Army nonlethal weapons/ scalable-effects program: a think piece.

The Army's strategy for the employment of nonlethal weapons (NLWs) requires true scalable-effects (SE) systems capable of fulfilling the Army and joint nonlethal (NL) core capabilities of counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and countercapability. NL/SE systems will be employed across the spectrum of operations from small-scale contingencies (SSCs) to major combat operations by Objective Force line-of-sight (LOS)-, beyond-LOS (BLOS)-, and non-LOS (NLOS)-capable systems. NLWs, as modifications of existing lethal weapons systems, will evolve into true SE (lethal to NL) systems for use by Army Objective Forces. This ability to "rheostat" force and effect is revolutionary, but it will become an integral part of Objective Force capabilities.

Nonlethal Weapons and Their Roles

The 1996 Department of Defense Directive 3000.3 defines NLWs as "Weapons ... explicitly designed and primarily employed ... to incapacitate personnel or materiel ... [by] minimizing fatalities, permanent injury ... and undesired damage to property and the environment." Their effects are relatively reversible but do not have a zero probability of producing either fatalities or permanent injuries. The critical point is that NLWs are not simply systems or weapons that do not "kill." They are specifically designed and built to deliver their effects against the prescribed targets (personnel or materiel) consistent with the mandates of Department of Defense Directive 3000.3.

The Army's approved 1996 Nonlethal Mission Needs Statement and the 2000 Joint Nonlethal Mission Needs Analysis/Mission-Area Assessment requires NL core capabilities for counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and counter capability missions. Joint Vision 2020, furthermore, also calls for a precision engagement capability for any situation capable of creating "the desired lethal or NL effects." An even simpler definition is the temporary incapacitation of people, places, and things. This is the proposed definition of NL/SE that the Army should use when pursuing Future Combat System (FCS) capabilities to meet future NL requirements.

Where We Are

While the Army has fielded Nonlethal Capability Sets (NLCSs) composed of predominantly legacy blunt-impact munitions and protective gear, there is a clear need for a future capability that goes far beyond this current mix. A recent, informal survey of some combatant units was conducted to determine what capabilities they would want from new NLW systems. A summary of the results is presented here.

Personnel from the 5-20th Infantry (Stryker) Suggested--

* Cordoning off areas with temporary, easily moved NL barriers to "channelize" hostile personnel mixed with noncombatants.

* Providing temporary, mobile antivehicular NL barriers (especially in military operations on urbanized terrain [MOUT]) or restricted terrain.

* Providing an SE weapon that could stun/incapacitate or wound/kill with the "flick of a switch."

Personnel from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) mentioned--

* Clearing buildings (MOUT) without causing damage (rubble) or noncombatant casualties.

* Breaking contact with or extracting selected personnel from a crowd.

* Developing a family of NL access-control and area-denial capabilities.

Personnel from the 5th Special Forces Group thought of--

* Providing better blunt trauma/"stunning" NL weapons.

* Securing vehicles, resupply, and rendezvous sites when teams are operating away from vehicles.

* Incapacitating vehicles at a distance (1-3 kilometers) using electronic systems/alarms/booby traps; crowds, prisoners (with a small number of guards), humans, and animals (herders with sheep) at a distance of 0-1 kilometer from strategic recon sites; and personnel when breaking contact.

* Providing a "low (no) signature" ambush which incapacitates immediately, lasts for a "variable" duration, persists for a "variable" time, and covers "variable-sized incapacitation zones."

Where We Need to Go

The Army's transformation effort is centered on the Objective Force, the centerpiece of which is the FCS with its LOS, BLOS, and NLOS SE capability. The NL/SE strategy has as its ultimate goal the delivery of a true, rheostatic SE capability for FCS platforms, crew-served weapons, and individual soldiers. This effort supports the defense planning guidance for the 2000 to 2005 and 2002 to 2007 time frames, in that the guidance cited the need for NL/SE from the tactical to the strategic levels while addressing the public demands for minimizing collateral damage and loss of innocent life "... while negating an adversary's exploitation of our rules of engagement." This new, indeed revolutionary, capability will represent a fundamental paradigm shift from NLWs suited for use in SSC situations against noncombatants to one in which NL effects are but one of the options available to commanders across the breadth of the operational spectrum. Delivering true SE weapon systems for the Objective Force will require time, money, and a focused effort to develop the technologies to meet the operational requirements.

A diverse range of capabilities is needed across the spectrum of conflict. They reflect the effect that the weapon will have on personnel and materiel. It is critical to combine the effect of a weapon and its delivery system into a single entity. The successful development of future NLWs systems must focus on both the effects and the delivery of NLWs. They must provide utility in multiple scenarios that will dictate a range of delivery systems and platforms consistent with the FCS and operational environment in which Objective Force units will find themselves (Figure 1).

Additional consideration must be given to determining the effectiveness of new systems. It is difficult to assess the utility of these systems when they are being compared to lethal weapons. Conventional assessment models rely upon kill probabilities that are not directly comparable to the effects desired when using NL systems. So one task that requires further investigation is developing effectiveness models that can relate the utility of NL systems in operational environments to measures of effectiveness. Figure 2 on page 12 shows the multidimensional problem that must be solved.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

The primary role of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) as the Army's proponent for NLWs is to focus the effort toward the desired FCS SE weapon systems. USAMPS must also work with the other proponent schools to coordinate NL science and technology (S&T) development efforts and, given the inherent nature of numerous users widely scattered over the country, help prevent unnecessary duplication of effort. This means that joint and Army research and development (R&D) efforts must expand to include increased support for promising technologies suitable for the Objective Force, as well as the SE capabilities that are suitable for employment by either the Legacy or Interim Force systems.

It is important that NL effects continue to be described properly in Objective Force requirements documents as these documents are developed and refined. Figure 3 shows the relationships of some of these key documents that are guiding the Army's transformation.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

As the next generation of NLWs are defined and developed, these documents form the foundation from which the individual NLWs requirements must flow. We are currently cross walking these documents to develop a unified set of NLWs criteria. This is being coordinated through a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)-sponsored NLWs Integrated Concepts Team (ICT) that involves all key stakeholders, including the U.S. Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command's program executive officer and headquarters Army players.

USAMPS also has a significant role as the TRADOC school responsible for the institutional training of key NL systems and doctrine. USAMPS must ensure that NL/SE employment; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and systems capabilities knowledge are fully integrated into the programs of instruction for courses comprising both the Officer and NCO Education Systems. Students in both systems' courses must receive instruction that provides them with a foundation of NL/SE understanding, including the likely situations in which they might be used and the capabilities of the NLWs systems currently in use--or to be fielded for use--by the future force.

Senior leader training should move beyond the current emphasis on providing information about NLWs to one emphasizing the benefits of NL/SE use in the current force structure in SSC scenarios, as well as the efforts to develop a more expansive capability for use by both the Interim and Objective Forces. Senior leaders must be made to understand that the dramatic shift for NLWs systems will occur when they expand from their current primary SSC employment options to their full potential as part of the FCS SE capability, suitable for use against both combatant and noncombatant targets.

Resourcing the Effort

The Army's battle labs must be encouraged to prioritize and support promising NL/SE-oriented advanced technology demonstrators or advanced concept technology demonstrators. This also means that promising SE capabilities must be included as S&T objectives in the Army S&T Master Plan. SE-based defense technology objectives of both the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan and the Defense Technology Area Plan should be developed.

The Army's NL ICT--conducted semiannually at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri--should be used by the participating Army proponents to submit (for consideration and further development) promising R&D or S&T candidates. School proponents are encouraged to document NL Objective Force requirements. The USAMPS assistant commandant, as the Army's voting principal to the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate's (JNLWD's) Joint Coordination and Integration Group (JCIG), will carry forward promising candidates to the JCIG as a whole, with an eye toward obtaining JCIG's endorsement of the proposals for funding by either the Army or the NLWs Integrated Product Team (IPT) through the JNLWD.

As members of the NL ICT, proponents are also encouraged to submit their own R&D and procurement funding requests. The JNLWD fully supports service-unique NL S&T funding with the development of the Objective Force FCS. Proponents must continue to develop their own unique NL/SE requirements capabilities (such as, NL mortar/artillery munitions and MK-19 NL) for use by Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces. The result of all this will be a vigorous effort to develop the necessary technologies that meet the requirements of the FCS for an SE capability for the Objective Force.

The strategy is dual-tracked. The overall effort for the short- and midterm should concentrate on accelerating the development of more mature NL/SE technologies addressing identified deficiencies in the NLCS, even accelerating the efforts of the ongoing Joint NL Concept Exploration Programs for crowd control, area denial to personnel, and area denial to vehicles. In this way, the Army's NL/SE efforts will support the needs of its current and Interim Forces until the Objective Force SE systems--the second track of the NL development strategy--can be brought online.

Summary

The focus of previous NL efforts has been the development and fielding of NLWs to meet the needs of units and commanders deployed in SSC situations. NLWs clearly have demonstrated their value and utility from Haiti to Kosovo, Panama, and Guantanamo Bay The key deliverable of this effort was the development of the NLCS, a prepackaged set of items, including NL munitions, that could be issued to an entire platoon, giving it everything it would need to fulfill its mission in an SSC environment.

Short- and midterm efforts will be oriented toward rounding out the NL capabilities already fielded and bringing to fruition distinctive, proponent-based NLWs requirements (for example, NL mortar). The roles of the NL ICT, separate Army proponent schools, and the JCIG's recommendations to the NLWs IPT establishing priorities for R&D by the Army and the JNLWD and to support procurement funding in the program objective memorandum, are absolutely essential in ensuring that the Army's NL strategy receives the appropriate resourcing and prioritization.

Future efforts must now be focused on the Objective Force's FCS with the deliverable being a true SE capability. FCS SE requirements must be cross-walked to those of the Objective Force warrior, ensuring that individual soldier SE capability is present in the Objective Force. The NL ICT shall serve as the forum for presenting promising SE-based technologies for consideration and further R&D either by the Army, under the auspices of the battlelabs (for example, advanced technology demonstrations, advanced concept technology demonstrations, the Concept Experimentation Program, and limited-objective experiment), or by direction and support of the NLW IPT under those of the JNLWD.

Figure 1. NLWs effects must be consistently defined based on their
operational utility.

Nonlethal/scalable effects must have utility in/against:

Environments

Rolling, forested
Complex (mountains)
Complex (jungle)
Desert
Urban (MOUT)

Targets

People--dismounted personnel
Things--equipment (especially
  vehicles) and/or systems
Terrain--barriers and obstacles

Delivery Means

Ground--soldiers, weapons,
  artillery, and missile systems
Air--helos, unmanned aerial
  vehicles, and fixed-wing
  aircraft

Engagement Categories

LOS     Out to 5 km         Collocated sensor, decider, and shooter
BLOS    Out to 12-16 km     Independent sensor; collocated
                              decider and shooter
NLOS    Out to 30-150 km    Independent shooter; decider and
                              sensor may or may not be collocated

This article was written in close collaboration with and cooperation from members of the USAMPS and TRADOC NLWs staffs and the Close Combat Armaments Center, Tank-automotive and Armaments Command-Army Research, Development, and Engineering Center. Colonel Lamb is the USAMPS assistant commandant and represents the Army as a voting member on the JCIG JNLWD.