Army must address irregular warfare needs.

The Army's largest-ever modernization program, the Future Combat Systems, is expected to deliver a kit bag of new capabilities for the tactical force. Although it's easy to see how FCS technologies will provide a clear advantage in the conventional fight, it is less clear how this program will improve capabilities in unconventional warfare.

The most unconventional warriors in the U.S. military, the special operations forces, are likely to welcome the improved conventional capabilities of FCS, but the program also must ensure that it addresses the difficult requirements of irregular warfare.

For example, how will the FCS help our conventional forces succeed in operations that require them to shift from combat to humanitarian aid to civil affairs duties?

Conventional systems have essentially focused on finding and destroying enemy formations hiding in physical terrain. FCS for the most part enhances these capabilities. Its components are conventional platforms that are designed to see, shoot, move, and communicate farther and faster with increased protection.

But in the context of the global war on terrorism, and Iraq and Afghanistan, we have to look beyond the tactical engagement.

The operations in which U.S. forces currently are engaged are not limited to the application and escalation of force. They require achieving objectives in very different political-military environments and circumstances. If conventional forces cannot create the desired effects in post-conflict or low intensity conflict environments, then they can become irrelevant in a matter of weeks.

Irregular warfare must form a large part of the context of future systems. Conventional capabilities do not always translate into victory in unconventional conflicts.

Missing are the psychological aspects of warfare. In irregular warfare, the population is the center of gravity and people are the contest's terrain. As a result, the political and psychological aspects of warfare become more central to the outcome of conflicts than the physical.

Irregular warfare requires a great deal of focus on the human factors of warfare--on mobilizing populations and finding human targets that are hiding in human terrain. The greatest strengths of special operations forces lie in their ability to identify the irregular enemy, in their inclusion of the indigenous populations and forces in their operations, and in their ability to achieve political and strategic objectives through a much broader set of options than kinetic ones.

Special operations forces flow from combat to policing to civil affairs and back to combat as needed. They move from conventional to paramilitary operations to humanitarian assistance to training local forces. This flexibility allows them to quickly transition to post-conflict requirements and turn military victories into political ones. Special operators also shift smoothly from platform to foot to different platforms.

One of the reasons for this flexibility is that in the special operations community we value humans more than hardware. They are trained to use any and all military systems, as well as anything else they find on the ground.

The bottom line is that technology enhances operational capability, but does not define it.

Conventional forces already are beginning to understand and learn the skills needed for irregular warfare. Conventional units returning for their second tours in Iraq are incorporating civil affairs, military policing and psychological operations into their missions more than they had on their first tours. The upcoming "year of the police" in Iraq may test the limits of conventional force flexibility.

Irregular warfare demands much closer relations with locals. Information operations, psychological operations, ideological operations are decisive, as is communicating with the population.

Conventional forces and systems will have to develop the ability to relate and to communicate with a wider range of actors, such as local citizens, local security forces, indigenous armies, interagency partners, coalition partners, non-governmental organizations and international organizations.

One of the factors leading to U.S. forces' success in the city of Ar Rutbah, Iraq, was that we communicated and demonstrated concern for the safety of the citizens through various channels prior to entering the city and during our stay there.

Interoperability must be expanded from worrying about being able to exchange data among vehicles within the same unit to being able to talk to the various local and interagency participants involved in an operation or campaign.

Of all the elements of FCS, the overarching network promises to be useful in irregular warfare. Information is ammunition in psychological warfare. Net-centricity enables the decentralization of decision-making and control, a requirement for successfully confronting a web of loosely connected enemy cells. This will work well for the special operations community that already pushes autonomy down to the lowest levels. But it is at odds with current conventional military hierarchies of command and control.

Conventional forces do not have to become SOF, but they must be able to operate and achieve objectives in low-intensity conflict and win counterinsurgency campaigns. At a minimum, the Army must understand how to use conventional power in support of a counterinsurgency campaign plan, and must determine what irregular attributes and capabilities the conventional forces will require to do this.

In any case, the FCS must either support the conventional forces as they conduct aspects of irregular warfare--which they are already doing in Iraq today--or support a larger SOF community in the future.

This commentary reflects the author's views and does not represent the position of the Defense Department or the U.S. government. Maj. Gavrilis is a career Army Special Forces officer who has served two tours in Iraq. He is currently a political-military planner in the Iraq division of the strategic plans and policy directorate on the Joint Staff.