Attorney fees.

5. Attorney Fees

U.S. District Court   Ciaprazi v. County of Nassau, 195 F.Supp.2d 398
                      (E.D.N.Y. 2002). An inmate filed a [section] 1983
  ATTORNEY FEES       action alleging that county correction officers
                      used excessive force against him. After a jury
  LIMITATION          awarded nominal damages on one count, the inmate
                      applied for attorney fees and costs. The district
                      court held that the inmate was the "prevailing
                      party" but that the award of attorneys fees was
                      not warranted, where the inmate recovered only $1
                      in nominal damages against one officer, the jury
                      found in favor of the other officer, the case did
                      not involve a significant legal issue, and there
                      was no award of injunctive relief. (Nassau County
                      Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court    Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2002). A
                      class of state prisoners who had brought a
  PLRA--Prison        [section] 1983 action against state prison
  Litigation          officials moved for the award of attorney fees
  Reform Act          after a private settlement agreement was entered,
                      dismissing the case without prejudice. The
                      district court granted the motion and the appeals
                      court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
                      class was entitled to a fee award for three
                      separate phases of the litigation and that the
                      award of fees was not banned by the Prison
                      Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1996. The court
                      also held that the private settlement agreement
                      did not bar the award of attorney fees. The court
                      found that the prisoners were the prevailing
                      party for the purpose of an attorney fee award
                      under [section] 1988, where they had obtained a
                      court-ordered consent decree that governed the
                      operation of a state prison for twelve years. The
                      appeals court affirmed the district court award
                      of fees in the amount of $106,877. (South Dakota
                      State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court    Hunt v. State of Missouri, Dept. of Corrections,
                      297 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2002). Female nurses who
  ATTORNEY FEES       had been assigned by a temporary staffing agency
                      to provide nursing services to state prisons,
                      brought claims against the corrections department
                      under Title VII. The district court entered
                      judgment in favor of the nurses on the
                      retaliation claims and awarded them attorney
                      fees. The nurses appealed and the appeals court
                      affirmed the district court decision. The appeals
                      court held that the nurses were employees of the
                      department, not independent contractors, and thus
                      had standing to sue under Title VII, noting that
                      the existence of a contract referring to a party
                      as an independent contractor does not end the
                      inquiry into whether the individual employee is
                      protected by Title VII. According to the court, a
                      person may have two or more employers for the
                      same work, for the purposes of conferring
                      standing to sue under Title VII. The court noted
                      that the nurses did not work independently and
                      were constantly under the supervision and
                      scrutiny of corrections officials and employees,
                      and although they were paid directly by the
                      temporary staffing agencies, the nurses did no
                      other work for the agency other than the prison
                      work. The appeals court found that the nurses
                      were constructively discharged, where their
                      complaints about their treatment on the job were
                      answered with threats to their well-being,
                      threats of termination, efforts to obstruct their
                      work, additional unnecessary and unreasonable job
                      requirements, and general harassment. The court
                      held that the award of $136,967 in attorney fees
                      was warranted, even though the nurses did not
                      prevail on their sexual harassment claims.
                      (Jefferson City Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court   Morrison v. Davis, 195 F.Supp.2d 1019 (S.D.Ohio
                      2001). A state inmate filed a [section] 1983
  LIMITATIONS         action alleging he had been beaten by a
                      corrections officer. After a jury verdict in his
  PLRA--Prison        favor and the award of attorney fees, he moved to
  Litigation          alter or amend the judgment. The district court
  Reform Act          held that, under the provisions of the Prison
                      Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the maximum hourly
                      rates were limited to 150% of the $70 rate for
                      in-court time, and $50 per hour for out-of-court
                      time, even though a Judicial Conference had
                      approved an hourly rate increase, because the
                      increase had not been implemented due to the
                      unavailability of funds. (Ross Correctional
                      Institute, Ohio)

U.S. District Court   Spruytte v. Hoffner, 197 F.Supp.2d 931 (W.D.Mich.
                      2001). After receiving a judgment in their favor,
  ATTORNEY FEES       prisoners who challenged their transfer to other
                      facilities filed a motion for fees and costs. The
  PLRA--Prison        district court held that the prisoners were not
  Litigation          required to show that the officials' actions
  Reform Act          shocked the conscience. The court found that
                      attorney any fee award was limited to 150 percent
                      of the total judgment awarded to the inmates,
                      even though they prevailed on all claims. Under
                      the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform
                      Act (PLRA) the court awarded the prisoners $8,450
                      in attorney fees and $3,474 in costs. (Michigan
                      Department of Corrections)