Assets Forfeiture: A Study of Policy and Its Practice.

Assets Forfeiture: A Study of Policy and Its Practice by Gregory M. Vecchi and Robert T. Sigler, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2001.

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Asset forfeiture laws authorize enforcement authorities to seize property used or acquired illegally. Practiced strategically, asset forfeiture can be an effective law enforcement tool. Employed by enforcement authorities without concern for its potential for abuse and overreaching, forfeiture can be seen as providing police with excessive powers that infringe upon concepts of fundamental fairness and due process of law. In response to concerns about its use, the Congress of the United States enacted reform legislation in 2000 that attempted to address the issue of fairness without unduly restricting the use of forfeiture as an effective tool in combating crime.

Assets Forfeiture: A Study of Policy and Its Practice addresses issues that the reform legislation of 2000 did not adequately consider. Authors Vecchi and Sigler have written a report of their study of forfeiture, consisting of two separate sections. The first section reviews issues relating to the revenue-generating function of asset forfeiture, and the other analyzes a survey conducted to test a hypothesis that evolved from their review. The authors begin their review with an explanation of the historical evolution of U.S. drug policies and laws and the influence that revenue-generating mechanisms have had on that development. An important aspect of this, according to the authors, is the tension between the legislative branch of government and the executive branch. The legislative branch's interest in revenue, manifested in the form of taxes, licenses, or tariffs, competes with the executive branch's interest in prohibition: an interest motivated by the desire to enhance agency budgets and increase authorities. This competition, in turn, contradicts the legislative intent to penalize and deter drug traffickers. The authors believe that asset forfeiture plays an important role in this continuing competition. Integral to this competition is federal legislation, initially enacted in 1984, which created a fund to act as a depository for money generated from the seizure and forfeiture of property and permitted federal agencies to enhance their budgetary resources through the use of forfeited property, the reimbursement of investigative expenses, and the ability to compensate state and local enforcement agencies in return for the use of their personnel to address common crime problems.

The authors contend that the primary purpose of forfeiture is deterrence, but the economic models adopted by major traffickers, in conjunction with the inelasticity of demand for illicit drugs, make attainment of that goal unlikely. As a result, law enforcement officers may displace that goal with others that may cause dysfunctionalism, inefficient use of resources, and result in improper police conduct. The authors cite federal task forces that may attract state and local officers for the purpose of "sharing" in asset forfeiture and inappropriate police conduct, such as "asset hunting." improper use of "reverse sting" undercover operations, and pretexturaly "structured arrests." In the second phase of the book, the authors analyze the results of a survey they conducted with federal and local law enforcement officers. The results of the survey indicated that, generally, the respondents believed that forfeiture did not deter drug traffickers and had little overall effect in reducing drug trafficking and drug use. However, the respondents did view forfeiture as punishment. The authors convincingly concluded that forfeiture can be an effective enforcement tool, but has an inherent potential for abuse.

The U.S. Department of Justice uses its nationwide forfeiture program as part of a financial incentive system to encourage greater cooperation in addressing common crime problems. However, to the extent that the revenue-generating function of forfeiture undermines the integrity of enforcement decisions, distorts the role of law enforcement, and causes a diversion of resources to unproductive activity, further changes may be warranted. This book informs the debate on that subject and makes a compelling read.

Reviewed by William R. Schroeder

Consultant Woodbridge, Virginia