Army's future combat vehicle.

* Regarding your August 2009 article, "Army's Next Combat Vehicle: New Beginning or FCS Sequel?" my compliments to Sandra Erwin for exposing the mindset of the various Army leaders and agencies trying to desperately put together the "new combat vehicle" to replace the recently canceled predecessor "Future Combat Systems." This effort, as FCS before it, is utter foolishness.

The Army has a fleet of 16,000 combat vehicles (Abrams tanks, Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles, personnel carriers, self propelled artillery). Through modifications, technology upgrades, and selective replacement, it intends to keep this fleet throughout the foreseeable future, perhaps 50 years. It has always been the intent to keep this combat vehicle fleet not only survivable but current with the latest communications and information technology architecture, and it would have remained fully compatible and interoperable with the then-emerging FCS.

The Army also has 12,000 MRAPs and perhaps 400,000 tactical vehicles, from small utility vehicles and cargo trucks to heavy equipment transporters and so on. These also require constant survivability and communications upgrades.

The Army also has aviation assets; a fleet of attack, utility transport, and cargo helicopters that are larger than the air forces of most nations. This fleet has survivability and communications upgrade requirements that are no less than those of the ground combat vehicle fleet.

The Army also has its overall command, control and communications architecture, from the individual soldier to the national command HQ. This architecture ties in all echelons of combat, combat support, combat service support, logistics and transport in general.

Finally, using evolutionary and revolutionary procedures and technology of an ever-expanding and sophisticated communications architecture, the Army ties all of the above to interoperate, seamlessly, with other services and allies.

Now, where did the late FCS fit in? It was a small fleet of combat vehicles that would have, at best, operated alongside the existing combat vehicle fleet but never replace it. It would have only added to the diversity of systems and the endless list of repair parts and logistical support requirements of units and formations getting stuck with it.

Yet the Army wants a new combat vehicle. What is it, anyway? Is it a tank? A personnel carrier?

Long before the Army started drafting up an operational and organizational plan for this new acquisition, it should have determined specific battlefield deficiencies and shortcomings. Such an analysis might have determined, for example, that we need a lighter of more survivable tank or a faster fighting vehicle or a more accurate artillery system; whatever. That would then lead to a determination of possible remedies; changes in doctrine and training, tactics and techniques, product improvement of existing systems, or perhaps a new system altogether.

Since the Army fully intends to maintain the current fleet, as mentioned earlier, it is evident that the analysis was completed long ago and there is no need for yet another, and in this case undefined new, combat vehicle.

Chester A. Kojro

Rolla, MO