Assembly defers action on situation in Central America until resumption of fortieth session in 1986.

Assembly defers action on situation in Central America until resumption of fortieth session in 1986

The General Assembly on 18 December 1985 decided to defer consideration of the situation in Central America until the resumption of its fortieth session in 1986.

Assembly President Jaime de Pinies (Spain) said that sponsors of two draft resolutions on Central America had requested that they not be put to the vote at that time, and that the item be kept on the Assembly agenda to allow for further consultations.

One text (A/40/L.34) was proposed by members of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) and its Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay). The other (A/40/L.36) was sponsored by three Central American countries--Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras.

The texts are nearly identical, both reiterating the need for the Governments of Central America, acting within the Framework of the Contadora Act and in accordance with international law, to take steps simultaneously to avoid the risk of confrontation by means of a reliable regional security system. Also, both would have the Assembly call on those Governments to spare no effort to strengthen democratic, representative and pluralistic systems and to promote national reconciliation, and urge them to pursue negotiations on unresolved questions covered by the Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America.

Likewise, both texts would urge States with ties and interests in the region to support peace efforts and refrain from any political, economic or military action that could impede the aims of the Contadora Act, and urge the United States and Nicaragua to resume their dialogue in order to normalize relations. Both would call on the Contadora Group to continue its peace-making efforts.

However, the draft sponsored by the three Central American countries contains two additional provisions: by one, the Assembly would express satisfaction "at the genuine, free and peaceful way in which general elections have been held in some countries of the region"; by the second, it would request the Secretary-General, together with the United Nations system, "to formulate as soon as possible a coordinated plan of economic and social assistance and co-operation for Central America".

Report

The Secretary-General's report on the situation in Central America (A/40-737-S/17549) stated there was broad support among the international community for the efforts of the Contadora Group for its persistent efforts to find a negotiated and comprehensive solution to the serious crisis facing Central America.

Thanks to the Group's unceasing work, it had so far been possible to avoid an explosion in the region, the report said. Formation of the Contadora Support Group, which reflected strong Latin American concern, would serve not only to support but also to strengthen Contadora's political action.

The serious economic situation in which the Central American countries found themselves made it imperative to formulate a co-ordinated plan of assistance, the report said. Despite the efforts of the Contadora Group, the situation in Central America had been "steadily deteriorating" in 1985. There had been an increase in bilateral incidents between countries in the region, which had not only hindered the Group's work, but also "prompted fears of a more serious breach of the peace". Particularly disturbing was the tension between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, in addition to the already delicate situation in the border areas between Honduras and Nicaragua.

In El Salvador, the report went on, although legislative elections were held in March 1985, "the armed conflict goes on, with an increase in bombings and an outbreak of kidnappings", while the talks between the Government and the Frente Democratico Revolucionario-Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FDR-FMLN) remained stalled. At the same time, the Manzanillo talks between the United States and Nicaragua remained suspended, and there was no sign of their being resumed.

The Secretary-General said the roots of the Central American crisis were to be found in "unjust socio-economic structures and domestic policies". The solution to the crisis was contingent on the political will of the States of the region. Concurrently with the Contadora Group's search for a comprehensive solution, any border incidents that arose should be dealt with directly by the parties. Countries with interests in the region must support "with deeds" Contadora Group's efforts and refrain from any action that might adversely affect them. There was an urgent need for an equitable, comprehensive and negotiated solution in the region.

Debate

Sub-region: Nicaragua said the situation in Central America had deteriorated dramatically over the past year. Nicaragua had suffered aggression on the part of the super-Power of the Western hemisphere. The United States Administration was bent on destroying the Sandinista Popular Revolution in Nicaragua. The United States President and other officials considered that there would be no peace in Central America until the democratic and revolutionary process in Nicaragua was destroyed. The United States Administration sought approval of funds to give direct military aid to its "terrorists". Funds had continued to reach those forces despite Congress's express prohibition.

Nicaragua said the "illegal and immoral war" in its territory had cost 11,000 Nicaragua lives, including those of the counter-revolutionaries. Some 240,000 Nicaraguans had been rendered homeless, and the war had cost it some $1.5 billion. The United States had arrogated to itself the right to intervene in any internal situation in any country which it perceived as undemocratic or contrary to its interests. That concept and its application endangered not only Nicaragua and Central America, but all countries and peoples.

The conflict in Central America was not the result of an East-West confrontation. Contadora and the Support Group represented the will of Latin America and the Caribbean. They represented anti-interventionism, respect for international law and for bilateral and regional dialogue in the settlement of disputes.

Although the United States voiced support for Contadora efforts, its policy of force in the region had prevented a just and honourable agreement from bringing peace to the region. There would be no peace in Central America if the United States: did not agree to the resumption of the bilateral dialogue with Nicaragua to normalize relations; continued to reject a serious and constructive dialogue with Nicaragua; continued to try imposing preconditions for that dialogue to resume; kept trying to get Nicaragua to accept its mercenaries as a negotiating partner and to get Nicaragua to dissolve its freely elected National Assembly; insisted that its mercenaries put pressure on and ultimately overthrow the Nicaraguan Government; and continued its policy of boycotting Contadora.

The solution of the conflicts in Central America must include an understanding between Nicaragua and the United States which would end the war of aggression the United States had forced upon Nicaragua. That understanding would entail a formal commitment by the United States to desist in future from its policy of war against Nicaragua. All of the foreign military presence in Central America must be ended; foreign military bases should be dismantled; all foreign troops and military advisers should be withdrawn; and all foreign military manoeuvres should be banned. Central America must become a zone of peace, free of all interference.

Nicaragua would continue seeking peace, but meanwhile it had a right to acquire the necessary military means to defend effectively its sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination. Nicaragua had not been the destabilizing factor in the region. It had constructively supported Contadora. It was willing to create, together with its neighbours, neutralized security zones under international supervision in border areas; and it had sought the resumption of bilateral talks with the United States.

Guatemala said that only an equitable, comprehensive and negotiated solution, which at the same time stemmed from the will of the Central American Governments, could end the regional crisis. Central Americans must not set aside dialogue and negotiation, even when they were "arduous and complex", in confronting the crisis before them. Contadora Group efforts "constitute our sole alternative in order to arrive at the comprehensive solution to which we all aspire". Guatemala would continue to work with the Contadora Group to achieve peace and harmony in the region. Guatemala accepted dialogue as the only way to achieve stability in Central America.

Honduras said the Nicaraguan Government's real wish was to continue to increase its arms build-up in an attempt to overcome by military force and crush those sectors of the population which opposed it. Nicaragua, it said, wished to block the right to self-determination of Nicaraguans by preventing the necessary national reconciliation of all of them, and thus gain time for consolidating its "subversive activities" in Central America. There was a fundamental dispute in Central America, the solution to which could be found only through a "main agreement" among the five countries of the subregion as a whole. "Our primary hope at the present time is the conclusion of the negotiations within the Contadora process." Honduras was opposed to any attempt to make negotiations among the Central American Governments within the Contadora framework subordinate to other factors.

El Salvador said that with the exception of Nicaragua, the Central American region had been undergoing a process of democratization. The Sandinista Government's policy lay at the roots of the present problems in Central America. Nicaragua had pursued an "opportunist and adventurist course" that had led to the creation of one crisis and to an increase in others. Its policy of "exporting revolution under the creed of solidarity with subversive movements of a similar hue" had created great tensions in the area.

In its strategy of sowing confusion and appearing as the victim of imperialist manoeuvres, El Salvador said that Nicaragua had sought to conceal its intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbours, particularly El Salvador, as a part of its "aggressive, expansionist policy" in Central America. That policy was based on a position of force, which was in turn based on an arms build-up. Nicaragua wished basically to use the Contadora process as a "screen to conceal its boundless military ambitions and its expansionist policies". The desirability of removing the problems of Central America from the context of East-West confrontation did not mean that there were not in fact elements and factors which pointed in that direction. "Those who would deny this are wearing blinkers."

El Salvador would firmly oppose "any scheme or project which seeks to replace the Contadora forum and which would permit or invite interference or influence in our affairs by outside interest". If Nicaragua did not change its "harmful positions", diplomatic effort in the context of the Contadora process would eventually "prove sterile". El Salvador would not accept the argument that it was necessary to fight guerrilla movements composed of "anti-regime Nicaraguans themselves, as a pretext for seeking military hegmony in the region, destroying all reasonable balance in the level of armament". It was possible to envisage, if intransigent positions were abandoned, a comprehensive negotiated political solution to end the violence and instability in the region.

Costa Rica said it favoured peace in Central America. It "most decisively and absolutely" supported a political, regional and negotiated solution in Central America, as advocated by the Contadora Group. "Peace is the banner that we hold aloft" in the Contadora Group. "It is either the Contadora Act or war. We are on the threshold of peace--or possibly the threshold of war in Central America. Some positions of absolute intransigence have made the chances of peace more remote in the past few days. The Contadora Group is going through a decisive and crucial time."

Militarism was not Central America's destiny; "dictatorship, whether of the right or of the left, cannot be the future of Central America". The struggle in Central America was one for peace, but it was also basically a struggle for democracy and for economic and social development in freedom. Without freedom and democracy, there would never be peace in Central America. The Secretary-General should formulate as soon as possible and in co-ordination with the United Nations bodies an effective and coherent plan of economic and social assistance for Central America.

Contadora views: Mexico said the arms race, the foreign military presence and the activities of forces whose aim was the overthrow of legitimately established Governments had hindered regional detente. Side by side with declarations of good faith and support for diplomatic measures, activities had taken place which, in addition to being contrary to the spirit of such intiatives, undermined peace in the region and delayed the adoption of agreements among States. In 1985 there was serious danger of creating a political vacuum through blocking, though not in a final form, the various channels of dialogue that had been so patiently, and with such dedication, opened in 1984.

The Contadora Group had pursued efforts to negotiate a regional agreement to reconcile the basic concerns of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The Final draft of the Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America included proposals which, in the Group's judgement, represented just and equitable arrangements. That was a "coherent and orderly set of commitments that made it possible to lay the foundations for peaceful coexistence over the long term in an atmosphere of political confidence and goodfaith". What was at state in central America was the validity of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.

The most scrupulous respect for those principles was a minimal and indispenable prerequisite for overcoming the crisis. The renunciation of the threat or use of force to destabilize legitimately constituted Governments was an essential condition for regional peace. The arms race must be halted in all its forms. While the arms race had been intensified in recent years, the foreign miliary presence had also increased. Mexico was convinced of the need for negotiations to continue and it was condident that an understanding on pending issues could be reached.

Colombia said that if negotiated solutions of the outstanding issues among Central American countries were to be achieved, it was vital to have the political will of their Governments to resolve the remaining differences between them by peaceful means. In that regard, mutual trust and the security of States were particularly important. The problems of Central American countries must be resolved by them without outside interference. Contadora had been working for peace so that those seriously concerned with economic and social justice could achieve their true goals of democracy, freedom and justice. The confrontations and conflicts in the region had generated a flow of refugees, who were sheltered in border camps in circumstances of considerable difficulty. Contadora was working to bring about their repatriation and in the interest of their health, education, employment and security.

Panama said that in the past 12 months, there had been a worsening of the tension and distrust that existed in Central America. There was also a serious threat to the peace process being followed by the Contadora Group. The responsibility for the establishment of peace in the region was incumbent upon Central American Governments. The sustained trend towards the consolidation of democracy and the institutionalization of freedom in the region were basic steps on the path to reconciliation, reconstruction and the well-being of all peoples of Central America. Panama appealed to all Central American countries, as well as to those who had interest in and links with the region, to refrain from any action which might aggravate the already delicate situation in the area.

Venezuela was "unequivocally" committed to the process of negotiation directed to the restoration of understanding and peaceful coexistence in Central America. However, Contadora Group efforts were encountering obstacles that tended at least to neutralize what was being done, "until the time is ripe for an attempt to block it for good". Only a political dialogue would make it possible for the Central American countries, with the support and encouragement of the Contadora Group, and with the "considerable collaboration" of others who lent their support, to find ways to end the violence and instablility in the region, to begin the march towards economic development and to develop and strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights.

Support group: Brazil said any attempt to understand the current crisis in Central America and to find solutions for it must take into account complex present and historical aspects in the social, political, economic, military and diplomatic fields. The situation in the region was not and should not become an issue of East-West confrontation.

Uruguay said the Contadora Act was a suitable juridical instrument, whose conclusion and signing would make it possible to lay down the fundamental political commitments that world lead to a solution within the framework of the co-operation of all States, both within and outside the region, that were concerned with the region. It was impossible to conceive of any genuine, lasting solution without broad, unconditional and effective respect for human rights, and the consolidation and strengthening of participative and pluralist representative systems in all regional countries.

Peru said the international community should not and must not retreat from the 1985 Contadora Act, which continued to provide the basis for a lasting political commitment. The Latin American peoples reiterated their firm rejection of all positions which fostered a military solution of the Central American conflict. Only realistic negotiation and the effective understanding emerging from it "can enable us to find the road that will truly guarantee the peace and security" of all of the region's countries while at the same time preserving the right of those people to self-determinated and effective, true democracy "that links freedom and justice and in which political and economic pluralism" could promote national unity and regional fraternity for all Central Americans.

Argentina said: "Now we are seeing the outward manifestations of the deep economic and social injustices which lie at the origin of the Central American crisis." The international community must make sure that the outcome of the crisis "guarantees the establishment of democratic pluralistic societies in which the inhabitants live in freedom and are able to develop harmoniously". There must be full respect in Central America for the principles of non-intervention, of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, of the non-use or threat of the use of force in international relations, and of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Human rights and fundamental freedoms for all must be fully respected and promoted, "as must be the ideological pluralism which is a natural consequence of the exercise of the self-determination of peoples". Confrontation benefited no one and must be discarded. Argentina would continue to support whatever solutions might be arrived at through the efforts of the Contadora countries. Without goodwill on the part of all interest parties there would be no solution to Central America's problems. The United States and Nicaragua should resume the Manzanillo dialogue in keeping with Security Council resolution 562 (1985).

Other views: Cuba said peace for Central America could be achieved only though an end to the interference by the United States, which was openly violating all the principles of international law and its own commitments under legal instruments to which it was a party, militarily attacking Nicaragua by arming, supporting and advising the so-called contras, which were mercenary forces in the service f United States interests. The Contadora Group's draft document, if it were to be a genuine guarantee for all, must contain the necessary elements to safeguard Nicaragua's peace and security. Peace would not come to Central America until the United States showed the political will to reach agreement. Cuba reaffirmed its readiness to contribute to peace in Central America. It respected and would support the arrangements freely accepted by Nicaraguans and the Sandinist revolution.

The USSR said the storm clouds of war had been looming ever more menacingly over Central America. Since

Nicaraguans had overthrown a dictatorial regime and had embarked upon the construction of a new life of their own free choice, Nicaragua had been "living an unending seige". A genuine, although undeclared, war was being waged against it. Attempts were also being made to choke Nicaragua economically. A broad range of action had been brought into play to destabilze and topple the existing political and social order in Nicaragua. That country was also being threatened with direct military intervention.

By a special decision, the United States Congress had approved the eventual use of United States armed forces against Nicaragua in "exceptional circumstances". The United States had continued to subvert the Contadora Group's constructive efforts, while at the same time paying lip-service to them. American-Nicaraguan negotiations had not been resumed, notwithstanding the Security Council decision calling for their reopening. "Unconscionable" attempts had been made to weaken Nicaragua's ability to withstand armed attacks against it from various sides and to dictate to Nicraguans the path to be followed towards a solution of their domestic problems.

A peaceful settlement in Central America would be possible only on the basis of the following factors: respect for the legitimate security interests of the region's countries; dismantling of foreign military bases in the region; the withdrawal of foreign troops; and cessation of the use of the territory of one country for purposes of interfering in the internal affairs of another. The Soviet Union continued to support the solution of Central America's problems by the States of that region by political means, including constructive negotiations. It supported the efforts made to that end by other States, including those of Latin America and Western Europe.

The Soviet Union repudiated attempts to blame it in some way for the situation in Central America. It opposed transforming that region into an arena for East-West confrontation. "We have not created and do not intend to create a threat to the interests of the United States and its allies." The solution of Central America's problems was to be found through negotiations taking due account of the legitimate interests of the region's countries and fully respecting their sovereignty. It was important that the Contadora Group resume its efforts to that end.

The United States said there was a continuing process of transition to, and consolidation of, democratic government in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala as well as a proud democratic tradition in Costa Rica. However, there was a continuing process of transition to, and consolidation of, totalitarian government in Nicaragua. National reconciliation through dialogue and elections was a fundamental principle of the Contadora process. The Nicaraguan Government did not oppose national reconciliation in other countries. But when the Sandinistas were asked to accept dialogue in their own country, they rejected it as a "foreign conspiracy".

The United States had consistently backed economic and political reform in Central America. It had spent four times as much on economic and social assistance to the Central American region as it had on military assistance. The Sandinistas had begun to intervene in El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica within a year of seizing power in July 1979, and had actively continued that aggression ever since. The Sandinistas had charged that the United States' "defensive reactions", including support for the "democratic resistance", constituted aggression against Nicaragua. That charge "stands the facts on their head", the United States said.

The Sandinistas had supported "insurgent forces tied to Cuba and the Soviet Union". The Sandinistas, with Soviet and Cuban support, had built the most powerful military forces in the region. Soviet-bloc arms shipments to the Sandinista Government had totalled more than $500 million. The Contadora mediation effort offered the best hope to achieve peace in Central America. The United States would continue to give it its full support. However, the Contadora process had encountered serious obstacles in the last year. The Sandinistas were not serous in their approach to the negotiations.

The Sandinistas refused to take the one step that might lead to an end to the internal insurgency--participation in internal dialogue. The United States would abide by any agreement that Central Americans reached. In the light of that position, the Sandinista demand that agreement could only be seen as an effort to thwart the Contadora process and waste nearly three years of effort. What was occurring in Central America was a conflict between the Sandinistas

and their neighbours as well as repression by the Sandinistas of their fellow Nicaraguans. The Contadora process represented both the proper forum and the best hope to achieve peace in Central America.