Australia's response to terrorism in the Asian region.

Terrorism can be defined as "a form of psychological warfare that is used to create extreme fear through the use of threat of force against non-combatant civilian military targets". (1) Terrorism is as much about psychological maiming as it is about physical destruction. Terrorists seek to be noticed and the mass media are often there to oblige them. Attacking a country's embassy, an airliner or a major commercial target provides the terrorists with the advertising that they covet.

The issue of terrorism has become increasingly important for Southeast Asian governments in the last few years. The increase in frequency and the effect of terrorist activities and political violence have threatened communities and stymied business growth and tourism. It has also impacted on Australia.

Australia was in the forefront of Western nations' demands that Indonesia crack down on the extremist Jemaah Islamiyah movement, which Indonesian government officials initially insisted did not exist in their country. Then came the shocking bomb explosions in Bali on the night of 12 October 2002. A total of 202 people were killed and 209 were wounded in the attacks. The bombing is considered the deadliest and ugliest act of terrorism in Indonesian history. The largest group among the killed were from Australia, leading to the day often being called "Australia's September 11".

It was a shocking and unexpected event for most Australians, and raised many questions about Australia's international and domestic security policies. The rapid formation of the Joint Investigation and Intelligence Team to investigate the Bali bombings, involving law enforcement officials from Australia and Indonesia, was a signal that there could be useful cooperation between the two governments on the issue.

The Indonesian authorities immediately sought executive powers to detain suspected individuals without recourse to the rule of law. Justice Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra justified the need for such powers, stating: "Terrorism is an extraordinary and inhuman crime. Therefore, we need extraordinary laws to deal with it." (2) Although human rights activists expressed fears that the government was adopting the draconian powers employed during President Suharto's dictatorship, they represented a minority voice. (3)

The Bali bombings have strengthened the political position of the Indonesian military and the police. Under pressure from Australia, the Indonesian security forces took a freer hand in tackling alleged terrorist groups. Australia cannot solve terrorism problems in Indonesia and, like other countries in Southeast Asia, depends on the Indonesian Government cracking down on Islamic extremists in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has been regarded as important in the war on terrorism because it is home to a number of groups that resort to violence to further their cause, and because a number of al-Qaeda operatives can function in such weak states as Indonesia and the southern Philippines island of Mindanao. The Bali bombing, coupled with the detention of 15 terrorists in Singapore in December 2001 and another 21 in August 2002, does confirm, however, that terrorists with links to al-Qaeda are active in the region and continue to wage their global terrorist campaign. Southeast Asia is also called in the West a hotbed of Islamic radicalism. (4)

The assumption that the region is one of Islamic radicalism is erroneous. In the largest, predominantly Muslim states in the region--Indonesia and Malaysia--the Muslim population practises an essentially moderate and tolerant form of Islam. In Indonesia, the two main Islamic organisations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, advocate a division between religion and politics; their memberships account for a quarter of the population. Both organisations have denounced extremism and violence committed by radical Islamic groups, with the Nahdlatul Ulama joining the Indonesian military in encouraging the government to enact anti-terrorist legislation. (5)

The leaders in both states are also moderates, with Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad considered a prime example of a modern Muslim leader meshing traditional Islamic ideas with the requirements of a multi-racial, globalised society. Indeed, Mahathir used events since 9/11 to criticise the main opposition party, Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), for its fundamentalist Islamic stance. The present Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi is implementing Mahathir's policies. In Indonesia, which has a secular regime, the former Muslim president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was the target of two assassination attempts by Omar al-Faruq, a top al-Qaeda representative in Southeast Asia, arrested in June 2002. (6) In other words, while extremists do exist, the vast majority of the region's Muslim population and the regimes in power practise a more moderate form of Islam.

However, Southeast Asia is also home to a variety of groups willing to resort to violence to further their cause. A number of guerrilla organisations there are seeking to gain independence (autonomy) for their regions. In Indonesia, these include the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Free Papua Movement (OPM). In the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has sought an independent Islamic state in Mindanao.

In southern Thailand, a variety of militant organisations have sought autonomy for the Patani Malay. While Islam, with the exception of the OPM, is an important element in their identities, it relates to their "demands for autonomy or secession, not as an end in and of itself". (7) It should be noted these are not the militant groups that have emerged since 9/11 that threaten to wreak havoc on the region.

In addition to these nationalist groups, other groups that are little more than criminal gangs have engaged in hostage-taking, extortion and murder. The best known is Abu Sayyaf that operates in the southern islands of the Philippines. While there is some evidence of early links to al-Qaeda, (8) Abu Sayyaf has no coherent political agenda. In Indonesia, such criminal gangs include the Islamic Defenders Front (IDF) and Laskar Jihad, the latter being responsible for the upsurge in communal violence in the Moluccas in recent years.

As the Bali bombing revealed, some terrorist groups and religious institutions represent a regional threat, and the group that has caused concern within the region is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which was founded in the mid-1990s. JI's struggle is primarily concerned with domestic issues in Indonesia. Its principal goal is the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic government in the country, followed ultimately by the formation of a unified Islamic state in the Southeast Asian region. The organisation has carried out many terrorist acts since 2000 in pursuit of its goal, which has made JI a threat to the security not only of Indonesia but of the region in general.

JI's terrorist acts in Indonesia have been directed chiefly against symbolically Western targets. These attacks have a two-fold effect, as they weaken the Indonesian government and the economy, while also conveying a frightening message to prosperous foreigners. Some of the most recent and well-known terrorist acts include the Bali nightclub bombing (October 12, 2002); the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing (August 5, 2003); the Jakarta Australian Embassy bombing (September 9, 2004); and the Bali restaurant bombing (October 1, 2005). Other JI attacks include the October 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Denpasar, Bali, and the Philippines Consulate in Menado, North Sulawesi; the April 2003 bombing of the United Nations building and Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, both in Jakarta; and the July 2003 bombing of the Indonesian Parliament compound in Jakarta.

As noted earlier, the 12 October 2002 Bali bombing killed 202 people including 88 Australians. The Australian Government decided that a high-level delegation, led by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, would visit Jakarta. The delegation's objectives were to give government support at the highest levels to the victims of the bombings and their families, to make high-level contact in Jakarta, and to encourage the Indonesian Government to take the investigation forward vigorously, regardless of where it might lead. Australian policy-makers believed it was important for the Indonesian Government to accept that an important line had now been crossed: that the threat of militant Islamic groups like Jemaah Islamiyah had to be faced and dealt with.

The delegation's immediate practical objective, however, was to secure Indonesian agreement to a joint investigation of the crime. In the light of traditional Indonesian sensitivity about sovereignty, and of the Indonesian Government's political nervousness about issues involving radical Islam, such agreement could certainly not be assumed. It was decided that, rather than seeking an umbrella agreement at government-to-government level, it would be easier and more effective to try for a working-level agreement between the police agencies, with a broad endorsement of this process from the national government.

The Indonesians agreed to a joint three-year investigation between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Indonesian police. This was a significant achievement for the AFP. It was also "the first and most important indicator that the Indonesian authorities were committed to a substantive and sustained response to the bombings. The agreement bore fruit for both governments in subsequent effective police work". (9)

Without the cooperation of its neighbors, Australia could not ensure an effective police response to the bombings and bring the perpetrators to justice. It needed to intensify its bilateral and multilateral cooperation on terrorism with all the states in our region. As Foreign Minister Alexander Downer commented: "In the main, the campaign against terrorism is going to be won by sovereign states, including the sovereign states of our region taking specific action to cut off the capacity of terrorists to operate." (10)

The bombings had a profound effect on Australian society, yet they occurred in another country. Australia's responses depended heavily on its diplomatic network and its intelligence agencies. These institutions had well-developed links with Indonesia, and were able to support Australia's response. JI was accused of planning the Bali bombing.

The August 2003 International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that: (11)

  "JI has elements in common with al-Qaeda, particularly its jihadist
  ideology and a long period of shared experience in Afghanistan. Its
  leaders revere bin Laden and seek to emulate him, and they have almost
  certainly received direct financial support from al-Qaeda. Virtually
  all of its decision-making and much of its fund-raising has been
  conducted locally, and its focus ... continues to be on establishing
  an Islamic state in Indonesia.... JI also maintains alliance with a
  loose network of like-minded regional organizations all committed in
  different ways to jihad."

The report clearly establishes that the members of JI's senior leadership fought and trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1985 and 1995, as did many of its key operatives, including those later involved in carrying out bomb attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines. For those JI leaders, the Afghanistan/Pakistan experience was clearly a radicalising one. Although the senior leadership of JI is almost entirely composed of Afghan alumni, it is important to note that many of its foot soldiers are simple pesantren (a Javanese word meaning religious boarding-school) graduates. (12)

It must be stressed that the vast majority of Indonesia's 14,000-plus pesantren teach a moderate, rather than a radical, understanding of Islam. Only five pesantren are closely linked to JI and teach a jihadist interpretation of Islam. These are al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Sukohardjo in Solo, al-Muttaquien in Jepara (Central Java), Dar us-Syahadah in Boyolali (Central Java) and al-Islam in Lamongan (East Java).

The al-Mukmin pesantren, one of the biggest schools with 1,800 boarders, is believed by many to be the recruiting grounds for Islamist extremists. Its alumni were responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing and the 2004 suicide bombings at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. Ali Gufron (alias Mukhlas), Amrozi and Ali Imron all graduated from here. And the alleged head of JI's military wing, Zul Karnaen--closely linked to the Marriott Hotel bombing--is also a graduate of this school. The principal of the school, Haji Wahyuddi, in an interview with The Bulletin's Asia correspondent, Eric Ellis, said: "The problem of terrorism is imported from outside; it is not from Indonesia or from this pesantren." (13)

Another controversial pesantren is Ihya'as Sunnah in Java. It does not teach radical Islam but is run by Jaffar Umar Thalib, an anti-Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s, who became notorious in the late 1990s for leading a jihad in Ambon, where local Christians and Muslims were fighting a civil war that claimed hundreds of lives. The Indonesian Government has taken action to combat the terrorist threat after the Bali bombing. JI's existence was finally acknowledged by Indonesia, and Hambali and Baasyir were arrested in 2003. Baasyir received a mere 30-month imprisonment on 3 March 2005. Despite accusations that he is head of JI and has planned terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, Baasyir was only convicted on conspiracy charges in the 2002 Bali bombing. The judge held he was not directly involved in the incident, but knew of the plan and did little to stop it. His 30-month sentence was later reduced by four months and 15 days.

It is encouraging to see that Indonesia, under its new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has already started cooperating with Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia. After the Bali bombing, Australian Prime Minister John Howard said that, if he had evidence terrorists were about to attack his country, Australia would be prepared to launch a pre-emptive strike. At the time, his comments drew strong criticism from Southeast Asian regional powers, including Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia; but subsequent developments in the region, including close cooperation in hunting down the Bali bombers, as well as JI cells responsible for the bombing of the Marriott Hotel and, later, the Australian Embassy, reinforced the need for closer military and intelligence cooperation.

The bomb attack in Bali on the evening of 1 October 2005 is the most recent case of terrorism in Indonesia, killing four Australians, other foreigners and many Indonesians. Clive Williams, a Canberra specialist on terrorism has identified several reasons for a repeat attack in Bali: (14)

  "The most obvious one is to hurt the Indonesian economy and undermine
  the government: 85 per cent of Western tourists going to Indonesia go
  to Bali, and most go only to Bali. Another factor could be the
  perception that attacks there would not cause many Muslim casualties,
  Bali being predominantly Hindu. The high level of investment by rich
  Indonesians in Bali, and the likely financial effect on them, would
  have been an added bonus. The bombers may also have wanted to
  capitalise on unrest in Indonesia prompted by the drastic increase in
  fuel prices."

The other aim probably was to kill Westerners, especially citizens of the United States and its allies, such as Australia and Britain, because these countries are seen as posing a moral threat to Islam. Mr Howard said the attack by Islamic extremists was to undermine democracy in Indonesia, rather than to specifically target Australians. JI was accused of the attack.

Why has JI not yet been outlawed in Indonesia? The simple answer is: parliamentary opposition. While many in the parliament would like to outlaw the group, other members of parliament have resisted this, as they either do not believe JI exists or see the effort as a throwback to the Suharto era's crackdown on non-governmental organisations (NGOs). (15) President Yudhoyono says he is willing to submit legislation to parliament that could lead to the proscription of JI, but only after the provision of "proof" that the organisation exists. As he told Time Asia magazine: (16)

  "After the review, if there are explanations and proof that JI as an
  organisation does exist in Indonesia, and if it is legally proved that
  its members are involved in terrorist activities, then it will be
  declared a banned organisation. We will use the legal process in order
  for this to become a legal and law enforcement issue, not a political
  one."

There are real political constraints. No political party commands even 25 per cent of parliamentary seats, and Yudhoyono's own Democratic Party controls a mere eight per cent, resulting in large and unwieldy coalitions. Yudhoyono has included the Islamist parties, the Prosperous Justice Party and the Crescent and Star Party, and appointed several of their leaders to key cabinet posts as part of his national unity government. While the Islamist parties condemn terrorism, they deny the existence of JI, though sharing its long-term vision of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state.

Australia faces a threat mainly from jihadist groups in our immediate region, particularly Indonesia, but also the Philippines. Eighty-eight Australians died in the 2002 Bali bombings; another four were killed in the 2005 attacks; and our embassy in Jakarta was directly targeted in 2004. We also face a threat from so-called homegrown terrorism, the perception of which increased after the 7 July London bombings and was brought home to the public by the recent raids and arrests of suspected terrorists in Sydney and Melbourne. Australia has recently introduced strict domestic counter-terrorism laws.

There seems to be a growing sense of recognition that the most serious terrorist threat we face is from terrorism in our region, not at home. That also seems to be a view held by the Australian Prime Minister who has stated on a number of occasions that the terrorist threat is much greater in Indonesia than it is in Australia and that an attack against Australians is less likely in Australia than it is in Indonesia.

JI and like-minded groups and individuals are still a force to be reckoned with after the recent death of JI bomb-maker, Azahari bin Husin. It should fairly be said that a number of key JI leaders are at large who are equally or even more capable than Azahari. It is also likely that Azahari trained a number of people to succeed him. Dr Aldo Borgu, terrorism analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, has said: (17)

  "Given Azahari's death, the new generation of leaders will be keen to
  demonstrate their relevance. They could also return to past tactics. A
  wave of smaller bombings against Christian churches at Christmas would
  see JI's return to the operations that heralded their arrival as a
  terrorist group and which are aimed at encouraging sectarian and
  communal violence to regenerate their ranks."

The terrorism threat to Western nations comes either from within its own society as a result of inter-communal tensions of various kinds, or as a reaction to its foreign policies. As one terrorism expert said: "The policies that make us a target at the present time are our close association with U.S. foreign policies and our involvement in the occupation of Iraq. Canada, which maintains some space between itself and U.S. policies and has not been involved in Iraq, is not being targeted by Islamist extremists--and is unlikely to be." (18) (This of course was said before the arrest, on 2-3 June 2006, of 17 Canadian Islamists who reportedly had stockpiled three tons of ammonium nitrate and were planning to commit large-scale terrorist attacks in southern Ontario, including detonating truck bombs in crowded areas). (19)

Unfortunately, attacks in reaction to our policies can come, as they did in London, from within our own ranks. John Howard's support of the Iraq War is unpopular in his own country. The federal opposition Labor Party leader Kim Beazley has said Australia should be developing an exit strategy as a matter of urgency. The invasion of Iraq has greatly enraged many Muslims, radicalising some of them deeply.

On 8 November 2005, police and security agents undertook raids in Sydney and Melbourne, and arrested 17 people on terrorism charges. All the men arrested were Australian citizens or residents, most in their twenties. One of them allegedly shot at police in a bid to escape arrest. The threat is home-grown. At a preliminary court hearing in Melbourne, the prosecutor alleged that they were committed to waging a "violent jihad" in Australia. The Sydney group, he also said, had made plans for an attack, and had collected bomb-making chemicals.

Some people have been convicted of terrorism-related offences. Prominent among them were: Frenchman Willy Brigitte, Jack Roche, Jack Thomas, Faheem Lodhi, Izhar ul-Haque, Saleh Jamal, Bilal Khazal and Zekky Mallah.

Nevertheless, former senior Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) officer Neil Fergus presents a picture of an Islamic community in Australia that is overwhelmingly peaceful. He says that, of the 300,000 Muslims in Australia: (20)

  "298,000 would be repulsed by al-Qaeda and its terrorism like any
  other Australian. Another 1,900 would have some sympathy for the
  political views of Osama bin Laden because of issues like Israel's
  actions in Palestine. Only about 100 could be classified as travellers
  who identify closely with bin Laden's aims and perhaps 30 of them are
  a clear risk and capable of getting involved in terrorism. Those 30
  would have some training or access or connection to people who have
  training in explosives and handling arms."

Senior law-enforcement officials claim that the surveillance operation has played a big part in preventing a terrorist attack on Australian soil. John Howard declared that his government would ban a radical Islamic group called Hizbut Tahrir (HT), if ASIO found it was a threat to Australia's security or encouraged terrorist behavior.

The group describes suicide-bombers as martyrs, denounces Western values, calls for unity among Islamic nations, and demands the restoration of the caliphate. It has also said that Muslims have a duty to resist the occupation of Iraq. The group's Australian spokesman, Wasim Doureihi, outlined the group's aim, saying: (21)

  "Hizbut Tahrir is an affiliated political party with a stated aim of
  resuming Islamic way of life by [inaudible] Islamic state, and this
  political work is conducted within the Muslim world and we achieve
  that through intellectual and political work and it's essentially
  through dialogue, discussion and building public opinion for Islam."

In other words, Hizbut Tahrir identifies itself as a political party that has Islam as its driving ideology. Most of what he says is of an ideological nature. The Australian Government decided recently that it could not ban the party under existing legislature. Attorney-General Philip Ruddock said: (22)

  "The words in the criminal code that are used in relation to
  proscription are that an organisation must be planning, preparing or
  fostering a terrorist act. And the word fostering is the one that
  everybody focuses on, but it's governed by the two previous
  words--planning or preparing--and the advice that we had in relation
  to the information that is known to us was that that organisation
  could not be proscribed in the law, under the law, as presently
  framed."

The Australian Government has continually made its case that the campaign against terrorism is not a war on Islam. Rather, it's the use of violence by jihadists about which we seem to be more concerned. There is a view that counter-terrorist strategy will succeed only to the degree it can exploit the apparent division within the followers of Islam, between a small minority who believe in violence against infidels and the enlightened majority who are opposed to violence. From all accounts, such a division is genuine, and efforts from now onwards should be directed towards strengthening the latter group to win the support and confidence of this moderate Muslim mainstream.

The Howard Government has decided to engage with moderate Muslims, which is the right strategy. The Government's counter-terrorism approach must be tactically hard but strategically soft, i.e., it must crack down on terrorists when it finds them, but avoid alienating Muslims because of the bad behaviour of a tiny number. The history of terrorism and the recent rioting in France show that people who feel cornered and without access to other options can resort to violence. Terrorism has to be tackled at its psychological source. Ethnic communities and the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims must not be demonised because of the hateful actions of a tiny minority.

Indonesia is crucial to Australia's security. It is the gateway to Australia from Asia. The international shipping lanes between Australia and Japan, China and other nations of North Asia pass directly through Indonesian waters, and Indonesia is an important trading partner of Australia, so that any disruption of these links would have a serious adverse impact on Australian trade.

Additionally, Indonesia is the largest Islamic nation in the world. Of its 240 million people, around 220 million describe themselves as Muslim. President Yudhoyono is strongly pro-Western, and has welcomed close relations with Australia. Indonesia is undergoing a difficult process of democratisation, and Australia has a vital interest in the success of this process. So, despite the cultural and historical differences between us, it is essential that Australia develop strong and close relations with Indonesia, based on mutual respect, and the need to work together to address common concerns.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines are working closely to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia, and Australians know that the governments of these countries alone cannot solve their terrorism problems. As a result, Australia has a strong interest in maximising its influence and efforts to help them. Australia's policy aims to negotiate agreements on counter-terrorism with Southeast Asian nations and deepen links between intelligence agencies and police forces.

Terrorism is a weapon, a tactic, wielded by certain groups. While it may not be possible to eliminate terrorism entirely from Southeast Asia, it could be reduced to only nuisance level. In a broader context, Australia and the West should promote an intelligent and balanced response to Islamic extremism, which demands moral and ideological answers, not just a military response.

1. Paul J. Smith, "Terrorism in Asia", Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2002, page 45.

2. Robert Go, "Jakarta to give security forces more teeth", The Straits Times, 19 October 2002.

3. Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003), page 6.

4. For example, see Christopher Hitchens, "Is Indonesia the next hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism?", Vanity Fair, No. 521, January 2004, pages 40-52. See also: Kit Collier, "Philippines: The Mindanao Solution", The Diplomat, Vol. 4, No. 6, February/March 2006, page 8.

5. Devi Asmarani, "TNI, Islamic body back terror law", The Straits Times, 28 September 2002.

6. For details of Omar al-Faruq's terrorist activities, see "Confessions of an al-Qaeda terrorist," Time, 23 September 2002, pages 34-40.

7. John Gershman, "Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4, July/August 2002, page 67.

8. For connections with the wider al-Qaeda networks in the southern Philippines, see Matthew Thompson and Renae Carlson, "On Terror's Frontline", Investigative, Issue 5, August 2005, pages 40-53.

9. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), page 166. See also Stephen Sherlock, "The Bali bombing: What it means for Indonesia", Current Issues Brief, No. 4, 2002-03 (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002).

10. Alexander Downer, "The Challenge of Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region", speech to the Foreign Correspondents Association, Canberra, 26 November 2002.

11. "Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia", International Crisis Group, August 2003.

12. Sharif Shuja, "Gauging Jemaah Islamiyah's threat in Southeast Asia", in Christopher Heffelfinger, ed., Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2005), page 422.

13. The Bulletin, 21 September 2004, page 20.

14. Clive Williams, "Bali bombs show JI is still alive and killing", The Australian, 3 October 2005, page 14.

15. Zachary Abuza, "The trial of Abu Bakr Baasyir: A test for Indonesia", Terrorism Monitor, Vol. II, Issue 21, 4 November 2004.

16. Simon Elegant, "I have to face many fundamental issues", exclusive interview with Indonesia's new President, Time Asia, 1 November 2004.

17. Aldo Borgu, "How Australia should fight terrorism," News Weekly, 21 January 2006, page 5.

18. Clive Williams, supra note 15, page 14.

19. "More terror arrests expected, top lawmakers say", National Post (Ontario), 5 June 2006.

20. The Bulletin, 16 August 2005.

21. Wasim Doureihi interview with Mark Colvin on ABC Radio National's PM program, 25 July 2005.

22. Sharif Shuja, "Tackling a home-grown security threat", News Weekly, 18 February 2006, page 16.