Armed robbery (bank robbery, ATM attacks and CIT heists) as part of current Violent Crime in South Africa.

1. INTRODUCTION

Armed robberies are topical and receive daily media coverage due to the extent of violence used during such incidents and the cost implications of the crime. The media accounts in newspapers not only to the general public but also to the offenders. (1) Offenders are provided with insight into future precautionary acts to safeguard themselves during the criminal act. Others will use the obtained information to 'copycat' criminal actions. An example is the different modus operandi used by different groups of offenders when committing attacks on automatic teller machines (ATMs) since 2004, using explosives. Media coverage on arrests of offenders and killings may possibly become a deterrent, as criminals will realise that they run a risk of being apprehended when perpetrating such a crime.

The manifestation of armed robbery, for the purposes of this article, will be explained in terms of the nature and extent, whereafter the focus will be on a comparison of the crime scene activities reported during ATM attacks, bank robberies and cash-in-transit (CIT) robberies. The article will conclude with guidelines to prevent and reduce bank related crime.

2. DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Armed robbery, for the purpose of this article, will include ATM attacks where explosives were used to gain access to cash, bank robbery and CIT robbery.

An ATM attack is defined as the unlawful and intentional causing of damage to an automatic teller machine or any part thereof, with the intent to obtain cash, through any means whatsoever, with specific inclusion of the use of explosives. (2)

Bank robbery is defined as the unlawful, intentional and violent removal and appropriation, or attempted removal and appropriation, of movable property (for example cash) whilst it is under the control of a bank by means of violence, or a threat of violence, where the victim has to believe that the perpetrator will, or is able to, use the indicated violence. (3)

Cash-in-transit robbery is the unlawful, intentional and violent removal and appropriation of movable assets in transit while the assets are under the control of a security company. This may include incidents inside or outside a bank and/or other premises, depending on circumstances. This may further include removal and appropriation of movable assets under threat of violence. The main consideration is that the movable assets must be under the control of the security company/guard. (4)

Targets for the purposes of this article refer to ATMs, bank branches and CIT vehicles/armoured vehicles or guards and reference to crime scene characteristics (activities) include among others, method of approach, method of attack, method of control, location type, materials used, verbal activity, non-verbal activity, and precautionary acts. (5)

3. THE NATURE OF ARMED ROBBERIES

Armed robbery is violent in nature and directed towards financial institutions such as banks and CIT companies. Re-offending where criminals are involved in two or more related crimes is indicative of a serial nature. (6) Some offenders continue to be involved in armed robberies directed at the same target, while others change between targets and adopt a different modus operandi. It is now confirmed that in South Africa the same armed robbers who robbed banks are also involved in other robberies targeting for instance the CIT industry, casinos, jewellery stores and ATMs.

In committing armed robbery against different targets the adaptive skills of criminals come to the fore. The following different scenarios can be identified:

The same armed robber will use the same tactic regardless of the target. For example, a firearm will be used to threaten employees of a bank, a jewellery store, a casino or the crew of a CIT company.

Some offenders stick to one target, whether it is an ATM, bank, CIT-vehicle or CIT-team. During 2008 a robber with the nickname "hammer man", because he used to carry a sledgehammer, jumped onto bank counters and smashed through bullet-proof glass to get to the money, was convicted for 28 bank robberies committed over a period of seven years by the time of his arrest in July 2007. In December 2003 he (Khumalo) escaped from Boksburg Prison. He was found guilty and sentenced to 35 years behind bars for 15 bank robberies. (7)

An armed robber can also change his modus operandi to adapt to changing targets. For example, entrance can be gained by taking a guard posted at a selected target hostage. Thereafter he is taken into a bank or jewellery store during the robbery, while at a casino he is held hostage outside to create the impression that all is in order, without attracting attention. An example is the use of additional co-workers to safeguard the individuals who are committing a CIT heist or blowing an ATM open with explosives. A specific modus operandi is often directed to a specific target type. For example the use of petrol to set CIT vehicles alight. In September 2006, four crewmen were burnt to death in an attack on a CIT vehicle.

The act of robbery is not a motive, but a behaviour that expresses the offender's need for money. Leonard postulates that motive is a state of mind. (8) Motive is also defined as the movement power which impels action to achieve a definite result. (9) Offender motivation is therefore attached to an individual and that person's perceptions regarding an action or event, and it can change over time. (10) The need for money becomes greed and most robbers become involved in crime initially because of a need for money to provide for basic necessities. Hence they stay involved in crime because the need for money remains, but the need changes to the provision for a high style of living. (11) According to Otu, unemployment accounts for the highest single reason why 35 per cent of armed robbers in Nigeria initially become involved in armed robbery. (12)

4. EXTENT OF ARMED ROBBERY

The extent of armed robbery for the purposes of this article will be addressed by referring to the reporting rate on a national level, provincial level, and the trends over a three year period.

Nearly half (48 per cent) of the armed robberies reported in South Africa during the first six months of 2007, on a national level, were CIT related. The situation changed in 2008, when most armed robberies (55 per cent) were ATM related incidents where explosives were used. (13)

TABLE 1: ARMED ROBBERY OVERVIEW

Type of armed robbery    2007  2008

ATM attack--explosives   38%   55%

Cash-in-transit robbery  48%   34%

Robbery                  14%   11%

Total                    100%  100%

All three crime types under discussion are perpetrated in six of the nine provinces. Gauteng is the province with the highest crime risk, but a decrease in robberies in the banking industry and CIT robberies is evident when comparing the 2007 (January to July) figure with the 2008 (January to July) figure. For robberies, the province with the second highest number of reported incidents is KwaZulu-Natal, and the same applies to CIT robberies. The province with the second highest number of ATM attacks is the North West province. This province borders Gauteng and is within one hour's driving time from the Pretoria/Johannesburg area. It means that offenders residing in the cities can easily travel to the North West province, or other smaller towns, for example Rustenburg, to commit an ATM attack.

Although the number of armed robbery incidents fluctuates from month to month, the following trend can be determined by analysing the total number of reported incidents over a three year period: ATM attacks--use of explosives, increased and the trend line based on three years' statistics shows an upward trend. So, the prediction for ATM attacks--use of explosives, is that the number of incidents could increase. The number of incidents for both robbery and CIT robbery decreased over the three year period and the trend for both crime types is a downward one.

5. CRIME SCENE CHARACTERISTICS

Crime scene characteristics refer to various factors reflecting the unique processes and procedures of armed robbers, also referred to as the offenders' modus operandi.

5.1 Amount of planning before the crime

Detailed planning is a prerequisite for ATM attacks, bank robberies and CIT robberies. Criminals involved in all three types of robbery plan accordingly. All criminals conduct pre-surveillance of the crime scene to determine the suitability of the target by taking several factors such as environmental factors and security measures into consideration when doing offence location selection. Route usage, preferred transportation and vehicles used also receive the necessary attention to ensure a safe escape after the incident. The escape is the most important issue and therefore alternative plans and routes are planned in detail. Other aspects taken into consideration by planners of an armed robbery include the day, date, time, target, place, number of co-workers, transportation needed, weapons, clothing, and security measures in place.

5.2 Specific tactics

5.2.1 Day and time of the robbery

Bank robberies and CIT robberies are committed during the day and ATM attacks--using explosives, at night. For 2008 the high risk days for bank robberies are Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays with the high risk times between 10:00 to 12:00 and 14:00 to 15:00. For CIT robberies Mondays and Fridays between 08:00 and 09:00 stand out as high risk time periods. ATM attacks--using explosives occur mostly during the early morning hours between 01:00 and 05:00 on Tuesdays and Fridays. Researchers offer the following explanations why Mondays are preferred as the most suitable day to commit armed robbery, namely the perception among criminals that more money is available due to non-banking during weekends; and that employees, and therefore potential victims, are less alert on a Monday after a weekend of wining and dining. (14)

5.2.2 Pre-surveillance of the selected target

Pre-surveillance of a crime scene forms part of the planning before the crime. One of the most important criteria when planning the crime is to ensure the availability of money. Offenders tend to take note of the replenishment of ATMs, although some ATMs have been bombed before they were operational for business. Banks identified as preferred targets were visited in a period that varies between a week and a day before the actual robbery. The same applies to CIT robberies, as suspicious vehicles following and observing services delivered by CIT companies were reported. This behaviour is not unique to the armed robber in South Africa. Several researchers reported such behaviour in Nigeria where the reconnaissance prior to 50 per cent of the armed robberies was done over a period of a few weeks before the operation. (15)

5.2.3 Crime scene and offence location type

Lee defines a crime scene as an area where a criminal act has taken place. (16) The offence location type refers to the type of environment within which the crime scene exists. Indoor crime scenes are those where the crimes are committed inside a structure with some form of cover from the elements of nature such as ATM attacks, and bank robberies. Outdoor crime scenes are exposed to the elements of nature. For example, CIT heists on the roads, or near lone standing ATM's next to a road in the rural areas. ATM attack crime scenes can be either indoor or outdoor crime scenes. The preferred ATM targets since 2008 are sites at smaller shopping centres where more than one ATM is placed. The crime scene of a bank robbery is always indoors. The preferred targets since 2007 are at smaller shopping centres with parking available close by, and with no access control to the parking area. CIT heists, where the moving armoured vehicle is the target, results in an outdoor crime scene.

5.2.4 Access to and from the crime scene

CIT robbers select areas where easy escape routes are available. Spatial analysis of all three crime types indicates that crime incidents mostly occur alongside highways or main roads. This emphasises the finding that the escape is the most important factor for criminals when committing a crime. (17) This is why they prefer areas where more than one suitable escape route is available. They also test drive the escape route to determine the maximum speed around corners and turns to ensure their safety in the car during the escape. The driver of the getaway vehicle is mostly a person with outstanding driving skills. The preferred vehicles are those with safety features such as airbags for protection during an accident.

The offenders mostly use their own vehicles during the scouting of the selected target because they do not want to be stopped and arrested for being in possession of a stolen vehicle. They prefer to play it safe before the actual criminal actions. Since 2004 the following types of vehicles were used during the escape after robberies, namely sedans, bakkies, and taxis.

5.2.5 Weapons to control the crime scene

The offender needs to take control of the crime scene. In order to fulfil this task the presence of a weapon is essential. A weapon refers to any item brought to the crime scene that is used for the purpose of administering force during the crime. During an interview with a CIT robber it was mentioned that high-calibre firearms are a necessity at a CIT robbery because the guards are heavily armed and the robbers must be prepared to defend themselves. (18) Although firearms are the preferred weapons when committing any one of the three crime types, other weapons are also reported to be seen or used at crime scenes. For example explosives and crowbars at ATM attacks, sledgehammers at bank robberies, and petrol at CIT robberies.

Although most of the bank robbers will be in possession of a firearm, incidents were seldom reported between 2002 and 2008 where shots were fired in a bank during the execution of the robbery. During the 1990s gangs tended to be more violent and therefore did not hesitate to shoot when entering a bank. (19) The use of a sledgehammer to break the glass at a counter was, as stated, a common characteristic of the so-called "hammer gang". (20) Hammers and the use thereof are not linked to only one group. After the arrest of Khumalo ("hammer-man") in July 2007 fewer incidents where a hammer was used were reported, but since middle 2008 hammers have been used more frequently. For example, two bank robberies in the Rustenburg area occurred in July and October 2008, where the robber smashed the glass at the teller counter with a hammer.

Weapons used at CIT robberies include high-calibre firearms, explosives, and petrol. A CIT robbery incident remembered by the CIT industry and the general public occurred in September 2007 at Villa Nora, when the offenders poured petrol on the armoured vehicle and set it alight. The crew members in the vehicle burnt to death. Explosives were also used to threaten the crew in an attempt to gain access to the money.

The possession or use of weapons is an element of robbery with aggravated circumstances. The weapons may result in injuries and deaths. Several criminals, police officers, guards and civilians have been seriously injured and fatally wounded during ATM attacks with explosives and CIT robberies. (21) Minor injuries are mostly associated with bank robbery although the experience of trauma can be severe.

5.2.6 Criminal experience of the offender

A criminal's professional experience refers to specialised knowledge

and the creation of crime opportunities. Criminals may have specialised knowledge of access to and the use of explosives, as well as cash handling procedures and precautionary measures at financial institutions. Certain professions can create opportunities for crime such as policing, or the employment of crew members on CIT vehicles, or custodians who are responsible for the replenishing of ATMs.

Criminal experiences build the confidence of criminals, and prepare them to better handle the unexpected. They tailor precautionary acts, for example lines of defence at crime scenes. Therefore, groups consist of different individuals with different skills. A criminal group can for example exist of planners, controllers, drivers, and shooters. Groups involved in ATM attacks using explosives, vary between three to five or more than ten individuals. The number of individuals in a bank robbery group varies between five and eight. CIT heists are committed by large groups of between ten and 30 individuals.

5.2.7 Tailored precautionary acts

Precautionary acts are not only taken by potential victims and law enforcement officers, but also offenders The tailored precautionary acts taken by the offenders include a number of individuals to fulfil a specific function during the execution of the robbery. Analysis of video footage confirms the presence of different role players.

Cash collectors are the closest to where the money is kept. They are responsible for the initial access to the cash and therefore also to the threatening or actual violence directed towards the possessors be it the tellers in a bank, the CIT crew or the safe of the ATM. Despite the threatening skills, they also need to be highly skilled to gain access. For example they need to know how to break the bullet-proof glass during a bank robbery or how to damage an ATM with explosives.

The main task of controllers and/or commanders is to ensure the fluency of the criminal actions. They act as a link between the cash collectors and the watch keepers/spotters. The controller present at the crime scene is usually also responsible for most of the planning. His responsibilities also include the command and control at the time of the robbery. Absolute adherence to his instructions is requested from all present. During a bank robbery the commander can also be the one who controls the clients in the bank and the tellers, while the collectors grab the money.

The driver of the get-away vehicle fulfils an essential role as a safe escape is the ultimate aim of all criminals. (22) The driver of the vehicle is highly skilled in safe driving techniques. Most of the time, he remains seated in the vehicle and can also be utilised to assist with observations.

Watch keepers and spotters are positioned on the outskirts of the crime scene to ensure proper protection. They are responsible for the early warning of cash collectors about the presence of reaction teams or suspicious activities. They are also instructed to react with violence if required. Shoot-outs mainly occur at crime scenes where the response teams or victims such as CIT crew members are armed. Several ATM attacks resulted in deaths and injuries of criminals, civilians and law enforcement officers including the police, when the offenders were confronted at the crime scene.

Tailored precautionary acts and specified roles fulfilled are evident when analysing a specific CIT heist which occurred on Tuesday, 12 March 2008, around 12:11. (23) A heavily armed gang of 20 suspects, wearing balaclavas, and armed with R5 and AK47 assault rifles blew up a CIT van near Flagstaff on the R61 between Flagstaff and Bizana. They rammed a Nissan 4x4 bakkie into the vehicle and then used explosives to blow it open. One security guard was wounded, and later died in hospital. They escaped in an Isuzu bakkie, hijacked from a passing motorist.

The lines of defence formed by bank robbers at a crime scene accommodates between three to six co-workers:

The first function at the crime scene is to control the door and to regulate access. The offender performing this task can be either on the inside or the outside of the bank. Depending on the number of offenders in the group, more than one person can be responsible for this task. The one can be on the outside of the access door, while the other one can be inside the banking hall.

The second function is to gain access to the teller area and to collect the cash. More than one robber can perform this role. A common modus operandi is that one of the robbers using a sledgehammer to break the glass at the teller counters, allowing them access behind the counters.

Another function to be fulfilled is command and control. This person controls the time duration of the robbery (time spent in the bank) and instructs withdrawal with the aim of ensuring a safe get-away.

The driver, another essential person during a robbery, waits in the get-away car as close to the bank as possible. Consequently, banks with parking close by are more frequently targeted. (24) This robber is responsible to observe at the outside and to alarm the robbers inside the bank through an agreed method.

Some groups prefer the robber responsible for the access control into the bank to take the guard hostage and take him along inside the bank. Some other groups may appoint an additional co-worker at the outside to take control of the guard.

5.2.8 Dress code

Based on analysis, the most common dress code of armed robbers is the wearing of balaclavas, hats, and jackets. Disguise by means of clothing is not a new phenomenon. Disguise forms an important part of the bank and CIT robber's kit. (25) The wearing of balaclavas and hats is not unique to South Africa. In countries such as New Zealand, 72 per cent of robbers have worn masks (26)

6. THE COSTS OF ARMED ROBBERY

Armed robbery is a financially motivated crime, as the specific aim of the offender is to obtain cash. Performing the criminal actions, such as threats or the application of violence may also cause additional costs. Those affected include clients and employees present at the crime scene, the institution targeted, the government, the general public in the vicinity of the crime scene, tax payers, and insurance companies. Costs can further be divided into immediate costs, medium-term costs and long-term costs.

Some of the following losses are applicable when a bank robbery incident occurs. Immediate costs--cash loss; loss of personal belongings of employees and clients; loss of business hours due to the robbery and follow-up investigations; losses because of missing financial transactions and travelling costs of investigators. Medium-term costs--loss of business hours due to the reputational risk after the robbery; financial costs for trauma counselling of personnel; additional security measures to be installed after the robbery; costs pertaining to repairing damage and insurance claims. Long-term costs--loss of productivity when victims and eye witnesses appear in court to testify and increased insurance premiums.

For ATM attacks the immediate costs include cash losses in half of the incidents; losses because of structural damages including possible damages to surrounding buildings; and loss of business if the ATM was placed in or near business premises. Medium-term costs--replacement costs of the machine and rebuilding of damaged structures, as well as increased insurance premiums. Long-term costs--the same as mentioned in the previous paragraph with regard to court appearance and testimony.

CIT robberies also resulted in most of the abovementioned losses, including losses with regard to the armoured vehicles and the vehicles used by the offenders. Most of these vehicles are hijacked or stolen, causing additional insurance claims and replacement costs for the vehicle owner.

Conklin identified various financial costs of crime. (27) The direct loss of property refers to damage to buildings such as damage caused by explosives used to bomb an ATM, as well as direct losses from murder, although it is difficult to place a monetary value on lost lives.

The second kind of cost of crime is the transfer of property. An example within the domain of armed robbery is when cash (property) during a robbery is transferred from the rightful owner/caretaker to the robber. The victims (individuals in possession, bank or CIT company) regard themselves as having lost the property. The property has been transferred and not become useless except when dye stain or other measures to destroy the money is used.

The third financial cost of crime relates to criminal violence in which a victim is physically hurt. Included are loss of productivity due to the injury, unemployment compensation paid to victims, fees for therapeutic sessions, payment for additional security measures implemented, hospitalisation and funeral expenses.

Enforcement costs refer to the money spent by the different law enforcement departments. For example, the salaries paid to law enforcers to carry out preventative patrols, and to provide training courses for members of crime fighting services.

Prevention and protection costs are another financial cost of crime. The banking- and CIT industries spend large amounts on target hardening. An example is the upgrading of security measures in an attempt to curb ATM attacks using explosives. This includes insurance premiums paid to cover losses.

7. PREVENTATIVE GUIDELINES

The criminals plan their criminal actions by taking safeguarding or defensive steps into consideration. This type of behaviour allows employees and law enforcement officers with increased awareness skills to take note of suspicious activities during the offenders' selection of a suitable target. The general public can also contribute to crime awareness and the limitation of crime opportunities by being alert and aware of their surroundings when approaching and while doing a transaction at an ATM or a bank.

It is essential to report suspicious activities observed at ATMs, banks and when CIT vehicles fulfil services at clients/retailers. Suspicious activities may include behaviour such as the observation by potential offenders of a CIT vehicle when they perform their services. The criminals either follow the armoured vehicle or stop in the surrounding area and observe the service delivered. Other suspicious activities include people in the bank who spend a long time observing activities in the bank and/or security measures. They tend to queue at the enquiry counter and ask bank related questions. The more time spent in the bank, the easier to observe routine activities of the staff and clients.

Several other actions are launched by different role-players, especially with regard to ATM attacks where explosives are used. A media campaign was launched by SABRIC during July 2008 to inform the community on this crime type. Note should be taken of these guidelines and safeguarding tips. (28) Whistle blowing on offenders or criminal activities should be done through the use of available telephone numbers or websites. In this regard several role-players developed a pamphlet to improve awareness among citizens with regard to explosives. (29)

8. CONCLUSION

Armed robbery in the banking industry is a concern for business, government, law enforcement and the general public. In order to curb this crime phenomenon it is important for all public and private partners to co-operate and act against the perpetrators. As it is now confirmed that the same offenders operate in the armed robbery arena, all industries should co-operate with one another and the police to identify the suspects and to build up a tracing record of their criminal activities.

Knowledge of the nature and extent of armed robberies, the modus operandi of offenders, crime scene characteristics and preventative measures, empower role-players with relevant information that can be operationalised.

REFERENCES

(1.) Pretoria News (Pretoria), 24 March 2008.

(2.) South African Banking Risk Information Centre, Violent Crime Office, Annual Report, Unpublished internal report, January 2008.

(3.) Ibid.

(4.) Ibid.

(5.) Turvey, B E, Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 3 rd edition, Elsevier, London, 2008, p 136.

(6.) Godwin, G M, Hunting Serial Predators, Jones and Bartlett, London, 2005, pp 71-88.

(7.) The Star (Johannesburg), 7 May 2008, p 2.

(8.) Leonard, D, "Character and motive in evidence law", Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, January 2001, pp 439-546.

(9.) Turvey, B E, op cit, p 275.

(10.) Ibid, p 299.

(11.) Maree, A, "Die modus operandi van die bankrower: 'n Kriminologiese introspeksie", Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Pretoria, Unisa, 1995, p 160.

(12.) Otu, S E, "Armed robbery in the Southeastern states of contemporary Nigeria: A Criminological analysis", Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Pretoria, Unisa, 2003, p 318.

(13.) SABRIC, "Analysis based on incidents captured on the data base", Midrand, Unpublished, 2008.

(14.) Maree, A, 1995, op cit, p 120.

(15.) Otu, S E, op cit, p 330.

(16.) Turvey, B E, op cit, p 204.

(17.) Maree, A, 1995, op cit, p 135.

(18.) Maree A, "Cash-in-transit robberies: An analysis of the offender's perspective", Security Focus, Vol 22, No 8, 2004, pp 10-14.

(19.) Maree, A, 1995, op cit, p 187.

(20.) The Star (Johannesburg), 7 May 2008.

(21.) Pretoria News (Pretoria), 26 August 2008; Pretoria News (Pretoria), 18 August 2008; and Sowetan (Soweto), 22 July 2008.

(22.) Maree, A, 2004, op cit; and Rossouw, J P, Walking Among Shadows, Unpublished SABRIC report, 2004.

(23.) http://blogs.dispatch.co.za/dispatchnow/2008/03/12/dramatic-cash-heistphotos/.

(24.) Maree, A, 1995, op cit, p113.

(25.) Ibid, pp 126-128.

(26.) Ibid, p128.

(27.) Conklin, J E, Criminology, 5th edition, Allyn and Bacon, London, 1995, pp 62-63.

(28.) The Star (Johannesburg), 15 July 2008.

(29.) Available at: http://www.saps.gov.org.za.

* Edited version of a paper delivered by Dr Alice Maree, Senior Manager Violent Crime Office, South African Banking Crime Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), at the Security 2008 Conference, presented by the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, at the University of Pretoria on 26 August 2008.