformation, we cross-leveled several mission-essential items, including handheld terminal units (HTUs), battery computer systems (BCS), firing charts, OE-254 antennas and advanced system improvement program (ASIP)/FM radios. Finally, our battery had created three mobile FDCs in high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and one static FDC at the firebase with a hard-stand, advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) and Blue Force Tracker (BFT). Our static FDC was collocated with the battery operations center (BOC) in a general-purpose medium tent that doubled as our 24-hour [C.sup.2] and technical fire direction node throughout the deployment.

Additional FDC leadership positions included our primary chief computer's assuming the duties of the 1st platoon FDC chief and our computer operator's certifying as the chief fire direction computer of the newly created 2d platoon FDC. After conferring with the TF command sergeant major, the battery was authorized to make its final key leader move of gaining the assistant TF operations NCO, an MOS 13C3P Tactical Automated Fire Control Systems Specialist, to be the FDC chief for 3d platoon.

After many personnel moves and intra-battery equipment transactions, the unit had overhauled all key leader duties and responsibilities. Each of the three firing platoons had a platoon leader, platoon sergeant and an FDC. Each of the FDCs had one officer who doubled as the platoon leader, one fire direction NCO, two Soldiers and the minimum mission-essential equipment to conduct independent operations. Within 60 days of arriving in theater, we rapidly had transformed our battery into three two-gun platoons that were fully mission-capable.

Initial Testing. 2/B/377th PFAR (19 personnel) was the first to deploy to Kandahar Airfield under the new two-gun platoon organization while the remainder of the TF ramped up for Operation Mountain Avalanche. This theater-wide operation provided the battery and TF the opportunity to validate the artillery platoons' execution of their combat tasks.

Avalanche was a combat operation with many significant combined arms lessons learned at all levels. The primary learning point for indirect systems was that our platoon-based operations concept worked magnificently. However, we also recognized that we could no longer rely on mortars to support the FOB counterstrike plan.

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During this operation, FOB Salerno received eight 107-mm rockets with a point of origin (POO) greater than eight kilometers from our FOB. With 2/B/377 deployed to Kandahar and 1 & 3/B/377 deployed more than 30 kilometers to the south, there was no indirect asset inside the wire that could provide immediate counterstrike on the POOs. 120-mm mortars are an outstanding indirect system, but no mortar system can counterstrike an enemy 107-mm or 122-mm rocket firing at or near their maximum ranges.

From December 2003 through July 2004, the battery maintained 24-hour continuous 105-mm firing capability from within the FOB with at least one platoon FDC and one howitzer section manning its position at all times. We knew that every second counts in a counterstrike--seconds can equate to casualties, friendly or enemy casualties. The only immediate delivery means to take out enemy rockets were B Battery's howitzers.

Our next combat operation, Mountain Blizzard, closely mirrored Avalanche and was another successful combat operation. During the same timeframe, 2/B/377 relocated from Kandahar Airfield to Bagram Airfield and established a counterstrike link with the Q-37 Firefinder radar positioned there.

Because of Operation Avalanche's key lesson learned, 3/B/377 was attached to the FOB security maneuver company and maintained a linkage with the Q-36 radar for a 24-hour firing capability.

Indirect fire assets available for Mountain Blizzard were 1/B/377 and its two guns and the 120-mm mortar platoon from 3-6 FA that had supported the TF's (-) conducting continuous combat operations in the far western portion of our AO. Operation Mountain Blizzard took 14 days and neutralized a terrorist cell. The TF (-) then redeployed to FOB Salerno to refit, recover and maintain 24-hour continuous counterstrike responsibility.

Combat History. Similar to all historical combat operations, it was not until the TF leadership conducted a detailed 100-day after-action review (AAR) that we understood the impact of terrain, the elements, population and, most importantly, the enemy we needed to hunt down and kill or capture. The TF AAR focused all Geronimo leaders and staff sections on how we saw the enemy and how we saw ourselves.

It was not until our leaders and troops had collectively experienced and seen the complete environment (post-Operations Avalanche and Blizzard) and cross-leveled information that we could paint a clear picture and thoroughly assess our battlespace. This truly opened our eyes to the terrain, size and scope, and all fully concurred that our piece of the pie was enormous.

The first priority of the TF commander was to collectively readdress how we were massing our forces and fires. After Operations Mountain Avalanche and Mountain Blizzard, we assessed our effectiveness and ascertained that the fight in our AO was a platoon leader's fight. To force the enemy to show his face, we had to conduct operations in smaller formations.

Providing [C.sup.2] at the company level, synchronization, fusion and asset allocation from the battalion TF gave our young platoon, squad and team leaders every advantage and asset needed and enabled them to win every fight. This doesn't mean the TF wasn't well prepared going into Operations Avalanche and Blizzard or didn't have excellent planning information. It simply validates the fact that nothing is more valuable than "putting boots on the ground" throughout the AO. To become more effective, TF Geronimo became more adaptive and flexible. Our artillery platoons had to achieve the same or greater level of flexibility to accomplish their assigned tasks, operating within the nontraditional three-platoon concept.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) Implementation. After analyzing our operations, the battery refined its TTPs to become more effective. During this time, the first platoon leader was selected to redeploy and assume duties as the rear-detachment commander. This was a significant leadership loss to the battery, especially to first platoon. But as the TF commander stated, "If it didn't hurt to send him back, then he probably wasn't the man for the job." This drove the decision to move the targeting officer out of the TF fire support element (FSE) to lead first firing platoon.

We also discovered that the battery still required a dedicated XO to resource and provide maintenance and logistical support for the three platoons. Additional personnel moves then included the headquarters platoon sergeant's (13D4P) assuming platoon leader responsibilities for 3/B/377, enabling the XO to concentrate on sustaining the battery. And with semiannual howitzer certifications due, we needed a dedicated master gunner, which mandated our chief of firing battery concentrate on certifying the howitzer sections.

The decision to move "Smoke" out of a platoon sergeant position required another senior staff sergeant section chief to assume platoon sergeant duties. This afforded another gunner the opportunity to certify and perform duties as the chief of section of first howitzer section. We had broken away from six-gun battery operations, but regardless of how degraded our platoons became, we would not assume risk with platoon-level leadership.

Thus, we ensured that each element maintained a designated platoon leader and platoon sergeant throughout the deployment.

Tactical Results. Fortunately, the TF was outfitted with all indirect assets required of a maneuver battalion. Included in the Geronimo task organization (organic and attached) were six M119A2 105-mm howitzers (plus one operational float), two 120-mm mortars, four 81-mm mortars, one Q-36 radar and two lightweight countermortar radars (LCMRs). Each system gave the commander several options and many of the same or similar desired effects.

Without question, the rapid rate-of-fire and flexibility of mortar systems has proven a tremendous combat multiplier throughout the deployment. A significant constraint that applies to any mortar system is that it cannot range and, therefore, cannot counteract the extremely high rocket threat facing FOBs.

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During the course of nine months, enemy forces fired 150 to 200 rockets at our TF troops with the intent to kill friendly forces where they slept. 107-mm and 122-mm rockets remained the biggest threat to static forces in the FOB, and although the 120-mm mortars can range out to more than seven kilometers, they cannot counterstrike the 107-mm or 122-mm rockets.

TF 1-501 PIR's primary deterrents to enemy rocket fires were active counterrocket patrols at known or suspected POOs and aerial over flights of named areas of interest (NAIs). The enemy understands the terrain, as he has spent the better part of his life in this AO, and is adaptable enough to fire rockets in this nonlinear fight. The number one defensive measure against a rocket launch in our AO was lethal 105-mm fires that could range all enemy rocket POOs.

After many rehearsals from sensor (Q-36/LCMRs) to shooter (105-mm), the Geronimos developed and fine-tuned a clearance-of-fires battle drill that provided immediate counterstrikes on acquired POOs. B/377's essential task in OEF remained supporting our maneuver brethren with fires and, simultaneously, making the insurgents true believers in the devastating effects of cannon artillery. Timely counterrocket fires alone defined the FA's relevancy in our AO, but with three independent platoons, the TF commander could ask much more from his organic artillery battery.

Why Platoon-Based Artillery Operations Work. After solidifying our personnel moves and incorporating our TTPs, our three-platoon concept was complete and, once again, put to the test during the next major combat operation, Operation Mountain Storm. The battery frequently maneuvered as Team Eagle with one firing platoon, one scout platoon and one up-armored platoon under the [C.sup.2] of the battery commander.

Team Eagle had the combat power to function as a maneuver combat team, enabling the TF to move artillery closer to any given objective area. Team Eagle also maintained force protection and direct fire capabilities to move and secure itself while conducting village assessments and cordons and searches and attempting to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

As Operation Mountain Storm began, the TF was relieved of the Bagram Airfield artillery platoon tasking, which brought all three firing platoons under the [C.sup.2] of the battery. With three independent firing elements in one battery, we attached one firing platoon to any given maneuver company and one platoon to deploy with Team Eagle as a maneuver team, always leaving a third platoon at FOB Salerno with the Q-36 to support the 24-hour counterstrike plan.

Typical non-doctrinal tasks (excluding the FOB Salerno counterfire platoon) included B Battery instructing an English Language School for local children (featured in Army Times). The battery also conducted operations from within the local populace, such as training and resourcing the local national police force, constructing and funding several irrigation wells, providing tractors to local villages, delivering generators to schools, performing mounted and dismounted security for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) voter assistance teams, and providing medical supplies for the medical civil affairs program (MEDCAP) for local villagers and veterinarian civil affairs program (VETCAP) for their live stock.

These missions provided information operations (IO) or other nonlethal effects with a two-fold purpose. First, we built rapport with and gained the trust and confidence of the local populace while providing them a safe and stable environment. Second, we received information from sources in the populace that led us to enemy forces. Our intent was to find, fix and finish the enemy, but without the support of the populace, it would have been difficult, if not impossible.

Counterinsurgency Artillery TTP. Throughout our deployment, one cannon artillery TTP that made a difference was employing artillery in a show-of-force capacity. While artillery platoons on mounted patrols performed IO and psychological operations (PSYOPs), the "Big Guns" affected the enemy psyche and often triggered a response. Regardless of the task--providing MEDCAP or VETCAP or conducting routine mounted patrols--all M119A2 howitzer platoons "left the wire" ready to support any mission, nonlethal through direct or indirect live fire to achieve desirable effects.

To counter the insurgents' advantage of blending with the population, we learned that when a cannon battery conducted a live-fire with its howitzers, even just as a "demonstration," the general populace felt a sense of security. As a result of the deafening sound of artillery from both delivery and receipt, the enemy was forced to communicate a situation report (SITREP) to superiors that often allowed us to pinpoint their locations. Bottom line: the battery often live fired and stimulated signal intelligence (SIGINT). On any given day throughout our deployment, we habitually had one platoon conducting Team Eagle missions, including live fires; one platoon attached to or performing direct support for a maneuver company; and one platoon maintaining a 24-hour nonotice counterstrike capability from FOB Salerno.

In more than nine months, the three two-gun platoons of B/377 PFAR accurately and safely delivered in excess of 1,000 howitzer rounds through our seven M119A2 cannons, including 110-extended range munitions (M913 rocket-assisted projectiles and Charge 8). Each round was tied to an essential fire support task (EFST) and took the form of demonstration fires, precision registrations, counterrocket and countermortar fires, or danger-close support for troops in contact.

Throughout countless operations, the battery maintained a firing capability in one or more locations and, post-Avalanche, never lost the ability to support the counterstrike fight.

As a result of artillery platoon-based operations, the 852 paratroopers assigned to TF 1-501 PIR were never without cannon artillery support for their operations. Without question, FOB Salerno slept better at night, knowing one of three howitzer platoons and one of three alert FDCs digitally linked to the Q-36 radar were ready to counterstrike on-call.

Most importantly, when asked if they love their artillery, the 11 series Infantrymen assigned to Apache, Blackfoot, Comanche and Delaware Companies unanimously and without hesitation said, "Hell, yes!"

Although our platoon operations were tested only in our OEF AO, we believe our method will work equally well in any theater throughout the GWOT.

Decentralized operations with platoons hunting insurgents are critical to our success in this fight. We must focus efforts on the platoon architecture in all combat arms branches. We strongly recommend the Field Artillery move toward including platoon-centric operations and platoon-based fires in our doctrine, TTP and training.

By Captain Shane P. Morgan, First Sergeant Robert H. Levis and Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. Glenn III, IN

Captain Shane P. Morgan commanded B Battery 377th Parachute Field Artillery Infantry Regiment (B/377 PFAR) and deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) from June 2003 until August 2004 as part of Task Force 1-501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (TF 1-501 PIR). Currently, he is an Action Officer in the Collective Training Directorate at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In a previous assignment, he commanded C Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery (4-11 FA), 172d Light Infantry Brigade (Separate), Fort Richardson, Alaska.

Master Sergeant Robert H. Levis is the First Sergeant of B/377 PFAR and deployed with the battery for OEF from September 2003 until August 2004. Among other assignments, he was the First Sergeant and Chief of Firing Battery in C/4-11 FA and Senior Enlisted Firing Battery Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. He has served 20 years in the Army's light infantry units.

Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. Glenn III, Infantry (IN), commanded TF 1-501 PIR, Fort Richardson, Alaska, and deployed the task force to Afghanistan from July 2003 through August 2004. He is now attending the Joint Advanced Warfighter School at National Defense University in Norfolk, Virginia. He also has served as the S3 of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and S3 of 2-505 PIR, both at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.