Assembly urges political solution for situation relating to Afghanistan.

The General Assembly on 5 November called for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan, calling upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of conditions to "enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour".

Resolution 41/33 was passed by a recorded vote of 122 votes in favour to 20 against, with 11 abstentions. Voting against were Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and Viet Nam.

The Assembly reiterated that the preservation of Afghanistan's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character was essential for a peaceful solution of the problem. The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system "free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever" was reaffirmed.

The world body noted the "increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers". It renewed its appeal for humanitarian relief assistance with a view to "alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees" in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Finally, it expressed support for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary-General, especially the diplomatic process initiated by him, in the search for a solution to the problem. Mr. Perez de Cuellar was asked to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, "and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for the non-use of force, or threat of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations".

The Secretary-General was also asked to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of progress towards implementation of the resolution and to report to Member States on the situation "at the earliest appropriate opportunity".

Report: On 18 September, the Secretary-General reported (A/41/619-S/18347) on the situation relating to Afghanistan, stating that tangible progress had been made during the past year. Procedural questions had been laid aside to enable all substantive problems to be tackled. The four instruments that would comprise the settlement between Afghanistan and Pakistan were "virtually complete". Those related to: non-interference and non-intervention; return of refugees; international guarantees; and inter-relationships between those three instruments and withdrawal of troops.

Agreement had been reached on a "very large number of extremely complex issues", he went on. As they approached the conclusion of the drafting of the instruments that would comprise the settlement, the interlocutors had become increasingly convinced that the settlement must be "broadly supported and effectively implemented" - and they were actively engaged in considering practical measures to that end.

On 28 July 1986, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in a move which he had described as designed to speed up a political settlement, had announced in Vladivostok withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan, stressing the expectation that that unilateral step would be answered by a curtailment of outside interference, the Secretary-General went on. Mr. Gorbachev had said he supported efforts of national reconciliation in Afghanistan, including setting up a government in which political forces outside the country's borders would participate.

Those developments should encourage all Governments concerned to pursue efforts towards a political settlement with renewed vigour, said the Secretary-General. Negotiations had at times lacked a sense of urgency and the readiness to conclude the settlement had "not always appeared entirely transparent to either side", he said. Mutual confidence-important now and indispensable if the settlement was to be effectively implemented-would only be promoted if pending provisions were made final "with resolution and without further delay".

"Bold and decisive steps of national reconciliation will indeed be needed to ensure that the settlement commands the support of all segments of the Afghan people", Mr. Perez de Cuellar said. A wider realization was needed in all concerned quarters that "their overriding need is to live together in peace". Governments of the region should "promote the finalization of a settlement" and political will was "of the essence", he said.

Impasse broken

The United Nations had received the full co-operation of all the concerned Governments to achieve a negotiated political settlement, he went on. Sustained efforts towards that end during the past year had met with increasingly broad support from the international community.

An impasse over the format of the negotiations had stalled the diplomatic process after the drafting of three of the four instruments had been virtually completed, he stated. The interlocutors had adjourned the talks in late December 1985 without beginning consideration of the fourth draft instrument on interrelationships.

Diego Cordovez, the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on the matter and Under-Secretary-Genneral's for Special Political Affairs, had held extensive consultation's with Pakistani and Afghan officials during a visit to Islamabad and Kabul in March 1986. The Iranian Government had been subsequently briefed on the contents of the discussions.

As a result, the Secretary-General said, it had been possible to work out a set of understandings which broke the impasse. The Pakistani and Afghan Governments, at the highest level, had stated that they wished the understandings to be seen as a "concrete demonstration" of their sincere desire to achieve a political settlement.

In the meantime, the diplomatic process had been supported by positive expressions of intent by the two designated guarantors-the USSR and the United States. In the course of consultations concerning the text of the instrument on international guarantees held by Mr. Cordovez in Moscow and in Washington, he was informed that the text in question was acceptable to those two Governments - subject to the conclusion of an overall settlement that they could support.

At the seventh round of negotiations, which had begun at Geneva on 5 May 1986, the interlocutors had considered for the first time a draft on interrelationships. The text of the principles and objectives of the settlement was completed, which included nonintervention and non-interference, nonuse of force, and self-determination. When negotiations had been suspended on 23 May 1986 at the request of the interlocutors so they could hold consultations, there remained two issues outstanding in the text on interrelationships: arrangements to ensure effective implementation of the settlement and the time-frame for withdrawal. The seventh round of negotiations was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986 to consider those matters.

|Encouraging movement'

Mr. Perez de Cuellar observed there had been "encouraging movement" concerning arrangements for effective implementation of the settlement and a willingness in August to "approach the problem anew with an open mind". Mr. Cordovez had discussed in more detail with the two interlocutors the nature and scope of such arrangements.

It was felt that in the circumstances in which the settlement was likely to enter into force, and given the fact that the settlement would set out specific interrelationships between the various measures envisaged, the determination of each of the Parties to implement its obligations fully and faithfully would naturally be enhanced by the conviction that the other side was acting with equal determination. Therefore that should be the underlying purpose of arrangements to be incorporated in the settlement, Mr. Perez de Cuellar stated.

Mr. Cordovez then submitted a revised proposal which was the subject of a preliminary discussion in Geneva and which the two interlocutors had since been examining in their capitals.

The Secretary-General said that there still existed a wide gap between the stated position of the two interlocutors on the other outstanding question-the time-frame and modalities for the withdrawal of troops. However, during talks in May and August, there was "some movement away from the original starting point" on the matter, denoting "a continuing disposition to find a mutually acceptable formula regarding the length and modalities for withdrawal". The two interlocutors were aware that "they must focus their attention on this question with a sense of urgency lest all their efforts over the past five years come to naught". Mr. Cordovez, the Secretary-General concluded, had remained in touch with the two interlocutors through diplomatic channels on all outstanding questions.

Debate

In the debate on Afghanistan, held on 4 and 5 November, 52 countries spoke.

Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said the past year had seen a new escalation in the intensity of operations, a marked increase in the bombing and sabotage on Pakistan soil and new manoeuvres to subjugate the Afghans and try to ensure the survival of an unpopular and unacceptable regime, propped up by the presence of foreign forces. A solution to the Afghan problem must be sought only through peaceful means and in conformity with the Afghans' will and aspirations, rather than by cosmetic changes or token gestures.

More than a million Afghans had perished in their struggle to safeguard their independence, faith, culture, and traditions. "The country has been emptied of one third of its population, its soil scarred and devastated." The fiction of legality created by the occupying forces to mislead the international community deceived no one.

He said there could be no realistic approach for a political settlement that excluded the total withdrawal of Soviet forces. But there was no agreement in sight on the principal outstanding issue - an acceptable and reasonable time-frame for the withdrawal of those troops.

An extended time-frame would imply a desire to secure a longer interval for the Soviet forces to suppress the indigenous Afghan resistance. That would amount to the imposition of a military solution in the guise of a political settlement and would not be acceptable to Afghans nor would it create the conditions necessary for the return of Afghan refugees in safety and honour. Pakistan hosted three million of those refugees, he added.

Pakistan could not be coerced into compromising its principled position on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. So far, it had exercised restraint, as a display of its sincere desire for a political settlement; however, its patience and forebearance should not be taken for granted. The tragedy that was being enacted in Afghanistan must be brought to an early end. The Soviet Union must be left in no doubt that its intervention and actions there were morally and politically indefensible.

Mohammad Farid Zarif (Afghanistan) said the "well-cherished and nurtured illusion of being able to undo the national-democratic revolution in Afghanistan was dealt a shattering blow by the collective-defence measure taken by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union". The "vile onslaught of imperialism and its hegemonist and other reactionary allies" had rapidly acquired the form of an outright undeclared war.

There were more than 120 counter-revolutionary bases and training camps in Pakistan alone. The United States had allocated more than $1.5 billion to escalate the war. Much greater quantities of sophisticated weapons and chemical weapons had been supplied to the "mercenary bandits" to carry out sabotage, commit arson and murder anyone co-operating with the Government or benefiting from its reforms.

The Afghan Government had successfully completed the process of elections for local organs of State power and administration, and the Commission to draft a new constitution had completed the first stage of its work. "Ever more disillusioned members of the counter-revolutionary bands and their ringleaders" were voluntarily surrendering themselves to State authorities and resuming a normal and peaceful life. Major achievements had also been registered in the socioeconomic field.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Government had made sincere and serious efforts to pave the way for the widest possible participation of all political forces, both within and outside Afghanistan, in the task of reconstructing the country. Crushing military blows had been dealt to the "counter-revolutionary formations" Their major hideouts had been eliminated and huge quantities of weapons and explosives had been recovered.

The Afghan Government had "tirelessly endeavoured to pursue a peaceful settlement of the situation that has been created and deliberately sustained around Afghanistan by imperialist, hegemonist and other reactionary forces". In line with its peaceful proposals of 14 May 1980 and 24 August 1981, it had followed a serious and constructive course in the Geneva talks. By returning six regiments of the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan to their permanent bases in the Soviet Union, it had demonstrated its goodwill and "principled flexibility for attaining a political settlement".

Aleksandr Belonogov (USSR) said that by helping Afghanistan's armed forces, Soviet troops were defending - at the cost of their lives - the peaceful labour of Afghans and preventing subversive acts against the country's popular democratic system. Pakistan had become the main bridgehead for the undeclared war against Afghanistan.

The revolutionary process in Afghanistan was irreversible, although it had not proceeded without some difficulty due to the extensive armed intervention in that country's internal affairs and the tremendous financial, military and propaganda support given to the Afghan counter-revolution by the United States and its allies.

Tangible progress had been achieved in drawing up the relevant documents at the Geneva negotiations. Pakistan and the United States should "demonstrate common sense and a realistic approach and evince their sincerity and interest in a settlement". Iran's joining in the negotiations would be regarded as "a very judicious step".

Six Soviet regiments had withdrawn from Afghanistan as a further gesture of goodwill, designed to speed up the process of political settlement; continuing interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs was making it difficult to return all Soviet troops to their country.

Said Rajaie-Khorassani (Iran) said 2 million Afghans had taken refuge in Iran. Afghanistan's so-called democratic regime represented only the military junta and those external forces without whose "constant fire support" it could not subsist, and which were prepared to exterminate many more hundreds of thousands of Afghans to keep that "unwanted regime on its paralysed feet". In addition to the local army, more than 100,000 well-equipped foreign forces were required to keep the puppet regime in power.

The only possible political solution to the problem was the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet military forces, the voluntary and honourable return of refugees, and recognition of the Afghan people's right to sovereignty and self-determination. Iran noted the positive gestures regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces-to the extent that they were sincere and genuine. Iran advocated an independent and non-aligned regime for Afghanistan, representative of the Muslim Afghan people and absolutely independent of all foreign coercion and intervention.

|Significant step'

Arrangements for implementing settlement relating to Afghanistan

completed, issue of withdrawal time-frame remains

Next round of talks - February |87

Detailed arrangements for implementing a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan were agreed upon during a November/December visit to the area by Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez, the Secretary-General's Personal Representative dealing with that subject.

In briefing correspondents at Headquarters on 9 December, Mr. Cordovez called the development "a very significant step" towards conclusion of the negotiations. It was linked to the question of the time-frame for troop withdrawal - now the only outstanding issue in completing the set-of four instruments comprising the settlement, he said.

Agreement on the arrangements, he said, showed that both sides wanted to complete the negotiations as soon as possible. The next round of talks were scheduled to begin in Geneva in February 1987.

The four legal instruments are: a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan concerning non-interference and non-intervention; a technical document dealing with all aspects of the question of the voluntary return of refugees including their rights, guarantees and resettlement; a declaration of guarantees on the settlement to be given by the Soviet Union and the United States; and the instrument concerning the inter-relationships between the three other documents and the question of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

The first three documents had been ready by the end of 1985, he said. After a procedural impasse that had developed had been overcome during Mr. Cordovez's visit to the area in March 1986, the two sides had begun for the first time in May 1986 to consider the fourth document which also includes the issue of implementation arrangements.

In addition to the relevant provisions in the fourth instrument itself a separate document had been drafted detailing those arrangements, Mr. Cordovez said. Both sides had been concerned that a political settlement could be used for military purposes and therefore felt there had to be a system to ensure that each side would comply with obligations it was undertaking under the settlement, Mr. Cordovez explained.

Instrument four was now complete, except for the question of the time-frame, and Mr. Cordovez said the two sides had agreed to examine the question again in a very serious and realistic way and with an open mind.