Army Intelligence support to Homeland Security.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Vision applies to all future Army missions. Anticipation of asymmetric threats significantly shaped the Vision, and as such it provides the overarching construct for the application of Army Intelligence's core competencies in support of Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD), or HLS/HLD.

This is not to say that the Army Intelligence Vision focuses only on support to HLS/HLD. Rather, HLS/HLD support is an application of the Vision's components and Army Intelligence core competencies to these missions. The Vision and core competencies remain equally relevant to Army Intelligence support to the Legacy, Interim and Objective Forces throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, to include simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs) and small-scale contingencies (SSCs). The bottom line is the application of Army Intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in the continental United States (CONUS), combined with its operations outside CONUS (OCONUS), and provides a seamless, global ability to identify and interdict threat activities aimed at the U.S. homeland and the fabric of our society. HLS cannot be confined to actions within the United States.

Army Intelligence contributes to the HLS/HLD mission by collecting, integrating and analyzing massive amounts of data and information on large numbers of seemingly diverse entities to predict what the threat intends, so that authorities can take action to prevent the threat activity before it occurs. In essence, Army Intelligence enables proactive actions rather than reaction to events in the execution of the HLS/HLD mission.

This article imparts a general understanding of how Army Intelligence provides its product--dominant knowledge--to combat leaders, installation commanders, and local law enforcement personnel at the point of decision as they conduct the HLS/HLD mission. As President George W. Bush said during the swearing-in ceremony for Governor Tom Ridge as the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security, "In the War on Terrorism, Knowledge is Power." Knowledge reduces risk or uncertainty for the decision maker, regardless of the echelon--squad leader through the President.

Overview of Army Transformation

The U.S. Army has an inherent obligation to protect CONUS as well as all U.S. interests worldwide. Army Transformation is an all-encompassing campaign that fundamentally overhauls the U.S. Army to ensure the Army fulfills these obligations. Transformation changes how the Army staffs, organizes, equips, and trains. It also modifies how the nation's leaders engage the Army as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, how the Army defends the United States, and when required, how it fights and wins the nation's wars. In the Transformed Army, "dominant knowledge" provides the decision and action advantages essential for mission success. Army Intelligence provides the Transformed Army with the "knowledge edge."

Army Intelligence Enables Army Transformation and HLS Mission Success

Commanders have always sought a knowledge advantage to defeat enemies while minimizing their own losses, to include protecting their own countries and support bases. On tomorrow's battlefield, commanders must have knowledge about the battlespace unavailable to previous generations--knowledge which we must continually refresh. Army Intelligence will provide that knowledge. To achieve knowledge superiority and decision dominance in HLS, Army Intelligence must-

* Integrate national, joint, Service and law enforcement agencies' (LEA) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

* Apply its predictive analysis expertise.

* Disseminate predictive intelligence down to the lowest levels of local government and law enforcement.

Army Intelligence will think globally and enable the HLS team to act locally!

Army Intelligence Support to HLS

Army Intelligence in support of HLS/HLD is a globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledge-based force composed of expert personnel harnessing the collaborative, analytical, communications, and presentation power of modern information technology to support leaders at the point of decision. It operates globally, within a national, joint, and combined context, and leverages the capabilities and expertise of the U.S. Intelligence Community, friends and allies, LEAs, academia, media, and private industry to provide commanders focused, "near-certain," knowledge. Its core competencies are:

* Full-dimension protection, including protection in the physical and cyber-domains.

* Unique collection to cover information gaps.

* Integration of all intelligence and non-intelligence sensors and fusion (knowledge) centers to build the relevant "Red" and "Gray" (neutral, such as terrain and weather) pictures.

* Analysis to transform data into information and that information into relevant knowledge.

* Presentation of knowledge in a format and manner that imparts immediate understanding.

Expert Army Intelligence personnel operating collaboratively to develop knowledge focused on the commander's or decision maker's requirements underpin the core competencies.

Challenges to Army Intelligence Support for HLD Authorities

Army Intelligence is resourced, equipped, and trained primarily to operate OCONUS. Legal authorities consisting of laws, policies, and regulations are undergoing review and change to enable Army Intelligence to bring all of its expertise to bear on HLS operations within CONUS. The threat operates globally; therefore, the HLS/HLD effort must be global in nature. Army Intelligence can merge on-going OCONUS operations with CON US-focused HLS/HLD efforts to provide seamless, predictive intelligence support.

Education-Based Training

The Army Intelligence Vision includes changes to the Institutional Army as we adapt Military Intelligence Corps professional training to include the focus and skills necessary to operate within the United States. Ongoing initiatives are moving Army Intelligence from a training system to an education system with established certification requirements and procedures at each level (apprentice, journeyman, and master) and professional degrees for soldiers. MI is consolidating some military occupational specialties (MOSs) to create multifunctional soldiers better able to handle the differing demands and required skill sets for operations across the spectrum of conflict. This will necessarily include the skills required to operate with LEAs and within the legal parameters that protect all the rights of U.S. citizens.

We must know this new threat, how they think, and how they operate. Institutional changes include developing counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) or CI/HUMINT All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) software applications, HLS/HLD modeling and simulation tools, and training based on HLS/ HLD intelligence preparation of the battlespace, "plug and play" classrooms, mentoring programs, and distance learning. Army Intelligence will also revise its doctrinal base to complement evolving national and joint HLS/HLD doctrine by publishing new versions of the FM 2-X series of field manuals and using object-oriented doctrinal development to expedite the distribution of doctrine to the field.

Editors' Note: See Mr. Strack's article in the TSM Notes on page 59 for discussion of the ASAS CI/ HUMINT systems and software.

HLS Operational Concept

The principal operational challenge facing U.S. military forces in this century is the requirement for early and continuous application of strategic responsiveness across the full spectrum of conflict, while simultaneously protecting against physical and asymmetric attacks targeting the CONUS and global infrastructure that serves as its power-projection base. The basis of our post-Cold War strategic military posture is power projection, with the preponderance of U.S. forces stationed in CONUS. Power projection emphasizes rapid deployability, an overarching need for transcendent speed of action, and HLS/HLD as an integral component of all operations. Army Intelligence enables "proactive" rather than "reactive" action to events in the execution of the HLS/HLD mission.

LEAs, the judicial system, consequence management activities and organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and even the Department of Defense's Joint Task Force (JTF)-Civil Support are fundamentally reactive in nature, mind-set, policy, structure, training, and TTP. Their responsibilities are primarily consequence management and building legal cases to prosecute those charged with terrorist acts. Conversely, Army Intelligence anticipates, collects, integrates, analyzes, and predicts so the decision maker can take action to stop the terror before it happens or to be waiting for the terrorists when they try to execute their planned action. To achieve this goal, we must know this threat and how they think and operate; we must integrate and analyze information in resident databases with global collection to provide predictive intelligence to the decision maker at the decision point regardless of echelon or agency. This effort must be truly global, as terrorists may conceive an attack i n Asia, plan it in Europe, finance it via a global network of front organizations, and execute it with operatives not just in CONUS, but wherever there are U.S. citizens (including military personnel) to attack. In the Global War on Terrorism, the area of interest is the planet Earth and the surrounding space that includes satellite arrays.

Intelligence and security elements organic to the installation, units of action, and units of employment will not likely possess the expertise locally to satisfy all of the commander's full-spectrum intelligence requirements. The expertise resident in echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence organizations can dramatically expand organic units' capabilities. Army Intelligence must conduct distributed intelligence operations linking organizations that have capabilities or possess expertise and resources required to provide predictive knowledge to the decision maker. We will conduct disperse operations, but must remain interconnected. The goal is getting the "right knowledge, to the right person, at the right time" so the decision maker 'Sees First, Understands First, Acts First, and Finishes Decisively." EAG linkages could provide the framework to refine the HLS and installation force protection (FP) functions, while engendering confidence through real-time, continuous (24/7) support.

An interconnected information network is the goal, a combination of commercial and government communications capabilities serving as the transport layer for collaboration, information exchange, and knowledge production. This is the future global information environment (GIE) and the essence of network-centric concepts. The Objective Force will use the information dimension to deploy rapidly and operate effectively once it is in the area of operations, and to protect the homeland and its power-projection base worldwide. Our foes will use this dimension to conduct terrorist as well as political, economic, and cultural activities. To be successful, the Army must dominate the "digital high-ground" in the information dimension of the battlespace as surely as it must occupy or control the high ground in a strategic rivervalley. Information assurance is a fundamental consideration.

An essential element of the Army Intelligence HLS effort will be the architectures that link the various Knowledge Centers to the warfighting commanders in chief, MACOM (major Army command) and installation commanders, units of action and employment, and national, regional, state and local law enforcement leaders. The focal point of such an effort could be joining the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Information Dominance Center (IDC) with the 902d Ml Group's Cl Analysis and Control Element (Cl ACE), National Ground Intelligence Agency (NGIC), and other Knowledge Centers. INSCOM could link the various classified and unclassified local area networks (LANs) and communications networks via the DC with the TROJAN Backbone, providing a nearterm global Army Intelligence communications system reaching down to garrison locations and tactically to the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBOTs), divisions, and corps. These communications would be through TROJAN SPIRITs (TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated R emote Intelligence Terminals) and TROJAN LITEs (Lightweight Integrated Telecommunications Equipment).

Once we establish the organizational construct and connectivity at the required classification levels, we must explore and develop the requirements, TTP, and training for "reach" and "collaboration." Effective and efficient execution and application of these concepts are in the rudimentary stages.

At the installation level, CI/HUMINT personnel collect information, conduct liaison with LEAs, and operate the intelligence cell in the emergency operation center (EOC). The EOC intelligence cell could inextricably link to a global knowledge-based intelligence family of systems (people, systems, processes, etc.) through the lOC that focuses on projecting instantaneous, near-certain knowledge. As the ultimate integrator and presenter of threat and environmental information for the commander, the installation EOC intelligence cell would integrate information from nonorganic intelligence collectors, organic intelligence collection assets, and non-intelligence collectors such as LEAs to provide the relevant Red and Gray pictures to the commander.

At the operational and strategic levels, intelligence professionals in INSCOM and its subordinate brigades and groups would provide the nucleus for support to the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) in the operational theaters, MACOMs, installations, and LEAs. Since INSCOM also provides the Army subject matter experts (SMEs) at Knowledge Centers, they would likewise link and leverage them for HLS support. The majority of these Knowledge Centers are preexisting, easily identified intelligence nodes that are centers of excellence in a specific intelligence discipline or intelligence process. These Knowledge Centers include the joint task forces and unified command joint intelligence centers, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs), NGIC, Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA), the intelligence centers of our sister Services and coalition partners, the 902d Ml Brigade's Cl ACE, etc. The objective would be to link and leverage these capabilities through INSCOM's Information Dominance Center to facilitate the integration, filtering, and analysis of information and predictive intelligence dissemination in support of the ASOC warfighter, MACOM and installation commanders; and to national, regional, state, and local law enforcement leaders at the point of decision.

Many actions such as those listed in Figure 1 are currently underway to accomplish this type of HLS concept. These actions need monitoring for lessons learned and "success stories" that will need rapid reinforcement.

Too often, today's discussion of "knowledge management' quickly and incorrectly reverts to a discussion of storage devices, switches, routers, protocols, etc. "Knowledge management" must include expert personnel; increased resident knowledge in databases; data, information, and knowledge mining; collaboration; rehearsal; and enhanced presentation capabilities and skills. Knowledge management must enable commanders and decision makers to understand rather than merely see the battlespace. Army Intelligence expert personnel at the MACOMs, installations, Knowledge Centers, and INSCOM's IDC must focus on collaboration to share knowledge and expertise to enable this awareness. Such understanding includes an improved capability to predict and assess intentions and courses of action of any adversary to include asymmetric attacks against our homeland. The Bush Administration is currently receiving criticism for a failure to heed the warning in a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent's report that went "unnoticed" in the ever-increasing mountains of data and information that our information technology allows us to process. As the saying goes, "if we only knew what we know."

Conclusion

The Army is developing a warfighting concept that is more dependent upon knowledge than ever before. It applies equally to HLS/HLD, installation security, FP, and the defense of our power-projection base. What has changed is an attack on the continental United States, something that has not occurred since the War of 1812, and the accompanying loss of our sense of invulnerability. Superior intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and cutting edge information operations are integral to achieving that dominant knowledge required for HLS/HLD success. Army Intelligence is prepared to provide the knowledge edge.

Figure 1

Areas of the HLS Operational Concept Under Development.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) strategy

How Army Intelligence will support U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

Installation security/force protection (FP) support demonstration

* Select two or three installations

* Equip with hardware/software/bandwidth/accesses (NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS)

* "Hook" INSCOM's IDC

* Training on "how to think" about HLS/HLD

HLS/HLD modeling tools, visualization capability, and ASAS software Cross-agency LNOs--put structure in place right now to solve the cross-compartment coordination problem below the departmental level (e.g. JWAC, DTRA, JTAC, CTC, etc.)

Strategy for gaining relief from existing policy and regulatory prohibitions

* Ascertain if we doing all we can within context of current laws, regulations, and policy

* Change internal Army policy and regulations as appropriate

* Participate in joint forums on reform of existing legal prohibitions

Army Intelligence's primary applicable core competency and value-added in HLS is analysis and predictive intelligence. Army Intelligence should support whomever it can, train others (such as LEAs), and assist them to the full extent of the law

Strategy for the effective use of the Reserve Component intelligence assets apart from their regular WARTRACE missions

Comprehensive strategy to address CI/HUMINT HLS/HLD issues--develop a list of recommendations to consider, coordinate, and execute Monitor, support, and reinforce success of the initiatives already underway in the areas of:

* Access

* Analysis nodes

* Increased number of CI agents at installation and MACOM levels

* Partnering with CID 

Key:

CID -- Criminal Investigation Division

CTC -- Combat Training Center

DTRA -- Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

JTAC -- Joint Terrorism Analysis Center

JWAC -- Joint Warfighting Analysis Center

JWICS -- Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 

LNOs -- Liaison Officers

NIPRNET -- Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network

SIPRNET -- Secure Internet Protocol Router Network

Brad Andrew (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired) is a Futures Analyst working on the Army Intelligence Master Plan. His active duty assignments included Commander, 303d Ml Battalion (Operations), 504th Ml Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas; Deputy Director of Operations, 718th Ml Group, Bad Aibling, Germany; J2 Joint Task Force-Bravo, Solo Cano, Honduras; and Force Integration Staff Officer, Department of Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He has a Master of Military Arts and Sciences degree from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. He is also a graduate of the NSA Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program and has a Space Operations specialty. You may contact him via E-mail at [e-mail] and telephonically at [phone] or DSN 761-4785.